Linguistic Traditions of Kashmir

Essays in Memory of Pandit Dinanath Yaksh

Edited by
Mrinal Kaul Ashok Aklujkar

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The volume could connect the results of the work done in the past with the work to be done in the future by adding to knowledge in the present because of the articles it attracted from veteran as well as upcoming researchers. The reader will find here discussions bearing upon texts, as well as discussions bearing upon the authors of texts; discussions devoted to elucidating single passages, as well as discussions exploring instances of intertextuality; and discussions exclusively addressing individual grammars, as well as discussions engaging in the relation of one grammatical school with another.

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Foreword

Kapila Vatsyayan

THIS volume titled the *Linguistic Traditions of Kashmir* covers a subject which, as a single theme or collectivity, is probably unknown to Indology so far. Kashmir served as a cultural confluence for many centuries. It attracted scholars of diverse disciplines, religions and faiths. There was a vigorous intellectual tradition in many fields. Through the early medieval period from CE 800 to 1300 we witness a tremendous intellectual activity going on in Kashmir focusing especially on the Tāntric schools of Śaivism and on language. However, Kashmir's contributions to the study of language have not received as much collective attention as its Śaivism. Kashmirian schools of grammar were not non-Pāṇinian branches of the Sanskrit grammatical tradition. They survived as more extended versions of the Pāṇinian school in the form of Kātantra, Samanvaya and other traditions. The most recent trend of a bilingual approach towards traditional learning of grammar is also exhibited in the *Kaśmīraśabdāmṛta* of Īśvara Kaula, which adds a new dimension to the study of language.

Slowly and carefully I have gone through the pages of this volume. Its purpose is to study a unique complex of linguistic sciences and to suggest an outline for future research. The study of language is not confined to grammar alone. Thus some fundamental issues have been raised in the Introduction

of the volume which are pertinent not only to the field of grammar and linguistics but also to many other domains of knowledge in the Indian tradition. The "epistemology" presupposed in Kashmir's traditions is distinctive and is inter- or multi-disciplinary in its very structure. This allows for various interpretations, which fits the method and nature of "traditional commentaries."

I am truly impressed with the detailed research the contributors have done in putting forward various important theories in the form of subtle discussions, in talking about a range of grammarians, and in identifying and locating hitherto unpublished manuscripts relating to the broad field of "grammar". The last is in itself a painstaking and laborious task which few scholars would have the tenacity to undertake. The editors have assiduously gleaned the relevant details of the unpublished material and drawn attention to the corpus of material of linguistic nature in the appendices to the volume. This material should help in attracting the attention of scholars in the future. The descriptions and listing clearly prove that, despite the earlier efforts to identify and catalogue the unpublished material, there remains a monumental task of cataloguing as also of publication and critical evaluation of the available manuscript material. It is hoped that, either individually or institutionally, there will be a continuation of the editors' work. Identification, listing, cataloguing, annotating and publishing is time-consuming and not adequately supported. In the case of the Kashmiri manuscripts there is an urgent task to undertake.

The essays of the several distinguished scholars — some who have spent a lifetime studying grammar and linguistics such as George Cardona and Ashok Aklujkar, and others who have reflected for a long time on the interpenetration of

philosophic speculation, "word", sound, meaning and structure as Bettina Bäumer — have given the volume a multilayered texture. All these valuable contributions are commendable and welcome. I feel the volume is a contribution of great significance. In addition, the articles in it make the reader aware of the rich material that still demands careful study.

Finally, the single-pointed pursuit to unfold a field as a commemoration of the great but little-known Sanskrit scholar Paṇḍit Dinanatha Yaksa is a praiseworthy act. May the "spirit" which permeates Kashmirian consciousness at its highest and subtlest lead to the distilled wisdom of a knowledge system which will guide the students of Indian traditions despite the outer *mala* of contemporary Kashmir. I have no doubt that the volume will receive sustained attention of scholars and students in the field.

Preface

Ashok Aklujkar

THE present volume mainly consists of original research papers. It is not a collection or anthology in which specialists of the different aspects of Kashmirian use or study of language were invited to survey the aspects best known to them or to produce a state-of-the-art report about the scholarly study of the aspects. An effort, however, has been made in the Introduction to provide the general background that a reader may need in order to situate the papers in the proper intellectual and historical context. The Introduction further outlines the themes that could and should be particularly explored to lead us to a fuller and sharper understanding of Kashmir's analytical engagement with language. The appen-dices toward the end of the volume then complement the Introduction by presenting objective and practical information about the manuscripts, etc. of works in Sanskrit.

The volume could connect the results of the work done in the past with the work to be done in the future by adding to knowledge in the present because of the articles it attracted from veteran as well as upcoming researchers. No limit was put on what they could write about, as long as what they wrote about fell in the frame formed by language and Kashmir. They were also free to submit more than one article, as long as the themes of the articles concerned language and Kashmir.

Nor was any exclusive disciplinary focus chosen. As a result, the reader would find here discussions bearing upon texts, as well as discussions bearing upon the authors of texts; discussions devoted to elucidating single passages, as well as discussions exploring instances of intertextuality; and discussions exclusively addressing individual grammars, as well as discussions engaging in the relation of one grammatical school with another.

For the reason indicated above, the papers constituting the present volume have not been arranged in thematic sections. They follow the alphabetical order of the last names of authors. Further, the authors have been given freedom to follow their individual preferences in the matter of abbreviations, use of italic typeface, etc. without sacrificing the uniformity in margins, indentation, etc. that the aesthetics of printing requires.

I have come to be associated with the project of preparing this volume rather late. Originally, my participation was limited to making suggestions to Mrinal Kaul as to which of the researchers known to me were likely to be interested in contributing articles to his projected volume *Grammatical Traditions of Kashmir* (which later saw a replacement of *Grammatical* by *Linguistic*). As the correspondence progressed, my impression of Mrinal initially formed on 13th December 2001, gradually strengthened. I found in him (only through correspondence, for I have not yet met him in person or talked with him on the telephone) a rare young Indian who had an informed passion for Sanskrit and for studying Kashmir's intellectual heritage and who was capable of making unceasing systematic efforts to put his noble passion to work. At a time in which, unfortunately, very few intellectually gifted Indians turn to Sanskrit studies and even fewer have the vision and

the determination to seek out scholars who can help them in improving their qualifications, Mrinal came across as a precious young man deserving all encouragement and guidance. It also occurred to me that it was very important to ensure that Mrinal's inexperience did not cause failure or denting of a thoroughly justified and timely volume he had initiated. For these reasons, and also because I had a long-standing interest in the linguistic contributions of several Kashmirian authors, the volume project gradually attracted more and more comment from me. My involvement slowly (and recently) reached a point at which taking the step of listing my name as one of the editors began to make sense. The major credit for putting the project together, contacting potential contributors, handling negotiations with promising publishers, reading the proofs, etc., however, must go to Mrinal.

I do not support all of the conclusions arrived at in the articles printed on the subsequent pages. However, I am confident that they will make the readers think and lead to a chiselling of the issues. Such chiselling of the issues sharpens the mind as it brightens the prospects for a resolution of the issues. I hope that sister volumes offering such resolution will begin to appear before long.

It cannot be doubted that Kashmir's contribution, through grammar, poetics, philosophy, etc., to thought about language is extraordinary, in fact, unparalleled in other parts of India. Therefore, I would also like to express the hope that the present volume will make Kashmirians think about what it was in the past of their region that enabled their ancestors to reach the pinnacles of intellectual achievement.

Success in meeting the basic needs of most of the populace and maintenance of a generally civil and peaceful society are obviously a precondition in any part of the world if intellectual

advancement is to take place. Beyond this, not only tolerance but also a positive interest in preserving diversity seems necessary. Kashmir of the first millennium CE had followers of Vedism/Brāhmanism and Buddhism interacting with each other. It had nothing that exactly corresponded to "religion", but it had abundance of religiosity — a combination of spirituality and ethics. What it had that we could include in our modern concept of religion was also largely porous and non-exclusivistic in practice. Philosophical differences, even when strongly articulated and steadfastly held, did not commonly prevent acceptance of different practices for different purposes. There was no suppression of skepticism or of articulation of different view points, which were in some cases diagonally opposite of each other, as in the case of *ātma-vādins* and *anātma-vādins* or Tantra and non-Tantra ways of thinking. The politics did not consist of unimplementable promises of equality but rested on the robust realism that persons differ in their capabilities and inclinations; the best a society can do is to strive constantly toward fairness. There was near unanimity that if something must be accepted on faith, it was better to repose that faith in living spiritual persons than in some scriptures or claims of historicity and that if scriptures must be accepted, only those interpretations of them were to be accepted which did not militate against the basic values of compassion and honesty.

Contents

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WHEN I was working for this volume, it was my good fortune to have the support of Dr Kapila Vatsyayan (India International Center, New Delhi), Prof. George Cardona (University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia) and Prof. V.N. Jha (University of Pune, Pune). Especially because I was a newcomer to such projects, the prospect of receiving comments of such eminent and veteran scholars served as a great source of encouragement.

The list of those to whom my thanks are owed is long. It is also difficult to give full expression to my sentiments of appreciation and gratitude to all whom I may manage to mention. It is with this qualification that my thanks to all the paper contributors should be understood.

Some contributors have obliged me in various ways beyond the contribution of scholarly writing for the realization of this volume.

- The successful commencement of this project would never have been possible without the immense help of Prof. Ashok Aklujkar (University of British Columbia, Canada). This great scholar has acted like a most cherished friend and guided me at every step.
- Prof. George Cardona (University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia) too has kindly given much of his valuable time to guide me on specific issues.

- Prof. Johannes Bronkhorst (University of Lausanne, Switzerland) was kind enough to make many suggestions for the improvement of the volume.
- Prof. David Peter Lawrence (University of North Dakota, USA) drew my attention to a number of issues and possibilities of research in the area of application of Sanskrit grammar to explaining some philosophical issues in Trika Śaivism.
- Prof. Bettina Bäumer (Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla) supported me throughout this project and continued to be a guiding light as in the past.
- Prof. M.G. Dhadphale (Honorary Secretary, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune) was so kind as to discuss many topics with me in detail and clear many of my personal doubts.
- Prof. Raffaele Torella (University of Rome, Italy) was always a source of encouragement.
- Prof. M.M. Agrawal (University of Delhi, Delhi) discussed with me the contribution made by Kashmirian poeticians to grammatico-rhetorical literature.

Although they could not write for the volume, the following have lent a much appreciated helping hand at various stages in the successful completion of my project:

- Prof. Walter Slaje (University of Halle, Germany) removed many of my doubts and promptly supplied me with several of his important writings.
- Prof. Navjivan Rastogi (University of Lucknow, Lucknow) sharpened my understanding of issues in the study of Trika Śaivism.

- Prof. Saroja Bhate (University of Pune, Pune) directed my attention to Īśvara Kaula and his work on Kashmiri Grammar.
- Prof. Karunasindhu Das (Rabindra Bharati University, Kolkata) was kind enough to discuss with me some issues in the Kashmirian school of Kātantra.
- Dr André Padoux introduced me to Dr Pascale Haag who in turn introduced me to Dr Vincenzo Vergiani.
- Dr Vincenzo Vergiani (University of Cambridge) introduced me to Estella Del Bon.
- Prof. Madhav Deshpande (University of Michigan, USA) was always kind enough to reply to my queries.
- Prof. Arlo Griffiths (Leiden University, Holland) cleared many of my doubts about the Kashmirian Vedic corpus.
- My teacher Prof. Nilkanth Gurtu (University of Kashmir, Srinagar) was always ready with suggestions, comments and advice.
- My tutors Dr Harsh Kumar and Dr A.D. Mathur (St. Stephen's College, Delhi), who have always been a source of inspiration to me, performed a similar role in the completion of what I had started.
- My teacher Prof. Alexis Sanderson (Oxford) supplied me with some of his highly informative unpublished articles.
- Prof. M.L. Kukiloo, Dr T.N. Ganjoo and Dr B.N. Kalla answered the many questioned I had regarding the tradition of Sanskrit grammar in Kashmir.
- Prof. N.B. Patil has been a good friend, advisor and motivator.

The untimely passing away of my father created a great impediment for me, as, in his death, I lost a very dear friend, advisor and associate. I still feel the pain of his absence. My mother and sister have crutched me up in all vicissitudes.

My friend Vineesh Gupta was kind enough to check my English. I would also like to thank Karen Harris (Harvard) and Hema Patankar (MIRI, California). I have a good word for all my friends, including Anurag Sinha, Muhammad Amir Sarosh, Kunal Kumar, Abhinav Rawat, Parthasarathi Banerjee, Jogendro, Anubhav Jain, Amit Sharma, Prachi Singh, Sumeer Razdan, Andaleeb Shadan, Pranav Prakash, Mayank Goyal, Peter Szanto, Csaba Kiss, Yoichi Iwasaki, Nina Mirnig, and Bihani Sarkar.

I have a special word of thanks for Mr Rabinder Kaul (Chicago) and Mr Kapil Kaul (Linz) who sponsored our project.

It has been a very pleasant experience to work with Mr Susheel K. Mittal of D.K. Printworld. I am grateful to him for taking up this publication. I am yet to see a highly professional team like his. He has warmly co-operated with my contributors and me.

Mrinal Kaul

Key to Transliteration

VOWELS

अ *a*	आ *ā*	इ *i*	ई *ī*	उ *u*	ऊ *ū*	ऋ *ṛ*	ॠ *ṝ*[1]
(Roman)	(palm)	(it)	(police)	(put)	(rule)	(rig)	
ऌ *ḷ*	ॡ *ḹ*[1]	ए *e*	ऐ *ai*	ओ *o*	औ *au*		
(able)		(there)	(aisle)	(no)	(loud)		

CONSONANTS

Guttural	क *ka*	ख *kha*[2]	ग *ga*	घ *gha*[2]	ङ *ṅa*
	(skate)	(blockhead)	(gate)	(ghost)	(sing)
Palatal	च *ca*	छ *cha*[2]	ज *ja*	झ *jha*[2]	ञ *ña*
	(chunk)	(catch him)	(john)	(hedgehog)	(bunch)
Cerebral	ट *ṭa*	ठ *ṭha*[2]	ड *ḍa*	ढ *ḍha*[2]	ण *ṇa*
	(start)	(anthill)	(dart)	(godhead)	(under)
Dental	त *ta*	थ *tha*[2]	द *da*	ध *dha*[2]	न *na*
	(path)	(thunder)	(that)	(this)	(numb)
Labial	प *pa*	फ *pha*[2]	ब *ba*	भ *bha*[2]	म *ma*
	(spin)	(philosophy)	(bin)	(abhor)	(much)
Semi-	य *ya*	र *ra*	ल *la*[3]	व *va*[4]	
vowels	(young)	(drama)	(luck)	(vile)	
Sibilants	श *śa*[5]	ष *ṣa*[5]	स *sa*	ह *ha*	
	(shove)	(bushel)	(so)	(hum)	

अं (ं) *ṁ anusvāra* is a nasal off-glide that immediately follows the pronunciation of a vowel as in *saṁskṛti.*

अः *visarga = ḥ* consists in abrupt release of breath after a vowel as in *prātaḥ.*

ऽ *Avagraha* shows non-pronunciation, that is, deletion of "a" after "e" or "o" as in *ime 'vasthitāḥ*. In Vedic Sanskrit, it can also show word division.


1 Longer form of the preceding vowel.

2 Aspirated forms of the preceding consonants. The compound words given as examples should be pronounced without a syllabic break at the underlined places. "tha" and "pha" should not be pronounced as fricatives.

3 retroflexed and written as "ḻ *ḻa*" in certain phonetic contexts.

4 Pronounced like "w," without aspiration.

5 "śa" is palatal; "ṣa" cerebral or retroflex.



Pandit Dinanatha Yaksa
(1921–2004)

Life Sketch of Paṇḍit Dinanatha Yaksa

Mrinal Kaul

Early Life and Education

PANDIT Dinanatha Yaksa (Dīnānātha Yakṣa, दीनानाथ यक्ष, DY) was born on 12 June, 1921 in Srinagar (Kashmir) to Paṇḍit Bodha Kāk and Śrīmatī Rādhāmāl. He was later adopted by Paṇḍit Siddha Bhaṭṭa and Śrīmatī Siddhalakṣmī, who became his formal parents. As a young boy, DY received his first education from Bage Dilawar Khan in Srinagar. Later he continued his education in a traditional Sanskrit school run by Paṇḍit Rāma Joo Kukilū and his son Paṇḍit Raghunātha Kukilū. He learnt some basic principles of *karma-kāṇḍa* (ritual worship) and Sanskrit grammar from both of them. Young DY polished his knowledge of Sanskrit language and grammar as he studied some advanced texts of Sanskrit grammatical tradition with Paṇḍit Paraśurāma Śāstrī and Paṇḍit Kākārāma Śāstrī of the then existing traditional Sanskrit schools in Jammu. The legendary Kashmirian figure in the *karma-kāṇḍa* and *jyotiṣa* — Paṇḍit Keśava Bhaṭṭa Jyotiṣī taught him astronomy and astrology.

At the young age of fifteen, DY completed his Prājña degree (Proficiency in Sanskrit Language and Literature) from the University of Punjab, Lahore, in 1936. Thereafter he completed his Śāstrī degree from the same university. While pursuing the Śāstrī degree, he learnt *Nyāya-śāstra* (Logic) and *Kāvya-śāstra* (Poetics) from Paṇḍit Ānanda Kāk and Paṇḍit

Nātharāma Śāstrī. He also earned a Prabhākara (Honours in Hindi language and literature) degree from the University of Jammu and Kashmir in the year 1957. He passed his intermediate examination in English in 1960 from the same University.

His Career and Scholarship

In 1945, DY joined the Jammu and Kashmir Research Department (JKRD) in Srinagar as a copyist and retired from the same department as the Head-Paṇḍit in 1976. In JKRD, he was paid very little but he was indubitably happy with the position, for it allowed him to work in a field that interested him. Mention should be made of the fact that when he joined the JKRD it had a collection of some 213 manuscripts[1] and he raised this collection to almost 5000 manuscripts. These manuscripts (excepting the ones mentioned in fn 1) are preserved in the Sanskrit Manuscript Section of the JKRD Library, which is now located in the Allama Iqbal Library of the University of Kashmir in Srinagar. In addition to expanding the library, he established a section of the Kashmir School of Art and Paintings, which comprises some 500 rare Kashmiri paintings and miniatures. During his tenure in JKRD, he edited a number of texts, but unfortunately most of them were not published. Since almost all of his book and manuscript collection has probably been destroyed, it is nearly impossible to get hold of his writings. Among the texts he edited, the major ones are:

1. After following a proper procedure, these 213 manuscripts were taken from the Sanskrit Manuscripts' Library of JKRD to New Delhi for displaying in an exhibition and they were never returned to JKRD. Now these manuscripts are in the safe custody of the National Archives in New Delhi.

1. ***Prabhāvatīpradyumna* (A Sanskrit play by Rāmakṛṣṇa Sūri)**: This text was planned to be published in the *Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies*, and DY had assiduously prepared a press copy. A thousand copies of it were printed but were never allowed to be bound and circulated by the then director of JKRD. As I could learn from DY himself, the authorities of JKRD were not supporting the publication of Sanskrit books anymore. The JKRD had already produced a good number of Śaiva texts, and the authorities were of the opinion that now the Sanskrit *paṇḍit*s of JKRD should rest for some time and that it was time for Persian and Arabic texts to be published. In the summer of 2005, I could see some bundles of printed pages of the *Prabhāvatīpradyumna* in the store room of JKRD in Srinagar. But it seemed extremely difficult to put together the complete work. I feel sad to have to inform scholars that perhaps the only manuscript of the above-mentioned text was in the personal collection of DY, which, as far as I can verify at present, has been destroyed by the religious fanatics in the Kashmir valley.
2. ***Śivasūtravivaraṇa* of Sukhānanda Zādū:** A press copy of this text was also prepared by DY, but he was not encouraged to get it printed by the JKRD. He had prepared the edition of this text after evaluating several manuscripts in his personal collection. To my knowledge there is now only a single manuscript preserved in JKRD. (Acc. no. 219, *Śivasūtravivaraṇa* of Sukhānanda in Devanāgarī, 86 folios, Kashmiri paper.)
3. ***Cittapradīpa* of Vāsudeva (A Śaiva-cum-Vedāntic work) with an exhaustive auto-commentary:** DY was

ready with a press copy of the critically edited text along with an introduction. If DY's personal collection is actually destroyed then perhaps this text survives only in a single manuscript kept in the JKRD. (Acc. no. 214, *Cittapradīpa* of Vāsudeva in Śāradā characters, 146 folios.)

4. ***Tarkakutūhala* (*Mandāramañjarī*) of Viśveśvara Sūri):** I have been unsuccessful in procuring any information about this text. I have not come across any manuscript of it. Perhaps the only manuscript was in the personal collection of DY. And now even the edition prepared by him has probably been lost with the destruction of his personal collection.

5. ***Laghustava* and *Carcastava* (*Pañcastavī*, vol. I) with the commentary of Paṇḍit Harabhaṭṭa Śāstrī (*Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies*, 90 (1963)**. This text is published by the JKRD and is available for sale from its office in Srinagar.

6. ***Sakalajananīstava (Pañcastavī*, vol. III) with a recent commentary of Paṇḍit Harabhaṭṭa Śāstrī (*Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies*, 87 (1960)**: The text of *Pañcastavī* is complete in five chapters. Paṇḍit Harabhaṭṭa Śāstrī wrote a learned commentary called *Harabhaṭṭī* on it. It was ably edited by DY and published in KSTS in two volumes which covered three chapters. The remaining two chapters (*Ghaṭastava* and *Ambhas-stava*) were to be published as the second volume. Again — as in the case of title 2, this second volume of the text was printed in one thousand copies but never bound and the bundles of the printed pages were dumped in the store room of the JKRD. Luckily, I have been able to procure a photocopy of the complete set

of printed pages that someone else had. I plan to publish all the five chapters in one volume.

7. ***Hariharastotra* of Vāsudeva (*Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies*, 89) (1962):** This book also contains *Svātmadevastotra* and *Brāhmī Vidyā*.

8. ***Svātantryadīpikā* of Manasārāma Monga**: Paṇḍit Manasārāma Monga was a learned Śaiva paṇḍit of his time in Kashmir and must have lived some time in the middle of the nineteenth century. He was the teacher of Svāmī Rāma Jī (1852-1915) the grand master of Svāmī Lakṣman Joo (1907-1991). Paṇḍit Manasārāma Monga composed this text on the Trika Śaiva system of Kashmir. I have with me a transcript made by DY. But I think that this small text still needs to be edited using modern critical methodology.

9. ***Śivasūtravimarśinī* of Kṣemarāja:** After the first edition of the *Śivasūtravimarśinī* of Kṣemarāja (published in CE 1911 as vol. I of the *Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies*, edited by J.C. Chatterji, with an introduction in English) was out of stock, the JKRD decided to produce a second edition. DY revised the earlier edition. The revised edition was published but without any acknowledgement of his role as the editor. This edition contains neither a copyright page nor an introduction and starts randomly with the text.

10. ***Bhāvacūḍāmaṇi* of Vidyākaṇṭha (A Tāntric Work with Literary Flavour):** DY had prepared a complete press copy of the *Bhāvacūḍāmaṇi* of Vidyākaṇṭha, using several manuscripts. This text, as many others, remained unpublished. A manuscript of it exists in the Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute in Jammu. (Acc. No. 5291, paper, Kashmiri Devanāgarī.)

11. ***Durbhikṣatārodayāstam* of Īśvara Kaula (A History of the Famine that Broke out in Kashmir in Vikramī Saṁvat 1932 = CE 1875):** DY had prepared a critical edition of this work which is probably lost in the destruction of his library. A manuscript of this text exists in JKRD. (Acc. no. 854, Devanāgarī, Paper, 29 folios.)

Besides the above, DY co-edited some research monographs and translated some texts. He also wrote a number of research articles in Sanskrit, Hindi, Kashmiri and English. He compiled a catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts present in the JKRD for the first time.[2]

After he retired from JKRD, DY was associated with the Center for Central Asian Studies in the University of Kashmir as a research associate for five years. Thereafter he served as a research associate in the Archaeological Survey of India at its office in Srinagar for a year. The Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan in New Delhi (a deemed Sanskrit university), for which he worked hard for the next four years, awarded him a fellowship of Śāstracūḍāmaṇi (fellowship reserved for senior scholars). For many years he worked as the Cūḍāmaṇi Adhyāpaka for

2. This catalogue was compiled by DY in the year 1989 and the JKRD used to sell cyclostyled copies of it for some years. But at present no copies are sold. It lists the number of the available Sanskrit manuscripts as 4838. Later, Dr B.K. Dembi published a version of it under the title "*Hand list of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Sanskrit Manuscripts Library of Research and Publication Department, Centre for Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir, Srinagar* (1989), vol. I, From A-K". Dembi's hand list covers the listing of manuscripts only up to serial number 2035 and is thus incomplete. A second volume carrying it to completion is awaited.

the project on the *Kāśmīraśaivadarśanabṛhatkoṣa*[3] that was sponsored by the Government of India.

In the year 1990, like all other Kashmiri paṇḍits who left the Kashmir valley because of the terror created by fanatics and religious extremists, DY fled to save his life, leaving behind his rich and invaluable private library, consisting of almost 9000 printed volumes and nearly 500 Sanskrit manuscripts. In the manuscript collection, about 300 contained precious original Sanskrit texts and commentaries. I hear from some private sources that DY's library was burnt to ashes. But I also hear that his collection was looted by some fanatics and is now in the possession of some persons in the valley.

His Specialization, Style and Genius

DY's specialization was in the Pāṇinian and other schools of Sanskrit grammar. His thorough knowledge of Kashmir's history, geography, culture, and philosophy was his additional achievement. He used to quote effortlessly from the *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, the *Nīlamata Purāṇa*, the *Mahābhāṣya*, the *Siddhānta-Kaumudī* and several other Sanskrit texts. He had completely read almost all the texts published in the *Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies* which mainly contained Kashmirian Śaivite texts.

DY's style in his Sanskrit writings matched greatly with that of the classical Sanskrit writers like Bāṇabhaṭṭa, Śrīharṣa and Bhavabhūti. His in-depth understanding of Sanskrit grammar made his writings profound. He used a difficult form of the language, consisting of long compounds and

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3. *Kāśmīra-Śaiva-Darśana-Bṛhat-Kośa* (2006) in two vols., Gen. ed. Prof. Balajinnātha Paṇḍita, published from the Ranbir Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Jammu (J&K).

grammatical puns. He used to trick even veteran grammarians with his verbal jugglery.

At first, DY had only elementary formal education in the English language and its literature. But, as he said to me once, he read a Sanskrit translation of Macbeth in a library and was deeply impressed by Shakespeare. He was so attracted by English literature that he bought copies of some dramas of Shakespeare translated into Sanskrit. Thereafter he got Shakespeare's works in English and tried to understand them in their original language. Later, he keenly studied the literal English translations of Sanskrit literary works by Moreshwar Ramchandra Kale and examined them with the help of the original texts and commentaries. Thus, he tried to improve his English mainly through Sanskrit. Later, he was able to write his papers in lucid and chaste English. Such was his passion for learning.

Although he was brought up as an orthodox traditional paṇḍit, he had an amazingly realistic and modern scientific approach towards traditional ways of thinking. He used to analyse and appreciate all branches of knowledge quite methodically. His sense of logic and literary criticism and his acceptance of the historical approach enabled him to penetrate deep into any subject he chose.

His Association with Research Students

DY was always a major centre of attraction for researchers in Kashmir. No research thesis on any subject related to Kashmir was considered to have gained authenticity unless it gained his approval. He guided, helped or supported dozens of research scholars from India and abroad. When Professor Raffaele Torella (Chair of Sanskrit, University of Rome "La Sapieza") was researching in Kashmir he was enthusiastically

assisted by DY, and Professor Torella gratefully recognizes his help. Professor Ranerio Gnoli, Professor Torella's teacher, had a long association with DY. They were very good friends. Professor Navjivan Rastogi (Retd. Professor of Sanskrit, University of Lucknow) has also duly acknowledged DY's help and guidance in his doctoral dissertation on the Kashmirian Krama System. Professor Constantina Rhodes Bailly (Professor of Religious Studies, Eckerd College, St. Petersburg, Florida) still cherishes DY's memory.

Honour Received

Recognizing his service to the cause of Sanskrit learning, the President of India awarded a Certificate of Honour to DY in the year 2003. He was undoubtedly a towering figure of traditional Sanskrit learning in Kashmir. He was also humble and loving by nature. Sincerity, humility, gentle nature and great calibre were unmistakable marks of his personality.

The twentieth century saw a sudden halt of the tradition of Sanskrit learning in Kashmir. In the present Sanskrit legacy of Kashmir, I can name only two traditional luminaries comparable to DY, one being Paṇḍit Balajinnātha Paṇḍita[4] and another, his pupil Paṇḍit Nīlakaṇṭha Gurtū. DY was a similarly impressive paṇḍit who had the credit of many distinctive achievements. With his sad demise on 4 October, 2004, a whole complex of the Kashmirian legacy of Sanskrit Śāstric systems tragically came to an end.

4. Since I wrote this piece Paṇḍit Balajinnātha Pandita passed away on September 7, 2007.

Introduction

Mrinal Kaul

BEFORE coming to the introduction proper I should apologize to the world of linguists and Sanskrit grammarians and confess that I am not a linguist or grammarian. It is only because of my strong wish to ensure that language studies do not die out in Kashmir that I have taken upon myself the compiling and editing of this volume. I am not sufficiently competent in Sanskrit linguistics and am aware that I have no right to work on a topic to which I may not be able to do justice. It is only because I had the full support of Professors Ashok Aklujkar and George Cardona that I have embarked upon this venture. After I pressed very hard, the former accepted to be a co-editor of this volume. I would not be surprised if some scholars wonder at his being the co-editor and not the editor. Before I invited him to be the editor of the volume he was guiding me as a member of the board of advisors for this volume. Even though I had started the project, I realized before long that I would need the help of a scholar of language-based sciences in editing the volume. Professor Aklujkar was his polite self in accepting the "co-editorship" and not the "editorship". I feel guilty of immodesty in having his name juxtaposed with mine, but I have no other choice in the matter.

How I Thought of Putting This Volume Together

The thought of initiating the volume project occurred to me when Pandit Dinanath Yaksa (Paṇḍit Dīnānātha Yakṣa), a doyen in the field of Sanskrit grammatical exegesis in Kashmir, passed away suddenly on 4th October, 2004. I strongly felt that in his passing away the tradition of grammatical studies in Kashmir had come to a sudden halt. I planned then to bring out a volume focusing on the traditions of language study in Kashmir and dedicate it to the memory of Pandit Dinanatha Yaksa. Before starting the work on my plan, I was quite ignorant about what actually constituted the grammatical tradition of Kashmir and what the planned volume should comprise. All I knew were the words of Dinanatha Yaksa; "Till very recently we were mostly taught Kātantra grammar in the traditional Sanskrit schools of Srinagar, and Pāṇini was not given much importance. Only a few teachers taught the *Laghu-(vaiyākaraṇa)-siddhāntakaumudī* or *Vaiyākaraṇa-siddhāntakaumudī*." This statement proved to be a *mantra* for me.

I started a search and, in the course of it, came across an impressive body of literature on language and grammar produced in Kashmir. My principal sources were the works of Kashinath Vasudev Abhyankar, Shripad Krishna Belvalkar, Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṁsaka, Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja (the last two are to be understood together). In addition, I studied Georg Bühler's *Kashmir Report* carefully. It throws much light on what paṇḍits usually studied in the latter half of the nineteenth century in Kashmir. The first hand information gleaned by Bühler from the paṇḍits of his time in Kashmir speaks volumes about the then living tradition in Kashmir. The information is indirectly confirmed to some extent by his acquisition of manuscripts. I was wonderstruck

when I discovered that there is still much literature either understudied or unpublished. As a consequence, I also listed some topics that might interest the scholars of posterity.

Initially, I thought that my main objective should be to highlight all the major grammarians of Kashmir and the works they produced. The title chosen for the volume, therefore, was "Grammatical Traditions of Kashmir." I reasoned that such a volume would be very useful to future students and researchers as a work with which they could start their study of attention paid to the grammatical study of language in Kashmir. As I contacted the veterans of the field and received their contributions, however, I realized that a greater service to Kashmir studies, Sanskrit studies and Indology, and hence a more fitting tribute to the late Pandit Dinanatha Yaksa, would result from combining original research papers with a surveying introduction and informative appendices contributed by me. The title of the volume was, then, accordingly changed to reflect its broader scope.

Focus and Arrangement of the Volume

As the contributing scholars were given full freedom to choose their themes as long as the themes fell in the frame formed by "Kashmir" and "grammar" (later extended to "linguistics," that is, understood as any systematic engagement with the phenomenon of language), the present volume does not have a single disciplinary focus. It includes the writings of scholars interested in grammar per se, in literary aesthetics and in philosophy concerned with language and grammar. The interest in grammar represented here is both theoretical or philosophical and historical, touching upon individual grammarians and grammatical works.

As is well known, Sanskrit was the language of literary and scholarly activities in ancient and medieval India. No scholar, reputed or not, could ever ignore Sanskrit grammar. Further, scholars followed various schools of Sanskrit grammar, primarily divisible into Pāṇinian and non-Pāṇinian. Almost all of the Kashmirian scholars mentioned in this volume were either specialists of grammar proper or belonged to other disciplines exploring language. (Those who were specialists of grammar were involved with grammar from a pedagogical as well as theoretical, disciplinary or philosophical point of view.) Thus we have Patañjali, Vāmana-Jayāditya, Kṣīrasvāmin, Kaiyaṭa and Helārāja, who belonged to the former category; and Udbhaṭa, Mukulabhaṭṭa, Jayantabhaṭṭa, Uvaṭa, Utpaladeva, Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa, who should be placed in the latter category. Those in the second category do not have any grammatical works to their credit (as far as we know at present), but the discussions they hold on grammar and language here and there in their works are of vital importance to the Sanskritic tradition (see, for example, the papers of M.M. Agarwal, Bettina Bäumer, V.N. Jha, David Peter Lawrence, C. Rajendran and Raffaele Torella). On the other hand, grammar in the conventional or narrow sense of the word is the primary concern of the works of Patañjali and others in the first category. A philological-historical discussion of the issues associated with the works can be found, for example, in the papers of Ashok Aklujkar, Johannes Bronkhorst, George Cardona, M.G. Dhadphale, S.D. Joshi, Malhar Kulkarni, Vincenzo Vergiani and P. Visalakshy.

I am aware that the nativity of a few thinkers of language assumed to be Kashmirian in this volume is open to doubt or has been a subject of scholarly disagreement. The position I have taken in his respect is the same as historians of pre-

modern India are frequently forced to take. I have gone by scholarly consensus or the collective weight of evidence and declined to hold up some promising discussion simply because a thinker's birth in Kashmir has not been proved. In an isolated case or two, I have considered it a sufficient ground for a thinker's inclusion if his influence on Kashmir is quite evident.

Just as one could object to the inclusion of a few authors, one could find fault with the non-inclusion of some others. For example, I know by hearsay that a certain Kashmirian named Śyām Bhaṭṭa composed the first grammar of the Tibetan language. It is plausible that the ancient contacts between Kashmir and Tibet gave birth to some discussions on language and grammar. Since Persian was the court language in Kashmir for several centuries and the Kashmirian paṇḍits were equally good in both Sanskrit and Persian, there could certainly have been some discussions going on about the Persian language as well. Furthermore, the poet and lexicographer Maṅkhaka tells us of a great literary conference held in Srinagar in about 1140 CE.[1] He mentions at least two grammarians who participated in the conference; Nāga (Sarga 25, verse 64) and Janakarāja (Sarga 25, verse 93).[2] We have not been able to locate any works on grammar by these scholars though. The oldest Kashmirian poet whose work has come down to us is Bhaṭṭa Bhūmaka (650-700 CE), who wrote *Arjunarāvaṇīya* or *Rāvaṇārjunīya* (cf. YM vol. II, 1984: 477). This work, in some 1500 verses, is written on the pattern of the *Bhaṭṭikāvya*. The work is a *mahākāvya* but is primarily composed to illustrate the Pāṇinian rules of grammar. However, as indicated above, the present volume is not intended to be a complete

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1. See *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita* pp. 338 ff. Cf. Bühler (1877: 50).
2. See *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita* pp. 346-51.

compendium on or a survey of Kashmir's engagement with the study of language.

Being aware of the importance of the theme of this volume and the relevance of the publications concerned, we have reproduced the following two papers: (a) Bettina Bäumer, from *Indian Linguistics*, Journal of the Linguistic Society of India, vol. 67, no. 1-4, October 2006. pp. 19-27. (b) David Peter Lawrence, from *Philosophy East & West*, vol. 48, no. 4, October 1998, pp. 592-622.

All the papers in the volume are arranged by the alphabetical order of the last or family names of the contributors. A chronological sequence of the texts or authors dealt with has not been followed.

An Overview of Language Studies in Kashmir

The Pāṇinian tradition of Sanskrit grammar seems to have been dominant in the valley of Kashmir from the very beginning. Subsequently, Patañjali might have had a strong influence on the local grammatical tradition. Kashmir has played a key-role in the preservation of the commentarial tradition[3] associated with the *Mahābhāṣya* — a tradition which, in due time, was to become the only authoritative tradition in interpreting Pāṇini's grammar for almost all the Pāṇinians (For a deeper study of Patañjali and his Mahābhāṣya, see the three articles by Ashok Aklujkar in this volume). A distinctive feature of the grammatical studies in Kashmir was the propagation of the Kātantra School, a post-Pāṇinian system of Sanskrit grammar, which, though founded outside Kashmir, had many

3. The Kashmirian Kaiyaṭa wrote a famous commentary called Pradīpa on Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*. Kaiyaṭa's student named Udoyatakara is supposed to have written some work on Sanskrit grammar which is lost to us. Cf. YM vol. I (1984: 419).

adherents in the valley. It entered Kashmir sometime before the tenth century CE. Alberuni[4] mentions that Ugrabhūti's book, belonging to the Kātantra tradition, was in use in Kashmir in the tenth century, although a remark of Georg Bühler would conflict with such an assertion.[5] We should stick to Alberuni's information which is more plausible than Bühler's. Alberuni

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4. Cf. Sachau (1910: 135) "I have been told that the last mentioned author was the teacher and instructor of Shāh Ānandapāla, the son of Jayapāla, who ruled in our times. After having composed the book he sent it to Kashmīr, but the people there did not adopt it, being in such things haughtily conservative. Now he complained of this to the Shāh, and the Shāh, in accordance with the duty of a pupil towards his master, promised him to make him attain his work. So he gave orders to send 200,000 *dirham* and presents of a similar value to Kashmīr, to be distributed among those who studied the book of his master. The consequence was that they all rushed upon the book, and would not copy any other grammar but this one, showing themselves in the baseness of their avarice. The book became the fashion and highly prized."

5. Georg Bühler (1877: 74) in his Kashmir Report mentions "I do not think that anyone of the Kashmrian commentators on the Kātantra is older than the thirteenth Century, though I have only circumstantial proofs for this assertion. But in the Kashmirian poems of the eleventh and twelfth centuries the paṇḍits never boast of, or are praised for, their proficiency in the Kātantra, Bilhaṇa, Maṅkha, Alamkāra, and others always represent themselves, or are represented, as students of Pāṇini's grammar and of the *Bhāṣya*. It seems to me, therefore, that the Kātantra cannot have enjoyed in those times that great popularity which it now has in Kashmir, and that it must have come later into so very general use, when Kashmirian scholarship declined. On the other hand, the *Śiṣyasaṁhitānyāsa* is mentioned by the Tibetan Pandit Tārānātha." But Bühler is not to be blamed for this assertion, since the translation of Alberuni's work appeared in 1910 CE and could not have been accessible to Bühler, who wrote his report in 1877 CE.

tells us that Ugrabhūti,[6] the author of *Śiṣyahitānyāsa*[7] was the teacher of King Ānandapāla,[8] a son of King Jayapāla. After being introduced in Kashmir, the Kātantra must have taken time for the native Sanskrit writers to turn their attention to it, but later it was almost ubiquitous in Bengal and Kashmir.[9] The oldest text of the former survives in the form of Durga's Vṛtti and of the latter in the shape of Ugrabhūti's Vṛtti and Nyāsa.[10] Perhaps, the study of Kātantra was introduced in

6. Misra (1991:24) has attempted a precise account of Ugrabhūti's life and time.

7. Since this text was never published before and was not available to the scholars, there was much misinformation being transmitted. With the publication of *Śiṣyahitānyāsa* by Misra (1991), I think all doubts have been cleared. Misra (1991:7) has corrected A.B.Keith p. 43, Vācaspati Gairolā p. 656, Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṁsaka I. p. 411 and Bhagavaddatta p. 217.

8. Bamzai (1962:137) mentions Ānandapāla as the ruler of a place called Udbhāndapura (modern Und in North Western Frontier Province). The present NWFR was a part of ancient Kashmir.

9. Cf. Belvalkar (1915:81ff), Saini (1999:15ff). Another question that should be raised here is why Kātantra remained confined only to these regions. Scharfe (1977:187) suggests a reason: "Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's school coincided with the Mahratta power which eclipsed the traditional patronage of several grammars, this renaissance swept those schools from the main part of India into residual pockets in Bengal and Kashmir etc." But this argument does not seem convincing at all, since we learn of the traces of the Kātantra in Kashmir as early as 1000 CE.

10. Misra attributes two works to Ugrabhūti viz. *Śiṣyahitā vṛtti* and *Śiṣyālokanyāsa*. He has produced an edition of the latter. He mentions one more work by Ugrabhūti which is no longer available to us. Cf. Misra (1991:24): "According to a Tibetan scholar Ugrabhūti composed another work on Kalāpa grammar in 5000 verses (Ref. Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal pp. 84-85: 1911), but there is no mention of this work anywhere else." It seems that Misra is unaware of the information Verhagen →

Kashmir with the latter work itself.[11] We should also note the differences in the two recensions to understand the nature of Kashmirian grammatical traditions better. Misra (1991:37) gives details of three kinds of divisions in the chapters of the Kātantra vyākaraṇa; 1. as suggested by Jogarāja, 2. as given by Ugrabhūti, and 3. as mentioned by Durgasiṁha. The *prakaraṇa*s are the same everywhere, but the *pāda*s in the Bengali recension lack *Nipāta, Strī* and *Uṇādi* sections. The Kashmirian school also includes some *sūtra*s supporting Vedic usage, and there is certainly the difference in the number of the *sūtra*s. Misra (1991:19) suggests good reasons for why the development of the Kashmirian school of Kātantra declined in modern times.[12]

→ (1994:67-70) provides. Verhagen informs us that a Tibetan translation of the *Kalāpavyākaraṇasūtra-vṛttiśiṣyahitā*(*-nāma*) [Tib: *luṅ-ston-pa-ka-lā-pa'i-mdo'ī-'grel-pa-slob-ma-la-phan-pa*(*-zes-bya-ba*)] of Ugrabhūti [Tib: Drag-'byor(-śes-rab)/Grags-'byor(-śes-rab)] exists. Verhagen also mentions a commentary titled *Kalāpa-laghuvṛtti-śiṣyahitā(-nāma)* (Tib: *Ka-lā-pa'i-'grel-pa-ñuṅ-ṅu-las-slob-ma-la-pha-pa(-zes-bya-ba)* by Tārānātha (Tib: *Sgrol-ba'i-dbaṅ-phyug*) written on Ugrabhūti's *Kalāpavyākaraṇasūtravṛttiśiṣyahitā*, which he mentions as not available to us. It seems Misra is perhaps referring to the latter work.

11. But the existence of a commentary on the Kashmirian recension of Kātantra mentioned in EIP (1990:465) raises some questions. This commentary is named *Kumāralabdha* or *Kumāralāta* and is said to have belonged to the second or third century. The fragments of this work are known to have been published in H. Lüders, *Kātantra und Kaumāralāta*. SBAW 25, Berlin, 1930, pp. 483-532.

12. I support Misra's view because it is a fact that the Śāradā Script, which was in vogue in Kashmir for many centuries never reached a printing press. So, for printing a certain text, its manuscript first had to be transcribed from Śāradā to Devanāgarī. Though the editors of the *Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies* published as →

That after the introduction of Ugrabhūti's *Nyāsa*[13] in Kashmir the region took to a deep study of Kātantra[14] system of grammar is evident from a series of Kashmirian commentaries which followed on *Kātantra-sūtras*. We come across Chuchuka Bhaṭṭa's commentary called *Laghuvṛtti* on the *Kātantra-sūtras*.[15] Jagaddhara Bhaṭṭa[16] (1350 CE) wrote a gloss

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→ many as ninety volumes, of which the majority was based on Śāradā manuscripts, they never seem to have been interested in taking up an unpublished text of grammar for publication. On the other hand, the Bengal recensions of Kātantra could always be reproduced easily because of the availability of presses capable of printing in the Bengali script.

13. Cf. EIP (1990:476), Ugrabhūti (N.Cat. 3.317)

14. Belvalkar (1915:91) concludes that Kashmirian pandits became familiar with the *Kātantra-vṛtti* of Durgasiṁha much later.

15. Misra (1991) attributes both the *Vṛtti* and *Nyāsa* to Ugrabhūti. But I have only come across manuscripts of the *Laghuvṛtti* or *Vṛtti* or *Chuchukavṛtti* attributed to Chuchukabhaṭṭa and of Nyāsa attributed to Ugrabhūti. I have not come across any manuscript of a *Vṛtti* attributed to Ugrabhūti. Given this experience, Misra (1991) must be said either to have mistaken Chuchukabhaṭṭa's *Laghuvṛtti* for Ugrabhūti's *Vṛtti* or to have come across a manuscript of the *Vṛtti* of Ugrabhūti of which I am unaware. A list of the available manuscripts of both the texts is appended towards the end of this volume. Also, see Verhagen (2001:172) who mentions Chichū Bhaṭṭa as Rācchatra. Further, Verhagen (2001:184) mentions in his note 788 that accretion of feminine section and particles (in *sandhi* chapter) had taken place before the seventh century in Kashmir. This statement seems unsupportable to me, since we do not have evidence to the effect that the Kātantra system was in vogue in Kashmir in the seventh century or before. Present evidence suggests that it was introduced some time around the tenth century.

16. See also EIP (1991:484) for more details on Jagaddhara Bhaṭṭa and his works along with the details of manuscripts.

on the *Kātantra-sūtras* called *Kātantrabālabodhinī*. He also wrote two other works called *Apaśabdanirākaraṇa* and *Varṇaśikṣā-saṁkṣepa*.[17] Furthermore, he composed the *Laghulallitavṛtti*.[18] Śitikaṇṭha[19] (1472-82 CE) composed a commentary called *Nyāsa* on the *Kātantrabālabodhinī* of Jagaddhara Bhaṭṭa. EIP (1990:513) (N.Cat. 3.317) also mentions a commentary on the Kashmirian recension of Kātantra by Rāma Paṇḍitavara (Sāhiba) (1900?). Kṛpālu Kokila's *Kātantrakaumudī*[20] is one among the more recent works. All these works are available to us in the form of manuscripts, and none of them has been published. I have appended a list of almost all the available manuscripts with details towards the end of this volume.

Till the first half of the last century the texts of *Kātantra* grammar were taught in the traditional Sanskrit schools of

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17. We find manuscripts of both these texts. Their details can be found in the appendix to this volume.

18. A manuscript of this text is preserved in Prācya Vidyā Pratiṣṭhāna, Jodhpur. Cf. Misra (1991:19). Also mentioned in Dwivedi (1988:13).

19. Rājānaka Śitikaṇṭha, the grammarian who was the son of the daughter of Jagaddhara's grandson, is often confused with the Śitikaṇṭha, the author of the *Mahānayaprakāśa*, a Kashmirian Krama text. Sanderson (2007:300) has explained why the two should not be confused.

20. It seems we have many texts carrying this name but written by different authors. Thus, we have a text by Govardhana Bhaṭṭa. Cf. EIP (1991:522). Two more Mss in Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute are attributed to Govardhana Bhaṭṭa. But the three Mss in the Jammu and Kashmir Research Library are attributed to Kṛpālu Kokila. Since I have not been able to have a look at the texts, I do not know if the texts are identical.

Kashmir.[21] Rāmchandra Kāk and Harabhaṭṭa Śāstrī mention this fact; "The most notable manuscripts on grammar are (1) *Kātantralaghuvṛtti* and (2) *Bālabodhinī*. The latter is written on a birch bark. Both of these are unpublished and were, until the Kashmir Pāṭhaśālās came under the aegis of the Punjab University, the chief grammatical textbooks of the Sanskritists in Kashmir. The first work is a commentary by Chhuchchhukabhaṭṭa [=Chuchukabhaṭṭa] on Śarvavarman's *Kalāpasūtras* and the second is a further elaboration of the same by Jagaddhara Bhaṭṭa. All of these writers were Kashmiris."[22] (For further understanding of the Kātantra, see the article by George Cardona in this volume).

It could also have been the case that the Kātantra was mostly a pedagogical grammar for Kashmirians and Pāṇini's grammar was meant for advanced students and scholars. This hypothesis is supported by the probability that the Kātantra was primarily composed for common masses who could not put much effort to learn the intricate Pāṇinian grammar.

In the year 1992, Professor Walter Slaje (Halle, Germany) discovered three Samanvaya texts: *Samanvayadiś* of Kuḍaka,

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21. I could gather this information from some contemporary Kashmirian Sanskrit scholars, namely Pandit Dinanatha Yaksa, Pandit Nilakantha Gurtu, Prof Makhan Lal Kukilu, Dr. Badrinath Kalla and Dr. Trilokinath Ganju, who studied in the traditional Sanskrit schools in Kashmir during their childhood. All of them agreed that they were primarily taught Kṛpālu Kokila's *Kātantrakaumudī*.

22. Cf. *A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Private Library of His Highness Shri Rajarajeshwara Maharajadhiraja Maharaja Shri Harisinghji Bahadur of Jammu and Kashmir by Ramchandra Kak and Harabhatta Shastri (1927:3)*, Poona. This catalogue does not mention any other works on grammar. I have failed to trace the collection to its present location so far.

Samanvayapradīpa and *Samanvayapradīpasaṁketa* of Devaśarman. Thus was established the possibility that Kashmir might have been distinctive in paying special attention to syntax. Oliver Hahn, in his paper in this volume, proposes some influence of Kātantra on the *samanvaya* tradition and gives some examples in support of his proposal. Reflecting on the terminological deviations from the Pāṇinian system of grammar, he points out some significant differences. Like Kātantra, the *samanvaya* works of Kashmir remove certain Vedic *anubandha*s. Hahn further points out that Kuḍaka and Devaśarman quote rhetoricians and poets and expresses his belief that the authors mentioned might have intended their syntactic treatises to be useful to poets.

I have been able to find two manuscripts which have the word *samanvaya* in the titles of the works they contain. The works are *Samanvayamuṣṭi* and *Samanvayasāra* by a certain Jogarāja (twelfth century CE). The manuscripts belong to the Sanskrit Manuscripts Collection of the Jammu & Kashmir Research Department. (further details are given in Appendix I). I have wondered if they are directly related to the *samanvaya* tradition mentioned above, but have not been able to determine if my guess is correct, since I have not so far studied the manuscripts.[23] We find another text by Jogarāja called *Pādaprakaraṇasaṅgati*.[24] It presents a topical analysis of the *Kātantra-sūtra*s.

The learned men of Kashmir have occasionally engaged in linguistic studies outside of grammar — in the Prātiśākhya

23. Oliver Hahn has shared with me his hypothesis that Jogarāja's "*anvaya*"-texts are philosophical and not grammatical.

24. This text is printed as Appendix- ii in Belvalkar (1915:118). Also published in Dwivedi (1988:244).

branch as the paper by Nirmala Kulkarni bears out. As M.G. Dhadphale points out in the following pages, Devarāja in his Niruktanirvacana attributes to Kṣīrasvāmin,[25] who was a Kashmirian, a commentary called *Nighaṇṭu-vṛtti*.[26] Similarly, Kashmirian philosophers have contributed many important and interesting observations on language in their debates with Kashmirian and non-Kashmirian philosophers. The Śaiva philosophers are particularly noteworthy in this context, and hence they will be discussed separately in a short section below. Of the other philosophers, some like the logician Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (ninth century CE) deserve a special mention. Besides writing at least two works on Nyāya,[27] he commented on Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.[28] His commentary has so far not become available,

25. The date of Kṣīrasvāmin remains a subject of debate. According to *Rājataraṅgiṇī* IV.489, an Upādhyāya named Kṣīra had instructed King Jayāpīḍa of Kashmir, which places him some time in the eighth century. But Belvalkar has settled his date at 1050 CE. Cf. Belvalkar (1915:51). Also EIP (1990:476) mentions him as belonging to 1050 CE. YM has pointed out the difficulties in taking the two Kṣīras as identical. Also see the discussion on the date of Kṣīrasvāmin (Einleitung. Datum des *Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī*) by Liebich (1930:201-04).

26. YM vol. II (1984:98) says that this reference by Devarāja may only be to Kṣīrasvāmin's commentary on the Amarakoṣa.

27. We know of *Nyāyamañjarī*, which has come out in several editions. The other text is *Nyāyakalikā* edited by Ganganath Jha and published in the series Prince of Wales Saraswati Bhavana Texts 17 (1925). YM-I (1984:521) also attributes a work titled *Pallava* to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. The second important author is Bhāsarvajña, who wrote *Nyāyasāra* and a commentary called *Bhūṣaṇa* on it.

28. Cf. EIP (1990:475) (N.Cat.7.180). Dezsö (2005) points out that evidence for the existence of this commentary is also furnished by Āgamāḍambara prologue and IV-52, Kādambarīkathāsāra Verse II and Nyāyamañjarī vol. II, p. 718). But unfortunately the →

but he is said to differ from later Pāṇinians and to interpret Pāṇini in his own way (cf. the article by V.N. Jha in the present volume).

Comparable in strength to the interest of the Śaiva philosophers in language was the interest of the aestheticians. The details differed, with the philosophers generally interested in theory or ideas and the poeticians generally interested in linguistic expressions. However, the intensity of interest was comparable. Bhāmaha discussed standard and non-standard usage. So did Vāmana, whereas the Śaiva philosophers employed theoretical concepts of the grammarians such as *dhvani*. We also come across Udbhaṭa, a poetician who seems to have been a Cārvāka and a Pāṇinian free thinker as well. According to Johannes Bronkhorst's contribution in this volume, Udbhaṭa did not consider Patañjali an authority and did not follow the rules of grammar as interpreted by Patañjali. Bhāmaha (675-725 CE) wrote a commentary called *Manoramā* on the Prākṛta grammar of Vararuci titled *Prākṛta-prakāśa*. It is worth noting what Georg Bühler (1877: 75) says about the manuscripts of this text: "As regards the works on Prākṛta grammar, the text of the copies of the *Prākṛta-prakāśa* and of its *Ṭīkā*, nos. 293-94, differs very considerably from that given in Professor Cowell's edition. The two MSS. are, unfortunately, not very good. The oldest has apparently been copied from a mutilated birch-bark volume, the leaves of which had lost pieces on the right-hand

→ commentary is lost to us. Although Dezsö knew of and used Raghavan and Thakur's edition of the Āgamāḍambara, he does not mention an important short article where Raghavan established that *adya ca atrabhavataḥ śaiśava eva vyākaraṇa-vivaraṇa-karaṇād vṛttikāra iti prathitāparanāmno bhaṭṭajayantasya śiṣyapariṣadāham ājñptaḥ* . . . in the prologue shows that the *vṛtti* in question was not on Nyāya but on grammar. See Raghavan (1960:173-74).

side. But if a new edition of the *Prākṛta-prakāśa* is prepared, Kashmirian MSS. ought to be consulted. This is so much the more necessary as Bhāmaha certainly was a Kashmirian."

What views one forms about the origin and development of Kashmiri language will naturally have a bearing on how one sees Kashmir's engagement with language studies. Many scholars, including George Abraham Grierson, have discussed the history of Kashmiri.[29] Perhaps the oldest text in Kashmiri language which is available to us is the *Bāṇāsurakathā* or (*Bāṇāsuravadha*), a manuscript of which is in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.[30] Sanderson suspects that the language of the unpublished *Chummāsaṁketaprakāśa*[31] of Niṣkriyānandanātha is Old Kashmiri or Apabhraṁśa. Referring to *Tarikh-al-Hind* of Alberuni and the works of Abhinavagupta and the Kashmiri satirist Kṣemendra, Sanderson holds that Kashmiri was already a distinct language in the early eleventh century.[32]

Georg Bühler (1877: 26) was much concerned about the problems created by the Sanskrit pronunciation of paṇḍits in Kashmir. He says that the country dialect has affected the

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29. See *Linguistic Survey of India* vol. VIII, Part-II. *Specimens of the Dardic or Piśācha Languages (including Kashmīrī)* edited and compiled by Sir George Abraham Grierson, Calcutta-Superintendent Government Printing, India (1919), pp.233-341 and also *Kashmiri Literature* by Brij B. Kachru in *A History of Indian Literature* ed. by Jan Gonda, volume VIII Fasc.4 (1981), Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden.

30. See Toṣkhānī (1985:14) and Sanderson (2007:305) f.n. 238.

31. This is a Sanskrit commentary that transmits and explains one hundred and five brief aphorisms in Old Kashmiri, consisting of one to three words, which it calls variously *chummāḥ*, *chummāpadāni*, *saṁketapadāni*, and *padāni*. Cf. Sanderson (2007:333). Also see Toṣkhānī (1985:15,24).

32. Cf. Sanderson (2007: 303ff). Also see Toṣkhānī (1985:15).

pronunciation to a very high degree. He lists some of the peculiarities of the Kashmiri language in his report and says, "A knowledge of these Kashmirian peculiarities is of the great importance for the students who use MSS from Kashmir, as they explain a great number of mistakes." In particular, local Prākṛta or rather old Kashmiri is likely to be of relevance to understanding the Paippalāda Atharvaveda in its Kashmir manuscript.[33] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's play the *Āgamāḍambara* (ninth century) also includes some Prākṛta, but Toṣkhānī mentions that, except for the similarity of a few words, there is no relation of the Prākṛta used in *Āgamāḍambara* with Kashmiri Prākṛta. We also find Kashmirian Prākṛta or Apabhraṁśa passages in *Uḍḍāmareśvara-tantra*.

The year 1898 CE witnessed a new development in the grammatical traditions of Kashmir when Paṇḍit Īśvara Kaula's[34]

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33. I thank Professor Arlo Griffiths (Leiden University) for bringing this aspect to my attention.

34. Since information about the life and works of Īśvara Kaula is not easily accessible, I should reproduce it here from Unmesh (1997) November, vol. I, no.3 (New Delhi).; "Born on 4th July, 1833 in a family deeply steeped in Sanskrit lore, Īśvara Kaula lost his father, Paṇḍita Gaṇeśa Kaul, when he was just three years old. He first studied under Paṇḍita Tikkarām Rāzdān, who was one of the most renowned Sanskrit Paṇḍits of that time. Later he learned from Paṇḍita Dayā Kṛṣṇa Jyotiśī of Benares who had come to Jammu in the service of Maharaja Ranbir Singh of Jammu and Kashmir. Equally proficient in Sanskrit and Persian, he was also fairly conversant with Arabic. These credentials were enough for the Maharaja to offer him the assignment in 1861 of translating Persian and Arabic works in his library into Sanskrit and "*Bhāṣā*" (Hindi). Ten years later, in 1871, he was appointed the Head Teacher at the Sanskrit Pāṭhaśālā opened by Maharaja Ranbir Singh in Srinagar. It goes to the credit of Īśvara Kaula that he was the first to use the Devanāgarī script for transcribing Kashmiri words both in his grammar and his dictionary. He expressed →

Kaśmīraśabdāmṛta,[35] a grammar of Kashmiri language was published. This is written in Sanskrit and is based on the

→ typical Kashmiri vowel sounds by using diacritic marks, mainly the horizontal bar and the "*halanta*". Grierson, and later Master Zinda Kaul and Prof. S. K. Toshkhani used the Devanāgarī characters for Kashmiri with a more elaborate system of diacritical notation. In the year 1881, Īśvara Kaula was made Director of Translation Department of the Jammu and Kashmir state. The department, set by Ranbir Singh, was wound up in 1884 after the Maharaja died. His successor, Maharaja Pratap Singh appointed Īśvara Kaula as Head Jyotiṣī or Chief Astrologer at his court, a post that he held until his death on 28th August, 1893. His genius was best summed up by Sir Aurel Stein when he described him as the 'Pāṇini of Kashmir'."

The source of the following information about Īśvara Kaula is my teacher Paṇḍit Dinanatha Yaksa: I reproduce the same here; Īśvara Kaula lived in Brida Math near Rishi Pir. His mother's name was Sarasvatī. Apart from being an authority on Pāṇinian Grammar, he was also an authority on Arabic, Persian, Kashmiri, Hindi and Urdu languages. His poetic excellence achieved its culmination in his work titled *Durbhikṣatārodayāsta* which describes the famine that broke out in Kashmir in Vikrami 1932. (A copy of this manuscript exists in the Kashmir Research Department, Srinagar; cf. Acc. no. 854, Devanāgarī Paper 29 Folios). Maharaja Pratap Singh honoured Kaul with the title "Rājadaivajña". Apart from his book of poetry cited above, he has the following works to his credit;

1. A translation of the Persian work titled *Bostān* of Shekhsādī into Sanskrit poetry.
2. *Daśabhāṣodaya* – A lexical work which lists ten synonyms of each word in different languages.
3. *Kānūn-i-ṭib* – A translation of a Persian work in Hindi and Sanskrit.
4. *Nisāb-ul-sibiyān* – A book on the education policy of Muslim kings translated into Sanskrit and Hindi.
5. *Gaṇitoddhāra*
6. *Grahadaśāphala*

35. I am aware of at least two manuscripts of *Kaśmīraśabdāmṛta* which are kept in the Kashmir Research Department, Srinagar. The details are listed in the appendix part of this volume.

Pāṇinian model (see the paper by Estella Del Bon and Vincenzo Vergiani in the pages to follow). Īśvara Kaula's grammar was also influenced by the Kātantra.[36]

Kashmirian Śaiva Scholars and their Study of Language

In the year 1964, André Padoux[37] produced an original exposition of Hindu Tantric literature. In it, he discussed in detail the concepts of manifestation of sound, levels of language and phonetic emanation, covering almost the entire literature from the *Ṛgveda* to the later Tantras. The major focus of his work is on the Tantras of Kashmirian origin.

The adherents of both Mantramārga and Atimārga in Kashmir produced a large body of literature and gave birth to the great Śaiva exegesis.[38] Among all those who wrote in this area, Abhinavagupta is the most important author. He was undoubtedly a well-informed grammarian[39] and a proficient Nirukta follower, besides being an extraordinary

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36. Cf. Scharfe (1977:199) "Īśvara Kaula follows the terminology and arrangement of the Kātantra with a few interesting innovations".

37. Padoux, André (1992) *Vāc: The Concept of Word in Selected Hindu Tantras*. Translated by Jacques Gontier, Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series no. 155. Delhi.

38. For more details on Śaiva exegesis, see Alexis Sanderson (2007) and also *"Meaning in Tantric Ritual"* by the same author (1995) in *Essais sur le Rituel III: Colloque du Centenaire de la Section de Sciences religieuses de l'Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes*, edited by A.M. Blondeau and K.Schipper, pp. 15-95. Bibliotheque del'Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Sciences Religieuses. Louvain-Paris: Peeters.

39. Abhinavagupta's proficiency as a grammarian is evident from the way he deals with his texts. In this context, I must make special mention of the third chapter of his *magnum opus* Tantrāloka, wherein he discusses the theories of reflection and phonemic emanation in full length.

philosopher and aesthetician (the papers by Bettina Bäumer, Raffaele Torella and David Peter Lawrence in the following pages will bear this out).

We know of Abhinavagupta's commentary called *Prakīrṇakavivaraṇa* (See EIP, 1990:193 and 476) on the third book of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* or *Trikāṇḍī*. On the same book Helārāja wrote a work titled *Prakīrṇakaprakāśa*. Unfortunately, Abhinava's work is lost. Helārāja's work[40], however, fortunately survives (see Vincenzo Vergiani's paper later in this volume, which analyses the concept of *padāvadhika anvākhyāna* as utilized by Helārāja). Furthermore, certain linguistic complications have received their elucidation in Torella's move of interpreting Abhinavagupta in the light of Kātantra grammar.[41]

I have come across some scholars of language and grammar whose direct relation with Kashmir is dubious. Still, I should mention some details about them, lest they remain buried in the chest of the past.

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40. Also, four works by Helārāja are reported to be lost. For more details on Helārāja, see EIP (1990:475).

41. See Raffaele Torella (1998) "The *kañcuka* in the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava Tantric Tradition: A Few Considerations between Theology and Grammar," in: G. Öberhammer (ed.) *Studies in Hinduism, II, Miscellanea to the Phenomenon of Tantras*, Österreichisce Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 662. Band, Wien.

    Also cf. Raffaele Torella (2001) "The Word in Abhinavagupta's Bṛhadvimarśinī." in R.Torella (ed.), *Le Parol e I Marmi, Studi in onore di Raniero Gnoli nel suo 70 compleanno*, 2 vols. IsIAO, Roma: Serie Orientale Roma, and Raffaele Torella (2004) "How is Verbal Signification Possible: Understanding Abhinavagupta's Reply", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 32: 173-188.

1. Utpala Bhaṭṭa wrote a commentary on the *Nāmaliṅgānuśāsana* which is not available. Scholars are not sure if this Utpala Bhaṭṭa is the same as the one who wrote *Spandapradīpikā* on the *Spanda-kārikās*. Cf. YM-II (1984: 276).
2. A manuscript of *Mitavṛttyarthasaṁgraha* by Udayana is available in the Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute, Jammu. Even though this Udayana could have had some relation with Kashmir, we don't have any evidence making it certain that he was a Kashmiri. Cf. YM-I (1984: 548).
3. *Cārāyaṇī-śikṣā* is a work of one Cārāyaṇa who is supposed to have some relation with Kashmir. Cf. YM-I (1984: 115).
4. Abhyankar (1961: 167) mentions Upamanyu who belonged to the ninth century CE as the author of a commentary called *Tattvavimarśinī* on the *Kāśikāvṛtti*. This Upamanyu's *Nandikeśvarakāśikā* seems to have been influenced by the Śaiva Tantras of Kashmir.
5. Abhyankar (1961: 348) also mentions Vāmana (750–800 CE) who is supposed to have written an independent grammatical treatise titled the *Viśrāntavidyādhara*[42] together with an *Uṇādisūtravṛtti* and an *Liṅgānuśāsana*. Abhyankar considers this Vāmana to be a Kashmirian and different from the Vāmana who wrote the Kāśikā or a part thereof.

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42. See also YM vol. I (1984:77). YM vol. II (1984:275) also discusses Vāmana's *Liṅgānuśāsana* separately and dates him to 787 CE.

6. The text of Śrīkaṇṭhī appended to Jürgen Hanneder's edition[43] of the *Mālinīślokavārttika* lists nine grammatical schools in verses 17, 18 and 19a.[44] Hanneder proposes that this text might have influenced Abhinavagupta's philosophy. If *Śrīkaṇṭhī* is a text of Kashmirian origin then we may say that the ancient scholars in Kashmir were aware of at least some of the nine schools.[45]

I have found two manuscripts, viz. *Kātantraprakriyāvṛtti* by Śaṅkaraśarman and *Kārakavāda* by Jayarāma, mentioned in the handlist of Sanskrit manuscripts preserved in the Jammu and Kashmir Research Department which should be of interest to grammarians (the details of both these manuscripts are given in the appendix part of this volume.)

Jinendrabuddhi, the writer of the commentary called *Nyāsa* on the *Kāśikāvṛtti* is also sometimes referred to as belonging to Kashmir.[46]

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43. Hanneder, Jürgen. (1998) *Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Revealation Mālinīślokavārttika* I, 1-399. Groningen Oriental Studies Volume XIV. Groningen, The Netherlands.

44. *aindragālavaśākalyagārgyavātsyakṛtam tathā,*
kātyāyanabharadvājaguhātreyakṛtāni ca ॥ 18 ॥
nava vyākaraṇānyevam sarvaśabdārthakāraṇam ॥

45. Ashok Aklujkar, referring to Candraprabha's *Prabhavakcarita* in his paper titled "Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya as a Key to Happy Kashmir" elsewhere in this volume, mentions in his note 56 that in the eleventh century eight grammars and their manuscripts were said to exist in Kashmir.

46. Cf. Bühler (1877:73) "I have stated already above that Jinendrabuddhi lived, according to the Kashmirians, at Varāhamūla-Hushkpura. He was a Buddhist ascetic, and is certainly not later than twelfth century, as the Nyāsa is quoted by Vopadeva." Also see Belvalkar (1915:38) for more details.

Directions and Suggestions for Future Research

Some possibilities for research that could add to the body of knowledge contained in this volume are already indicated by the information and observations I have offered above and by the information contained in the appendices. Such research would include the search for manuscripts of the so far undiscovered works, editing of the unpublished works known to exist in manuscripts and critical editions of the works that have already been published. In the case of works quoted by later authors, penetrating studies of the quotations could also be carried out.

In addition to such indicated research possibilities, I would like to list the following (numbers 1-9 of these are gratefully reproduced, with minor alterations, from a letter Professor David Peter Lawrence wrote to me; some are expressed in sentences, frequently interrogative, and some in phrases; it is hoped that Lawrence himself will explore some of the possibilities):

1. Why and how did the monistic Śaiva writers, particularly Somānanda, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, become progressively more sympathetic to, and interested in appropriating ideas from Bhartṛhari, Patañjali and other grammarians?
2. What teachers and texts were involved in the ostensible efforts to make the Tantric traditions more acceptable to brāhmanical audiences? For example, is there anything more that can be determined about Abhinavagupta's possible relations with Helārāja?
3. Relations of the linguistic aspects of the Pratyabhijñā theory of divine self-recognition to Abinavagupta's use of Bhartṛhari's ideas in the interpretation of the semantics of *dhvani* in his aesthetic writings.

4. Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's use of Vyākaraṇa in interpreting the ontology of divine self-recognition in terms of mythico-ritual action (*kriyā*).
5. Relations of the Śaiva understanding of action to grammatical and ritualistic conceptions of time and sequence (*krama*). Starting points would be a study of the connections between notions of Vedic and Tantric ritual sequence, as well as Pratyabhijñā advertences to the *Kriyāsamuddeśa* and *Kālasamuddeśa* of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*.
6. Could the entire Śaiva-śāstra and the *Vākyapadīya* be conceived as approaches to *mokṣa* through contemplations on relation?
7. The various aspects of the Śaiva syntax and its relations to the grammars of Pāṇini, Patañjali, Bhartṛhari (for example, in his *Sādhanasamuddeśa*), Mīmāṁsā, Vedānta, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhism (from Nāgārjuna to Dharmakīrti).
8. *Indian Semantic Analysis: The Nirvacana Tradition* by Eivind Kahrs has broken new ground on Abhinavagupta's applications of ancient methods of word-derivation in interpreting Śaiva terms such as the name *Bhairava*. More should also be done on grammatical operations informing Abhinava's convoluted and occult interpretations of mantras and other linguistic aspects of myth and ritual such as have been described in André Padoux's *Vāc*.
9. A systematic study of Abhinavagupta's relationships with Vaiyākaraṇa and Mīmāṁsaka approaches to the grammar of *vidhi*s in his exegeses of the axiological and practical import of texts.

10. Among all the nine branches of the *Atharvaveda* only two have come down to us, viz. Śaunaka (AVS) and Paippalāda (AVP). The latter is strongly associated with Kashmir. An exploration of the history of Vedic exegesis in Kashmir should, therefore, bring something of wider scholarly use to light.[47]

11. A critical study of the Prākṛta in the texts of Abhinavagupta such as the *Tantrasāra* and the *Tantroccaya*.

12. Comments of Georg Bühler (1877: 72-73) on the manuscript of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* that he found in Kashmir.[48]

13. The model of philosophy of language as put forth by Sanskrit poeticians, particularly with reference to authors such as Mukulabhaṭṭa and Mahimabhaṭṭa.

I hope that this volume will be useful to scholars and students alike and that it will lead to other volumes adding to

47. In our volume, Hukam Chand Patyal has discussed some peculiar vocables from the AVP.

48. "The MS. of the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, no. 283, is a real gem. It is the most correct and the best written birch-bark MS. in the whole collection, and almost without a lacuna. I collated a small portion of its contents with Professor Balasastri's edition, and found not inconsiderable differences. The readings of the Kashmirian MS. appeared to me the better ones. It also gives the correct statement regarding the authors of the work. In the colophons of the first four *adhyāya*s Jayāditya is named as the author, and in those of the last four Vāmana. Professor Balashastri told me that he had found the same statement in one other MS. He considers the authors to have been *nāstika*s, and men of small grammatical learning, who had not penetrated to the deepest depth of the *śāstra*. The Kashmirians think that probably Jayāditya is another name of the learned king Jayāpīḍha, and that Vāmana is his minister, who is mentioned by Kalhaṇa. Be that as it may, the Kāśikā Vṛtti is not a modern work, and most probably has been written by a Kashmirian."

our knowledge of Kashmir's involvement in and contribution to grammatical and linguistic studies.

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Abbreviations

EIP	Coward, Harold G. (1990): *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies — The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, Princeton, New Jersey.
YM-I	Mīmāṁsaka, Yudhṣṭhira (1984): *Saṁskṛta vyākaraṇa-śāstra kā itihāsa*, bhāg 1; 4nd edition, Rāmalāl Kapūr Ṭrasṭ, Sonīpat.
YM-II	Mīmāṁsaka, Yudhṣṭhira (1973): *Saṁskṛta vyākaraṇa-śāstra kā itihāsa, bhāg* 2; 2nd edition, Rāmalāl Kapūr Ṭrasṭ, Sonīpat.

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Mukulabhaṭṭa and Vyañjanā

M.M. Agrawal

MUKULABHAṬṬA was a great grammarian, logician, rhetorician and mīmāṁsaka.[1] He was the *guru* of Pratīhārendurāja, a teacher of Abhinavagupta.[2] He was the father of Harṣaṭa who wrote a gloss on Jayadeva's *Chandaḥśāstra (HCSL*, p. 741). He was the son of Bhaṭṭakallaṭa,[3] a *siddhapuruṣa*, who flourished, according to Kalhaṇa,[4] in the reign of Avantivarman of Kashmir (CE 855-84) and was, therefore, a contemporary of Ratnākara and Ānandavardhana (*AVM* Ch., pp. 60, 66; *Rāj*.,

1. ***mīmāṁsā***-*sāra-meghāt* ***pada***-*jaladhi-vidhos* ***tarka***-*māṇikya-kośāt,*
sāhitya-*śrīmurārer budhakusumamadhoḥ sauripādābjabhṛṅgāt* ।
śrutvā saujanya-sindhor dvijavara-mukulāt kīrti-vallyālavālāt,
kāvyālaṁkārasāre laghuvṛttim adhāt kauṅkaṇaḥ śrīndurājaḥ ॥
— *KSS*, p. 92

2. *śrīsiddhicela-caraṇābja-parāgapūta-*
bhaṭṭendurāja-mati-saṁskṛta-buddhileśaḥ ।
vākya-pramāṇa-pada-vediguruḥ prabandha-
sevāraso vyaracayad dhvani vastu-vṛttim ॥
— *Dhv. Lo.* Ch., p. 604

3. *bhaṭṭa-kallaṭa-putreṇa mukulena nirūpitā* ।
sūri-prabodhanāyeyam abhidhāvṛtti-mātṛkā ॥
— *AVM* Ch., *Kārikā* 15, p. 73

4. *anugrahāya lokānāṁ bhaṭṭāḥ śrīkallaṭādayaḥ* ।
avanti-varmaṇaḥ kāle siddhā bhuvam avātaran ॥
— *Rāj*., V.66

V.34). Accepting Kalhaṇa's statement, we should place Mukulabhaṭṭa between Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta roughly in the first half of the tenth century (*HSP* De, p. 74; *HSP* Kane, p. 218; *AVM* Ch., *bhumikā*, pp. 11-14).

Mukulabhaṭṭa is known to us as the author of *Abhidhā-vṛtti-mātṛkā* (*AVM* NSP) or *Abhidhā-vṛtta-mātṛkā* (*AVM* Ch. and *AVM* MSS, Asiatic Society), a work on the grammatico-rhetorical question of *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*, containing fifteen *kārikā*s with *vṛtti* thereon by the author himself. *Abhidhā-Vṛtti-Mātṛkā* deals with the two senses of words, viz. *mukhya* and *lākṣaṇika* and gives a detailed treatment of *lakṣaṇā* with its sub-divisions and examples. Later works like *Kāvyaprakāśa* based their treatment of *lakṣaṇā* on this work. Mahābhāṣyakāra (*AVM* Ch., p. 4), Śabarasvāmin (*AVM* Ch., p. 25), Bhartṛmitrācārya (*AVM* Ch., p. 49), Vākyapadīyakāra (*AVM* Ch., p. 5), Kumārilabhaṭṭa (*AVM* Ch., p. 25) and Bhaṭṭakallaṭa (*AVM* Ch., p. 73) are quoted in this work.

I

Mukulabhaṭṭa's view, as expressed in his *Abhidhā-vṛtti-mātṛkā*, can be summerized as follows:

(i) all the suggested senses can be had by *lakṣaṇā*. He refers to the *atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācya* and *avivakṣita-vācya* types without giving a direct criticism of them but wrongly placing a *vivakṣitavācya* type also on the same footing as that of the former (*AVM* Ch., pp. 63-66).

(ii) He names the capacity of the word to convey the meaning as *abhidhā-vyāpāra*, classifies it into *mukhya* and *lākṣaṇika abhidhā-vyāpāra*,[5] and tries to show that the

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5. *śabdasya ca mukhyena lākṣaṇikena vābhidhā-vyāpāreṇārthāvagati-hetutvam iti* — *AVM* Ch., p. 1.

suggested sense can be communicated by six forms of *lakṣaṇā*.[6]

(iii) He recognizes the three conditions of *lakṣaṇā* as *mukhyārthabādha* = incompatibility of the primary sense, *mukhyārtha-pratyāsatti* = proximity with the primary sense, and *prayojana* = purpose; classifieas *prayojana* into two types and adds that both the varieties of *prayojana* also become the object of cognition along with the respective *lākṣaṇika* senses.[7]

(iv) Strangely enough, Mukulabhaṭṭa also refers to some *vyaṅgya dharma* (*AVM* Ch., p. 63) in connection with *rāmo 'smi* of the verse *snigdhasyāmala* . . . which the *dhvani*-theorists take as the *prayojana* of *lakṣaṇā* and hence as suggested (*Dhv. Lo.* Ch., p. 177), but he says elsewhere that the same *dharmas* are conveyed by *lakṣaṇā* (*AVM* Ch., p. 33.[8] From this he may be said to be advocating for *viśiṣṭe lakṣaṇā* referred to by Mammaṭa (*KP* Jhal., p. 62).

(v) Mukulabhaṭṭa's endeavour to show that all the three types of suggested senses namely, *vastu, alaṁkāra* and

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6. (i) *lakṣaṇā ṣaṭprakāraiṣā vivektavyā manīṣibhiḥ* । — *AVM* Ch., *kārikā*, 7a

(ii) Ibid., pp. 27-41.

7. Cf: *etac ca prayojana-dvitayaṁ mukhyārthāsambhave sati mukhyārtha-pratyāsannatayā pūrvopadarśitena sambandhapañcakenāvagamyamāne lākṣaṇike 'rthe yathā-viṣayam anusarttavyaṁ . . . na hi tat puṇyatva-manoharatvādi svaśabdaiḥ spraṣṭuṁ śakyate, avyāptyativyāpti-prasaṅgāt.* — *AVM* Ch., pp. 50-53

8. Cf: *atas tenāpi rājyabhraṁśa-vanavāsa-sītāpanayana-pitṛmaraṇādayaḥ svābhidheya-bhūtārthaikagāmino'sādhāraṇa-duḥkha-hetavo dharma-viśiṣṭa-sāmagryanupraviṣṭena lakṣitāḥ.* — *AVM* Ch., p. 28.

rasādi are conveyed by *lakṣaṇā*, is evidenced by his treatment of the three illustrative verses given in *Abhidhā-vṛtti-mātṛkā* (*AVM* Ch., pp. 27-41).

(v.a) Illustrating a case of *lakṣaṇā* due to the speciality of the speaker — *vaktṛnibandhanatvena*, he gives the verse *dṛṣṭiṁ he prativeśinī* (*AVM* Ch., p. 31). According to him *lakṣaṇā* conveys the idea of the fact that "the speaker would have erotic dalliance with a *para puruṣa*." He comments that the expressed sense, telling that there would be scratches by the reeds, etc. is false and hence, *bādhita*. Hence, the secondary sense, observed above occurs to make the statement consistent.[9]

(v.b) Illustrating *lakṣaṇā* due to the speciality of the whole sentence — *vākya-gata-paryālocanayā*, he gives the verse *prāpta-śrīr eṣa kasmāt* (*AVM* Ch., p. 33) and adds that *prāpta-śrīḥ*, etc. refer only to Lord Vāsudeva. Hence the doubts as regards the activities are inconsistent unless there be identification of the king with Vāsudeva. Hence, it is also a case of *upādānā-lakṣaṇā* which conveys the idea of the identification of the king with Vāsudeva, which helps in making the statement consistent.[10]

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9. Cf: *atra hi parapuruṣa . . . tenātra vaktṛ-viśeṣa-paryālocanayā satyārthe niṣṭhāyā upādānātmikāyā lakṣaṇāyāḥ pratipattiḥ*. — *AVM* Ch., pp. 31-32

10. Cf: *te ca vitarkāḥ prāptaśrīr ityādinā bhagavad-vāsudevasya vyāpāra-viśeṣa-viṣayāḥ. yāvac ca tasya nṛpaterbhagavadvāsudevatā na samasti tāvat kathaṁ tadīyeṣu vyāpāra-viśeṣeṣu saṁśayaḥ samupajāyate . . . prāptaśrīr ityādiṣu tu triṣu vitarkeṣu . . . tenātropādānātmikā lakṣaṇā.* — *AVM* Ch., pp. 33-34.

(v.c) Illustrating *lakṣaṇā* due to the consideration of the expressed sense — *vācya-nibandhanatvena,* he gives the verse *durvārā madaneṣavo diśi diśi* (*AVM* Ch., p. 37). Here the expressed sense is that the five things namely, the arrows of Cupid, the spring season, etc. are of the nature of fire and are unbearable. When the expressed sense is taken into consideration *vipralambha-śṛṅgāra* is conveyed by *lakṣaṇā*. Without this *vipralambha-śṛṅgāra* the words in the sentence are inconsistent. Therefore, the specified verse is also a case of *upādānā-lakṣaṇā* due to the nature of the expressed sense.[11]

II

Mammaṭa gives a counter criticism of Mukulabhaṭṭa's views sharply but in brief in the *Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra* and in a general way in the *Kāvyaprakāśa*. Mukulabhaṭṭa's views may be refuted from the standpoint of *dhvani*-theorists in the following manner:

1. Mukulabhaṭṭa recognizes a *prayojana* of *lakṣaṇā* but does not explicitly say how it can be arrived at, but implicitly says that it occurs along with the secondary sense, decidedly being conveyed by *lakṣaṇā*, as evidenced by his sporadic statements.

   In the case of *lakṣaṇāmūla-vyañjanā*, as in the sentence *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, the suggested idea of coolness, *śītatva*, etc. cannot be conveyed by *abhidhā*, inasmuch as the

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11. Cf: *atra hi samara-śara-prabhṛtīnāṁ pañcānām adhyāropita-vahni-bhāvānām asahyatvaṁ vākyārthī-bhūtam, atas tasya vācyatā. tātparyālocanasāmarthyāc ca . . . ity upādānātmikā lakṣaṇā . . . nāpi ca vākye padānāṁ vipralambha-śṛṅgārākṣepam antareṇānvayopapattiḥ.* — *AVM* Ch., p. 37.

word *gaṅgā* does not have a conventional invariable relation with ideas such as coolness, etc.[12] Moreover, we cannot have the sense of coolness, etc. with the help of *lakṣaṇā*, because as regards this sense the three conditions of *lakṣaṇā* are not present.[13] We have already arrived at the secondary sense — *taṭa* from the inconsistency of the primary sense "current" with the *lakṣaṇā* function residing in the word *gaṅgā*. Naturally the same function will not work again to convey the idea of *śītatva*, etc. due to the fact recorded in the maxim: *śabda-buddhi-karmaṇāṁ viramya vyāpārābhāvaḥ*. Then again, since the primary sense of 'current' is already out of the picture, we must take the secondary sense of *taṭa* 'bank', as the primary sense, with regard to a fresh *lakṣaṇā* function. But the secondary sense is certainly not the primary sense. It is not inconsistent or incongruous — *nāpi bādhaḥ*. The secondary sense also does not have a definite and invariable relation with the sense of *śītatva*, etc. which is desired as a *lakṣyārtha*. Since there is no conventional relation of the word *gaṅgā* with *śītatva*, it cannot be a case of *rūḍhimūla-lakṣaṇā*. Hence, it can at best be a case of *prayojanamūla-lakṣaṇā*. But to be a *prayojanamūlā lakṣaṇā* with regard to the sense of *śītatva*, etc., which is desired as the secondary sense, we must have another idea as the *prayojana*. We do not have such a *prayojana*. But it is also an experienced fact that the word *gaṅgā* does not fail to convey the idea of the *prayojana*.[14] Then, since

12. *nābhidhā samayābhāvāt* — *KP*, *sūtra* 24.

13. *hetvabhāvān na lakṣaṇā* — *KP*, *sūtra* 25.

14. Cf: *lakṣyaṁ na mukhyaṁ, nāpy atra bādho, yogaḥ phalena no* ।
na prayojanam etasmin, no ca śabdaḥ skhaladgatiḥ ॥ — *KP*, *sūtra* 26.

the word is supposed to convey the idea of *prayojana* with *lakṣaṇā*, let us forcibly think of some other *prayojana*. But the *prayojana* of the original *prayojana* — *śītatva*, etc. will also have to be explained as conveyed by another *lakṣaṇā* with the imaginary presence of still another *prayojana*. In this manner there will be the fault of *anavasthā*, i.e. *regressus ad infinitum*.[15]

Then, let us suppose that the *lakṣaṇā* function itself conveys the idea of the bank as having its holy calm, i.e. the *pāvanatvādi-dharmayukta-taṭa*. Such a *lakṣaṇā* is designated by Mammaṭa as *viśiṣṭe lakṣaṇā* (*KP*, *sūtra* 30). Mukulabhaṭṭa may cherish such a view. But Mammaṭa replies that, from *lakṣaṇā*, we cannot have the secondary sense along with the *prayojana*,[16] because of the dictum that the object (*viṣaya*) and the result (*phala*) in the form of knowledge (*jñāna*) are different from each other, *jñānasya viṣayo hy anyaḥ phalam anyad udāhṛtam* (*KP*, *sūtra* 29). The object of perception is *nīlaghaṭa* and the outcome thereof is some such idea as "the black jar is known by me" (*nīlaghaṭo jñāyate mayā*). Now, if the *lakṣyārtha* be taken as including the *prayojana* or *phala* of *lakṣaṇā-jñāna* then the *viṣaya* and *phala* of *jñāna* will not be different from each other. For, the *viṣaya* or the object of knowledge which is taken to be *pāvanatvādi-viśiṣṭa-taṭa* in the sentence *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* is not different from *pāvanatvādi*, the recognized fruit of *lakṣaṇā-jñāna*.

Thus *lakṣaṇā* cannot convey the *prayojana*. But the secondary sense is found to have certain speciality,

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15. Cf: *evam apy anavasthā syād yā mūlakṣayakāriṇī*. — *KP*, *sūtra* 27.

16. *prayojanena sahitaṁ lakṣaṇīyaṁ na yujyate*. *KP* — *sūtra* 28.

the idea of which must be conveyed by some function of the word itself, which the *dhvani*-theorists name as *vyañjanā, dhvanana, dyotana*, etc. (*KP Jhal.*, pp. 61-63).

2. From Mukulabhaṭṭa's words: *etac ca prayojana-dvitayaṁ mukhyārthāsambhave sati mukhyārtha-pratyāsannatayā . . . avagamyamāne lākṣaṇike 'rthe yathāviṣayam anusartavyam* (*AVM Ch.*, p. 50), it also appears that when the secondary sense is made out of *lakṣaṇā* the *prayojana* is to be understood by some other process of reasoning — *anusarttavyaṁ*, i.e. to be followed. The necessity of such a process of reasoning as regards the *prayojana* seems to be implied by the following words also, which continue the thought in the above quotation: *tatra sambandha-lakṣaṇā yathā — gaṅgāyām ghoṣa ity atra hi gaṅgā-śabdābhidheyasya sroto-viśeṣasya ghoṣādhikaraṇatvānupapattyā mukhya-śabdārthabādhe sati yo 'sau samīpa-samīpī-bhāvātmakaḥ sambandhaḥ tadāśrayeṇa taṭaṁ lakṣayati. atra ca lakṣaṇāyāḥ prayojanaṁ taṭasya gaṅgātvaikārtha-samavetā-saṁvijñānapada-puṇyatva-manoharatvādipratipādanam. na hi tat puṇyatva-manoharatvādi sva-śabdaiḥ spraṣṭuṁ śakyate, avyāptyativyāpti-prasaṅgāt* (*AVM Ch.*, p. 53). From this quotation we learn that *taṭa* alone is said to be conveyed by *lakṣaṇā* and *puṇyatva*, etc., i.e. the *prayojanas*, are said to be beyond the scope of expressive words. Since both the *mukhya-vyāpāra* and *lakṣaṇā* are *abhidhā* for Mukulabhaṭṭa, we should understand both the *vācaka* and the *lākṣaṇika* words from the expression *svaśabda*.

Possibly apprehending such a position of Mukulabhaṭṭa, Mammaṭa contends that in *prayojanamūlā-lakṣaṇā* a function other than the *lakṣaṇā* itself must be recognized. We have *lakṣaṇā* in those cases only when the *prayojana* is there. That *prayojana*

cannot be cognised by the ways of knowing, i.e. *pramāṇas*, other than the *śabda* itself[17] such as the cause of the incongruity of the primary sense. If we do not think that the primary sense fails, it must have a cause, and the cause is the understanding of *prayojana*. Why? Because the *prayojana* is not so unimportant as to be arrived at by the reasoning of the said manner; rather the word is used in the secondary sense to convey the same *prayojana* more smoothly.[18] *Pratyakṣa* does not precede the meaning of a word. No *anumāna* occurs before its cognition, with any *pratyakṣa* preceding it. We cannot establish an *anumāna* in this case with the help of another *anumāna* because that would lead to *anavasthā*. There is no *smṛti* involved in the cognition of the meaning of a word, because the idea we had from a *śabda* was not experienced before. Even where *smṛti* is present it cannot be said to be invariably associated, for it does not relate to anything definite. Thus *śabda* alone is the *pramāṇa*, i.e. a source of valid knowledge there. *Śabda* does not convey the sense without a *vyāpāra*, i.e. function. The function is not *abhidhā* due to so many reasons. It is none other than *vyañjanā* for having the *phala* or *prayojana*.[19]

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17. *śābdī hy ākāṁkṣā śabdenaiva prapūryate* — *SD* Bom. *SS*, pp. 11.

18. Cf: *prayojanāvagamasya sukhasampattaye hi sa śabdaḥ prayujyate tasminn amukhyārthe* — *Dhv. Lo.* Ch., p. 158.

19. Cf: *saprayojanāyāṁ ca lakṣaṇāyāṁ tadatirikto vyāpāro 'vaśyam aṅgīkartavyaḥ. tathā ca, sati prayojane lakṣaṇā, tac ca na mukhyārtha-bādha-nimittavat pramāṇāntarād boddhvyaṁ. tadartham eva lakṣaṇā-śabda-prayogāt. na khalu śābde 'rthe pratyakṣaṁ kramate, nāpi tatpūrvakam anumānaṁ nānumānāntaram anavasthāpatteḥ. na smṛtiḥ, tadanubhavābhāvāt. satyām api vā tasyāṁ niyata-smaraṇaṁ na syāt.* →

3. In the verses illustrating *lakṣaṇā* due to speciality of the speaker, etc. we cannot have the suggested senses because of *lakṣaṇā*.

3.a In the verse, *dṛṣṭiṁ he prativeśinī* there is no incompatibility of the primary sense — *mukhyārtha-bādha*. Hence, the question of *lakṣaṇā* does not arise at all. We do not indeed reject the primary sense as incompatible or false here. We accept the primary sense and aided by the speciality of the speaker, *vaktṛvaiśiṣṭya,* have the suggestion of her actual intention to meet the lover.

3.b In the verse, *prāptaśrīr eṣa* the sense of incompatibility or inconsistency of the doubt does not arise. Hence, Mammaṭa observes that there is no *mukhyārtha-bādha* and also no scope for *lakṣaṇā*. Abhinavagupta very lucidly points out the consistency of the doubt (*Dhv*. Lo. Ch., p. 283). He says that the ocean thinks that only those who have not acquired Lakṣmī and those who desire to sleep should come to perform churning, etc. But, this king — who is addressed in the eulogy — has already acquired lakṣmī, i.e. the royal fortune; hence, he need not churn the ocean; he has already conquered the whole world and so he need not erect any *setu*; he is very enthusiastic and hence he need not feel

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→ *tasmācchabda eva tatra pramāṇam. nirvyāpāraś ca śabdo nārthapratītikṛt. vyāpāraś ca nābhidhā . . . na lakṣaṇā . . . tataḥ prayojanaviṣayo vyāpāro 'bhyupagantavyaḥ. sa ca dhvananāvagamana-prakāśana-dyotanādiśabda-vyavahāryaḥ.* — *SVV*, p. 18.

sleepy as well. Then, why should this king come to the ocean and disturb it? Thus, the doubt is quite consistent in respect of the king also. Abhinavagupta adds that the expressions like *punaḥ, pūrvaṁ* and *bhūyaḥ* alone are not responsible for the suggestion. Because, these expressions need not necessarily mean an identity of the subject. But the expressed sense of the whole verse is so peculiar that it suggests an identity of the king with Vāsudeva and hence a *rūpakālaṁkāra* is derived as the suggested content of the verse.

3.c Similarly, in the verse *durvārā madaneṣavo* also, an expressed sense, without appearing inconsistent, *bādhitā*, suggests the *rasa*. Mukulabhaṭṭa does not show why there should be *anvayānupapatti* of the expressed sense of the words. The *dhvani*-theorists would explain that there is no *mukhyārtha-bādha*. All that is had is really meant by the speaker. Here, there is no inconsistency in the *nāyikā*'s calling the arrows of Cupid, etc. the five fires (surrounding an ascetic), because it is a very natural way of stating things for a *nāyikā* in the lovelorn condition.

Compare Mammaṭa in *SVV*, pp. 17-18:

dṛṣṭiṁ he . . . . pañcāgnayo duḥsahāḥ, ityatra nādeya-pānīyānayanena para-puruṣa-saṁbhogasya naḍa-granthi-lekhanena saṁbhāvyamāna-nakha-daśana-kṣatānāṁ ca nihnavātmakaṁ vastu, bhavān hari iti rūpakālaṁkāraḥ, vipralambha-śṛṅgāraś ca raso lakṣyata iti nodāhāryaṁ, mukhyārthasya bādhābhāvāt. asakhyā api sakhyabhidhānasyaivaṁ saṁbhavāt. ākṣiptasyālaṁkārasya lakṣyatve ca vahnyānayane

> *pātrānayanasya lakṣyatva-prasaṅgāt. abādhitasyaiva vācyasya rasapratītikṛttvāt.*

The argument of Mammaṭa about the suggested *alaṁkāra* in *prāpta-śrīr eṣa* is very perceptive. Mukulabhaṭṭa says that the doubts of the ocean are not consistent if we do not have the idea of the identification, because, that alone removes the sense of inconsistency in the expressed sense of doubts. The counter-argument is that we really have a *lakṣyārtha* when there is inconsistency of the expressed sense. But, do we again apply the secondary sense to bring consistency to the inconsistent expressed sense? Moreover, the inconsistency that Mukulabhaṭṭa finds in *prāpta-śrīr eṣa* is also not a very conspicuous one. If there is any inconsistency here, then we should find an inconsistency also in the expression *vahnyānayana*, because, *vahni* cannot be brought with bare hands — without some holding pot under it.

So, to remove this inconsistency we must gather the secondary sense of bringing a *pātra*, i.e. a container of the fire also, according to the way Mukulabhaṭṭa has argued. But we do not have any *lakṣaṇā* involved in the realization of the sense of the expression *vahnyānayana*. Similarly we must not drag in any *lakṣyārtha* to find consistency in the expressed sense of *prāpta-śrīr eṣa*. The idea of *rūpaka* occurs to our mind only as the suggested sense.

References and Abbreviations

AVM Ch.	*Abhidhā-vṛtta-mātṛkā* of Mukulabhaṭṭa, ed. Rewa Prasad Dwivedi, Chaukhamba edn., Varanasi, 1973.
AVM NSP	*Abhidhā-Vṛtti-Mātṛkā* of Mukulabhaṭṭa, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1916.
Dhv. Lo. Ch.	*Dhvanyāloka-locana* of Abhinavagupta, ed. Ācārya Jagannātha Pathak, Chaukhamba edn., Varanasi, 1965.

HCSL	*History of Classical Sanskrit Literature*, M. Krishnamachariar, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1989.
HSP De	*History of Sanskrit Poetics*, S.K. De, Firma KLM P. Ltd., Calcutta, 1976.
HSP Kane	*History of Sanskrit Poetics*, P.V. Kane, MLBD, Delhi, 2002.
KP Jhal.	*Kāvyaprakāśa* of Mammaṭa with *Bālabodhinī* of Jhalakikara, Poona, 1950.
KSS	*Kāvyālaṁkāra-sāra-saṁgraha* of Udbhaṭa with *Laghuvṛtti* of Pratīhārendurāja, ed. N.D. Banahatti, Bombay, 1925.
Rāj.	*Kalhaṇa's Rājataraṅgiṇī*: a chronicle of the kings of Kaśmīr. tr., annot. by M.A. Stein (1900), 2 vols. London: A constable and Co. Ltd. Photographic reprint 1961. Delhi-Patna–Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass.
SD Bom. SS	*Sāhitya-darpaṇa* of Viśvanātha, ed. P.V. Kane, Bombay Sanskrit Series, 1951.
SVV	*Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra* of Mammaṭa, ed. Rewa Prasad Dwivedi, Chaukhamba edn., Varanasi, 1974.

2

Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya as a Key to Happy Kashmir*

Ashok Aklujkar

§1.1 THE extraordinarily sophisticated and rich tradition associated with Pāṇini has the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya (= MB)

* A very preliminary draft of a part of this paper and the next two was presented under the title "Kashmir and Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya" at the Xth World Sanskrit Conference held between 03-09 January 1997 at Bangalore. I thank Professors George Cardona, Walter Slaje, Hartmut Scharfe and Dr. S. Palaniappan for reading an earlier version of the present full text and helping in making it precise (see notes 7, 18 and 48). I also wish to acknowledge Professor Michael Witzel's generosity in sharing with me a draft of his planned publication *The Nāgas of Kashmir*. Although it was in a very preliminary stage, the draft helped me with its painstakingly compiled lists (see note 28b).

I prefer to make the reading of compound Sanskrit words easy by marking off their component words through hyphens. In doing so, I try to retain the sandhi seen in my sources. Therefore, in some cases, I succeed only in making the second or last member of the compound stand out. The hyphens should not be seen as invariably offering guidance regarding the syntactic relationship of the words involved.

Further, I use a dot/period inside a word to separate two consecutive vowels (rare in Sanskrit but common in Prakrit, Hindi etc.) or to indicate that the nature of the following consonant has changed due to sandhi.

→

of Patañjalī[1] (= Pat°) as its third oldest surviving work.[2] Two references indicating that the rulers of Kashmir attached considerable importance to ensuring that the MB was studied in their country are found in a text written in 12th century CE (passages (c) and (d) below). The text speaks of the rulers as making at least two attempts to revive MB studies (see note 24). Additionally, reference is made in three texts from the same region (passages (a), (b) and (f) below) in such a way as to suggest that the readers were expected to know the significance of Kashmirians being acquainted with the MB or that the contemporary rulers were to be praised if they had succeeded in maintaining an excellent tradition of MB exposition. In other words, we so far have five passages in which a special concern for MB studies on the part of Kashmirian scholars and rulers can plausibly be read. A sixth

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→ In my statements as well as the statements I cite, I italicize only those non-English words which are mentioned (as distinct from used). The titles of book length texts/works, volumes, journals, etc. are mostly italicized only in the bibliography at the end.

Since this essay is connected in its concerns with the following two essays, a common bibliography and list of abbreviations is given at the end of the third essay.

1. A variant *Pātañjali* (with a long vowel in the first syllable) is noticed in some sources that deserve to be taken seriously. I intend to discuss the variant and the related issue of the etymology of the author's name on another occasion. For the present, I will retain the commonly known form.

2. The oldest version of the second oldest work, namely the Vārttikas (= Vt), is accessible to us at present only through Pat°'s MB. As far as I know, no Vārttika-pāṭha manuscript giving us an independent and/or older version of the Vts has so far been brought to light. With this in mind, one may speak of the MB as the second oldest independently surviving work in the tradition started by Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī.

passage, (e) below, negatively corroborating such an interpretation, is also found in the source of passages (c) and (d).

§1.2 In their approximate chronological sequence the passages can be presented thus:

(a) Bilhaṇa (*circa* 1076-1127 CE), Vikramāṅka-deva-carita 18.79, while describing his father Jyeṣṭha-kalaśa, whose time would approximately be 1028-1078 CE:

kṣamā-sāraḥ sārasvata-rasa-nidhānaṁ śruta-nidhiḥ
samutpannas tasmād amala-yaśaso jyeṣṭha-kalaśaḥ ।
mahābhāṣya-vyākhyām akhila-jana-vandyāṁ vidadhataḥ
sadā yasya.cchātrais tilakitam abhūt prāṅgaṇam api ।

"From that (Rāja-kalaśa) of spotless achievement was born Jyeṣṭha-kalaśa, whose very constitution was forbearance, who was a repository of the quintessence of learning, who was an ocean of knowledge and by whose students, while he was offering an explanation, respected by all people,[3] of the MB, even the courtyard was always dotted/adorned."

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3. (a) The intended meaning could be either or both of the following: (i) Jyeṣṭha-kalaśa was such a great scholar or an authority on the MB that his understanding of the MB was considered authoritative by all. (ii) The very act of explaining the MB was worthy of reverence.

(b) Banerji-Gupta (1965) tr.: "Jyeṣṭha-kalaśa, the best in the world (or, having forgiveness as the essential trait of character), the receptacle of the taste of learning, a repository of Vedic lore, was born to him (Rāja-kalaśa) of spotless fame; of him (Jyeṣṭha-kalaśa), who wrote on the Mahābhāṣya a commentary applauded by all, the (house-) compound was always adorned by pupils." This translation, plausible and adequate in most respects, should not have left out *api*. As for its attribution of a MB commentary to Jyeṣṭha-kalaśa, we should recall what Y. Mīmāṁsaka (saṁvat 2041, pp. 425-426), following one Murārīlāla Śāstrī, observes with respect to the same attribution by Krishnamacharya: the present →

(b) Maṅkha/Maṅkhaka (circa 1129-1150 CE),[4] Śrī-kaṇṭha-carita 25.61, reproducing a composition of Devadhara in praise of Maṅkhaka's brother Laṅkaka, also known as Alaṁkāra:[5]

ekaṁ śrī-jaya-siṁha-pārthiva-patiṁ kāśmīra-mīna-dhvajaṁ
tasyopāsita-saṁdhi-vigraham alaṁkāraṁ dvitīyaṁ stumaḥ ।
bhū-bhāraḥ prathamena pannaga-pateḥ kṣmāṁ rakṣatā vārito
nīto 'nyena kr̥tārthatāṁ pravacanair bhāṣyopadeśa-śramaḥ ।

"First we praise the lord of kings, Śrī Jaya-siṁha, who is the Cupid of Kāśmīr; then we praise Alaṁkāra who resorts to (or pays attention to) peace and war for him: the Lord of serpents is freed from the burden of the earth by the first [= Jaya-siṁha] when he protects her; and (Śeṣa's) effort to enunciate his bhāṣya has reached its goal thanks to the lectures of the second [= Alaṁkāra]."[6]

→ tense in *vidadhataḥ* particularly clashes with the inference that Jyeṣṭha-kalaśa wrote a commentary on the MB.

(c) In Vikramāṅka-deva-carita 18.82, Bilhaṇa speaks of himself as one reasoning in grammar by following Pat°: *phaṇi-pati-diśā* (see note 28) *śabda-śāstre vicāraḥ*. This agrees with Bilhaṇa's mention of his father's proficiency in the MB.

4. Bilhaṇa and Maṅkhaka are referred to by Kalhaṇa, the source of my next citations, in RT 7. 935-937 and 8.3354, respectively. Kalhaṇa and Maṅkhaka were particularly close in time.

5. Jona-rāja concludes his comment on the verse I have cited with *iti bhāgavatācārya-devadhara-śloka-dvayam* "These two are the verses of Devadhara, a senior scholar of Bhāgavata sect (or an acknowledged specialist of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa)." In verse 25.59, Maṅkhaka speaks of Devadhara as pleasing him with 2-3 verses in praise of Laṅkaka alias Alaṁkāra. Thus, it would not be accurate to attribute the authorship of 25.60-61 to Maṅkhaka who merely incorporates them approvingly.

6. (a) Here, I have adapted Filliozat's (1991:11-12) translation. I have replaced his translation of *upāsīta* as 'arranges' with 'resorts to' and 'pays attention to,' but I am aware that "arranges" could →

(c) Kalhaṇa (circa 1148 CE), Rāja-taraṅgiṇī (= RT)[7] 1.174-76:

→ also be understood in essentially the same sense as that of my replacements. Secondly, Filliozat reads a pun in *uppāsita-sandhi-vigraham* and gives 'who restored body and joints to this [Cupid])' as an alternative translation. I have eliminated this alternative translation, for I am not sure that the author intended to engage in punning. The commentator Jona-rāja does not read a pun in the expression. If *vigraha* is (also) taken as 'body,' there would be no real reason to mention the joints (*sandhi*) as a separate item in a dvandva relationship. Furthermore, if a pun must be accommodated, the second sense should be such as would fit Alaṁkāra's role specified in the context. There would be no particular appropriateness in saying that he restored the body and joints to the Cupid in the form of Jaya-siṁha. A rendering like "who pays attention to euphonic combinations and to dissolutions of compounds" would go better with Alaṁkāra's suggested expertise in a grammar text like the MB.

(b) There is no clear recognition of *upāsita* in Jona-rāja's commentary. A part of the commentary text could have been lost between °*devasya* and *saṁpādita*. Another possibility is that the reading known to Jona-rāja was *tat-saṁpādita-saṁdhi-vigraham*, expressing somewhat awkwardly the meaning "who accomplished/managed treaties and wars for him (namely, Jaya-siṁha)." The awkwardness would be absent in a translation like: "The second we praise is Alaṁkāra, through whom he (Jaya-siṁha) realized peaceful and hostile strategies."

(c) Near the translation adapted above, Filliozat remarks: "The character of a "Defence Minister" teaching a work of grammar seems to be unique in the history of the world. And it could happen only in India, which is the country where Grammar enjoyed the highest status." I think 'foreign minister' or 'minister of external affairs' would be a more appropriate understanding of *upāsita-sandhi-vigraha* / *tat-saṁpādita-saṁdhi-vigraha*. Still, Filliozat's comment is essentially valid, for grammar, in general, enjoyed a more important place in ancient Indian education than in the education of other comparable cultures.

7. Rāja-taraṅgiṇī is a title shared by the compositions of Kalhaṇa, Jona-rāja, Śrīvara and Śuka which form a continuum. In what →

atha niṣkaṇṭako rājā kaṇṭakotsāgrahāradaḥ ।
abhīr babhūvābhimanyuḥ śata-manyur ivāparaḥ ॥
sva-nāmāṅkaṁ śaśāṅkāṅka-śekharaṁ viracayya saḥ ।
parārdhya-vibhavaṁ śrīmān abhimanyu-puraṁ vyadhāt ।
candrācāryādibhir labdhvādeśaṁ tasmāt sahāgamam ।
pravartitaṁ mahā-bhāṣyaṁ svaṁ ca vyākaraṇaṁ kṛtam ॥

"Then[8] the fearless Abhimanyu, who knew no foes *(kaṇṭaka)* and was like a second Indra (Śata-manyu), became king. He was the donor of the Agrahāra of Kaṇṭakotsa. That illustrious king, having constructed a crest-ornament (in the form of a temple/image of) Śiva, which (temple or image) bore his own name (i.e. was referred to with a collocation like 'abhimanyu + an epithet of Śiva'), founded (the town of) Abhimanyu-pura, which abounded in wealth. Under his instructions, Candrācārya and others brought the Mahā-bhāṣya, along with (its) āgama (traditionally received knowledge), into general use, and [also] composed their own grammar."[9]

→ follows, my concern will be with only the first two RTs, for they alone furnish the relevant passages. Kalhaṇa covered events from the beginning of Kali-yuga to 1148/1150 CE; Jona-rāja, in one version of his work, from 1149 CE to 1459 CE and, in another, from 1149 to 1588 CE. The overlapping verses about 1413–1459 CE and the extra verses 1459-1588 CE found in the second version were not composed by Jona-rāja, but they do not constitute an unreliable interpolation. I am grateful to Professor Slaje for sharpening my understanding of how the RTs took their present shape.

8. If the place at which the three quoted verses appear in the edns of the RT is correct, that is, is the place Kalhaṇa had intended, Abhimanyu would be a ruler who lived after Huṣka, Juṣka and Kaniṣka, before Gonanda III, and at about the same time as Nāgārjuna, the well-known Buddhist.

9. I have adopted Stein's translation for the first verse. For the second and the third, I have adapted it. I have taken *sva-nāmāṅkaṁ* →

(d) Kalhaṇa, RT 4.488-489:

deśāntarād āgamayyātha vyācakṣāṇān kṣamā-patiḥ ।
prāvartayata vicchinnaṁ mahā-bhāṣyaṁ sva-maṇḍale ॥
kṣīrābhidhāc.chabda-vidyopādhyāyāt saṁbhṛta-śrutaḥ ।
budhaiḥ saha yayau vṛddhiṁ sa jayāpīḍa-paṇḍitaḥ ॥

"The king [= Jayāpīḍa, *circa* 750/775 CE], by bringing from abroad [competent] expositors, restored in his own country the [study of the] MB, which had been interrupted. Receiving instruction from a master of grammatical science, called Kṣīra, the learned (*paṇḍita*) Jayāpīḍa became prosperous along with the scholars."[10]

→ as an adjective of *śaśāṅkāṅka-śekharam*, instead of *abhimanyu-puram*, and emended *tadāgamam* to *sahāgamam*. My reasons for so doing are stated in Aklujkar 1987:225. The same publication should be seen for my examination of the pre-Stein and post-Stein translations, including those in Hindi by Raghunātha Siṁha and Pandeya Ramtej Shastri and the one in Marathi by Mādhava-rāva Vyaṁkaṭeśa Lele.

10. (a) Stein, whom I have followed in this translation almost till the end, renders 489cd with "the learned (*paṇḍita*) Jayāpīḍa gained distinction with the wise." I find the phrase "with the wise" ambiguous. If it is taken to mean "in the eyes/estimation of the wise," as I think one would tend to take it, it would amount to ignoring *saha*. If the intended meaning is "along with the wise (both the wise and Jayāpīḍa became distinguished),' it would be better to make the translation reflect the comitative instrumental in the original.

(b) A possible suggestion of my translation would be either that Jayāpīḍa, being prosperous, rewarded the scholars handsomely or that, just as the scholars in his kingdom became better scholars (because of the knowledge of the MB?), he became wealthier or more influential. (because the MB was being studied in this kingdom?; see §3.1 below). This does not clash with the possible suggestion in (e) below that Jayāpīḍa himself was learned enough to discern superior scholarship. →

(e) Kalhaṇa, RT 4.634-637:

viparyasta-caritrasya tasya krūrasya bhū-pateḥ ı
evaṁ stuti-viparyāsaḥ kāvyeṣv api budhaiḥ kṛtaḥ ıı 634 ıı

"Of that cruel lord of the land (namely Jayāpīḍa), whose conduct had become the opposite (of what it was before), a reversal of praise was made in this way (i.e. as explained in the three verses to follow) by the wise even in poetic compositions (i.e., Jayāpīḍa was criticized in the later part of his life beyond serious public pronouncements, official submissions, private conversations, etc.)." (The wording of the earlier laudatory verse was:)

→ (c) Pandit's (1935:162) translation "the erudite Jayāpīḍa gained a reputation on a level with the savants" suffers from taking *vṛddhi* in the unattested sense of 'reputation.'

(d) The Hindi translation by Raghunātha Siṁha (1973:205-206) retains most of the words of the original. Where it differs, it disregards the core or literal meanings of the words concerned. Pandeya Ramtej Shastri's Hindi ṭīkā or translation adds many things that are not in the original.

(e) Y. Mīmāṁsaka (saṁvat 2041:379) cannot be accurate in interpreting the verses as stating ". . . *deśāntara se 'kṣīra' saṁjñaka śabda-vidyopādhyāya ko bulākara vicchinna mahā-bhāṣya kā punaḥ pracāra karāya*" "(Jayāpīḍa) caused others to spread again the MB that had gone out of currency (or active study) by inviting (or after he had invited) a teacher of grammar named Kṣīra from another region (of India)." Firstly, the verses speak of several vyācakṣāṇas 'explainers, commentators' as having been brought into Kashmir. Secondly, they mention Kṣīra only as augmenting or completing Jayāpīḍa's learning. Kṣīra could have been one of the invitees of Jayāpīḍa and could have been the principal figure in promoting MB studies. Even the proposal for inviting MB exponents could have come from him. However, the verses do not so inform us unambiguously about such particulars. The only detail regarding Kṣīra about which they inform us definitely is that Jayāpīḍa learned something (probably of grammatical nature) from him.

nitāntaṁ kr̥ta-kr̥tyasya guṇa-vr̥ddhi-vidhāyinaḥ ।
śrī-jayāpīḍa-devasya pāṇineś ca kim antaram ॥635 ॥

"What is the difference between His Majesty Jayāpīḍa, who has thoroughly performed his duties and who brings about the enhancement of good qualities, and Pāṇini (the great grammarian), who (in his grammar) has thoroughly rendered the kr̥tya (formations) (and) who brings about guṇa and vr̥ddhi (the two degrees of changes in simple vowels he defines as part of his process of deriving word forms)!"[11]

bhāṣya-vyākhyā-kṣaṇe śloke [⟶ śloko] vaicakṣaṇya-hr̥taiḥ kr̥taḥ ।
so 'yaṁ. tasya viparyāso budhair evaṁ pravartitaḥ ॥636 ॥

"This was the verse which was composed by (scholars) attracted by the ability to discern differences (shown by the king) at the time of (or in celebrating) the MB exposition.[12] Its reversal was thus given currency by the wise:"

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11. Implication of the rhetorical question: 'There is no difference. One may view Jayāpīḍa as equaling Pāṇini in greatness.'

12. (a) Who the agent of bhāṣya-vyākhyā, 'MB exposition,' is not clear. Since in passage (d) above Jayāpīḍa has been described as learning from a grammar specialist, we can understand verse 636ab also as "carried away (misled, deceived) by the proficiency shown by the king at the time he explained the MB." However, it seems more likely that Jayāpīḍa showed proficiency only in grasping the MB as it was being explained by the specialists like Kṣīra,

(b) It could also be Kalhaṇa's intention to contrast the earlier vaicakṣaṇya-hr̥ta scholars with the later budha, 'wise,' scholars.

(c) I have construed *bhāṣya-vyākhyā-kṣaṇe* with *vaicakṣaṇya-*. However, I do not rule out the possibility that its intended connection was with *kr̥taḥ ślokaḥ* — with the event of composition of the verse. In that case, Jayāpīḍa's vaicakṣaṇya would be of a general political (non-academic, cunning) nature, and the suggestion would be that he was quite good at showing one thing and thinking of another.

kṛta-vipropasargasya bhūta-niṣṭhā-vidhāyinaḥ ।
śrī-jayāpīḍa-devasya pāṇineś ca kim antaram ॥637॥

"What a difference (there is) between His Majesty Jayāpīḍa, who has inflicted pain on the Brahmins and who provides resting places to ghosts (because of the killing of innocent persons in which he indulges),[13] and Pāṇini (the great grammarian), who enjoined/employed the preverbs *vi* and *pra* (in his grammar)[14] (and) prescribed the niṣṭhā suffixes (*kta* and *ktavatu*) in (the sense of) past (actions)!"[15]

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13. Because the word *niṣṭhā* can also mean 'loyalty' and 'death,' the following additional translations are possible: (a) 'who gives rise to attachment or loyalty in the spirits,' (b) 'who causes death of living beings.'

14. Here I am not sure that I have even approximated the author's intent in writing the first quarter of 637. Saying that Pāṇini has employed the preverbs *vi* and *pra* in his grammar does not bestow the expected cleverness of punning on the verse (even if one takes only the words such as *vipralāpa* and *viprakṛṣṭa* in which Pāṇini employs both *vi* and *pra* simultaneously and in the same order as in the verse). Another possible rendering of the verse quarter 'a' would be: "who (through his grammar) befriended the knowledgeable." The literal sense of *upasarga* 'going near, visiting' can imply 'befriending' (just as it has given rise to the secondary sense 'unwelcome visitation, inflicting'). The word *vipra* with the specific connotation of '(self-transforming) learning /experience' exists as can be seen in floating verses like the following: *janmanā jāyate śūdraḥ saṁskārād dvija ucyate* । *vidyayā yāti vipratvaṁ tribhiḥ śrotriya ucyate* ॥. However, here too, one does not get anything exclusively or cleverly applicable to Pāṇini's grammar that would introduce wit into the verse and agree with the content of quarter 'b' in its nature.

15. (a) Implication: 'There is a great, unbridgeable difference. The two should not be brought together for comparison in the first place.' However, it is possible to understand the verse smoothly even if one takes *kim* in the same sense as in 635. The double

→

(f) Jona-rāja (*circa* 1389-1459 CE), RT 828, while describing the rule of his junior contemporary Zain-ul-abidin (1417-67/69 CE):

> *śrī-rāmānanda-pādānāṁ bhāṣya-vyākhyā-kṣaṇe 'kṣaṇam* ॥
> *vīkṣate śāradā kṣoṇīm eva saṁbhrānta-mānasā* ॥[16]

→ entendre in its first half, in which the adjectives once apply to Jayāpīḍa and once to Pāṇini, will allow one to assert that there is no difference between the two persons, because the same adjectives apply to both of them (albeit the adjectives apply in different senses, in a pejorative sense to Jayāpīḍa and in a complimentary sense to Pāṇini).

(b) I will not quote the translations that Stein (1900:177-178), Pandit 1935: 175-176), Pandeya Ramtej Shastri (1960:120) and Siṁha (1973:267-268) offer of the four verses or offer a detailed explanation of why I do not follow them. The four scholars should not have accepted the reading *ślokair*. They should have emended *śloke* of manuscripts A-1 and A-3 to *śloko*, just as they accepted A-3's emendation of *viparyāse* in A-1 to *viparyāso*. That Kalhaṇa speaks of only one verse, the first half of which was changed by the disenchanted and suffering Brahmins is evident. Without *śloko* as the reading, the sentence in the verse will lack a subject and make the presence of *so 'yaṁ tasya* inappropriate (as the non-recognition of one or more of these words in the specified translations indicates). Siṁha, in fact, proceeds on the assumption that *ślokair* in his text was *śloko*. Secondly, the attempt which Stein makes and which Siṁha follows to read three meanings in the first halves of 635 and 637 is excessive. As the words in the first halves have not remained the same, it should be evident that the authors' intention was not to derive, from the same string of syllables, once a laudatory meaning and once an unflattering meaning. The reversal paralleling the reversal in Jayāpīḍa's conduct is mainly in the words and, through them, in the intended meanings. Thirdly, Stein ignores *api* and takes liberties with the literal meaning of *stuti-viparyāsaḥ*.

16. (a) The text of the second half of this verse has been, except for 2-3 syllables, preserved only in what Kaul (1967:151) calls sub-archetype *b* (the only other sub-archetype in his mss of Jona-rāja's RT is *a*). We thus have an uncertain textual situation on our →

"At the time/festival of the bhāṣya explanation done by the revered Rāmānanda, the Goddess of Learning, with her mind confused (and therefore feeling shame), looks inopportunely/continuously at nothing but the ground."[17]

→ hands. Further, the sudden switch to the present tense in *vīkṣate* from the past tense forms employed in the neighboring verses adds to one's uncertainty about the dependability of mss at this point.

(b) Even if certainty is presumed, the readings adopted by Kaul need to be changed in quarters 'b' and 'c.' I take the verse as implying that Rāmānanda was such a capable exponent of the MB that even the Goddess of Learning considered herself inferior and, out of shame or modesty, fixed her gaze on the ground. In this, I have the support of the Persian translation reported by Kaul on pp. 108-109. On the other side, *vyākhyā* should not be the subject of the sentence, as it would be unusual, albeit not impossible, to speak of a commentary or exposition activity as *saṁbhrānta-mānasā* — as if it has a mind or can do the action of looking. Therefore, we must separate the word *śāradā* from the compound in which Kaul has put it, make it the subject of the sentence, take *kṣoṇīm* as the object and prevent *vyākhyā* from being the subject by compounding it, unlike in Kaul's reading, with the following *kṣaṇe*. The second *kṣaṇe* of Kaul's text is already present in manuscript D as *kṣaṇam*. Confusion between the *e*-mātrā and the anusvāra is quite common in manuscripts. All we have to do to accommodate *kṣaṇam*, therefore, is to imagine an avagraha or apostrophe before the word (readers of Sanskrit mss in which the sentences are written without a break are so commonly required to entertain the avagraha possibility that it is not thought of as an act of emendation). A bahu-vrīhi compound *akṣaṇa* is listed in dictionaries in the sense 'inopportune, unseasonable,' etc. Used in the neuter accusative singular form *akṣaṇam* with no noun to qualify, it would functions as an avyayībhāva as many bahu-vrīhis do.

17. (a) Since one meaning of *kṣaṇa* is "opportune time, happy occasion, festival" (cp. the use in passage (e) under §1.2), "at bhāṣya exposition festival, at the good time of explaining the →

§1.3 It need not be doubted that in (b), (e) and (f) *bhāṣya* stands for the MB, which is explicit in passages (a), (c) and (d). Pat°'s work is the most well-known bhāṣya and is the oldest available bhāṣya.[18] It has been described as a text that

→ bhāṣya" could also have been Jona-rāja's intended meaning. Kashmir could have had the tradition of considering a public MB exposition as a celebration or as a part of certain celebrations.

(b) Kaul (1967:108) rightly infers, on the basis of the Persian translation and the appending of *-pāda*, that Rāmānanda was a highly respected religious person (note also the prefixing of *śrī*), a saṁnyāsin, who came to Kashmir from some other part of India. However, he (Kaul) may have gone too far in linking Rāmānanda specifically with the Rāmāvat sect.

(c) Raghunātha Siṁha (1972:465-466) understands Kaul as identifying Jona-rāja's Rāmānanda with the reformist Vaiṣṇava renunciate Rāmānanda, probably the same as the teacher of Kabīra. However, I do not see precise words to that effect in Kaul's statements. If Kaul, in fact, intended what Siṁha attributes to him, then the date discrepancies pointed out by Siṁha must be overcome.

(d) In his discussion of Rāmānanda and verse 828, Kaul does not take into account the possibility that *vyākhyā* could have been used as an action noun — as a synonym of *vyākhyāna*.

(e) The following Hindi translation by Siṁha (1972:465) is not helpful beyond unraveling the syntax of the Sanskrit original as presumed by Kaul: *śrī rāmānanda pāda kī sambhrānta mānasa vālī bhāṣya vyākhyā pratikṣaṇa śāradā bhūmi ko dekhatī thī*. The ignoring of *eva* in the original is another serious shortcoming of this translation.

18. Early Nirukta commentators such as Durga and Skanda-Maheśvara speak of the Nirukta as a *bhāṣya*, and the Nirukta is probably older than the MB. However, the designation *bhāṣya* is not found in the colophons of the Nirukta mss. Outside the works of the specified commentators, it is so far known to have been used only in the phrase *nirutta bhāṣya* occurring in the Uttaramerur inscription (I owe this last piece of information to Dr. Palaniappan).

had a defining influence on the genre — that served as the model or template for the bhāṣyas to follow (cf. Trikāṇḍī/ Vākyapadīya 2.482 and Helā-rāja/Puṇya-rāja thereto). The unqualified use of *bhāṣya*, therefore, naturally and frequently stands for the MB in several works, especially in the tradition of grammar on which authors like Bilhaṇa, Maṅkhaka, Kalhaṇa and Jona-rāja were nurtured.

In passages (c) and (d), the talk is of introducing or initiating MB studies. Of these, (d) explicitly states that MB studies had suffered a rupture, but the implication of (c) is not very different in that it too speaks of bringing the MB into currency along with its āgama, which must involve a study of the text. Bilhaṇa's and Maṅkhaka's statements, on the other hand, refer to scholars' expositions of the MB without implying that the tradition of studying the MB had fallen on bad times or had been lost. Jona-rāja's statement stands in the middle. It does not use any word that would convey decline or loss in Kashmir's study of the MB, but, as the information in note 17b indicates, Jona-rāja's contemporary readership, being aware that Rāmānanda was not a Kashmirian, could have understood the statement as presupposing emaciation or extinction of MB studies in their land prior to the rule of Zain-ul-abidin. On the other hand, Rāmānanda could have been patronized by Zain-ul-abidin simply because he was the best-known specialist of the MB and a highly revered religious person.

Two of the passages, (a) and (b), suggest that the acquaintance of Kashmirian scholars with the MB was of a high order. In Bilhaṇa's statement, there is also a suggestion of high student interest and excellence. Devadhara stating, through Maṅkhaka, that Alaṁkāra did justice to the effort Pat° invested in the delivery of the bhāṣya, likewise, implies

that Alaṁkāra could offer an exposition that came nearest to matching Pat°'s intentions.

§1.4 The meeting ground or common core of all the passages is concern with studying the MB. Access to the text of the MB must, of course, have been necessary to meet this concern, but the emphasis of the passages is not on simply acquiring or possessing the text of the MB. None of them speaks of loss of the MB *text* in Kashmir[19] (cf. Aklujkar 1980-81:592-601). Their focus is principally on the meaning or understanding of the MB.

The concern with studying the MB is expressed in the passages without raising the issue of what the comparative standing of the study of texts other than the MB was. The passages appear in the general context of describing how a particular king ruled or what the author's family was like, not in the relatively specific context of describing which texts were studied or taught or what the śāstra or kāvya scene was like in the rule of a particular monarch or in the time of a particular family.[20]

In Jona-rāja's five verses preceding his 828, (f) above, we do get the names of Tilakācārya, Śirya-bhaṭṭa, Siṁha, Karpūra-bhaṭṭa and Ruyya-bhaṭṭa and, possibly, Pika,[21] who must be

19. In passage (b), *vicchinnam* is in grammatical agreement with *mahābhāṣyam*. This may initially create the impression that the MB text is meant. However, note that only the vyācakṣāṇa are spoken of as being brought from areas outside of Kashmir.

20. Since Maṅkhaka's remark occurs in the context of giving information about himself, it is natural that he should speak of his learned brother and the brother's speciality. Its specificity *in that respect* is not unexpected.

21. Verse 825, which I have left out of consideration at this point, reads thus: *mediny-ākhaṇḍalasyāsīt pikasyeva rasa-śriyā* ı *akhaṇḍaṁ*

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excellent in discharging the responsibilities assigned to them. Yet, except in the case of Śirya-bhaṭṭa, mentioned once several verses earlier (812-816), and, possibly, Pika, words expressing expertise or scholarship are not found. Jona-rāja leaves no doubt that his intention in giving the list is not to convey that Zain-ul-abidin promoted education to such an extent (although he might have) that Kashmir produced the likes of Tilakācārya, etc. but to convey that, with Zain-ul-abidin coming to power, the twice-born were again appointed to important government positions — that the exclusion of Hindus from high positions

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→ *rasa-pāṇḍityaṁ brahma-kuṇḍala-sevayā* || Raghunātha Siṁha (1972:464) translates it into Hindi as follows: *pṛthvī ke indra usa rājā kā brahma-kuṇḍala sevā ke kāraṇa rasa-pāṇḍitya usī prakāra akhaṇḍita thā jisa prakāra isa [⟶ rasa] śrī ke sevana se pika kā.* "The rasa proficiency of that Indra/Lord of the Earth (= Zain-ul-abidin) was unbroken /constantly progressing because of service/ resorting to brahma-kuṇḍala as is/was (the rasa proficiency) of pika on account of partaking of/resorting to rasa-śrī ('wealth/ glory/beauty of rasa')." In this translation, a good sense of the syntax of the words used by Jona-rāja is maintained, but we still do not come to know what Jona-rāja really wishes to convey. Is *rasa* in *rasa-śrī* and *rasa-pāṇḍitya* to be taken in the sense of 'poetic flavor' or 'substances such as poisons' or 'alchemical substances' that kings were expected to know about? Is *brahma-kuṇḍala* used to speak of Śirya-bhaṭṭa, Tilaka and Siṁha-gaṇanā-pati (mentioned in the preceding verse) collectively? Are there other occurrences of the word *kuṇḍala* in this sense? (*brahman* can stand for *brāhmaṇa*; it does not pose a problem.) Does it mean 'ear-ornament (in the form) of (the aforementioned) Brahmins'? Or, is it a corruption of *brahma-maṇḍala*? Why is a verse devoted to praising the king when two verses before it and two verses after it speak of his advisers? Could it be that *pika* is here a proper name, the name of a fifth adviser who made the king proficient in his speciality of rasa (probably in the sense 'poisons' or 'alchemical substances')? Does rasa-śrī mean 'mango'?

ended. In other words, even in Jona-rāja's RT 823-828, the reference to the MB is exclusive of other texts and of any general concern with cultivation of scholarship.

To make my point differently, all the references we have so far taken into account have an unexpected specificity, a sudden focusing on the MB. This feature indicates that the authors making the references presumed a certain understanding of a regional or cultural nature on the part of their readers; they not only expected them to think immediately of the MB even when the word used was only *bhāṣya* but also to be knowledgeable about why a reference would be made to the MB — why the work is important, why it is important for Kashmir not to be without an active and continuous engagement with the MB.

The feeling I have delineated above is strengthened when we note the following: (a) Usually, more than one confirmation of a historical event or condition is difficult to come by in ancient history. This is all the more a reality in the case of ancient Indian history. Yet, for MB teaching in Kashmir, we have confirmation from as many as four authors and in six statements. (b) All confirmers hail from Kashmir.[22] Clearly, something of unusual cultural significance stands behind our passages, and, although our textual evidence for the phenomenon begins with the twelfth-century texts, the phenomenon itself could be older.

Furthermore, all the passages cited above appear in positive contexts, two of them, (a) and (b), even in the context of extolling a MB exponent. The kings whose reigns are

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22. Cf. Filliozat (1991:12): "This [= Śrī-kaṇṭha-carita 25.61] stanza shows that there must have been a great interest for the study of the Mahābhāṣya in Kaśmīr at that time."

described are not portrayed as ordinary or wicked.[23] This is true even of Zain-ul-abidin or Jainollābhadena, who belonged to the markedly different faith of Islam.

§2.1 Several scholars have noted or discussed references in passages (c) and (d) to MB studying in Kashmir (Aklujkar 1987 has the references). Usually they have done so by taking (c) and (d) in isolation from the other passages collected above. I am not aware of anyone who has analyzed (c) and (d) by relating them even to (e), although all three passages come from the same author Kalhaṇa. Secondly, the purposes of interested scholars have been one or more of the following: (a) relating the passage to Trikāṇḍī/Vākyapadīya 2.486, (b) giving an account of the rule of a particular Kashmirian ruler, (c) pointing out the vicissitudes in the survival of the MB text, and (d) determining the identity and dates of Candrācārya and Candra-gomin. Consequently, a gleaning of features of the type attempted in §§1.3-4 has not taken place, and no attempt to explain why as many as three Kashmirian rulers have been associated with the study of the MB has been made. If I leave aside Peterson's pitiable rationalization,[24] the only

23. This is true of Jayāpīḍa only in the first part of his reign. RT verses 4.634-637 provide a negative confirmation as was stated in §1.1.

24. Peterson's (1885:182) view that Kalhaṇa divides the story in Vākyapadīya 2.486 into two parts and separates the parts by centuries (placing one in the reign of Abhimanyu and the other in the reign of Jayāpīḍa) is — if we decide to view it kindly — a rationalization needed to maintain some of his other views. It has no objective support. As I will point out in another publication, we cannot be certain that the Vākyapadīya passage is Kalhaṇa's source. Secondly, while Peterson's observation that Kalhaṇa "invites us to believe that twice in the history of Kashmere did the king of the country interfere to set the Mahābhāṣya on its feet again" is literally accurate, it would have no causal significance, →

remark I have come across that shows awareness of the issue is Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṁsaka's found for the first time in the third edn of bhāga/volume 1 of his Saṁskṛta Vyākaraṇa-śāstra kā Itihāsa (saṁvat 2030:335): . . . *patañjali kī janma-bhūmi kauna sī thī, yaha sandigdha hai. punar api kaśmīra ke rājā abhimanyu aura jayāpīḍa dvārā mahābhāṣya kā punaḥ-punaḥ uddhāra karānā vyakta karatā hai ki patañjali kā kaśmīra se koī viśiṣṭa sambandha avaśya thā.*[25] "It is not clear which region was Pat°'s place of birth. Still, the (record/mention) that the Kashmir rulers Abhimanyu and Jayāpīḍa repeatedly brought about a resurrection of the MB suggests that Pat° had a special/specific relationship with Kashmir." This remark, dating back to 1973 CE and repeated in 1984 CE, beckons researchers to find out if Pat° could have had a special relationship with Kashmir and if Y. Mīmāṁsaka's conjecture that the resurrection of MB studies in Kashmir could be due to that special relationship is valid. Yet there have been no explorers of any special relationship. I became aware of the remark just as my thinking was moving along similar lines. As the preceding and the following discussion should establish, while Y. Mīmāṁsaka articulated, in a general way, what would have been my conclusion, I had to grope from various directions to determine the form of the special relationship. An intellectual makeup very different from his was needed to pursue the challenge implicit in his remark.

→ unless Peterson can demonstrate that a second 'interference' never took place. But can an absence be proved? Thirdly, why should one imagine only unflattering possibilities in Kalhaṇa's case (e.g., the possibility that he expects us to accept something for which he had no evidence)? Should (what seems to be) an oddity not lead a historical researcher at least to admit the possibility that there could be a reason for the oddity, albeit the sources available to him/her do not reveal that reason?

25. The same remark is found on page 361 in the fourth edn published in saṁvat 2041 (= 1984 CE).

§2.2 Apart from the question of why the rulers should be involved in ensuring that the MB continued to be studied in their country, the passages, collectively, give rise to the following questions: Why should the text be specifically the MB, which, despite its colloquial style, apparent simplicity of words and syntax, is a sophisticated, and challengingly layered and contextually nuanced text, frequently intractable as to its author's conclusions? Why should there be the acceptance of a text falling in the area of grammar, a subject not known for commanding popular attention (even in pre-modern India, despite the importance attached to grammar in the Brahmanical or other formal educational streams)? Further, the feature that the steps to ensure continuity of MB studying were taken, at least,[26] at three widely separated times[27] is intriguing. Could it be that the steps had as their background a notion or belief that endured over several centuries? Could Kashmir have been unique in holding that notion or belief? At least until now, a similar or parallel situation with regard to any other text in any other part of India does not seem to have been recorded by scholars (see §§3.3-5).

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26. Jaya-siṁha (*circa* 1127-49 CE), mentioned as a contemporary of Alaṁkāra (and hence of Maṅkhaka) in the Devadhara verse reproduced in Maṅkhaka's Śrī-kaṇṭha-carita, is not explicitly spoken of as ensuring the continuity of MB studies. However, that might have been a suggestion for Maṅkhaka's contemporary readership. Jaxtaposing a minister engaged in explicating the MB with a king is not something that would as naturally occur to a classical Sanskrit poet as imagery based on the moon, the lotus, etc. A convention could already have come into existence by Devadhara's/Maṅkhaka's time of associating a ruler with the MB for imparting a particular message to the readers.

27. Abhimanyu: not later than the fourth century CE but quite possibly much older (see the 'if' clause in note 8 above), Jayāpīḍa: *circa* 750/775 CE; Zain-ul-abidin: 1417-67/69 CE.

§2.3 My answer to the central and allied questions I have raised must, of necessity, move through recalling or establishing several historical conclusions. Relatively minor in themselves, these conclusions will build up toward as final an answer as Indology in its present state can deliver. Initially, the conclusions may appear unrelated to each other and to the final conclusion or answer. It is my hope, however, that, taken together, they will form a highly plausible logical whole and perhaps — what is more important — lead to some interesting implications for the study of ancient Indian history in general.

§2.4 For the sake of convenience in presentation, let me begin with historical conclusions that are already established or ably argued for elsewhere.

Practically every scholar who has concerned himself/herself with the author Pat° knows that this historical person (or pair/group of historical persons) has been associated with a mythic snake or serpent for many centuries. In the estimation of Indians, he deserves and transcends the approbation and reverence that come with designations such as *muni* ('sage') and *ṛṣi* ('seer'), which are frequently applied to him, and is viewed as an incarnation of Śeṣa or Ananta.[28] The oldest

28. (a) The epithets expressive of this incarnation found in the tradition are *nāga-nātha* (Kaiyaṭa 4.2.92), *śeṣāhi* (Vallabha-deva, comm. on Śiśupāla-vadha 2.112), *phaṇi-pati* (Bilhaṇa, Vikramāṅka-deva-carita 18.82), *phaṇin, phaṇīndra, bhogīndra*, etc. Ram Shankar Bhattacharya's (1985:90-93) useful discussion leads us to add *ādi-śeṣa, viṣadhara, ahi-pati*, and *phaṇibhṛt* [⟶ *phaṇābhṛt? phaṇi-bhartṛ?*].

(b) In the lists of Nāga names put together in Witzel's very preliminary draft of *The Nāgas of Kashmir*, the name *phaṇīśvara* appears in the Kashmirian list used for tarpaṇa in the Go-pradāna rite. That name or any other combination of the type '*phaṇin* + a synonym of *īśvara*' is not attested in any other list. This state of ⟶

explicit statement of this identification with the divine snake that is at present available to us comes from Kaiyaṭa, the commentator of the MB, who could have lived as early as 950 CE and cannot be dated any later than 1050 CE. However, if the stories about Candra-gomin preserved in the Tibetan histories of Buddhism are older in their origin, the identification could be older than the tenth century CE. In those stories, Pat° as the MB author is spoken of as a mighty Nāga/ Śeṣa-nāga (who is defeated or subdued by the Buddhist hero).[29]

→ affairs and the predominance of *phaṇin* in the names collected in (a) indicate that originally epithets of the *phaṇīśvara* type could have come into existence for a venerable human being without any particular lord of the snakes in mind. This conjecture of 'an-abstraction-rather-than-a-proper-name' state and 'a-ṛṣi-to-whom-a-tarpaṇa-could-be-made-rather-than-a-real-snake' state is supported by the fact that in the same Go-pradāna rite list Śeṣa is listed separately, that the lists collected by Witzel show considerable variation as to who the lord of the snakes is (or who the lords of the snakes are) and that in a few lists Ananta and Śeṣa appear as different snakes.

(c) According to Ram Shankar Bhattacharya (1985:92), Matsya Purāṇa (6.38-44), Liṅga Purāṇa (1.63.37) and Padma Purāṇa (5.6.70-73) include Pat° among twenty-six principal nāgas. The Purāṇa edns accessible to me allowed verification of only the last. The actual reading there was *pātañjali-mukha*.

29. It might be suggested that the possibility of greater antiquity of the identification should be entertained on the basis of Yoga-sūtra 2.47 (*prayatna-śaithilyānanta-samāpattibhyāṁ vā*), since the YS can be dated to the third or fourth century CE if not earlier. However, the reading *ananta*, although supported by some manuscripts and the commentaries of Vācaspati-miśra, Vijñāna-bhikṣu, Bhāvā-gaṇeśa, Nāgojī-bhaṭṭa, Rāmānanda, Rāghavā-nanda-sarasvati and Sadāśivendra-sarasvatī, should not be preferred to *ānantya*, supported by the Yoga-śāstra-vivaraṇa authored by Śaṅkara (unlikely to be the same as the author of →

§2.5 Researches conducted by historians of religion, folklorists and cultural anthropologists, etc. leave no doubt that snake folklore, snake worship, etc. are not confined to India.[30] Within India, too, these cultural phenomena cannot be said to be restricted to certain provinces or regions (Fergusson 1876, Vogel 1926) or to only to one of the three ancient Indian religions. The prominent figures of Brahmanism or old Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism are associated with saving, etc. of a snake; Kṛṣṇa in the Mahābhārata, Pārśva-nātha in the Jain canon and the Buddha in several Thera-vāda and Mahāyāna texts (cf. Bloss 1973 for the last).

Different interpretations of the folklore, superstitions and rituals surrounding *sarpa*, *nāga* and *ahi* (meaning '-dragon' in earlier usage but later used as a synonym of *sarpa* and *nāga*) have been offered. Some are psychoanalytic, some start with the assumption that early man had only primitive science that ended up in deifying forces of nature, and some take the position that the specified cultural phenomena are to be traced

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→ the Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya) and by the Vṛtti ascribed to Bhoja. Also, it is unclear how the Yoga-sūtra author considering himself as Ananta would make a self-reference in the sūtra. On the other hand, if he is not identifying himself with Ananta, how would the presence of *ananta* make the identification older?

30. For example, in ancient Egypt, a snake accompanied images of Osiris. Snake is also found in connection with Hermes, an ancient god of Greece. Many Internet entries now echo a text I copied some years ago from a newspaper: "snake-handling continues mostly in small communities in rural areas of Tennessee and Kentucky, as well as pockets in other southern states [in the United States of America]. Participants feel that "the spirit of God" comes upon them as they open the boxes containing the snakes. Often lifting three or four of them up simultaneously in one hand, holding them high and allowing the creatures to wind around their arms and bodies, they praise God ecstatically."

to what was etched on man's mind during the evolution process. Words such as "fertility cult" and "ophidian symbolism" figure in this branch of scholarly discourse.

The features of Indian snake/serpent-concerned life that should be mentioned particularly are these:

(a) A people or ethnic group called Nāgas and rulers having *-nāga* as a part of their name are undeniably attested beyond mythic texts (Viyogi 2002).[31] Therefore, it is probable, albeit not entirely proven, that some of the Nāga myths and legends contain historical truths.[32]

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31. Cf. Ved Kumari 1968:46-71, who points out that the Nāgas come across "at one time as reptile snakes and at another as human beings. Ancient Indian literature abounds with references to them but while some of these references indicate their character as a people or tribe, others show them to be either mythical beings with supernatural powers or actual serpents with poisonous fangs."

32. The most common way of situating such historical truths is reflected in the following statement of Ved Kumari: "All these pieces of evidence [= references to Nāgas in ancient Indian literature] prove the existence of some serpent-worshipping people in pre-historic India. Hostile to the Vedic Aryans in the beginning, they became, later on, friends of some of the Aryan tribes . . . the Puranic statement that Kaśyapa was the common ancestor of the Dānavas, the Nāgas, etc. . . . seems to be a later attempt of the Aryans to bring the conquered races into the Aryan fold. . . . the Nāgas were the aborigins [→ aborigines] inhabiting Kaśmīra and other parts of North India before the advent of the Vedic Aryans. The Vedic Aryans fought with them as well as the Piśācas and pushed them to the south, east and west." I am not sure if one should depend so confidently and broadly on the Aryan-non-Aryan frame for reconstructing ancient Indian history. Also, it would have been better if Ved Kumari's statement had not been confined to Vedic Aryans (the authors of the Sanskrit sources available to us are not always →

(b) While in the earliest surviving literature of India, particularly the Ṛg-veda and the Atharva-veda, the serpent (*ahi*) is found as an evil force, decidedly to be put down, in the immediately next surviving literature, namely the later Saṁhitās, the serpents form a class of semi-divine beings deserving veneration; cf. Smith 2003.

(c) While the serpent-centered cultural phenomena are pan-Indian (Beal, 1914:x) and trans-Indian, the serpent as a cultural institution is particularly prominent and significant in Kashmir and north-eastern South Asia. In the case of Kashmir, this was observed by H.H. Wilson as early as 1825 (p. 93 of the 1960 reprint) on the basis of the RT, etc.: "We have frequent occasion to notice the important figure which snakes and snake deities make in the worship and traditionary history of Kashmir. The extent and permanence of the superstition we may learn from Abul Fazl who observes that in seven hundred places there are carved figures of snakes, which they worship (Ain-i-Akbari ii. p.148). His statement is in fact taken from the text of Puṇya [= Prājya? AA] Bhaṭṭa; for its being as old as the age of Alexander we have what may be regarded as sufficient, though indirect testimony; for Onesicritus, as quoted by Strabo, avers that Abisaras, who . . . is a misnomer for Kashmir, or a part of it, is

→ Vedic; Sanskrit should not be equated with Aryan *as the referent of an ethnic term*) and had been made in terms of mutual hostility, not just in terms of Nāga hostility toward the Aryans. Further, the phenomenon noticed by Ved Kumari has an aspect of recognizing the rights of the original inhabitants. It also needs to be determined if there are accounts of conflicts with the Nāgas in South India, etc.

> said by his ambassadors to cherish two enormous dragons . . . upon the authority of Maximin of Tyre . . . when Alexander entered India, "Taxilus, a powerful prince of the country" (He was raja of the Takshasilas) "showed him a serpent of enormous size, which he nourished with great care, and revered as the image of the God whom the Greek writers from the similitude of his attributes called Dionysus or Bacchus."

Texts native to Kashmir also recognize this. In Nīla-mata-purāṇa (= NMP)[33] 68-73, Viṣṇu assures the Nāgas that Garuḍa will not attack them as long as they live in Satī-deśa or Kashmir Valley. In NMP 1331, the lord of the snakes, Vāsuki, is said to be permanently present at Vr̥ddha-tīrtha. NMP 1368 mentions a Nāga-tīrtha as capable of giving the same merit as the gift of a cow. The water of the Vitastā, which river was especially sacred to the ancient and medieval Kashmirians, is said, in NMP 1435, to be in contact with Nāgas of various forms. Worship of the Nāgas is prescribed in NMP 651 (*phala-vedāt tato jñātvā nāga-varṣasya vārakam* । *tasya pūjā prayoktavyā bhakṣya-bhojya-puraḥsarā* ॥), 870-71 (*nityaṁ saṁnihitā devāḥ kaśmīrā-maṇḍale, dvija* । *teṣāṁ bhaktiḥ sadā kāryā nāgeṣu brāhmaṇeṣu ca* ॥ *pujyāḥ piśācāś ca tathā bali-pūrveṇa karmaṇā* । *deśānukārāḥ kartavyā janāḥ kāryāḥ svadhiṣṭhitāḥ* ॥[34]), 879 (*pañcamī dvādaśī caiva paurṇamāsī tathaiva ca* । *sarveṣām eva nāgānāṁ yātrā-karmaṇi pūjitaḥ* [→ °*jitāḥ*] ॥), 883 (*caturthe 'hani kartavyaṁ piśācānāṁ ca pūjanam* ।

33. As far as I, a non-specialist, can judge, Ved Kumari (1968:9-15) is justified in her conclusion that the older part of the NMP was composed between the 6th and 8th centuries CE.

34. Most mss consulted by Ved Kumari have a reading with singulars for this line; one ms., G. has °*nusāraḥ* for °*nukārāḥ*. Ved Kumari's translation ("The people should be settled well and made to follow the (traditions of the) country.") conveys the contextually most probable meaning of the line.

pañcame 'hani kartavyaṁ sthāna-nāgasya pūjanam ll), 1408 (*sarve ca saṁgamāḥ puṇyā nāgānāṁ ye jalāśayāḥ* l *suvarṇa-śata-dānasya phalaṁ prāpnoty asaṁśayam* ll).[35]

Supportive in this context is also Bilhaṇa (Vikramāṅka-deva-carita 18.16cd): *yasminn antaḥ-sthitavati jagat-sāra-bhūte prayātāḥ kāśmīrās te niyatam uragādhīśa-rakṣāspadatvam* ll "(Pravara-pura), the best of the world, upon the inclusion of which the Kāśmīra country became a place protected by the Lord of the Snakes . . ."

RT 1.177-181 provides a negative confirmation of the special place accorded to Nāgas in Kashmirian life. Kalhaṇa informs us in these five verses that, according to the information he had, the Buddhists suffered terrible losses in Kashmir when they, using their majority, opposed the performance of rites honoring the Nāgas that the NMP had prescribed.[36]

§2.6 Focusing more sharply, we should list the noteworthy features of the Nāga lore of Kaśmīra:[37]

(a) The relation between birds and snakes observed elsewhere is particularly close.

(b) Snakes are associated with specific places much more frequently. Practically each locality has its snake, a vāstu-nāga.

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35. Translations of these relatively easy verses are available in Ved Kumari 1972.

36. Bloss (1973:43, 48-49) suggests that elsewhere and at other times the Buddhists accommodated the earlier folk beliefs and ways.

37. Professor Witzel's draft of *The Nāgas of Kashmir* has directly and indirectly furnished several of the observations made in this section. He and I are aware that Kashmir shares some of the features listed here with eastern South Asia, particularly Nepal. Witzel 1994 is also indirectly helpful in the present context.

(c) The house snake is thought to represent the soul of some ancestor who has taken up residence there; cf. Crooke 1896:133.

(d) Snakes are in several cases viewed as relatively distanced ancestors and as a kind of departed teachers. Some rulers are spoken of as reincarnating in the form of Nāgas or as being transformed into Nāgas without a statement or implication of rebirth. Accordingly, references to Nāga kings who rule over human subjects are not wanting (as they are not wanting in pre-Gupta central India). A dynasty, Kārkoṭa/Kārkoṭaka, named after the sarpa/nāga Karkoṭa is credited with a long rule. In NMP 1236, Paraśu-rāma is spoken of as practicing penance in the abode of the Nāga king of Kashmir.

(e) Snakes are explicitly recognized as capable of living with the humans. King Durlabha-vardhana is said to be the son of snake Karkoṭa who cohabited with Durlabha-vardhana's mother while she took her bath. In addition, some other early kings are spoken of as progeny born of man by a local Nāginī (a female nāga, sometimes confused with an Apsaras, 'nymph' or 'water nymph,' in the Indian snake narratives).

(f) Ananta of the Nāgas occupies the most prominent place in myths, legends and snake-related rituals. In NMP 171-172, 189, he is credited with making, under the guidance of Kaśyapa and Viṣṇu and in a form resembling that of Bala-rāma, the outlet that drained the valley of Kashmir and made it habitable. The story occurs, in a slightly different form, in the Mahāvaṁsa 12.3.9-28, the Chinese version of the Mūla-sarvāsti-vādin Vinaya and Hiuen Tsang's/Yuan Chwang's

travel account.[38] Appropriately, Ananta has an even more special place than the other Nāgas; cf. NMP 779: *madhye brahmāṇam ālikhya tathānantaṁ ca bhoginam* I *tato likhyeta dikpālān svāṁ svāṁ diśam avasthitān* II

§2.7 Although most of the existing research literature leans in the direction of viewing Pat° as a native or resident of the Goṇḍa area of central or east-central India, the case for thinking of him as a Kashmirian by birth is stronger as I have argued in my third essay in the present volume. The consideration that most observations in §2.6 make Kashmir as the most likely place for the origin of the 'Pat° = Śeṣa/Ananta' identification (see note 48c) or for the myth of Pat°'s birth in the hands of a woman standing in water further strengthens the thesis of Pat°'s association with Kashmir.

§3.1 The philological and mythic/folkloric strands of evidence collected or summized in §§2.1-7 are indisputable in themselves. They are established on the basis of independent evidence by me or other scholars. True, we do not have a statement on how they are to be brought together, but, then, if we had such a statement in our sources, we would not have felt the need to explore the evidence the way we have. The only alternative open to us, therefore, is to bring the strands of evidence together in the most plausible way in the context of the question raised at the beginning of this essay. So doing,

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38. (a) See Watters 1961 reprint, p. 265; Beal 1884, reprint 1969, p. III.149. Compare the Tamil tradition given in §3.5a and the Cambodian myth summarized in Bloss 1973:41-42.

(b) The story is summarized in Kalhaṇa's RT 1.25-28 without reference to Ananta.

(c) Ved Kumari (1968:17-19) points out that modern researches in geology support the kernel of the legend, namely that the Kashmir valley was once a lake, which somehow got drained.

I submit the following as the initial part of my answer to the question, 'Why did Kashmir attach so much value to the preservation of MB studies?': Nāgas were venerated in Kashmir. Pat° was thought of as an incarnation of Śeṣa/Ananta Nāga. Secondly, Gonanda was a founding figure in the area of governance for the Kashmirians. Pat° was associated with Gonanda through the epithet *Gonandīya,* directly or through a country name derived from *Gonanda.* For either reason or for both reasons, his MB occupied a very special place in the culture of Kashmir. For the Kashmirians, studying the MB was not merely a matter (a) of gaining proficiency or the highest level of proficiency in the tradition of Pāṇinian grammar or (b) of gaining recognition, in fact extraordinary recognition, as a scholar,' as it probably was in other regions of India over a long time.

Why should we thus construct the cause-and-effect relationship initially? Recall the features of our evidence noted in §1.4. A general word *bhāṣya* that can stand for any significant, learned or original commentary is used in such a way that it can stand only for the MB. Readers who knew what *bhāṣya* meant and who were aware of the function the MB served in Kashmirian life were presupposed. Even a general context to the effect that the rulers were supporters of learning or education is not created before the bhāṣya is introduced in the narration. The introduction is sudden and brief. The only real context it has is of good times. The narrators have favorable impressions to convey of how the rulers concerned ruled. They present to us kings who managed the affairs of the kingdom well and whose emergence they viewed as welcome developments in the history of their land. They must, therefore, presuppose readers who associate the study of the MB with a pleasant reign — with good governance. To accept

this inference is to accept that, for the Kashmirians, the MB was not merely an object of academic achievement.

Even if we to take the perception of a later author like Jona-rāja to be that his reader should know the references to the revival of MB studies in the preceding RT, the hermeneutical situation will not change. A stance similar to Jona-rāja's is seen in the references by Kalhaṇa. The reigns of Abhimanyu and Jayāpīḍa, described by Kalhaṇa, were marked by prosperity and/or peace (or relative peace as is probably the case with any reign). In Kalhaṇa's third reference, the verse in praise of Jayāpīḍa is said to have been composed when the good/auspicious situation/festival of MB elucidation existed. After Jayāpīḍa became a cruel and wicked ruler, the wise obviously felt like matching the change in the king's character with a change in the verse in such a way that, while reminding the hearers and the readers of the earlier wording of the verse, it no longer spoke positively of the king. It would be justified, therefore, to infer that (at least) the two earlier RT authors, Kalhaṇa and Jona-rāja presupposed a close connection between a good, stable reign and the maintenance of MB studies.[39]

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39. (a) The other important text for Kashmirians from the point of view of social welfare was the NMP; cf. Jona-rāja's verse 907: *rājā nīla-purāṇādīn paṇḍitebhyas tato 'śṛṇot* । *cintāntarāṇi saṁtyajya sāhasaika-samutsukaḥ* ॥ This verse, incidentally, strengthens the suggestion that the importance Kashmirians attached to preservation of MB studies was, at least in part, based on associating the MB with a Nāga.

    (b) One more text that the Kashmirians could have similarly associated with the welfare of their land would be the Atharva-veda. A very perceptive discussion about its re-introduction in Kashmir is available in Slaje 2007. However, it is not clear if Kashmir was significantly different in this respect from the other royal domains of India and if the usefulness of the Atharva-veda →

A similar special and specific relationship may be read, although not with the same degree of certainty, in Maṅkhaka's juxtaposition of a sensible, powerful ruler and the ruler's minister's proficiency in the MB. The pattern of associating a king with a MB-proficient scholar seen in passages (c)-(f) of §1.2 is seen in passage (b) too, even though Devadhara and Maṅkhaka were concerned with the eulogy of an individual scholar and had the freedom of leaving the king out (see §3.4b below for another possible instance).

The pattern is not evident in Bilhaṇa's reference, but the reference does not clash with it either. Its absence could be due (a) to the fact that Bilhaṇa's father Jyeṣṭha-kalaśa did not hold a government position or (b) to Bilhaṇa feeling uncomfortable in mentioning his father's association with the government.[40] Whether we prefer (a) or (b), Bilhaṇa's

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→ to Kashmir extended beyond what was achieved through the personality of the ruler's chaplain.

(c) According to Bilhaṇa (Vikramāṅka-deva-carita 18.73), Brahmins were brought from Madhya-deśa to make the land of Kashmir pure. Such an introduction of purity may, first, be understood as implying a mystic power on the part of self-sacrificing, spiritually advanced individuals to change things around them. However, since the change is for the better, it can include — apart from regularity in the appearance of natural forces such as rain — absence of adharma and prevalence of values such as justice, careful use of his/her power by the ruler etc. The effects of bringing certain texts back into use should be similar in spirit or overall character, if not in all the attendant features mentioned so far.

40. We know for certain that Bilhaṇa left Kashmir (under Kalaśa's rule), although he loved Kashmir and was proud of its culture, but we do not know for certain that he returned to Kashmir and established a contact with the ruler (Harṣa) Ṛcā Śuklā (2005:14) →

statement quoted in §1.2 does not pose an obstacle in concluding that, in Kashmir, the perception of many authors, over a long time, was that the MB had a specific and special role transcending the academic or scholarly one and that the readers were aware of this role.[41]

§3.2 When we recall that a similar connection was seen between honoring the Nāgas and the natural (and, perhaps, cultural) welfare of Kashmir (§2.5c, §2.6) and that the MB was ascribed to an author thought to be an incarnation of a pre-eminent Nāga (§2.4), the probability that we are reading the evidence rightly increases. The probability also receives

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→ concludes, on the basis of RT 7.934-937, that Bilhaṇa returned to Kashmir. However, Kalhaṇa does not explicitly say so. His wording can at the most imply that the thought of returning to Kashmir, because of the liberality of Harṣa toward poets, occurred to Bilhaṇa. This limited attribution by Kalhaṇa could be based on Vikramāṅka-deva-carita 18.103: *goṣṭhī-bandhaḥ sapadi sujanaiḥ sāra-niṣkarṣa-dakṣa-prajñā-labdha-stutibhir acirād astu kāśmīrakair me* ǀ Banerji-Guptā translation: "May I have an early meeting for conversation with the good Kashmirians who have earned eulogy by their intellect proficient in realising the real nature of things." Kalhaṇa may not have had certain knowledge of Bilhaṇa's return or could have wished to convey that Bilhaṇa was tempted to return but did not or could not actually return.

41. (a) That, in Jona-rāja's statement, the ruler is a Muslim who offers a relatively stable and exemplarily tolerant rule after a period of commotion and bloodshed is particularly telling. The statement suggests the possibility that the connection between studying the MB and enjoying political stability and peace was seen so widely in Kashmir that it could not be uprooted even after a large-scale and frequently bitter conversion of the Kashmirian populace to Islam.

(b) The surmise in (a) receives indirect support from the instances that have been discovered of the use of Sanskrit by Kashmirian Muslims in their inscriptions.

support from two other considerations: (a) As Bloss (1973:38-43) points out, both the honoring of Nāgas and the righteous conduct of kings are associated with fertility, prosperity and absence of natural calamities. (b) As noted in §2.7, the MB author has a royal and/or territorial connection with Gonanda. In Kalhaṇa's RT 1.185, Gonanda III is specifically credited with restoring the pilgrimages or fairs (*yātrā*) and ritual worships (*yāga*) dedicated to the Nāgas.

§3.3 Further, there are pieces of historical information from other parts of Asia which indicate that the phenomenon of relating texts or species to the welfare of a region or to royalty[42] is not confined to pre-modern Kashmir. Lokesh Chandra (1987:91) informs us that "The Tantras were translated into Chinese, *inter alia,* for the security and stability of the State against the attacks of Tibetans and Arabs. This is explicitly stated in the *Vaiśravaṇa-kalpa* translated by Amogha-vajra (T 1249), and in monk Chihp'an's chronicle *Fo-tsu T'ung-chi* (Jan 1966:65). Reverses on the battlefield were followed by renewed vigour in translating the Tantras."[43] A similar view possibly led the Burmese King Anuruddha (1044-77) to fight a war for the copies of the Tipiṭaka (and the relics of the Buddha), although Collins (1990:115), who speaks of this event, interprets it as meant only for legitimation. Associations of essentially the same nature are said to exist in the case of Prajñā-pāramitā texts, the Vajracchedikā, the Heart Sūtra, etc.

42. In many ancient cultures, the behavior of the ruler is assumed to influence nature. The welfare of the region is thought to depend on his observance of morality. The ruler, in effect, stands for the region.

43. In the phala-śrutis speaking of the benefits of knowing or reciting a text, a similar association with nature running its proper course or with society enjoying freedom from negative alien forces is reflected.

extending to Newar Buddhists, Tibetans and the peoples of Inner Asia (depending on which text has currency in their part of the world).

§3.4 As for the MB's relationship with royalty outside of Kashmir, we find corroboration in the following:

(a) Padma-purāṇa[44] (Uttara-khaṇḍa, adhyāya 189, verses 2-7, Manasukharāya Mora edn):[45] *kṛpālur nara-siṁho*

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44. I learned about the Padma-purāṇa passage quoted here and the Viśva-prakāśa passage quoted below from Jogendra Chandra Ghosh's 1933 and 1934 articles. While the articles have thus been useful to me, they have failed to convince me about the validity of some of Ghosh's inferences. In the present case, one also faces the problem of lack of critical edns of the Padma-purāṇa and Viśva-prakāśa. As the following notes will indicate, some readings remain uncertain.

45. (a) Ghosh (1933:948) does not specify the edn of the Padma-purāṇa he followed or fully cite the passage. He only specifies the reference as "Padma-purāṇa, Uttara-khaṇḍa, ch. 185" and mentions *ujjalpayāṁcakre* as the reading where I have *ujjvalayāṁcakre*. The reference, the explicitly mentioned reading and the presumed reading *kṛpāṇa-nara-siṁha* (cf. Ghosh's statement: "Nara-siṁha was skilled in manipulating the sword") fit the Ānandāśrama edn of 1894 CE.

(b) Ghosh understands *ujjalpayāṁcakre* as meaning 're-established . . . by refuting the arguments of the adversaries.' His meaning is not impossible but is too indirect and too precise for the context. A translation like "made people recite the MB" would be closer and satisfy the contextual need, albeit it too would not be as transparent as *ujjvalayāṁcakre*. The *lectio difficilior* principle of textual criticism would favor the readings *kṛpāṇa-nara-* and *ujjalpayāṁcakre*. However, I would suspend judgment until a critical edn of the Padma-purāṇa is available. In any case, the reading difference does not affect the point being made in the present article.

'bhūn nāmnā gauḍeṣu bhū-patiḥ . . . yasmin vṛtrahaṇo mitre samuddharati medinīm । *punar ujjvalayāṁcakre mahābhāṣyaṁ phaṇīśvaraḥ* ॥[46] "There was a compassionate ruler of the Gauḍas, Nara-siṁha by name. . . . While this friend of the Vṛtra-slayer (= Indra) was bringing the Earth up (= making the life of the people under his control better), the Lord of the Snakes (= Pat°) once again made the MB resplendent / revealed the MB."[47]

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46. (a) After verse 2ab, a poetic description of Nara-siṁha's military might follows in four-and-half verses. I have omitted this description as irrelevant for my present purpose. It will be noticed that the 'cd' part of verse 7, which I have reproduced, is unexpected. There is in it a switch from heroism to scholarly activity. This switch seems sudden (as noticed in Ghosh 1933:948) but makes sense if it is taken in the light of what I point out toward the end of §3.1. In fact, 8ab, *tasyāsīt sainiko dhīmāñchastra-śāstra-kalā-nidhiḥ* "Of him, there was a talented soldier/general — a veritable treasure of physical and mental skills," makes 7cd look contextually quite natural. The situation is comparable to the one in the Tamil inscription mentioned in §3.4b. A shared political and cultural philosophy seems to have existed between the Gauḍas and the Drāviḍas on the East coast of India that was not isolated from the philosophy of the Kashmirians.

    (b) Ghosh (1933:950) informs us: "In a manuscript of the Padma-purāṇa in the Govardhana Maṭha, Puri, we found the reading *'Munīśvara'* in place of *'Phaṇīśvara.'*" Since Pat° is considered a muni, this reading does not pose a problem, but it is not as precisely applicable to Pat° as *phaṇīśvara* (cf. note 28b).

    (c) Ghosh (1933:948) suggests that Nara-siṁha was probably a ruler of "Nara-siṁher dhāp, i.e. the mound of Nara-siṁha in Mahāsthān, in the district of Bogra, Bengal." He adds that "Mahāsthān with its environs is identified as Puṇḍra-vardhana, the ancient capital of Gauḍa."

47. This Phaṇīśvara, as Ghosh suggests, may be identical with the Bhogīndra mentioned in the introductory part of Maheśvara's →

(b) In a mid-tenth century Tamil inscription printed in *South Indian Inscriptions* (vol. 14, inscription 87, p. 56) and found at Kīḷmāttur near Madurai, an officer of the Pāṇḍyas is described as an expert in many texts beginning with the Patañcalam, that is, Pātañjala.[48]

→ Viśva-prakāśa (but this identification may not be the proper and adequate basis for Ghosh's conclusions about Maheśvara's ancestors): *bhogīndra-kātyāyana-sāhasāṅka-vācaspati-vyāḍi-puraḥsarāṇāṁ* । *saviśva-rūpāmara-maṅgalānāṁ* [→ °*ra-maṅkhakānām*?] *śubhāṅka-vopālita-bhāgurīṇām* ॥ *kośāvakāśa-prakaṭa-prabhāva-saṁbhāvitānargha-guṇaḥ sa eṣaḥ saṁpādayann eṣyati vāñchitārthān kathaṁ na cintā-maṇitāṁ kavīnām* ॥. "How will this (lexicon, the Viśva-prakāśa) not perform the role of a wish-fulfilling jewel for the poets as it brings about the desired items/meanings, being (a composition) whose priceless merit is made plausible by its effectiveness manifest in the area not covered by the lexicons of Bhogīndra, Kātyāyana, Sāhasāṅka [= Vikramāditya], Vācaspati, Vyāḍi, Viśva-rūpa [= Sureśvara?], Amara, Maṅgala [→ Maṅkhaka?], Śubhāṅka, Vopālita and Bhāguri!" Since both *phaṇin* and *bhogin* occur in the sense of 'snake,' synonymy of *phaṇīśvara* and *bhogīndra* would not be far-fetched in classical Sanskrit; cf. note 28a.

48. (a) The editor of this volume of inscriptions, A.S. Ramanatha Ayyar, briefly discusses, on p. iii of his introduction, the officer mentioned. In Epigraphia Indica, vol. 25, p. 37, the same scholar states his preference for dating the accession of Vīra Pāṇḍiya, the ruler at the time of the inscription, to circa 947, making it probable that the inscription was executed in mid-tenth century CE.

(b) S. Palaniappan, because of whose email of 10 Dec 1998 on the Indology-Liverpool list, I became aware of the specified inscription, has kindly made the reference clearer in recent correspondence, as a result of which I have been able to give the particulars given in the main text and (a) of the present note. Palaniappan, objecting to a part of K.G. Krishnan's 2002 translation of the inscription, has also pointed out that *pātañcala/pātañjala* in the inscription must stand for the MB, since the Yoga-

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(c) Satya Vrata Śāstrī (1979:59-60) informs us that in Thailand an inscription has been discovered, according to which a king named Hiraṇya established a golden statue of his father king Narendrāditya after he (Hiraṇya) had completed 20 years of his reign. In the inscription, both the son and father, Hiraṇya and Narendrāditya, have been mentioned as knowers of the MB.

§3.5 The notion of protective animals, birds, etc. which is familiar in anthropological literature mostly under the label "totem," is found in the following instances with particulars close to what has been noted above in the case of Kashmir :

(a) Tamil has legends in which floods are followed by the founding of the Caṅkams or Saṁgams/Saṁgamas,

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→ sūtra, which also is referred to with *pātañjala* in some other occurrences of the word, is already included in the six taricaṉam (= darśanas) mentioned earlier in the inscription and since the inscription mentions no other grammatical text.

(c) Palaniappan has further drawn my attention to his May 1999 electronic article "Madurai and Chidambaram: The Tamil Cities that Created Important Sanskrit Myths" available at <http://indology.info/email/members/palaniappan/patanjali.shtml >. While accepting exchanges between the Śaivas of Kashmir and the Śaivas of South India, I do not accept Palaniappan's suggestion, partly based on Professor Madhav M. Deshpande's view, that the equation of Pat° with Śeṣa was transferred from Tamil Nadu to Kashmir. The northern attestation of the equation is earlier in my view and so widespread in North India already in the 10th-11th centuries CE that I do not see much scope for a Tamil equation to reach Kashmir and spread from there to other parts of North India (see note 28). In view of the facts recorded in §2.6, it seems more natural that the equation should take shape in Kashmir. Furthermore, I find Deshpande's and Palaniappan's arguments roundabout and conjecture-based.

'Literary Academies.' In some of these, the serpent Ādi-śeṣa redraws the boundaries of the city of Maturai/ Madurai (as Ananta secures a place for the humans and the Nāgas in Kashmir). Then an expounding of the Vedas (a symbol of society and good norms coming into effect) takes place; cf. Shulman 1980:69.

(b) We learn this from Leibowitz (2000:I.11), among possibly many other earlier sources: "According to legend, if the ravens that reside at the Tower of London ever flee, the tower would crumble and 'a great disaster would befall England.' . . . Many ravens lived on the grounds until the mid-17th century. When King Charles II visited the tower to check on the preparations for his coronation, the "astronomical observator" complained that the ravens were interfering with his work. The king ordered that the ravens be banished. Advised that, for the sake of the kingdom, this was a bad idea, Charles amended his request, permitting six ravens to stay. Today, six ravens (and two reserves, though there is only one right now) are kept at the tower."

(c) Mueller (1996:23-24) informs us: "Gibraltar, the tiny British Colony at the extreme western end of the Mediterranean, is famous for its imposing, strategic Rock, but is also known for its population of Barbary macaques, the only free-living monkeys in Europe. Gibraltar Natives believe that the colony will revert to Spain if these diminutive residents ever die out."

§4.1 Thus, whether we attribute a protective role to a text, the MB, or to an animal or reptile, Nāga, we have enough corroboration, in texts as well as myths and legends, of the thesis inferred above, namely that the Kashmirians attached a

special importance to the study of the MB and made repeated efforts to ensure that it continued to be studied, because in their world view it was linked with the security of their land and was a sign of good governance. How *exactly* they reasoned is not explicit in our sources and may never be recovered in a definite authoritative form. The entities involved in the phenomenon may have more than one symbolic value. The element of recognizing the rights of the earlier inhabitants, including non-human creatures (the bhūmi-putras in a wider sense), may be present as in some other parts of India. History may have become blurred to the point of being indistinguishable from legends and myths. Yet there seems to be no reason to deny the function of ensuring, increasing the potential for or augmenting the forces of communal well-being to the MB, in addition to the contribution it makes to knowledge and enhancement of the standard of scholarship.

§4.2 We have faint reflections of a similar association with the MB in the Gauḍa part of eastern India[49] and possibly in the Tamil country and Thailand (§3.4b-c, 3.5a).

In the second, a connection with royalty is so far missing, but a convention noted by Bhashyācharya (1905:21-22), namely that the MB cannot be read by a Brahmin without śānti, indicates that the association of the MB with a Nāga incarnation existed. Usually a śānti or appeasement rite is offered to those who have been deprived of or are likely to be deprived of their earlier or fair share. It is an ancient Indian way of saying 'sorry' and/or admitting helplessness in the occurrence of a loss. As Pat°, a revered figure of the tradition, is unlikely to be the object of such a rite in his human form, the probability

49. The employment of *punar* 'again' in the Padma-purāṇa citation given in §3.4a is particularly noteworthy.

is that his 'original' Nāga form is intended. The depiction of Pat° in the South Indian temples also points in the same direction (cf. Staal 1972:xvi)

As for the corroborative inscription from Thailand, clearly some special significance lies in rulers knowing the MB. We will probably not be able to prove that this significance did not have in it the element of impressive or extraordinary scholarship. Saying that someone knows the MB could easily have been another way of saying that the person has reached the pinnacle of scholarship. Without excluding this possibility, however, we may interpret the unexpected specificity in the singling out of the MB the way we have interpreted Kalhaṇa's and Jona-rāja's references in §3.1.

What is noteworthy in the close parallels I have listed is that all of them come from areas to the east of Kashmir. Even the remote parallels in which the texts involved are the Tantras and Tipiṭaka are attested in eastern countries such as China and Burma. All these regions are acknowledged to have received Indian thought. The feature of the historical situation identified here is consistent with the eastward movement of Brahmanical and Buddhist thought that has been frequently discussed in the histories of India and Southeast Asia.

§4.3 However, the distances involved are considerable. While the Tantra and Tipiṭaka associations could have traveled through Central Asia, the research carried out so far does not make it seem likely that the MB association could have traveled the same way. In the case of the nearest eastern point from Kashmir *in the present context,* namely the Gauḍa region, the more likely possibility is a frequent and direct connection between peoples. The evidence for such a connection is, fortunately, there (in fact, it is present in our sources in relative abundance, considering the paucity of evidence in other similar

issues). Rightly does Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya (1946:Introduction:4) observe: "The free communication between Kashmir and Bengal during the glorious days of the Buddhist universities of Magadha is now a well-known fact."[50] Just to mention two particularly telling examples of the movement of well-informed persons, Jinendra-buddhi, the author of the Pañcikā/Pañjikā commentary on the Kāśikā, was a resident of Varāhamūla-Huṣkapura (modern Baramulla area of Kashmir),[51] but his work was most current in eastern India, particularly Bengal (cf. *ibid*). On the other hand, Śrīdhara, the author of the Nyāya-kandalī commentary on Praśasta-pāda's Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha, was a native of Bengal, who traveled to Kashmir and whose work, while frequently utilized in Western India, remained unknown in Bengal until modern times (cf. Kaviraj 1924-27, reprint 1982:27-28).

The migration of the MB association with royalty and good governance from the Gauḍa lands to the Tamil lands would just be a matter of conveyance along the eastern coast of India. The farther migration of the association to Thailand would fit with the fact that India communicated with countries of Southeast Asia mostly through its ports on the east coast.[52]

50. I would not, however, limit the observation to Buddhist universities or their times.

51. This tradition recorded by Bühler (1877:13, 73) should be accepted in the present state of our knowledge. It is not contradicted by any other piece of information about Jinendra-buddhi so far available.

52. It may be suggested that the evidence in §§3.3-4.3 can also be accounted for under the view that Pat° was a native of central-eastern India (roughly, one or more places on the Mathurā-Goṇḍa-Pāṭaliputra stretch) and by assuming an east to west movement of the association he and his work have with Nāgas and royalty. For my response to such a suggestion, see §1.2 in my third essay in the present volume.

§4.4 Among the larger connections we have begun to entertain, we should include the MB's connection with the proverb *mahābhāṣyaṁ vā paṭhanīyaṁ mahārājyaṁ vā pālanīyam*, reported to be current among the pundits.[53] I have not come across any literal translations of the proverb (agreeing exactly with the text I have cited) or discussions focusing on its intent. Its meaning, given the simple and common words it contains, seems to have been viewed as too transparent to need any unraveling. The reaction could have been: What is there to spell out in "Either the MB should be read or a great kingdom should be looked after" or in the less literal "Either one should read the MB or one should manage a great kingdom." As to why anyone should make such a statement in the first place or juxtapose the two usually unlinkable items in it, one explanation can be seen in Scharfe's (1977:152) remark: "this saying among the pandits shows the high regard in which they held Patañjali's work" and Venkitasubramonia Iyer's (1978-79:109) remark: "[the MB is] a work of such sterling worth that its proper study is declared as equal to ruling a kingdom." While equal worth/greatness could be one intended suggestion in the proverb, equal complexity or equal expansiveness are other plausible suggestions; cf. Abhyankar-Shukla 1975:vi: "The study of the Mahābhāṣya is an uphill

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53. My immediate sources for the proverb are Abhyankar 1975:vi, Scharfe 1977:152 and Venkitasubramonia Iyer 1978-79:119. Further research may reveal earlier occurrences, with the same or inverted sequence of the two clauses and with *pāṭha°* taking the place of *paṭha°* as in Scharfe's translation, who, however, translates it with "Either read [not 'teach'] the Mahābhāṣya or rule a large kingdom." The essence of the proverb seems to have been current at least from the eleventh century CE, since in the Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa ascribed to Bhoja we find: *rājyaṁ vā kartavyaṁ bhāṣyaṁ vā śrotavyam* (Raghavan edn., p. 22) cited as an example.

task, as borne out by the familiar remark heard in Schools of traditional Vyākaraṇa studies viz. *mahābhāṣyaṁ vā paṭhanīyam, mahārājyaṁ vā pālanīyam.*" However, if the relationship between preserving the tradition of MB learning and procuring the welfare of a region, especially Kashmir, that I have proposed is allowed to stand, another understanding of the proverb could be put forward *without ruling out the validity of the understandings of V. Iyer and Abhyankar mentioned so far.* Instead of taking *mahābhāṣyaṁ vā paṭhanīyaṁ, mahārājyaṁ vā pālanīyam* as a sentence in which *vā* is used for two mutually exclusive propositions — "One either studies the MB or one takes care of a great kingdom, both activities are so demanding that one cannot manage them at the same time" — one could now take it as a sentence in which the two '*vā*'s convey coexistence of two actions, for samuccaya is also recognized as a (functional or cosignified) meaning of *vā* in the traditional understanding of sentences such as *vāyur vā tvā, manur vā tvā* (Taittirīya Saṁhitā 1.7.7.2) and *yaśo 'dhigantuṁ sukham īhituṁ vā manuṣya-saṁkhyām ativartituṁ vā* (Kirātārjunīya 3.40), where the entities or actions involved are not mutually exclusive.[54] Depending on the context in which the sentence at the base of the proverb took shape, it is possible, therefore, to understand the originally intended meaning as "One should study the MB *and* manage a large kingdom," with an implicit cause-and-effect relationship of the form "the first action would be helpful in performing the second action well." (Imagine an English-speaking senior minister advising a would-be-king: "You had better study the MB, if you wish to take good care of a great kingdom.") Understood thus, the proverb would be a

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54. (a) Cf. Tilaka's Nipātāvyayopasarga-vṛtti p. 2; Śiva-datta's Rūpa-mālā, Prakīrṇaka section, part 3, p. 21; Srivatsankacharya's Avyaya-kośa. A Dictionary of Indeclinables, p. 325.

(b) Some Kirātārjunīya edns read *sukha-lipsayā vā.*

reminder of an artifact of Kashmir's cultural history and could be viewed as another piece of evidence supporting the explanation I have given of Kashmir's attachment to the MB. I do not insist that it be viewed as such,[55] but I do wish to note that, viewed thus, it makes the juxtaposition of "great kingdom" and "a grammar text" look less arbitrary — less a matter of pure chance.

§4.5 In §2.2, I expressed a sense of puzzlement about the fact that the text involved in the very interesting cultural phenomenon I have tried to identify and delineate, namely the MB, is one of the most challenging texts produced in the Sanskrit tradition. Its espousal is similar to the espousal of Tantras and the Tipiṭaka (§3.3) only to the extent that, like the latter two, it is a text. Its content belongs to a field in which far fewer scholars take interest and to which even fewer scholars make intellectual contributions. Unlike the Tantras and the Tipiṭaka, it has no religious following or organizational backing. That it was viewed as the work of a "son of the soil" and/or of the incarnation of a great Nāga may not constitute a full explanation of the "shield text" role assigned to it and of the perseverance shown in holding on to it. This feeling leads me to place the investigation I have just completed in the wider context of the strategies employed by the intellectuals and social planners of ancient India.

To some, it may seem sufficient to apply the anthropologists' "primitive societies" approach to the interesting web of causal factors before us. Three elements —

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55. The reasons behind my keeping the other interpretational possibility open are these: The Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa reads 'vikalpa' as the meaning of *vā* in *rājyaṁ vā kartavyaṁ bhāṣyaṁ vā śrotavyam* (Raghavan edn, p. 22). In the examples of samuccaya cited, the vikalpa meaning would not lead to incongruence.

(a) being superstitious about reptiles, etc. (b) not having a scientific understanding of the world around us, and (c) absence of a theory or abstractions about social institutions — may appear adequate to them to explain the distinctive use of the MB in Kashmirian life. However, the text involved and the agents of the actions involved are certainly not primitive in the Kashmir case. It seems unlikely that they would, for centuries, hold on to a quaint use without questioning it.

The society led by Brahmins of which they were a part is known to use myth (in the wider sense of the term — in the sense "a discourse that takes place at the level of a believing subject, a discourse that gets him/her to do the right/desired thing without resorting to explicit rational injunctions or arguments) very widely and intelligently to achieve several social goals (cf. Aklujkar 2004:717-723). What could originally have been primitive, tribal or provincial seems to have been more than once turned into a tool of socio-political management in Brahmanism. Even if the MB had originally attracted extraordinary veneration because of its supposed authorship by Śeṣa/Ananta, the Brahmanic strategy could easily have turned the veneration to achieve something for the society at large.

To sustain the study of a text belonging to a highly demanding branch of knowledge, the lower levels of development of scholarship must be well-cultivated in a country. Education must enjoy wide support and receive substantial backing from the ruler.[56] Such enlightened attitude

56. What Candra-prabha's Prabhāvaka-carita says in its Hema-candra section (verses 86-98), reflecting the author's perception of the situation in Hema-candra's time (11th century CE), supports this conjecture. Eight grammars and their mss are said to be in use in Kashmir. Hema-candra's patron is advised to get them for him, and he does so.

on the part of the subjects and the ruler, in turn, strengthens the prospects for a just and peaceful society.

Could pre-modern Kashmir be signaling to us that if a region can sustain the study of a text like the MB, all other branches of learning it presupposes will be cultivated, the educational system will reach a very high standard, political and social harmony will follow, and peace and prosperity will be guaranteed? Could the hidden message of what we have unearthed be that in the highly troubled state of contemporary Kashmir we should, regardless of how unrealistic it may seem at present, aim at creating a situation in which MB expertise again begins to flourish?

3

Gonardīya, Goṇikā-putra, Patañjali and Gonandīya*

Ashok Aklujkar

§1.1 THE question of whether Patañjali, the author of the Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya, was referred to also with the epithets *Gonardīya* (= *G*) and *Goṇikā-putra* (= *Goṇ*) has engaged the attention of scholars for a long time. The prevailing view is that neither epithet should be accepted as historically applicable to Pat° — that *G* and *Goṇ* can at the most be names of authors quoted by Pat°.[1] The purpose of this paper is to

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* The contents of the first asterisked note in my other paper in this volume should be understood here. In order not to make my presentation more complex than what its central concern requires, I do not touch upon all the derivational details of grammar or translate all the cited passages. I presuppose a basic understanding of Sanskrit and the śāstras in what follows. I wish to thank Professor Kenneth Zysk for informing me about the notices in secondary literature of references to Gonardīya and Goṇikā-putra found in Kāma-śāstra literature.

For the abbreviations employed and works cited, the bibliography at the end of the next essay should be seen.

1. (a) Cf. Mitra 1883:261-269; Kielhorn 1886:81-84; Chakravarti 1926:267; Puri 1957:16, fn 2; Agnihotrī 1963:52; Y. Mīmāṁsaka saṁvat 2030:302-303, saṁvat 2041:347-348, 357, 360-361; see note →

demonstrate that, minimally, the issue needs to be kept open in the present state of our knowledge and that, in the case of G (especially when it is understood as a corruption of *Gonandīya*), we very probably have an historically valid and revealing epithet. True, myths have developed around the two epithets in the tradition, but the possibility that, behind those myths, a historical truth exists is very much real. To this extent, the paper should be useful also for the discussion that has intermittently taken place regarding the ancient Indian sense of history.

Goṇikā-putra

§1.2 MB on Pāṇini (= P) 1.4.51, *akathitaṁ ca*, p. I.336, mentions Goṇ as follows: *atheha kathaṁ bhavitavyam? netāśvasya srughnam iti, āhosvin netāśvasya srughnasyeti. ubhayathā goṇikā-putraḥ.* "What should be the correct form? 'the leader of the horse to Srughna' or 'the leader of the horse of Srughna'? Both according to Goṇikā-putra."[2]

→ 75. Among all the Indologists I mention Bhandarkar (1873:70) and Lévi (1925:198-199) seem to be the only investigators who have tried to determine Pat°'s native place without questioning the 'G = Pat°' tradition. Both, however, differ in their identification of the Gonarda region while placing it central-eastern part of northern India and do not take any position on the 'Goṇ = Pat°' tradition. Without referring to them, Caturveda (1966:156) mentions the identifications associated with them, expresses preference for Bhandarkar's identification, explicitly accepts the 'G = Pat°' tradition and maintains silence on the 'Goṇ = Pat°' tradition. For related details and observations, see §5.2 below and §3.4 in my third essay in this volume.

(b) For the pre-modern expression of the view that G is other than Pat° — that he is a Vārttikakāra quoted by Pat°, see §2.1 below.

2. Here I have adopted the translation by Mitra (1883:261) with minor changes. Kielhorn (1886:82) explains the passage thus: →

Śiva-rāmendra-sarasvatī (sometime between 1543-1673 CE), author of the Ratna-prakāśa commentary (= comm), and Nāgeśa (1673-1753), author of the Uddyota comm, state that Goṇ is the same person as the Bhāṣyakāra, but both may be viewed as making their statements as mere reporters of a received piece of information and as not indicating confidence about the validity of the piece.[3] The former uses *iti sāṁpradāyikā vadanti*, putting some distance between himself and the information he imparts. The latter appends *ity āhuḥ* to his statement of identification, which has led Kielhorn (1886:82) to characterize the statement as "somewhat vague" and Kudāla (1912:273) to consider it as a statement of *aruci*.[4] However, while such interpretations cannot be ruled out, they are not the only possible interpretations. We could be making them

→ "After having raised the question, whether one should say *netāśvasya srughnam* or *netāśvasya srughnasya*, i.e. whether the word *srughna* should here be put in the acc. or gen. case, Patañjali simply answers *ubhayathā goṇikā-putraḥ* 'Goṇikā-putra (says that) either (case is correct)."

3. (a) Śiva-rāmendra p. IV.324: *guṇa-karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī-vikalpas tu bhagavata iti bhāvaḥ.* ***goṇikā-putra*** *iti. icchatīti śeṣaḥ. goṇikāyāḥ putro bhagavān bhāṣyakāra iti sāṁpradāyikā vadanti.* [This is followed by a summarizing verse:] *kṛd-yoga-lakṣaṇā ṣaṣṭhī guṇa-karmaṇi veṣyate* I *bhāṣyakāreṇa. mukhye tu nityam eva tu sā bhavet* II

   (b) Nāgeśa, p. II.273: *goṇikā-putro bhāṣyakāra ity āhuḥ.* Kudāla 1912:273, fn. 2: ***āhur iti.*** *aruci-bījaṁ tu* — "[citation of Vātsyāyana, KS 1.1.12, reproduced below in §1.5]" *iti kāma-sūtre prathamādhyāye śāstra-saṁgrahe vātsyāyanena gonardīya-goṇikā-putrayoḥ pārhta-kyenopādānena "gonardīyaḥ patañjalau" iti kośa-prāmāṇyena* [see §1.7 below] *gonardīyasya bhāṣyakāra-patañjali-nāmatvāṅgīkāre 'pi goṇikā-putrasya bhāṣyakāra-nāmatve pramāṇānupalambha eva — iti.* The first part of the argument here, the one coming from the KS, is found earlier in Mitra 1883. The latter is present in Y. Mīmāṁsaka saṁvat 2041:348 etc.

4. Contrast with such an impression the impression that statements about G (§2.4) make.

only because we are influenced by indications in some other sources of information, such as the ones stated at the beginning of §1.5. There are no *unambiguous* expressions favoring them in the original statements. What we may take as a suggestion of distancing in the case of Śiva-rāmendra may, in fact, be a suggestion of traditional support. He clearly proceeds on the assumption that the information conveyed is valid and extends the epithets *bhagavat* and *bhāṣyakāra*, commonly reserved for Pat° in the Pāṇinian tradition, to Goṇ.[5] He is also unlikely to have a negative association with *sāṁpradāyika* 'those who know/follow the saṁpradāya 'the totality of what is handed over (in a succession of teachers and students)' that has come about in some parts of India because of modernization, westernization etc. Similarly, what Kielhorn and Kudāla have taken as vagueness or lack of commitment on the part of Nāgeśa could either be advice of caution (for reasons such as the one the information in §1.3 and §1.6 suggests) or an expression of endorsement, because *ity āhuḥ* implies that the view came from three or more predecessors — that it enjoyed a reasonably widespread acceptance.[6] As the citation in §2.6 below shows, commentator Nārāyaṇa draws even a stronger implication of abhiyukta support from Kaiyaṭa's *ity āhuḥ*.

§1.3 While commenting on MB 1.4.51 cited above, Kaiyaṭa (not later than 1050 CE, probably as early as 950 CE), who preceded Śiva-rāmendra-sarasvatī and Nāgeśa by several centuries, does not identify Goṇ with Pat°.[7] Also, his use of

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5. More occurrences of *bhagavat* standing for Pat° have been incidentally collected in Aklujkar, 2005.

6. Cf. Y. Mīmāṁsaka (saṁvat 2041:357): *ka.ī prācīna ṭīkākāra* "Several ancient commentators took *Goṇ* to stand for Pat°."

7. Mitra's (1883:261) first phrasing is not precise in that it gives the impression that Kaiyaṭa speaks of *Goṇ* as an epithet of Pat°, but

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smaryate and *śiṣṭa-smaraṇāt* may be taken as indicating that he thought of the MB author as mentioning the view of a predecessor through the specification *Goṇ.*[8] However, the first fact would at the most yield an ex silentio argument, inconclusive by its very nature. As for the second, it would be very natural for Kaiyaṭa to use *smaryate* and *śiṣṭa-smaraṇāt* with Pat° in mind, for it is evident that he thought of Pat° as a muni and śiṣṭa, capable of making as authoritative statements as the ones in the Smr̥tis; cf. for example, Kaiyaṭa on MB 1.1.29, p. I.339, reproduced below in §2.5.

§1.4 Kielhorn (1886:82) suggests that a difference of style is one reason why we should reject the 'Goṇ = Pat°' proposition coming from a part of the tradition: ". . . when we find that only on p. 332 Patañjali has answered a similar question by saying *ubhayathāpi bhavitavyam,* and has there moreover given his reasons for such answer, we shall, I think, decide in favour of the alternative that in the words *ubhayathā goṇikā-putraḥ* he is quoting the opinion of *another* scholar."

The passage to which Kielhorn refers occurs in MB 1.4.49 (*kartur īpsitatamaṁ karma*) and reads thus: *atheha kathaṁ bhavitavyam? taṇḍulān odanaṁ pacatīti, āhosvit taṇḍulānām odanaṁ*

→ later on the same page Mitra clarifies that Kaiyaṭa provides support only for G as an epithet of Pat°.

8. Kaiyaṭa 1.4.51: ***ubhayatheti.*** *guṇa-karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhī-dvitīyā-darśanād ubhayam api smaryate. vācanikaṁ cedaṁ, na tu nyāyyam. yatra hy ekenaiva śabdena bhinna-kakṣyayor guṇa-pradhānayoḥ karmaṇor abhidhānaṁ na saṁbhavati tatra pradhāna-karmaṇa evābhidhānaṁ nyāyyam. ṣaṣṭhī tu pr̥thag guṇa-pradhānābhyāṁ dvitīyāvad vidhīyate. virodhābhāvād ubhābhyāṁ prāptā śiṣṭa-smaraṇād guṇa-karmaṇi vikalpyate.* Annaṁ-bhaṭṭa (p. IV.319) elucidates this. Elucidations by other commentators of Kaiyaṭa mentioned in §2.3 must be unavailable in the mss for this part of the Pradīpa, since the edn by Narasimhacharya does not contain them.

pacatīti? ubhayathāpi bhavitavyam. katham? iha hi taṇḍulān odanaṁ pacatīti dvy-arthaḥ paciḥ. taṇḍulān pacann odanaṁ nirvartayatīti. ihedānīṁ taṇḍulānām odanaṁ pacatīti dvy-arthaś caiva pacir, vikāra-yoge ca ṣaṣṭhī, taṇḍula-vikāram odanaṁ nirvartayatīti.

It is to Kielhorn's credit that he could isolate the only passage in the midst of many passages in which *ubhayathā* occurs that offers a close parallel to the 'Goṇ' passage. However, the deduction Kielhorn makes from the passage is problematic. If passages x1 and x2 are similar in style and structure and x2 has the features of a quotation, one *could* argue that x1 is likely to be a quotation; but one cannot argue that x1 *is* a quotation. For the argument to be truly applicable, the quotation indicators in x2 must be beyond doubt. Such is not the case with the MB 1.4.49 passage. It resembles only in the structure 'usage *U1 āhosvit* usage *U2 iti*.' It does not at all come across like a quotation. Even in MB 1.4.51, the signs of being a quotation do not extend beyond the name *Goṇ*, the very detail standing in need of determination; *iti* is missing. This fact and further scrutiny reveal that some text is very likely to have been lost between *ubhayathā* and *goṇikā-putraḥ*. The passage in which these two words occur, while having a perfect structural similarity (*atheha . . . ubhayathā*) with the passage in 1.4.49 at its beginning, comes across as incomplete: *api bhavitavyam* and a reasoning similar to the one found under 1.4.49 are missing. Generally, the structural parallels are fully maintained in the MB passages such as *pūrvaṁ hy apavādāḥ pravartante . . .*, *yathā-lakṣaṇam aprayukte* etc. Because of this evidence of textual loss, we must be open to the possibility that Goṇ's view might have been quite different from what we have taken it to be. The name might not have been associated with sanctioning of optionality in the case of

'netāśvasya srughnam : netāśvasya srughnasya'[9] and hence also not with the parallel passage cited by Kielhorn. The view or observation the MB credited to Goṇ might even have been irrevocably lost in the surviving mss.

§1.5 A stronger argument against the identity of G (or Goṇ) and Pat° came from Mitra (1883:266-267). He observed that Vātsyāyana's Kāma-sūtra (= KS) spoke of G and Goṇ in a manner that would make no sense unless they were understood to be two different persons. Obviously, Pat° could at the most be identical with either G or Goṇ but not both. The KS references concerned are:

(a) 1.1.12: . . . *pṛthak provāca . . . gonardīyo bhāryādhikārikam* . . . 1.5.25: *utkrānta-bāla-bhāvā kula-yuvatir upacārānyatvād aṣṭamīti gonardīyaḥ*. 4.1.4: *na hy ato 'nyad gṛhasthānāṁ citta-grāhakam astīti gonardīyaḥ*. 4.1.21: *na hy ato 'nyad apratyaya-kāraṇam astīti gonardīyaḥ*. 4.2.28: *jyeṣṭhā-bhayāc ca nigūḍha-saṁmānārthinī syād iti gonardīyaḥ*. 4.2.34: *guṇeṣu sopabhogeṣu sukha-sākalyaṁ. tasmāt tato viśeṣa iti gonardīyaḥ.*

A summary of these following Bhattacharyya 1975:75 would be: ". . . G's treatise dealt with the position and conduct of one's wife. In the KS, G's views are mainly dealt with in connection with the conduct of the devoted wife and her behavior during the absence of her husband. He mentions the domestic arts by which a woman should win the heart of her husband (5.1.4-21) and the variety of behavior by which she can obtain an honourable place among the co-wives (4.2.36ff)."

9. Note also that constructions of the type "*ubhayathā* + a specialist's or thinker's name" do not occur in the Kāma-sūtra (= KS) or the Artha-śāstra (= *AŚ*), the two texts particularly relevant in the present context, and in the Kāvya-mīmāṁsā, an indirectly relevant text.

(b) 1.1.12: . . . *pṛthak provāca . . . goṇikā-putraḥ pāradārikam . . .* 1.5.4: *anya-kāraṇa-vaśāt para-parigṛhītāpi pākṣikī caturthīti goṇikā-putraḥ.* 1.5.31: *saṁbandhi-sakhi-śrotriya-rāja-dāra-varjam iti goṇikā-putraḥ.* 5.1.8: *yaṁ kaṁcid ujjvalaṁ puruṣaṁ dṛṣṭvā strī kāmayate. tathā puruṣo 'pi yoṣitam. apekṣayā tu na pravartata iti goṇikā-putraḥ.* 5.4.9: *nāyikāyā eva tu viśvāsyatām upalabhya dūtītvenopasarpayet prathama-sāhasāyāṁ sūkṣma-bhāvāyāṁ ceti goṇikā-putraḥ.* 5.4.34: *saṁstutayor apy asaṁsṛṣṭākārayor astīti goṇikā-putraḥ.* 5.4.43: *sakhī-bhikṣukī-kṣapaṇikā-tāpasī-bhavaneṣu sukhopāya iti goṇikā-putraḥ.* 5.6.41: *te hi bhayena cārthena cānyaṁ prayojayeyuḥ. tasmāt kāma-bhayārthopadhā-śuddhān iti goṇikā-putraḥ.*[10]

Using words from Bhattacharyya 1975:75, the preceding can be summarized thus: "Vātsyāyana mentions Goṇ as . . . authority on the extra-marital relations with wives of other men. . . . According to [Goṇ], there is a fourth type of Nāyikā, called Pākṣikī, i.e. one who is already married to another (1.5.5). He is opposed to the view of Bābhravya that a woman who has had intimate relations with five men becomes fit to resort to . . . such a woman is not fit if she happens to be the wife of a relative or friend or a learned brāhmaṇa or a king (1.5.34). He argues that a woman may feel attracted to every

10. (a) Mitra could not list all the occurrences in the KS probably because the KS text was not as well printed in his time as it is now. I have brought his list to completion with the help of an electronic text.

(b) Vātsyāyana's account of how the Kāma-śāstra literature came to be composed that forms the context of . . . *pṛthak provāca . . . gonardīyo bhāryādhikārikam* . . . and . . . *pṛthak provāca . . . goṇikā-putraḥ pāradārikam* . . . is essentially reproduced in Kāñcī-nātha's commentary on Rati-rahasya 1.1 and in verses 22 and 24 in Vīra-bhadra-deva's Kandarpa-cūḍā-maṇi. Kāñcī-nātha's work contains a citation of KS 5.4.34 in the following corrupt or misprinted form: *saṁstutayor apy asaṁmṛṣṭākārayo[ra]pi dūtyam astīti goṇikā-putraḥ.*

handsome man, and a man to every handsome woman, but this does not imply that they strive for physical union in all the cases (5.1.8). When a man wishes to approach a woman, who is not so much experienced, he should seek the help of a female messenger (5.4.9). The places convenient for meeting are the house of a woman-friend, and the resorts of a beggar woman, a recluse or a woman practising penance (5.4.42). [A] wife should be guarded and [the] guards should be reliable persons."

The situation presupposed in Mitra's argument, however, is not as straightforward as he understood it to be. We have neither definite nor comprehensive knowledge of why ancient Indian authors and thinkers mentioned themselves and others with epithets rather than given personal names.[11] Why in a few cases the same epithet is noted for authors belonging to widely separated times and different branches of learning is also an unresolved issue. The possibilities that the epithets were literally applicable because of a shared gotra, paternal or maternal name,[12] country name etc. and that some epithets

11. (a) A society encouraging non-egotistic expression and/or attaching greater importance to discoveries, views or contributions than to individuals is one possible reason, but of that too we do not, as far as I know, get an *explicit* corroboration in the tradition. It is the preponderance of non-personal references, especially in the early period, that makes it likely.

    (b) Some epithets are quite strange or funny in their meanings (e.g. *Ghoṭa-mukha, Bahu-dantī-putra*). Several bear traces of non-Indo-Aryan languages. The co-occurring ones do not show any exclusive pattern (as to being patronymics, matronymics pen-names etc.) in some (perhaps, all) cases; more than one variety appears in the same text.

12. Conventions such as the following also need to be borne in mind: renaming the bride at or after the wedding ceremony so that her name would match the name of her husband; naming the grand-son after the grand-father.

were borrowed because of the prestige associated with them cannot be ruled out. In other words, the G and Goṇ of the MB may, as historical persons, have nothing to do with the G and Goṇ of the KS.

Further, could it just be a coincidence that G and Goṇ, both of whom appear in a grammar treatise while expressing a position different from the one stated earlier, appear together in a Kāma-śāstra treatise, are listed one after the other in the introductory section of that treatise, and are spoken of as writing on obviously connected topics (bhāryādhikāra 'concerning a man's own wife/wives' and pāradārika 'concerning some other person's wife/wives')? Could one historical person not have assumed two different epithets for two different but related essays (see §3.3)?[13] In other words, there may be only one historical person behind the G and Goṇ of the KS and the G and Goṇ of the MB, or there may be one historical person behind the G and Goṇ of the MB and another historical person behind the G and Goṇ of the KS. In the former case, the person may have kept to his convention in two texts. In the latter case, the persons concerned could have taken over a convention from an earlier period independently of each other or through one's imitation of the other[14] and each could have taken two different epithet names for two different but related monographs (see notes 13, 14 and 16).

Thirdly, is it not significant that the verb form used in the KS to speak of the contributions of G and Goṇ to Kāma-śāstra

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13. We do not know if this person used his given individual name in the colophon of his work, for the work has so far remained undiscovered.

14. Given the dating of the MB and the KS generally accepted at present, the KS would be imitating the MB. However, see note 78.

is *provāca*? As Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṁsaka (saṁvat 2041:266) rightly observes, a prokta text builds upon the original text of someone else; it is a revision or complementation of an earlier work, usually by a specialist who expounded or taught that work to students. Vātsyāyana's commentator Yaśodhara paraphrases *provāca* with *prakarṣeṇa vac* and clarifies the nature of prakarṣa intended in the context with *prakarṣaś ca grantheṣu sva-mata-prakāśanam*. The references made by Vātsyāyana collected above fit this description. They predominantly have the appearance of adding a qualification, detail or evaluation to an existing body of knowledge, not of composing extensive, entirely self-initiated texts.

The following verses cited by the commentators of Kālidāsa as coming from G also point in the same direction:

(a) Malli-nātha on Raghu-vaṁśa 19.16, *tasya sāvaraṇa . . .*: *atra gonardīyaḥ* [in vaitālīya metre, after syllables amounting to ten mātrās that are left out] *saṁdhir dvi-vidhaḥ sāvaraṇaḥ prakāśaś ca* ǀ *sāvaraṇo bhikṣuky-ādinā prakāśaḥ svayam upetya kenāpi* ǁ *iti* ǁ Cf. Aruṇa-giri-nātha: *dakṣiṇāvartas tu* ***sāvaraṇāḥ*** *pracchannāḥ,* ***dṛṣṭāḥ*** *prakāśāś ca* ***saṁdhayaḥ*** *saṁdhāna-viṣayo* [→ °*yā*?] *yeṣāṁ tathā. gonardīya-mate saṁdhir dvi-vidhaḥ sāvaraṇaḥ prakāśaś ca. sāvaraṇo bhikṣuky-ādinā. prakāśaś ca svayam upasṛteneti.*

(b) Malli-nātha on Raghu-vaṁśa 19.29, *kaṇṭha-sakta-. . .*): *atra gonardīyaḥ* [in Upendra-vajrā metre] *ratāvasāne yadi cumbanādi prayujya yāyān madano 'sya vāsaḥ* [→ *dāsaḥ* as in the citation of the same verse by Aruṇa-giri-nātha and Nārāyaṇa] ǁ" *iti* ǁ

(c) Malli-nātha, Aruṇa-giri-nātha and Nārāyaṇa on Raghu-vaṁśa 19.31, *mitra-kṛtyam . . .*: *atra gonardīyaḥ* [in śloka/ anuṣṭubh meter] *ṛtu-snātābhigamane mitra-kārye*

tathāpadi । *triṣv eteṣu priyatamaḥ kṣantavyo vāra-gamyayā* ॥ *iti* ॥[15]

(d) Malli-nātha on Kumāra-saṁbhava 7.95, *nava-pariṇaya- . . .: yathāha gonardaḥ* [→ *gaunardaḥ?* cf. Schmidt 1902: 47; °*rdīyaḥ*?] [in śloka/anuṣṭubh meter] *hāsena madhunā narma-vacasā lajjitāṁ priyāṁ* । *vilupta-lajjāṁ kurvīta nipuṇaiś ca sakhī-janaiḥ* ॥ *iti* ॥[16]

Additionally, a reference in Kokkoka's Rati-rahasya verse 2.5 to Goṇī-putraka (a form dictated by the need of the metre, rightly equated with Goṇikā-putra by the commentator Kāñcī-nātha) indicates that Goṇ prepared a sixteen-item list of erogenous body parts as against a fifteen-item list by Nandikeśvara and that Goṇ elaborated upon the 'moon digit'

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15. The *Raghu-vaṁśa* commentator Dinakara quotes the same verse without attributing it to any particular author.

16. (a) While all these verses could fit a text discussing wives (Bhāryādhikāra), they (especially the first one) indicate openness or willingness to discuss the possibility of man's sexual interest in others' wives (Para-dārādhikaraṇa). They are thus close in terms of content as reported to us by Vātsyāyana.

(b) At the first and third occurrences specified above, Malli-nātha and Aruṇa-giri-nātha cite Vātsyāyana too. Nārāyaṇa does the same at the third occurrence. This indicates that in the view of the specified commentators G was not an epithet of Vātsyāyana. Thus, while in the MB context the tradition leans on the side of G, Goṇ and Pat° being one and the same historical person, in the KS context it rules out Vātsyāyana, G and Goṇ being less than two different historical persons.

(c) In the KS passages reproduced at the beginning of the present section, Vātsyāyana does not seem to be presenting the thoughts of G and Goṇ in their own words. There is no stylistic difference in the sentences speaking of G and the sentences speaking of Goṇ. Nor is there any stylistic difference of both groups of sentences from Vātsyāyana's sentences elsewhere in the KS.

theory associated with the lists (see Schmidt 1902:403-429, Bhattacharyya 1975:107 for an explanation of the theory).[17]

Of a similar nature is Jyotir-īśvara Thakkura's reference in Pañca-sāyaka 3.54 to what Goṇī-suta recommends if a woman wished to keep her husband under her sway: *saṁbhoga-śeṣa-samaye nija-kānta-meḍhraṁ yā kāminī spṛśati vāma-padāmbujena* । *tasyāḥ patiḥ sapadi vindati dāsa-bhāvaṁ goṇī-sutena kathitaḥ kila yoga-rājaḥ* ॥[18]

Thus, even if we were to think of Pat° as identical with G and/or Goṇ of the MB as well as the KS, we would not be

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17. Kokkoka's commentator Kāñcī-nātha takes *munīndraḥ* in verse 6.8 as standing for *gonardīyaḥ*. If this specification is correct, G may be credited with adding to Kāma-śāstra the content of the verse, namely the designation (*tila-taṇḍula*) of a particular embrace. However, in the case of *munīndraḥ* occurring in verse 6.11 with a similar content, Kāñcī-nātha does not offer the gloss *gonardīyaḥ*. If this is because he had conveyed the contextually particularized sense of *munīndraḥ* only three verses earlier, G can be credited also with the recognition or designation *jaghanopaśleṣa*. Similar would be the case of the nail mark maṇḍalaka in verse 8.4. As Kāñcī-nātha distinguishes the meaning of *muni* from *munīndra* while explaining verses 10.13 (***muninā** vātsyāyanena*), 10.26 (***munayaḥ**,* no gloss offered either because the meaning 'authoritative thinkers of the tradition' would be clear to the average reader or because no specific information was available to Kāñcī-nātha) and 10.29 (***munibhiḥ** goṇikā-putrādibhiḥ*), it is quite probable that the items mentioned in Rati-rahasya 6.8, 6.11 and 8.4 actually came from G and that in the case of the item in 10.29 (samudra position in sexual intercourse) Goṇ was the first or best known articulator.

18. (a) That the work of Goṇ was available to Jyotir-īśvara is borne out also by *dṛṣṭvā . . . goṇī-putraka-mūla-deva-bhaṇitaṁ . . .* in the introductory part of the Pañca-sāyaka.

    (b) Kokkoka's work was written in the 8th century CE or earlier; Jyotir-īśvara's by end of the 13th century CE or the beginning of the 14th century CE.

required to assume that he composed some kind of sizable and entirely self-initiated text(s), making it seem improbable that one and the same person could compose so many works. Assumption of texts that complemented or revised pre-existing texts would suffice.

As to a question like 'How could the same person have been active in so many or so widely different branches of knowledge?,' the response should be that such a question does not constitute a strong objection to the identity view. It serves only to urge caution, not to establish that the persons involved must be different. In several intellectual traditions, authors have composed texts in branches of knowledge we would not think of as proximate (consider, for example, the work of H.G. Wells in English literature and history and of Arthur B. Keith in Indology and British empire's constitutional law).

Lastly a possibility about which I am not enthusiastic but which is logically there: If G of the MB was really Gonandīya (§5.3, §5.5 below) and such was not the case with G of the KS, then we will have 'Gona**n**dīya : Goṇ' as a pair in the MB and 'Gona**r**dīya : Goṇ' as a pair in the KS. This will reduce the extent of the feeling of 'too-much-coincidence' that Mitra and those who followed him have obviously experienced (but it will still be unusual to have the specified pairs).[19]

§1.6 What seems to be a formidable obstacle in connecting Pat° with two epithets, namely *G* and *Goṇ*, is thus not really formidable. Mitra's observation does not force upon us the proposition that we must choose between G and *Goṇ* as the alternative designation of Pat°. We still retain the option of

19. As indicated, I do not attach much evidential value to this outcome, because it will still be unusual to have pairs formed by names beginning with the same *g* sound.

stopping at the acknowledgement that a similar author persona problem confronts us in the MB and the KS but refusing to hold that the problem is identical. In the case of the KS, the tradition does not inform us that Vātsyāyana could historically be identical with G or Goṇ or both. In fact, it clearly indicates the opposite (see note 16b). Also, we are not constrained to accept that the G and Goṇ of the KS were identical with those of the MB or with each other. In the present state of evidence, it seems more probable that the G and Goṇ of the KS were different from the G and Goṇ of the MB. Yet in both cases the pair could have, independently, stood for a single historical person in the context of the MB as well as in the context of the KS, although a tradition to that effect has not yet been found explicitly stated in the context of the KS. The historical person in the KS context could have followed a precedent created in the MB context (see notes 14 and 78). Nor is the alternative possibility that there was only one real person behind the G and Goṇ in both the contexts absolutely ruled out. The metres and the diction of the verses ascribed to G make it seem unlikely that such was the case, but, in themselves, the metres and the diction are meagre evidence to claim that non-identity is proved.[20]

§1.7 If we must choose between 'G = Pat°' and 'Goṇ = Pat°,' the evidence *as a whole* would lead us more in the direction of affirming the former equation than the latter. As suggested at the end of §1.4, we do not know with certainty what thought or opinion of Goṇ found a mention in the MB. At present, we do not have any *definite* basis even to assume that Goṇ is mentioned in the MB. The (probably) dangling

20. Other statements of Mitra (1883:262) that serve as objections against the 'Goṇ = Pat°' view, as well as the 'G = Pat°' view, are discussed in §3.3 and §3.8.

presence of his name could as well be due to a wrong insertion of a note made in the margin of some ms, although there is no way, at present, to take this particular possibility to the level of probability.

Further, the tradition of Pāṇinīyas is clearly much thinner in respect of Goṇ being identical with Pat° than in respect G being identical with Pat°. For the latter identity, we have corroboration in Pāṇinian works as well as outside of them as the following listing, arranged in the approximate chronological order, establishes:[21]

(a) Rāja-śekhara (880-920 CE), Kāvya-mīmāṁsā, adhikaraṇa 1, adhyāya 6, third edition, pp. 25-26) cites the MB part beginning with *yas tu prayuṅkte* and ending with *yas tv apramatta-gītas tat pramāṇam* (Kielhorn edition, pp. 2-3), with the addition of *eva* and *iti gonardīyaḥ* at the end.

(b) Kaiyaṭa (not later than 1050 CE, probably as early as 950 CE), author of the Mahābhāṣya-pradīpa, and his commentators: see §2.4 and §3.1 below.

(c) Ahi-rāja/Bhoja (11th century CE), Nāma-mālikā chapter 3, p. 26: *gonardīyaḥ patañjaliḥ.*

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21. A piece of evidence recorded by Kielhorn (1986: 82) goes thus: ". . . on the margin of a ms which was written in AD [=CE] 1695, and which often furnishes valuable notes, we have the gloss *goṇikā-putrācārya-mate ubhayathā. ṣaṣṭhī bhavati, dvitīyāpi bhavati,* 'in the opinion of the Ācārya Goṇikā-putra . . .,' a phrase which cannot be taken to refer to the Bhāṣyakāra." Apparently, Kielhorn thinks that the MB author will not be mentioned as *ācārya* by a commentator or annotator of the MB. As §3.2(b) points out, this cannot be a strong argument against the identity view. Furthermore, the gloss has the marks of a note written by a scholar-user of a MB manuscript for his own benefit.

(d) Yādava-prakāśa (11th century CE), Vaijayantī-kośa 3.6.157, p. 69: *gonardīyaḥ patañjaliḥ.*

(e) Hema-candra (1088-1172 CE), Abhidhāna-cintā-maṇi verse 851cd (= Martya-kāṇḍa verse 515cd): *gonardīye patañjaliḥ.* Auto-commentary: *gonarde bhavo gonardīyaḥ. "dor īyaḥ"* [Siddha-hema-śābdānuśāsana 6.3.32] *tatra* [= in the same sense, for that very referent]. *patati pataḥ. pato 'ñjaleḥ patañjaliḥ, pṛṣodarāditvāt.*

(f) Vardhamāna (1103-1153 CE), Gaṇa-ratna-mahodadhi, adhyāya 1, verse 37, p. 68: *kecit go-kakṣa-śabdaṁ yañ-antam atra* [= *krauḍy-ādi-gaṇe*] *peṭhuḥ. tan-mate gaukakṣyā. phalaṁ tu gaukakṣī-patiḥ. gaukakṣī-putraḥ.* [. . .; see §3.10] *ṣyaṅaḥ saṁprasāraṇaṁ bhaved iti gonardīyo manyate. asmākaṁ tu mate pautimāṣyāvat siddhih. tathā gaukakṣyā-patiḥ, gaukakṣyā-putra ity eva bhavitavyam. atrāpāṭhāt.*[22] *tathā ca saunāgāḥ paṭhanti "ṣyaṅaḥ saṁprasāraṇe gaukakṣyā-pratiṣedha"* [probably taken over from MB 4.1.74] *iti.*

(g) Puruṣottama-deva (1100-1150 CE), Trikāṇḍa-śeṣa kāṇḍa 2, varga 7 (= Brahma-varga) 25-26: *gonardīyaḥ patañjaliḥ* ॥ *cūrṇikṛd bhāṣyakāraś ca . . .* C.A. Seelakkhandha's commentary (p. 60), written a little before 1915 / 1916 CE, explains this with: *gonarde tan-nāmaka-parvatra-samīpe deśe bhavaḥ. 'gonandīyaḥ'* (see §5.3, §5.5, note 89 below). *patañjaliḥ. patan añjalir yasmai. cūrṇīkṛt. curṇiṁ mahābhāṣyaṁ karotīti. bhāṣyakāraḥ iti catvāri patañjali-muneḥ.*

(h) Mathureśa (1600-1625 CE), Śabda-ratnāvalī Brahma-varga-prakāśa, p. 118: *gonardīyaḥ patañjaliḥ* । *cūrṇikṛd bhāṣyakāraḥ syāt . . .*

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22. That is, in kārikā 1.37, which deals with a part of P's krauḍyādi gaṇa and on which Vardhamāna is commenting at this point.

(i) Sahaja-kīrti (1605-1648 CE), Siddha-śabdārṇava kāṇḍa 1, adhikāra 2, p. 19: *gonardīyaḥ patañjaliḥ.*

No support similar in age and breadth can be claimed for identifying Goṇ with Pat° even if we decide to regard the kośa attestations (c), (d), (e), (g) (h) and (i) as essentially one, because they have identical wording and their immediate contexts are formed by very similar words, making it highly likely that one kośa compiler borrowed from the other.

This does not mean that we are not free to make such remarks as (Puri 1957: Preface: v) "Presumably the name of his [= Pat°'s] mother was Goṇikā." The literal meaning of *Goṇ* is 'a/the son of Goṇikā,' As pointed out in §§1.2-6, it has not been proved that Goṇ cannot be identical with Pat°. A historical kernel could very well have been preserved in the mytho-poetic narrations of Pat°'s life such as Rāma-bhadra-dīkṣita's Patañjali-carita (2.7-19). These mention Goṇikā as Pat°'s mother. The very oddity and rarity of the metronymic speak in favour of its being historically genuine (unless, of course, the oddity was introduced purely for the purpose of being humorous, sarcastic, insulting etc.). The common meaning of *goṇī* is 'sack.' The other meanings the dictionaries record are 'cow,' 'ragged/torn garment' and 'measure similar to droṇa.' *Goṇikā* as a diminutive of *goṇī* in any of these meanings is unlikely to convey a sense that would make *Goṇ* a flattering or attractive metronymic.[23]

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23. (a) Many other similarly formed epithets are listed on p. 311 of Index II (Ab Ultimo) in Vishva Bandhu's Vaidika-padānukrama-kośa. They show a prevalence of the type 'female of a bird/animal + *putra*.' *Goṇikā-putra,* therefore, is more likely to have meant "the son of a smallish cow whose udders were full of milk." From sources such as Trikāṇḍī Brahma-kāṇḍa-vṛtti 140/176 we learn that a cow holding much milk was sometimes called *goṇī.*

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Gonardīya Not a Vārttika Author

§2.1 Before we determine how the epithet *G* would fare under a scrutiny of evidence similar to the one carried out in the case of *Goṇ*, we should note that the identification of G with Pat° is not uniform in the traditional sources. He has also been identified with a/the Vārttikakāra[24] by Hari-dīkṣita in his Śabda-ratna or Bṛhacchabda-ratna commentary on Prauḍha-manoramā, an auto-commentary by Bhaṭṭoji-dīkṣita on his Siddhānta-kaumudī. On P. 7.2.101 (Sitaram Shastri edn vol. I, p. 357), Hari-dīkṣita writes: ***gonardīya** āheti. gonardaḥ parvataḥ. tatra bhavo bhāṣyakāra iti kaiyaṭādayaḥ. gonardīyo vārttikakāra ity apare.* P.S. Subrahmanya Sastri 1960 (second edn of vol. I): xl-xli, 1951 (vol. II): 139, who seems to have been the first to point out the divergent view recorded by Hari-dīkṣita, however, states the following as his own view: *G* stands for a Vārttikakāra who did not agree with the opinions of

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→ (b) The Vaidika-padānukrama-kośa also lists epithets such as *kṛttikā-putra, Anūḍhā-putra, Vaiśyā-putra, Devakī-putra, Gargī-putra,* and *Vātsī-putra,* derived from personal names, descriptions of life condition, family name, country/ethnic name etc.

(c) The duality of having a respectable meaning and an unattractive meaning is also reflected outside Vedic literature in epithets such as *Bahu-dantī-putra, Kuntī-putra, Gautamī-putra (Sātakarṇi) and Vāsiṣṭhī-putra (Śrī-sātakarṇi).*

(d) In many parts of India, a child is given an unattractive name if the mother has a history of unsuccessful pregnancies or infant deaths.

24. "The Vārttikakāra" is generally used for Kātyāyana, the presumed author of most of the Vts commented upon in the MB. The other (probable) Vt authors whose names or epithets have been recorded by the Pāṇiniīyas are: Bhāradvāja, Sunāga, Kroṣṭṛ, Vāḍava/Kuṇara-vāḍava, Vyāghra-bhūti and Vaiyāghra-padya; cf. Y. Mīmāṁsaka saṁvat 2041:340-344.

Vārttikakāra Kātyāyana and the Mahābhāṣyakāra.[25] Probably basing themselves on Hari-dīkṣita's statement or a part of P.S. Subrahmanya Sastri's statement, Bhagavat-Bhate (1986: 194) say: "Traditionally, this Gonardīya is either Pat°. himself or Kāt[yāyana]. However, there is no clear-cut evidence to prove either."

§2.2 Subrahmanya Sastri's (and indirectly Hari-dīkṣita's apare) view is unlikely to be correct. It does not come from as old a source or as broadly spread out a complex of sources as the 'G = Pat°' view (§1.7). Generally, the older and widely shared sources have a better chance of being close to an historical truth (when there is one). The 'G = Vārttikakāra' view is more likely to have been arrived at precisely because no explanation was known by the time of the later Pāṇinīyas of why the MB author would refer to himself in the third person and with a peculiar epithet and that too with some rarity or unexpectedness or because no support could be detected for the 'G = Pat°' view in what survived of a source older than Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa, namely Bhartṛ-hari's (= BH; not later than 425 CE) Mahābhāṣya-ṭīkā (= MBT), in other words, because a dissatisfaction along the lines of what Mitra (1883) and Kielhorn (1886) felt was felt by Hari-dīkṣita with the inherited piece of information.[26] Perhaps revealing of the newness or

25. Sastri does not specify the place where Hari-dīkṣita expressed the specified view. My thanks to Prof. Madhav M. Deshpande for identifying the place. Sastri also attributes the element 'who did not agree with the opinions of Vārttikakāra [Kātyāyana] and the Mahābhāṣyakāra' to Hari-dīkṣita. However, there is nothing expressive of that element in the words actually employed by Hari-dīkṣita. Sastri might have misremembered *vārttikakāra ity apare* as *vārttikakāro 'paraḥ* or as *aparo vārttikakāraḥ*.

26. Hari-dīkṣita (or his source) did not put forward the view that G was merely quoted by Pat°. This may be indicative of his awareness that G could not be denied a certain (high) degree of authoritativeness.

ad-hoc nature of Hari-dīkṣita's 'G = Vārttikakāra' view is the fact that his own disciple Nāgeśa shows no awareness of it and unhesitatingly continues with the 'G = Pat°' view.

§2.3 Apart from these probabilistic consideration, there are other problems in identifying G with Kātyāyana or the main Vārttika (= Vt) author (as distinct from *one of the Vt authors* quoted in the MB). To understand these problems, we need to know first the main concerns of the four MB passages in which *G* occurs.

In reproducing the passages, I will explain the background and, for the sake of convenience in presentation, cite, immediately after them, the relevant parts of the traditional MB commentaries and sub-commentaries (readers not at home in reading Sanskrit, particularly technical grammatical Sanskrit, may find it helpful to read §§2.8-10 first). The commentaries come from BH, Kaiyaṭa and Śiva-rāmendra-sarasvatī.

Unfortunately, that part of BH's MBT which would have discussed the first occurrence of *G* is not preserved in the only surviving manuscript. Parts that could have dealt with the third and fourth occurrences might never have been written, if the references to the commentary as Tripādī or Tripadī were made in recognition of its not extending beyond the first three pādas of (the Aṣṭādhyāyī and hence of) the MB.

When Śiva-rāmendra-sarasvatī refers to Kaiyaṭa, his intention, unlike that of the other Pāṇinīyas cited here, is almost always to take an exception to Kaiyaṭa's understanding of the MB. On those occasions he is a critic of Kaiyaṭa, not a commentator in the dominant traditional Indian sense 'explicator, annotator, one who glosses or paraphrases' etc.

In the case of the sub-commentators, the dates suggested by M.S. Narasimhacharya (1973:xvi-xix; 1983:xcv-cli) and Y.

Mīmāṁsaka (saṁvat 2030:418-429, saṁvat 2041:453-470) are: Rāma-candra-sarasvatī, author of (Laghu-)vivaraṇa: saṁvat 1525-1575 = 1466-1518 CE; Īśvarānanda, author of (Bṛhad-) vivaraṇa,: saṁvat 1535-1575 = 1478-1518 CE; Nārāyaṇa, author of Nārāyaṇīya, available only after P adhyāya 3: not later than saṁvat 1654 = 1597 CE; Pravartakopādhyāya, author of Prakāśa, available only for P adhyāyas 1 and 2, with some gaps in between: saṁvat 1650-1730 = 1593-1673 CE; Annaṁ-bhaṭṭa, author of Uddyotana: saṁvat 1650-1700 = 1593-1643 CE (but later than Pravartaka, whom he is said to quote); Śāstri-nārāyaṇa, author of Kaiyaṭa-ṭīkā or Nārāyaṇīya, available only for P adhyāya 1 pāda 1: saṁvat 1710-1760 = 1653-1703 CE; Nāgeśa: saṁvat 1730-1810 = 1673-1753 CE.

§2.4 Occurrence 1 of G: **MB on P 1.1.21** (*ādy-antavad ekasmin*) p. I.78: After a discussion begun by the Vt *saty anyasminn ādy-antavad-bhāvād ekasmin ādy-antavad-vacanam*, justifying P's wording, four Vts follow, in which three ways of taking *ādy-antavat* out of the sūtra (vyapadeśivad-bhāva, loka-vijñāna and different understandings of the concepts ādi 'beginning' and anta 'end') are pointed out. After the last Vt comes *gonardīyas tv*[27] *āha satyam etat 'sati tv anyasminn' iti.* "But

27. Kielhorn (1886:82 fn. 1) reproduces the reading of the Kashmir ms accessible to him as *gonardīya āha satyam etat 'saty anyasminn' iti.* One would be inclined to favour this reading, not containing *tu* before either *āha* or *anyasmin*, given the superiority of the readings of Kashmir mss vouchsafed by Kielhorn (1880:8, 1883:9). However, like all the Deva-nāgarī mss consulted by Kielhorn, the MB commentators Kaiyaṭa (a Kashmirian) and Śiva-rāmendra read the first *tu*, the former explicitly and the second implicitly (cf. his use of *dūṣayati* indicating that what precedes *gonardīyaḥ* is a pūrva-pakṣa, a view to be refuted). Probably being aware of this or similar considerations, Kielhorn (1886:82) retained *tu* in his edn and translated: "but Gonardīya says, that (the definition

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G says that it is valid (to hold) that (one can really speak of a beginning and an end only when) something else (other than the item of which the beginning and end are under consideration) is there (i.e. the position taken in Vt 1 is correct, and it is necessary to state what P has stated)."[28]

(a) **Kaiyaṭa** 1.1.21, p. I.298: *bhāṣyakāras tv āha* ***sati tv anyasminn*** *iti. na hy anapekṣita-pratiyoginor ādy-antayoḥ pravṛttir ity arthaḥ. tasmād, ekasmin mukhya ādy-anta-vyapadeśo nāstīti kartavyo yogaḥ. yady api laukikena vyapadeśivad-bhāvenādy-anta-vyapadeśa ekasminn api sidhyati, tathāpi gauṇatvāt kāryeṇa na bhavitavyam iti yasya bhrāntiḥ syāt taṁ prati yogo 'yam ārabdhaḥ.*[29]

→ of ādi and anta) ought to contain (the clause) *saty anyasmin* 'while it is accompanied by something else' (and that therefore P's rule is necessary)."

As for the *tu* between *sati* and *anyasmin*, further text-critical work is needed. It has no implications for the present inquiry.

28. Subrahmanya Sastri's (1951:139) explication is worded thus: "Gonardīya says that the argument adduced for the necessity of the sūtra *sati tv anyasmin ādy-antavad-bhāvād ekasminn ādy-anta-vacanam* stands true." What he mentions as sūtra is actually a Vt, amenable, at the most, to the term *bhāṣya-sūtra*.

29. (a) Kaiyaṭa, under MB 1.1.21, first gives us the message of G's (= Pat°'s in Kaiyaṭa's mind) words as 'P 1.1.21 is needed' (*kartavyo yogaḥ*), but then he adds that this message is meant only for someone whose grasp of the issue is not perfect (*gauṇatvāt kāryeṇa na bhavitavyam iti yasya bhrāntiḥ syāt taṁ prati yogo 'yam ārabdhaḥ*). Nāgeśa (below) undercuts the assumption of imperfect grasping and indicates thereby that G/Pat° should be understood as concluding that P 1.1.21 is not necessary. His commentator Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍe (*anena sūtrānāvaśyakatvam evoktam*), Kaiyaṭa's other commentator Annaṁ-bhaṭṭa and the independent MB commentator Śiva-rāmendra, state the same conclusion explicitly, with Annaṁ-bhaṭṭa differing from Nāgeśa in his reasons and →

Īśvarānanda, p. II.93: ***anapekṣita-pratiyoginoḥ*** *anapekṣita-para-pūrvayor ity arthaḥ.* ***tathāpīti.*** *gauṇa-mukhya-nyāyābhāvāya svarita-liṅgāsaṅgasya durjñānatvād ity arthaḥ.*

Pravartakopādhyāya, p. 101-102: *gonardīya-śabdo gonarda-saṁbandha-nimitto bhāṣyakāre vartata ity āha* ***bhāṣyakāra*** *iti. ādy-antāv ity ukte, kasyādiḥ kasyānta iti saṁbandhy-apekṣā-darśanam eva tatra pramāṇam ity āha* ***na***

→ Śiva-rāmendra differing from Kaiyaṭa in his. However, we should be mindful that, in G's words, there is nothing more than acceptance of the semantic view expressed in the first Vt in MB 1.1.21 and, therefore, nothing more than acceptance of the need to use *ādy-antavat* in the sūtra. We should not assume that the logical concerns and urge to ensure consistency *of a particular type* which determine the commentators' interpretation were present in Pat°'s mind, for he uses no expression indicative of them.

(b) Kielhorn (1886:82) presents G as favoring the composition of the sūtra. Subrahmanya Sastri (1951:139), on the other hand, follows the traditional commentators. The details he gives in this context are, however, not entirely accurate: "According to the former two [= Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa], this sentence [= the G sentence under P 1.1.21] tells us that Mahābhāṣyakāra wants the sūtra against the opinion of Vārttikakāra. But in the opinion of Hari-dīkṣita, another Vārttikakāra who went by the name of Gonardīya did not agree with the opinion of Vārttikakāra and Mahābhāṣyakāra." From the statements of Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa reproduced here it should be evident that Kaiyaṭa represents G/Pat° as recommending a qualified acceptance of P 1.1.21 and Nāgeśa suggests that G/Pat° is better understood as recommending non-acceptance of the same. Thus, the first part of Subrahmanya Sastri's note is inaccurate. Since he does not give a precise reference as to where Hari-dīkṣita's opinion is expressed, I cannot ascertain the accuracy of the second part of his note. If Hari-dīkṣita on P 7.2.101 quoted above is meant, one finds there only *vārttikakāraḥ*, not any phrase that would mean "another Vārttikakāra" (see note 25).

hy anapekṣiteti*. tasmād ādy-anta-padārtha-nirṇaya-phalam āha* ***tasmād*** *iti. evam api nirūḍha-loka-vyavahāreṇaivādy-anta-kāryasyāsahāye bhāṣyakārasyāpi siddhatvād yogānārambham āśaṅkyāh* ***yady apīti****.*

Annaṁ-bhaṭṭa, p. II.97: *gonardīyo bhāṣyakāra ity āha* ***bhāṣyakāras tv*** *iti. bhāṣye 'saty anyasminn ity-etad eva satyam' ity anvayaḥ.* ***anapekṣita-pratiyoginoḥ*** *anapekṣita-pūrva-parayoḥ.* ***tathāpīti****. gauṇa-mukhya-nyāyānavatāra-nimitta- svarita-liṅgāsaṅgasya durjñānatvād ity arthaḥ.* ***bhrāntiḥ*** *ity-anenākaraṇam api sūcitam.*

Nārāyaṇa-śāstrin, p. II.97: *vārttikakārāpekṣayā kathaṁ gonardīyasyābhiyuktataratvam ity āśaṅkya daiśiko 'yaṁ bhāṣyakārasya vyapadeśa ity āha* ***bhāṣyeti****. gauravāt kathaṁ viśiṣṭasya pravṛtti-nimittatvaṁ bhāṣyakṛtāṅgīkṛtam ity-atrāha* ***na hīti****. prāmāṇikatvād gauravaṁ na doṣāyety arthaḥ.*

Nāgeśa, p. I.298: *gonardīya-padaṁ vyācaṣṭe* ***bhāṣyakāra*** *iti.* ***anapekṣita-pratiyoginoḥ*** *anapekṣita-para-pūrvayoḥ.* ***ādy-antayoḥ*** *ādy-anta-rūpārthayoḥ.* ***pravṛttiḥ*** *ādy-anta-śabda-pravṛttir ity arthaḥ.* ***tathāpīti****. vastuto loka-nirūḍhatvād gauṇatvam evātra nāstīty arthaḥ.*

(b) **Śiva-rāmendra-sarasvatī,** 1.1.21, p. II.95: *tad etad* [namely, the view that one could use *ādi* and *anta* without presupposing the presence of some other item — that *saty anyasmin* is not necessary as a condition or assumption — and that P 1.1.21 is not necessary] *dūṣayati kutārkika-nāga-garuḍāyitaḥ sva-nāma-grahaṇa-pūrvakaṁ bhagavān* ***gonardīya*** *iti.*[30] ***satyam etad*** *iti. ardhāṅgīkāra-sūcakam idam. tad-ukta-pravṛtti-nimittaṁ* [→

30. Curiously, Śiva-rāmendra's extended metaphor ends in equating Pat°, usually considered a Nāga incarnation, with Garuḍa, the well-known enemy of Nāgas.

tvad-u°?] svābhimata-pravṛtti-nimittaika-deśatayāṅgīkṛtaṁ, na tu pravṛtti-nimittatayaiveti tad-upapattiḥ. sati tv anyasminn iti cety [=?] *arthaḥ. tathā ca tena prakāreṇa pratyākhyānaṁ sūtrasya na yujyata iti bhāvaḥ. etena* [Kaiyaṭa cited in (a) is quoted here from *tasmāt* to *ārabdhaḥ*] *iti nirastam. vārttikakārābhimata-sūtra-pratyākhyāna-prakārasya bhagavatā* [see §1.2, note 5, §3.1] *nirākṛtatve 'pi sūtrasya sthāpitatvābhāvāt. vārttika-pratyākhyāna-yuktīnāṁ sūtra-pratyākhyāne 'pi tulyatvena vārttika-viṣaya-nyūna-viṣayakatvābhyupagamena*[31] *sūtrasya sthāpane bhagavato vaiṣamya-nairghṛṇya-doṣāpatteś ca.*

§2.5 Occurrence 2 of *G*: **MB on P 1.1.29** (*na bahu-vrīhau*) p. I.91: Concerned with what usage could justify the formation of the sūtra, the MB author goes through *priya-viśvāya* and *dvy-anyāya* (and *try-anyāya* etc.) as such usages. He refers to Vts 2.2.35.1-2 as leaving room for such usages (and hence for the formation of P 1.1.29). This necessitates a general consideration of whether the prohibition in P 1.1.29 should be understood as applicable only to bahu-vrīhis ending in an item from the sarvādi class:

Discussant 1: The prohibition should apply also to bahu-vrīhis ending in asarvādi items. The gain in such a broadened understanding of the sūtra would be that *akac*, sanctioned by P 5.3.71 (*avyaya-sarva-nāmnām akac prāk ṭeḥ*) and serving as exception to *ka* prescribed by P 5.3.70 (*prāg ivāt kaḥ*), would be blocked in the case of stems ending in consonants, and *ka* will be allowed. As a consequence, (*ahakaṁ pitā asya* ⟶ *asmad* + *pitṛ* + (bahu-vrīhi-indicating) *kaP* (by P 5.4.153) ⟶ *mad* (by P 7.2.98) + *pitṛ* + *ka* ⟶ *mat* + *ka* (by P 5.3.70) + *pitṛ* + *ka*) will yield *matka-*

31. Probable meaning: 'through the acceptance of nyūna-viṣayakatva (being smaller, being self-contained, not requiring the presence of another item).' The repetition of *viṣaya* or *viṣayaka* is suspicious.

pitṛka, which is desired. Similarly, from *tvakaṁ pitā asya* will come about the desired *tvatka-pitṛka*.

Discussant 2: How can the step of denying (the designation *sarva-nāman*) that pertains to the outside (that can take place only after a formation has acquired the nature of a bahu-vrīhi, which, in turn, depends on more than one stem/word becoming syntactically connected) be allowed to come in the way of a derivation step that pertains to the inside (namely, the addition of *akac* before the *at* in *mat* and *tvat* according to P 5.3.71 that depends only on *mat* and *tvat* receiving the designation *sarva-nāman*, which, in turn, depends on only a single word)?[32]

Discussant 1: What you say would be valid if no exceptions are made to the metarule *antar-aṅgaṁ bahir-aṅgād balīyaḥ* that you invoke. But exceptions indeed are made as in the derivation of *gomat-priya*, for example.

Discussant 2: The exception you cite is made because the substitution advised in P 7.2.98 (*pratyayottara-padayoś ca*) indicates that an exception be made.

Discussant 1: In the present case, too, we could take P 1.1.29 as indicating the necessity of making an exception.

Discussant 2: P 1.1.29 is needed for another purpose, namely the derivation of (words like) *priya-viśvāya* or *priya-sarvāya*.[33]

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32. Cf. BH's imperfectly preserved but largely intelligible explanation in Abhyankar-Limaye, 1970:211 and Bhagavat-Bhate, 1986:23; also Kaiyaṭa, p. I.338.

33. This variant given by Kielhorn on p. 512 of his MB edn should be taken seriously. It parallels *atisarvāya* given under Vt 1.1.27.2, to which the immediately following word *upasarjana-pratiṣedha* refers. The repeated citation of *priya-viśvāya* as a form justifying →

Discussant 1: The upasarjana-pratiṣedha, 'non-application of the designation *sarva-nāman* to a subordinated stem,' made in Vt 1.1.27.2 would take care of *priya-viśvāya / priya-sarvāya*, releasing P 1.1.29 to indicate an exception to the antar-aṅga metarule. A typical bahu-vrīhi has the features 'being one word (by virtue of having a single unified meaning or single syntactic-semantic role in the sentence),' 'carrying one accent' and 'taking a single case termination.' However, the term *bahu-vrīhi* can also stand for 'linguistic units *meant* to form a bahu-vrīhi, words that will eventually result in a bahu-vrīhi' on the principle tādarthyāt tācchabdyam 'using X for Y, when Y is meant to bring about the content of X.' In the present context, we will understand *bahu-vrīhi* in the latter sense (so that the underlying units that will derive *priya-viśvāya / priya-sarvāya* will be designated bahu-vrīhis and, as subordinated units, will not be thought of as subject to the designation *sarva-nāman* and, further, as creating a need for P 1.1.29, which is meant to restrict the application of *sarva-nāman*).

When, thus, it is implied that P 1.1.29 has really no usage that would justify its composition, we read: *gonardīya* [→ *°dīyas tv*] *āha.*[34] *'akac-svarau tu kartavyau pratyaṅgaṁ* [→ *pratyaṅge*; see

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→ the way the sūtra is composed would bring the discussion back to where it started. Besides, if Pat° was reverting to an example that was rejected earlier, he would have had his interlocuter say so. Such is his usual style (the *'athavā punar astu . . . nanu coktam . . .'* format). In spite of these considerations, I have not rejected *priya-viśvāya* because it exists as a pratīka in BH's comm and is not unsuitable to the context; cf. Annaṁ-bhaṭṭa 1.1.29, p. II.173: *atisarvāyety-ādy-artham upasarjana-pratiṣedhāvaśyakatve, tata eva priya-viśvāya ity-ādye 'pi siddhe . . .*, in which the indirectness or strain involved in making *priya-viśvāya* applicable *at the present stage of discussion* is acknowledged.

34. Kielhorn's MB edn in its third version prepared by Abhyankar (1962:91) has a footnote to the effect that the Benares edn of the →

Aklujkar, forthcoming] *mukta-saṁśayau /' tvakat-pitṛko makat-pitṛka ity eva bhavitavyam iti.* "But G says that, in the inner part (of *mat* + *pitṛ* + *ka* or *tvat* + *pitṛ* + *ka*, that is, in *mat* or *tvat*),[35] one should effect *akac* and the accent (proper to a sarva-nāman stem) without (bearing in mind) any doubt.[36] (The derived forms) should be none other than *tvakat-pitṛka* (and) *makat-pitṛka* (not *tvatka-pitṛka* and *matka-pitṛka* as presupposed by discussant 1)."[37]

→ MB reads *gonardīyas tv āha.* As the mss used by BH and Kaiyaṭa, older by many centuries, had the same reading, we should accept it.

35. It is not clear if G had bases in addition to *tvat* + *pitṛ* + *ka* and *mat* + *pitṛ* + *ka* in mind. P 5.3.71 (*avyaya-sarva-nāmnām akac prāk ṭeḥ*) allows *akac* in the case of indeclinables and pronouns in general, i.e. without restriction to *yuṣmad* and *asmad*.

36. To be precise, *mukta-saṁśayau* is an adjective of *akac-svarau*. The phrase literally means "*akac* and accent which have given up — which are freed from — doubt/hesitation." However, unless *mukta-saṁśayau* is viewed as an adjective transferred to the process from the items involved in the process, that is, as an equivalent of the adverb *mukta-saṁśayam*, it would not work well in the context as an earlier translator and an earlier explicator quoted in note 37 acknowledge.

37. (a) Kielhorn's (1886:82) translation: "Gonardīya says that (the words termed *sarva-nāman*) ought without any doubt to take *akac* and to receive the accent (due to them as *sarva-nāmāni*, even in a bahu-vrīhi compound) because (both *akac* and that accent present themselves before the composition takes place and) are (therefore in regard to it) antar-aṅga; that accordingly one ought (not) to say (*tvatka-pitṛka, matka-pitṛka*, but) *tvakat-pitṛka, makat-pitṛka*, (and that Pāṇini's rule 1.1.29 is superfluous and may be dispensed with)."

Subrahmanya Sastri's (1951:197) explication: "Gonardīya says that undoubtedly the svara and *akac* due to *sarva-nāman* should be had. Hence in his opinion the forms should be *tvakat-pitṛkaḥ* and *makat-pitṛkaḥ*."

→

(a) **BH** 1.1.29 folio retro 142 of the Berlin ms, first three lines: ***gonardīyas tv āha.*** *kim asyācāryasya darśanam?* [. . .][38] *ekāṁ* [→ *eke*] *tāvat varṇaya[n]ti*[39]

→ (b) Kielhorn (1886:82) represents Pat° and G, respectively, as arguing that P 1.1.29 is necessary and unnecessary. Subrahmanya Sastri (1951:193-197) speaks of both Pat° and G (along with the Vārttikakāra) as seeing no loss in the removal of the sūtra. Bhagavat-Bhate (1986:186-194) do the same but not explicitly, only suggesting that, since no pertinent examples are said to exist, the view must have been that the sūtra is to be rejected.

(c) In this MB passage probing if P 1.1.29 is needed, the proposed examples are declared to be ineligible by appealing to post-P statements: two Vts and one statement which, in the present state of our resources, can only be taken as a shortened version of a statement by Pat° himself under MB 2.2.35. In other words, the Sūtrakāra is presumed to be aware of the proposals the later Pāṇinīyas made. I am not aware of any study of such anachronistic posing of questions in the MB.

38. In the following part, there is no glossing of the words attributed to G in the MB. It is extremely improbable that BH would leave out those significant words from his elucidation. As sentences like *eke varṇayanti, anye varṇayanti* etc. occur frequently in the MBT, a haplography taking the copyist's eye from one *eke* to another *eke* several lines later seems to have occurred.

39. (a) One's first reaction would be to read the first two syllables of this word in the ms as *varspa* or *varsya*. The second syllable does not at all look similar to *ṇa* that appears in the following part in words such as *grahaṇam, dakṣiṇā* etc. In those words, *ṇ* is written very much like modern North Indian *ṇ*. However, *varspaya*°/*varsyaya*° must be read as *varṇaya*°, because the same orthographic feature is noticed when the context leaves no doubt that the intended word is *varṇayati* or *varṇayaṁti*. In other words, the scribe has one form for *ṇa* when it is a part of *varṇayati* or *varṇayaṁti* (and perhaps some other words containing *ṇa*) and another form when it is a part of words like *grahaṇa* and *dakṣiṇā*. Why this should be the case needs further study.

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vastrāntarvasarnātrarā [→ *vastrāntara-vasanāntarā*][40] *ity-evam-arthaṁ bahu-vrīhi-grahaṇaṁ paṭhitavyam. tatra sati prayojane 'śakyam antar-aṅgo vidhir bahu-vrīhiṇā bādhituṁ tādarthyaṁ vā pratipattum ityetanā* [→ *iti. etan na.*][41] *saṁpraty evoktam "upasarjana-pratiṣedhenāpy etat siddham"* [MB p. I.91 line 16] *iti. antara-śabdaś cāpy upasarjanam. tasmād etat bhāṣyakāro vyāṁcati* [→ *vyācaṣṭe? vāṁchati? °ro . . . pratyācaṣṭe?*][42] *sūtram iti.*[43]

→ (b) The emendation *eke tāvat varṇayanti* comes from Abhyankar-Limaye 1970:211 and is adopted in Bhagavat-Bhate 1986:24. The absence of sandhi between *tāvat* and *va°* in it is not problematic because the MBT ms is not consistent in the application of sandhi rules (cf. *etat,* instead of *etad,* before *bhāṣyakāro* below). Further, it is likely that *ekāṁ* is a corruption of *eke* (just as *ekaṁ* could corrupt into *eke* through the spreading of ink). Similarly, a loss of the anusvāra is plausible in the case of *varṇayaṁti* (= *varṇayanti*). The interpretation introduced by *eke tāvat varṇayanti,* is rejected in the part beginning with (the partly emended) *etan na.*

40. This emendation effected by Abhyankar-Limaye and Bhagavat-Bhate is supported by the occurrence of *vastrāntara-vasanāntarāḥ* as an example toward the end of the MB on the immediately preceding sūtra and in Kāśikā 1.1.29.

41. This emendation by Bhagavat-Bhate is superior to Abhyankar-Limaye's *etacca,* contextually and because of the clear presence of *nā* (probably resulting from *na* followed by a daṇḍa) in the ms.

42. Abhyankar-Limaye read the ms as *tprāṁcati* and correct it to *vyācaṣṭe*. Bhagavat-Bhate read it as *vyāṁcati* and suggest the same correction. Since the sentence needs a grammatical subject, *bhāṣyakāraḥ* must be retained. Its sandhi form *bhāṣyakāro* indicates that the next word began with a soft consonant, assuming no textual loss has occurred after *bhāṣyakāro*. This rules out (the nonsensical) *tprāṁcati* and its (somewhat improbable) emendations such as *pratyācaṣṭe* that begin with a hard consonant and are presumed in the Bhagavat-Bhate translation "rejects" (note 43), contrary to the translators' own initial acceptance of *vyācaṣṭe*. If one wishes to read *pratyācaṣṭe,* one must imagine that

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(b) **Kaiyaṭa** 1.1.29, p. I.339: ***gonardīyas tv āheti.*** *sūtra-pratyākhyānam etat. yathottaraṁ hi muni-trayasya prāmāṇyam. svaraḥ "svāṅga-śiṭām ad-antānām"* [Śāntanava, Phiṭ-sūtra 29] *ity ādy-udāttatvam.*

Rāma-candra-sarasvatī, p. II.171: ***śiṭ*** *iti sarva-nāma.*

Īśvarānanda, p. II.172: *kartavyau ced akac-svarau, sūtrasya tarhi ko viṣaya iti na vācyam ity āha* ***sūtreti****. muni-traya-madhye uttarottarasyety arthaḥ.* ***prāmāṇyaṁ*** *yathārthānubhavāśrayatvāt.* ***śiṭ*** *iti sarva-nāma. ādy-udāttatve ca pūrva-pada-prakṛti-svareṇa tad eva śrūyata iti bhāvaḥ.*

Pravartakopādhyāya, p. 114: *gauṇa-bahu-vrīhy-arthatva-nirāsa-pratīteḥ prāthamakalpika-bahu-vrīhy-arthatvaṁ sthitam ity āśaṅkyāha* ***sūtra-pratyākhyānam*** *iti. sarvajña-sūtrakāra-vacana-prāmāṇyād bahu-vrīhy-arthatvaṁ tad-avayavārthatvaṁ vā kim-iti nāṅgīkriyata ity āśaṅkyāha* ***yathottaram*** *iti.* ***svāṅga-śiṭām*** *iti. sarva-nāmnaḥ śiḍ iti pūrvācārya-saṁjñā.*

→ some text has been lost between *vyā* and *pra*. The presence of other words between *etat* and *sūtram*, leading to a little strained construing uncharacteristic of the MBT style (cf. the syntax in Abhyankar–Limaye, p. 270, line 22, p. 299, line 18, p. 310 line, 20 etc.) also suggests that a textual loss has occurred.

43. Translation of the BH passage by Bhagavat-Bhate (1986:71-72): "However, Gonardīya says, (that *tvakatpitṛka* etc. are correct examples." What is the view of this Teacher? Some (grammarians) describe it (as follows): The mention of (the word) *bahu-vrīhi* should be made for the sake of the example *vastrāntara-vasanāntarāḥ*. The purpose thus being (available) it is impossible to cancel the antar-aṅga (*akac*) by (the bahir-aṅga) bahu-vrīhi or to understand tādarthya. This is not (correct). Just now it was stated that this (prohibition) can be obtained also by the prohibition with regard to upasarjana. The word *antara* (in the above compound) is also upasarjana. Therefore, the Bhāṣyakāra rejects this rule."

Annaṁ-bhaṭṭa, p. II.173: ***sūtreti***. *atisarvāyety-ādy-artham upasarjana-pratiṣedhāvaśyakatve, tata eva priya-viśvāya ity-ādye 'pi siddhe tvatka-pitṛkaḥ ity-atrākaj-nivṛtty-artham evaitad iti paryavasitam. tatrākaj-aṅgīkāre sūtraṁ vyartham ity arthaḥ. nanu sūtrānurodhāt ka eva bhavatu. ata āha* ***yathottaram*** *iti. phiṭ-sūtre śiṭ sarva-nāma. bahu-vrīhāv api prakṛti-svareṇādy-udāttatvam eva bhavatīti bhāvaḥ.*

Nārāyaṇa-śāstrin, p. II.176: ***sūtreti***. *etat-prayojanābhāve 'pi prayojanāntaroddeśena sūtra-karaṇaṁ nābhipretaṁ, prayojanāntarasyānyathā-siddhatva-kīrtanād iti bhāvaḥ, nanu sūtrārambhād akaj-ādy-abhāvaḥ sūtrakṛd-abhipreto lakṣyate, bhāṣya-vacanāc ca tad-bhāvaḥ; kim atra prāmāṇikam ity-ata āha* ***yatheti***.

Nāgeśa, p. I.339: [re: MB:] *tad etad vṛttikāroktaṁ dūṣayati* ***akac-svarau tv*** *iti. eṣā smṛtir aviśeṣāt sarva-prakaraṇa-viṣayā.* [re: Pradīpa:] ***sūtra-pratyākhyāneti***. *samudāye niṣedhasya mahāsaṁjñayopasarjana-pratiṣedhena vā siddhatvād iti bhāvaḥ. evaṁ ca mahāsaṁjñā-siddhārthānuvādakaṁ prapañcārthaṁ sūtram. evaṁ* ***dvandve cety*** *api sūtram iti sūtra-hṛdayam* [⟶ *bhāṣya-hṛ°*?]. ***yathottaram*** *iti. uttarottarasya bahu-lakṣya-darśitvāt. spaṣṭaṁ cedaṁ "dhinvi-kṛṇvyor"* [P 3.1.80] *iti sūtre bhāṣye. etena sūtra-sārthakyāya vṛttikāroktaṁ vyākhyānam eva prabalam ity apāstam. śiḍ iti sarva-nāma. svarodāharaṇam viśva-priyāyeti.*

(c) **Śiva-rāmendra-sarasvatī**, p. II.175: *idānīṁ tvakat-pitṛkaḥ ity-āder eva sādhutvaṁ, na tu tvatka-pitṛka ity-āder, ity āśritya, prakṛta-sūtraṁ pratyācaṣṭe* ***gonardīya*** *iti. gāvo nardanty asminn iti go-nardo deśa-viśeṣaḥ. tatra bhavo gonardīyaḥ. gahāder ākṛti-gaṇatvāc chaḥ. bhāṣyakṛta idaṁ yoga-rūḍhaṁ nāma.* ***akac-svarāv*** *iti. "avyaya-sarva-nāmnāṁ akac prāk ṭeḥ"* [P. 5.3.71] *ity akac. svaras tu*

"svāṅga-śiṭām ad-antānām" [Śāntanava, Phiṭ-sūtra 29] *ity ādy-udāttatvam. tatra śiṭ sarvādeḥ saṁjñā prācām.* ***pratyaṅgam*** *iti. yathārtha-vīpsāyām avyayī-bhāvaḥ. aṅga-śabdo 'tra viṣaya-paraḥ. prati-viṣayaṁ, sarvasmin sva-viṣaya iti yāvat.* ***mukta-saṁśayāv*** *iti. muktaḥ saṁśayo yābhyāṁ tau. saṁśayāviṣayāv ity arthaḥ. tathā ca niḥsaṁśayaṁ yathā bhavati tathākac-svarau sva-viṣaye sarvatra kartavyau, na tu tan-nimitta-sarva-nāma-saṁjñā-vighātakopasarjanatā-saṁpādaka-bahu-vrīhy-ādi-saṁjñayā bādhanīyau, jñāpaka-siddhasya "antar-aṅgān api vidhīn"* [MB 1.1.29, p. I.91][44] *ity-asyāsārvatrikatvād iti bhāvaḥ.* ***ity eva bhavitavyam*** *iti. tathā ca sūtraṁ na kartavyam iti bhāvaḥ.*

§2.6 Occurrence 3 of G: **MB on P 3.1.92** (*tatropapadaṁ saptamīstham*) Vt 2, p. II.76: Pat° expresses the view that we should not derive *mṛt-kumbhīkāra* in the sense 'mṛdaṁ kumbhīkaroti' by adding the suffix *aṇ* to root *kṛ*. His interlocutor then asks: *na tarhīdānīm idaṁ bhavati, "icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram" iti.* "Then, now, this (statement, namely) *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram* 'I wish (the form) *kāśa-kaṭīkāra*,' does

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44. The remainder of the MB sentence cited here is *bahir-aṅgo vidhir bādhate.* The paribhāṣās having a similar but more specific form are *antar-aṅgān api vidhīn bahir-aṅgo lug bādhate* and *antar-aṅgān api vidhīn bahir-aṅgo lyab bādhate.* To judge from Abhyankar 1969:42, the presence of the first paribhāṣā in the Vyāḍi-paribhāṣā-pāṭha mss is uncertain (it does not occur in the Paribhāṣā-sūcana attributed to Vyāḍi). It occurs in the paribhāṣā works of Puruṣottama-deva (68), Sīra-deva (85), Nīla-kaṇṭha (63), Hari-bhāskara (88) and Nāgeśa (52) at the specified numbers. For the second paribhāṣā, the specifications would be: Puruṣottama-deva (54), Sīra-deva (34), Nīla-kaṇṭha (62), Hari-bhāskara (34) and Nāgeśa (54). If Śiva-rāmendra had the *paribhāṣā* form in mind, which is unlikely in the present context, he must be understood, given his time, as quoting from a pre-Nāgeśa work in the Pāṇinian tradition.

not come about (i.e. is not accorded sanction/support)." The interlocutor receives the response *iṣṭaṁ evaitad gonardīyasya*. "This indeed is desired by G."[45]

(a) **Kaiyaṭa** 3.1.92, p. III.133: *kāśān kaṭīkarotīty atra tv iṣṭyāṇ-pratyayo bhavati. tasminn utpanne kāśa-śabdāt kṛd-yoge ṣaṣṭhī. tasyāḥ "ṣaṣṭhī"ti* [P 2.2.8] *samāsaḥ. samāsa-rūpasyaiva ceṣṭatvenopāttatvāt 'kāsānāṁ kaṭīkāra' iti vākyaṁ na bhavatīty āhuḥ.*

Nārāyaṇa (see §2.3), p.VI.195: *"iṣṭam evaitat" iti bhāṣyaṁ vyācaṣṭe* ***kāśān kaṭīkarotī****ti. nanu 'pratipada-vidhānā ṣaṣṭhī na samasyate'* [2.2.10 Vt] *iti pratiṣedhāt kāśa-kaṭīkāraḥ iti kathaṁ samāsa ity āśaṅkya "kṛd-yogā ṣaṣṭhī samasyate"* [Vt under P 2.2.8] *iti pratiprasava-vidhānād idhma-pravraścanādivad atra samāsa ity āha* ***tasyāḥ "ṣaṣṭhī"ti*** [P 2.2.8] ***samāsa*** *iti.* ***ity āhur*** *iti. iti bhāṣya-tātparya-paryālocanenābhiyuktā āhur ity arthaḥ.*

Annaṁ-bhaṭṭa, p. VI.191: *nanu "iṣṭam evaitad gonardīyasya" ity uktam, sāpekṣatvena pratyaya-vidhānāsaṁbhavāt. ata āha* ***kāśān*** *iti. kāśakaṭīkāram iti ṣaṣṭhī-samāsa ity āha* ***tasminn*** *iti. cvy-antena saha samāsa eva sādhuḥ, na vākyam ity āha* ***samāsasyaiveti.***

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45. Kielhorn's (1886:82) explanation of the background and translation goes thus: "Patañjali raises the question whether it is allowable to form a noun like *kumbhīkāra* to express the sense of *kumbhīkaroti* in such a phrase as *kumbhīkaroti mṛdam*, "he turns clay into a jar," and having, for reasons given, answered that question in the negative he proceeds . . . "Do we then not find the following, viz. 'I maintain (that we ought to say) *kāśakaṭīkāra* 'one who turns grass into a mat'? Gonardīya certainly does maintain (that) this *is* correct."In my view, the first question is about the acceptibility of *mṛt-kumbhīkāra*, not just *kumbhīkāra*. As to how we should understand the sentence *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśakaṭīkāram*, see §3.5.

Nāgeśa, p. III.133:[46] *nanv evaṁ nitya-sāpekṣa-tvenā-sāmarthyād aṇ durvāraḥ. tad-anapekṣāyāṁ cvyer* [→ *cver?*] *abhāvena cvy-antasya nitya-sāpekṣatāyā upapāditatvād, iti ced, atra mahadbhir yatanīyaṁ. mama tu pratibhāti — na nitya-sāpekṣatvaṁ vr̥ttau prayojakam, kiṁtu gamakatvam. evaṁ ca* [when given *mr̥daṁ kumbhīkāroti*], *nitya-sāpekṣatve 'py agamakatvān na vr̥ttiḥ.* ***kāśā-kaṭīkāram*** *ity-atra tu gamakatvād bhavaty eveti. spaṣṭaṁ cedaṁ samartha-sūtre* [P. 2.1.1] *supa ātmana* [P. 3.1.8] *iti sūtre ca bhāṣye sūkṣma-dr̥śām.*

(b) **Śiva-rāmendra-sarasvatī**, 3.1.92, p. VI.193: ***kāśā-kaṭīkāram*** *iti. kāśān kaṭīkarotīty-arthe 'ṇ jāta iti manyate.* ***iṣṭam evaitad*** *iti. kāsa-śabda-nairapekṣyeṇa kaṭa-śabde cvy-anta upapade karoter aṇi kr̥te, tato 'ṇ-antena kāśānāṁ saṁbandhe kr̥d-yoga-lakṣaṇa-ṣaṣṭhyāṁ "ṣaṣṭhī"* [P 2.2.8] *iti samāsa ity-anena prakāreṇa tasya sādhuteṣṭeti bhāvaḥ. etena* [Kaiyaṭa's comment quoted above in (a) is reproduced in full at this point] *iti nirastam. prakr̥ta-bhāṣyasya tathā vyākhyāne kriyamāṇe, "na bhavitavyam" ity-ādi pūrva-bhāṣyeṇa virodhāpatteḥ. kāśān kaṭīkarotīti kāśa-śabde dvitīyānte saty aṇi vihite, kāśa-śabdād dvitīyāyā nivr̥ttau mānābhāvena tataḥ ṣaṣṭhyā durlabhatvāt. samāsa-rūpasyaiveṣṭatvam ity-atra mānābhāvena kāsānāṁ kaṭīkāra iti vākyābhyupāgame bādhakābhāvāc ca.*[47]

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46. This comment of Nāgeśa is printed as pertaining to the sentences preceding *na tarhi . . . gonardīyasya* in MB 3.1.92. However, since, in it, Nāgeśa defends the formation of *kāśā-kaṭīkāram* (in a way different from that of Kaiyaṭa and others), it should be associated with the third G occurrence in the MB under consideration.

47. Śiva-rāmendra-sarasvatī objects to Kaiyaṭa's inclusion of *kāśa* from the beginning of the derivation process of *kāśa-kaṭīkāra;* in his view, *kāśa* should be introduced at a later stage of derivation. In other respects, his explanation is similar to Kaiyaṭa's.

§2.7 Occurrence 4 of G: **MB on P 7.2.101** (*jarāyā jaras anyatarasyām*) p. III.309: *yady evam atijarasam, atijarasaiḥ ity atra na prāpnoty atijaram, atijaraiḥ iti bhavitavyam. gonardīya āha.*[48] *iṣṭam evaitat saṁgṛhītaṁ bhavati. atijaram atijaraiḥ iti bhavitavyam. satyāṁ etasyāṁ paribhāṣāyāṁ saṁnipāta-lakṣaṇo vidhir animittaṁ tad-vighātasyeti.* "If so, (i.e. if you cite an accusative singular form through a sentence like *atijarasaṁ paśya* instead of a nominative singular form through a sentence like *atijarasaṁ tiṣṭhati*, because the metarule *saṁnipāta-lakṣaṇo vidhir animittaṁ tad-vighātasya* would block the deletion (luk), then, the substitution of *jarā* by *jaras*) would not come about (also) in the case of *atijarasam* (and) *atijarasaiḥ*; (the forms) would then be *atijaram* (and) *atijaraiḥ*. G says; '(Then) this is something certainly desirable that would be covered (by the grammar being discussed, namely, the Aṣṭādhyāyī). The forms should be *atijaram* (and) *atijaraiḥ*, because of the metarule (namely) *saṁnipāta-lakṣaṇo vidhir animittaṁ tad-vighātasya.*"[49]

> **Kaiyaṭa** 7.2.101, p. 173: ***yady evam*** *iti. sor bhisaś cākārānta-saṁnipātenāj-ādir ādeśo 'kārānta-vighātinaṁ jaras-ādeśaṁ praty animittaṁ syāt.* ***iṣṭam*** *iti. saṁnipāta-paribhāṣā-vaśāt. atijarasaṁ paśyety-atra tu nākārānta-saṁnipāta-kṛtam aj-āditvaṁ bhavatīti bhavaty eva jaras-ādeśaḥ. sa tv aj-ādi-saṁnipāta-nimittatvād aj-āder lukaṁ praty animittam iti lug-abhāvaḥ.*

48. In the Prauḍha-manoramā citation of a part of the MB passage, Sitaram Shastri's edn. reads *gonardīyas tv āha*. However, the editor records that his mss *gha* and *ṅa*, out of the six he had, did not contain *tu*. The Prauḍha-manoramā commentator Hari-dīkṣita, who was the author's grandson, also reads only *gonardīya āha*.

49. The Pāṇinian derivational details involved here are largely explained by Kaiyaṭa. Annaṁ-bhaṭṭa (p. X.164), and Nārāyaṇa (p. X.165) explain them further. Nāgeśa (p. III.173-174) addresses the difference of views that existed in his time regarding them.

Annaṁ-bhaṭṭa, p. X.165: ***saṁnipāta-paribhāṣā-vaśād*** *iti. tad-āśrayaṇasya nyāyyatvāt. tarhy anayaiva paribhāṣayā atijarasaṁ paśya ity-atrāpi jaras-bhāvo na syād ity-atrāha* ***atijarasaṁ paśyeti.*** *atijaraṁ tiṣṭhati ity-ādau saṁnipāta-paribhāṣā-pravṛtti-kathanāt atijarasaṁ paśya ity-atra luk-prāpti-codyam apy arthāt parihṛtaṁ bhavatīti bhāṣyakṛtā mahatā kaṇṭhena noktaḥ parihāra ity-āśayenāha* ***sa tv*** *iti.*

Nāgeśa, p. III.173: *na* [→ *nanu*?] *cānayaiva paribhāṣayā dvitīyānte 'pi jaras-bhāvo na syād, ata āha.* ***atijarasaṁ paśyeti. nākārānta-saṁnipāta-kṛtam*** *iti. kiṁ tu tad-abhāve 'py aj-āditvam astīti bhāvaḥ. evaṁ ca, saṁnipāta-lakṣaṇa-vidhiṁ vināpi yasya pravṛtti-yogyatā tatra nāyaṁ nyāya iti tātparyam.*[50] . . . *atijaram iti bhavitavyam iti bhagavatoktam . . . bhagavatā sākṣān noktaḥ parihāraḥ . . . siddhāntī* [sandhi not observed in the edn.] *iṣṭāpattyā pariharati "iṣṭam evaitad" ity-ādinā.*

§2.8 Returning to Hari-dīkṣita's and Subrahmanya Sastri's views, I would first like to observe that in none of the passages collected in §§2.4-7, a G statement is a Vt in the sense that it receives a paraphrase in the MB, a sense that scholars like Kielhorn have accepted for good reasons and a sense that holds good in the MB context. A suspicion of paraphrasing may arise in the case of the statement under 7.2.101, because *atijaram atijaraiḥ iti bhavitavyam* is found before and after *gonardīya āha. iṣṭam evaitat saṁgṛhītaṁ bhavati.* However, *iṣṭam evaitat saṁgṛhītaṁ bhavati* lacks the usual stylistic features of a Vt, and *atijaram atijaraiḥ iti bhavitavyam* may not be a paraphrase but an instance of redundant writing precisely because of its

50. In a relatively long discussion that follows, Nāgeśa records a criticism of Kaiyaṭa and states his own view of how the MB sentences should be distributed in a dialogue of pūrva-pakṣa and uttara-pakṣa. However, his assumption that G is the MB author (bhagavat, siddhāntin) remains constant as the phrases extracted in the next few lines show.

occurrence immediately before *gonardīya . . . bhavati*. If it is dropped, there would be no loss of continuity in thought.

§2.9 If most of the Vts preserved in the MB come from Kātyāyana, as the specialists of P have assumed at present on the basis of indications available in the tradition, then the diction, style and situating of the G passages rule out the possibility that G is Kātyāyana.[51] As for whether G could be a Vt author other than Kātyāyana, it should be noted that Subrahmanya Sastri has not pointed out a similarity of style or thinking with any of the Vt authors who have been associated with the MB. Naturally, a demonstration of difference from Kātyāyana's style or thinking has also been lacking (see Miśra 1970: 70-84, 124-128 and Tripāṭhī 2002:30-65 for stylistic and theoretical differences among the Vārttikakāras).

Nor is there any indication of otherness as a Vt author in the G passages. None of them takes exception to propositions in Vts (probably) attributable to Kātyāyana by writing sentences that could conceivably pass as Vts. A commentator C2 does not earn a place in the group of commentator C1 merely by endorsing or opposing C1's view. Under P 1.1.21, G supports what is found in the first Vt.[52] Under P 1.1.29, G's

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51. I will not get into the other names or epithets of Kātyāyana such as Vara-ruci, Kātya etc. As far as I can ascertain, they are not assumed in the tradition to stand for historically different individuals.

52. Under P 1.1.21, because the phrase *saty anyasmin* occurs in the first Vt and also in G's remark *satyam etat 'sati tv anyasminn' iti*, it does not follow that G must be a Vt author. The first Vt explains why it is necessary to use *ādy-antavat* ('as if having a beginning and an end') in the sūtra. The reason is said to be that the talk of beginning and end presupposes the presence of something in addition to the item of which beginning or end is spoken — that →

opposition, if it is there as I suggest, is directed toward someone who relies on Vts (under other sūtras) to negate P's effort. Such a person assumes that *matka-pitṛka* and *tvatka-pitṛka* are correct forms. G declares *makat-pitṛka* and *tvakat-pitṛka* to be the correct forms.[53] Under P 3.1.92, the point in G's remark

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→ associating a single item with the notions of beginning and end would be vacuous if no other relatable item exists in the context, at least implicitly. The following five Vts challenge this understanding by referring to P's practice and wordly usage which may be said to imply that the assumption of the presence of an additional item is not always necessary when one is concerned with a single item — that there can be an 'otherless' one or first. At the end of this discussion, G declares himself to be in favour of the position or view expressed in the first Vt. To be able to do this, it is not necessary that he be a Vārttikakāra.

53. (a) The part preceding *gonardīya[s tv] āha* under MB 1.1.29 proceeds on the understanding that the proper forms are *matka-pitṛka* and *tvatka-pitṛka*. To derive them, discussant 1 is forced to accept an exception to the antar-aṅga metarule without any indication in the words of the Sūtrakāra that would favour the particular exception. G/Pat° challenges the very assumption that *matka-pitṛka* and *tvatka-pitṛka* are proper. In so doing, he may either be very confident about what the proper usage is (cf. *mukta-saṁśaya* and *eva*) or he may be implying that, if two different forms depend on derivation and neither is actually attested, the one which the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī derive straightforwardly, without our being required to depend on this or that indirect evidence or metarule, should be preferred. The swiftness with which the discussion is put to rest in the G sentence of MB 1.1.21 also gives the impression that G is a thinker who shuns excessive hermeneutic stretching of what P composed and is confident about what occurs or can occur in the object language.

(b) G's/Pat°'s rejection of *matka-pitṛka* and *tvatka-pitṛka* may be taken to mean that there is no usage for which P 1.1.29 can be useful and that, for this reason, it should be dispensed with or that the usefulness of P 1.1.29 is confined to being a restatement (anuvāda) of what we could have inferred. The traditional →

is made only after the suggestion in the Vt *upapada-saṁjñāyāṁ samartha-vacanam* is demonstrated to be unnecessary. However, to refuse to add the qualification *samartha* to *upapada* is not to refuse sāmarthya as a necessary condition for the contemplated grammatical operations. G, too, rejects *mṛt-kumbhīkāra* and *kāśa-kaṭīkāra* (§3.7) because the words underlying their derivation lack sāmarthya. Even the rejection of the suggestion that the sāmarthya requirement be made explicit is made in the usual MB style. Finally, under 7.2.101, there is no Vt in the preceding part to which G can be seen as reacting.

§2.10 The argumentation of Subrahmanya Sastri (1960:xli-xlii) in favour of his inference that G may refer to a Vārttikakāra other than Kātyāyana actually consists of mere assertions. His sentences do not go beyond the following: "it seems that it cannot refer to Bhāṣyakāra," "Here too it is better to take *Gonardīya* to refer to Kātyāyana or another Vārttikakāra." "Here too there is no harm if *Gonardīya* is taken to refer to a Vārttikakāra other than Kātyāyana and not to Bhāṣyakāra," and "Here too the same thing may hold good as in the third case." Only in the case of P 1.1.29, he has something resembling

→ commentators speak of both the possibilities. For the first, see the commentators other than Nāgeśa quoted in §2.5 under MB 1.1.29 and Bhaṭṭoji-dīkṣita, Siddhānta-kaumudī 222 (= P 1.1.29): *bhāṣyakāras tu tvakat-pitṛko makat-pitṛka iti rūpe* [locative singular with no sandhi? printing error for the locative dual *rūpayoḥ/ rūpayor*? text after the neuter nominative or accusative dual *rūpe* lost?] *iṣṭāpattiṁ kṛtvaitat sūtraṁ pratyācakhyau*. However, as I suggest in (a), it is possible that G/ Pat°, sure about what the acceptable usage was or sensing the twists and stretching in the other side's argumentation, upheld P. Vāsudeva-dīkṣita's Bāla-manoramā commentary on what I have cited from Bhaṭṭoji also finds P 1.1.29 purposive. Further, in Nāgeśa's suggestion that Kaiyaṭa should have spoken of anuvāda, not pratyākhyāna, a similar understanding of G's/Pat°'s intention is seen.

evidence to offer: non-mention by the Kāśikā of the forms *tvakat-pitṛka* and *makat-pitṛka*. The intended line of reasoning behind this (indirect) piece of evidence seems to be this: 'The forms are emphatically declared to be correct by G. If he was the same as the Bhāṣyakāra Pat°, his authority was unlikely to be ignored. The Kāśikā has ignored it. G must therefore not be the Bhāṣyakāra Pat°.' However, this reasoning rests on an absence that can be accounted for in more than one way: The G part under P 1.1.29 might not have existed in the MB manuscripts accessible to the Kāśikā authors. They might have understood the part differently. The early Pāṇinīyas may have had a tradition of keeping the Vṛtti-Vt understandings of P separate from the Bhāṣya understandings.[54]

Gonardīya as Patañjali

§3.1 Having pointed out the difficulties in accepting the view that sees G as a Vt author, I will now examine if the objections raised against the 'majority' traditional view, namely that G is none other than Pat°, the MB author, are strong enough to make the view unacceptable. Prior to this examination, however, I should remove two possible sources of reservation.

In the passages collected in §2.4, Kaiyaṭa and his commentators do not speak of the identity of G and Pat° after they have conveyed it once under MB 1.1.21. Kaiyaṭa conveys the identity somewhat indirectly by substituting *bhāṣyakāras tv āha* for *gonardīyas tv āha*. But both these features of the evidence are natural. Paraphrasing is the most common activity

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54. Raghu-vīra Vedālaṁkāra's/Mumukṣu's 1977 study bears this out. Most of the well-substantiated conclusions of his book that he summarizes on pp. 346-349 point in the direction of an awareness or effort by the early Pāṇinīyas to ensure that the Vṛtti tradition is influenced by the Bhāṣya only in certain areas or ways.

in Sanskrit commentaries. That Kaiyaṭa should extend it to a MB phrase is not unusual. There is also no reason why Kaiyaṭa should repeatedly offer personal information about G.

The references by Kaiyaṭa's commentators to G as *bhāṣyakāra/°ṣyakṛt* 'the MB author,' *bhagavat* (note 5) or the person whose view is to be finally maintained (*siddhāntin*) are sufficient to convey the same identity as Kaiyaṭa conveyed through his substitution. We may think of all of these commentators as simply following Kaiyaṭa or some lexicon compiler(s) as Mitra (1883:269) did. In that case, they lose their value as providers of independent testimony, but that does not mean that their unanimity should be thought of as having no historical value at all. They include South Indians as well as North Indians. Although they all could have studied in Varanasi (an unproved proposition so far) and thus received the same information, it may not be without significance that they did not bring divergent information from their home regions or did not qualify the information (possibly) received in Varanasi after returning to their home regions.

§3.2 It can fairly be pointed out as undercutting the evidence offered so far that the oldest MB commentary known and (partially) available to us, namely BH's MBT, does not provide a confirmation of the 'G : Pat°' identity. In fact, Kielhorn stated, as early as 1883, that he "hoped to prove, by [→ with] the help of Bhartṛ-hari's commentary on the Mahābhāṣya that later grammarians were wrong in identifying Gonardīya with Patañjali." In fulfilling his hope three years later, Kielhorn (1886:84) writes: "Bhartṛ-hari, when commenting on P 1.1.29 [see §2.3], and after having quoted the words *gonardīyas tv āha*, raises the question *kim āsyācāryasya darśanam* 'what is the opinion of *this* ācārya?,' words which clearly imply that *this* ācārya is not Patañjali."

Of all the arguments that have been made against the 'G : Pat°' identification, the preceding one is the strongest. A sentence pair like *gonardīyas tv āha. kim āsyācāryasya darśanam*, with the first sentence cited from the commentandum and the second coming from the commentary, does naturally make one feel that, for BH, G is a different author from the one on whom he has commented up to that point, namely Pat°. However, to measure the real strength of Kielhorn's piece of evidence, we should consider the following:

(a) We do not know how BH understood the first occurrence, under P 1.1.21, of G in the MB (§2.3). If at that place he had written something to the effect that G was an epithet of the Bhāṣya author (probably a function-based or context-determined epithet, see §3.3 below) — that G is not a historically different person from Pat°, then his use of *asya* would not have the implication we tend to read in that word. It could easily mean 'of this one, the one at hand, the one whose text we are studying; of the commentandum author, namely the MB author.'

(b) It is true that *kim asyācāryasya darśanam* occurring immediately after *gonardīyas tv āha* leads one to take G as the antecedent of *asya* and to understand the phrase as 'of this *ācārya*, a senior or authoritative teacher, namely G,' which understanding would imply that G is different from the MB author. However, while conceding this, one should also be aware that the authors Vasu-bandhu and Bhā-viveka/Bhāva-Viveka, who are thought of as relatively close to BH in time in the current determination of the dates of Indian philosophers, have used *ācārya* in the specific sense 'author of the work on which I am commenting,' that

is, in the sense they and other commentators may elsewhere express with such words as *granthakāra/ ganthakṛt* or *śāstrakāra/śāstrakṛt*. They use *ācārya* while commenting on their own work and citing a part of that work.[55] While an in-depth study of this unexpected self-referential use of the word is yet to be carried out from the point of view of determining when and to what extent is was prevalent, it must be acknowledged that the use contains a very plausible extension of the meaning "senior or authoritative teacher" that is associated with *ācārya*. A commentary author in the pre-modern Indian tradition, almost always, presumed that the commentandum author was a reliable guide or exponent. He might disagree with the latter outside of the frame of the text on which he was commenting, but, within the frame, his task was to give as charitable and supportive a reading as his intellectual powers allowed. Also, the very oddity of the usage found independently in (at least) two works and confirmed by later authors[56] should make us look upon it as

55. (a) Vasu-bandhu, Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya, p. 2: *kim-arthaṁ punar abhidharmopadeśaḥ, kena cāyaṁ prathamata upadiṣṭo, yata ācāryo 'bhidharma-kośaṁ vaktum ādriyata ity āha . . .* See note 56.

(b) Bhā-viveka, Tarka-jvālā on Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā, Tibetan translation: Dsa 50a-5; 75a-1; 86a-2; 107a-2;112b-6; 224b-4; 246b-5; 274b-6; 321a-5 etc. I have reproduced these references from the introduction of the M.A. dissertation on Bhā-viveka's Madhyamaka-hṛdaya, Chapter 3, verses 138-256, done under my supervision in 1994 by Dr. Chikafumi Watanabe. I have no knowledge of the Tibetan language.

56. Commenting on the Vasu-bandhu passage cited in note 55, Yaśomitra says in his Sphuṭārthā, p. 10: *ācāryaḥ śāstrakāraḥ*. What the Tarka-jvālā on Madhyamaka-hṛdaya 3.291 cites as a quotation from *ranḥ gi bstan bcos* (*sva-śāstra*) is cited with the helpful addition →

genuine, not as a proof of difference of authorship of the commentandum and the commentary. Thus, BH's use of *ācārya* need not mean that he distinguishes G from the commentandum author Pat°.

(c) What survives of BH's MBT after *āsyācāryasya darśanam* does not at all cover the words attributed to G in the MB, namely *'akac-svarau tu kartavyau pratyaṅgaṁ* [→ *pratyaṅge*] *mukta-saṁśayau / tvakat-pitṛko makat-pitṛka ity eva bhavitavyam.* At the most a short sentence like *eke tāvat varṇayanti* can be recovered, but we cannot be sure that it was meant to introduce an elucidation of G's quoted words; it is more probably connected with the interpretation rejected with *etan na* in the following part. As G's quoted words could not have been left unelucidated by BH, we must accept that a part of the text has been lost after *kim āsyācāryasya darśanam* or *eke tāvat varṇayanti* (more probably after the former; cf. note 38). In such a textual situation, it would be risky to proceed on the assumption that BH definitely rejected the identity of G and the Bhāṣyakāra.

(d) Kaiyaṭa is frequently found to adopt the discussions in BH's commentary in a shortened form, especially by removing the initial, tentative explanations by BH. The likelihood, therefore, that in his substitution of

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→ "*ācārya-pāda* says as follows" in Madhyamaka-ratna-pradīpa (MR Tsa 360a5-b7), a syncretic post-Candrakīrti and post-Dharmakīrti work probably authored in Bhā-viveka's tradition, not by Bhā-viveka himself. Further, Nāgeśa's Uddyota on Pat°'s (Kielhorn, p. I.5) statement *tebhya . . . ācārya idaṁ śāstram anvācaṣṭe* provides a confirmation of the convention with *ācārya-padena śāstrādhyāpako bhāṣyakṛd eva vivakṣitaḥ* (although, in my view, this particular application of the convention by Nāgeśa is not correct).

gonardīyaḥ with *bhāṣyakāraḥ* under MB 1.1.21, Kaiyaṭa followed BH's understanding of *G* is quite strong.

The sharp observation made by Kielhorn (a remarkable achievement if one takes into account the fact that the MBT was accessible in his time only in the form of a badly written ms) is thus incapable of cutting the ground from under the later tradition as he thought.

§3.3 Mitra (1883:261-262) gave absence of third person references to himself on the part of the MB author (in other words, the unique and, therefore, suspicious nature of the third person references with *Goṇ* and *G*) as the reason for not identifying Pat° with Goṇ and G. He wrote: "Certain it is that Patañjali has to give his opinion at an average once in every tenth line in the course of his elaborate exegesis of over 22,000 lines of 32 letters each, and he always does so by the use of participles, such as *jñeyam* "it should be known," *kartavyam* "it should be done," *vaktavyam* "it should be said," and by other devices, and not by naming himself in the third person. Sometimes, but not often, he appears under the aegis of the modern editorial dignity of the first person plural, 'we,' (*vayaṁ tu brūmaḥ*, p. I.15) but never under the third person, nor under the name of *Patañjali*."

The various ways of indicating a preferred derivate, derivation procedure, rule wording or theoretical stance collected here by Mitra are definitely present in Pat°'s work. But how many of the instances covered by them contain outcomes truly preferred or ultimately accepted by Pat° is not certain. Practically each instance needs to be studied in itself and on the background of what we learn from other instances in order to be sure that the view expressed is Pat°'s own. Given this, we cannot be certain that all sentences containing potential signals such as *jñeyam, kartavyam* or *vaktavyam* are

actually the author's references to himself. Since the work almost entirely consists of dialogues, these signals frequently stand for positions preferred by the dialogue participants, one of whom may or may not be identical with Pat°.

It is also possible that in a few cases Pat° has no preferred position. To leave the issue unresolved might have seemed to him the best or most honest stance.

Thirdly, despite its simple language, the MB is a complex work. Its author deals with a long line of well-informed and critical students of P, some of whom offered their observations in the form of Vts (having diverse stylistic features), some in the form of iṣṭis and some in forms less easily characterizable or lacking traditional names. Pat° not only explains the observations but critiques them, puts them in an intricate interplay (marshalling all the subtle derivational devices of P), adds to them and, occasionally, setting all of them apart, engages himself directly with P's rules. He tests the adequacy of P's rules for the Sanskrit he knew, as well as what their automation would produce. He is a Pāṇinīya most of the time but does not always think of himself as constrained to work within the frame of P's grammar.

Just as the dialogue format and the intricate texture of Pat°'s work make the separation of true authorial references difficult, they also, one would imagine, give rise to a need to have markers for precisely such references. The proponents of various views and solutions speak through Pat° to such an extent that it should not come as a surprise if he occasionally felt the need to identify his own voice to his readers.

Further, the fact that Pat°'s work displays some features (e.g. repeated passages and listing of initial words reminiscent of the complete sentences or verses that come later in their

full form as in his discussion of the uses of grammar) that have been associated with orally preserved literature (or with literature meant to be preserved orally)[57] makes the postulation of the need for markers defensible. The markers may differ according to context or purpose. They may also indicate different degrees of acceptance, rejection etc. (albeit it is still not established that they do so). In our MB studies we have not yet reached a stage in which we can isolate them and associate precise functions with them, but, as the foregoing statements indicate, there are reasons why we should not discount the possibility of their being present. [58] They could also have been present in the form of personal epithets such as G and *Goṇ*.

Mitra (1883:269) thinks that if Pat° in fact used G and *Goṇ* as his aliases or epithets, then "he used [them] in his work in a very inconsistent and absurd manner to indicate himself in the third person." However, if we note the following features of the G passages, the use comes across as anything but inconsistent and absurd:

(a) The passages occur at the end of the discussion of the issue at hand.

(b) They have an authoritative 'this-is-the-last-word-on the matter' kind of tone. None of them is followed by

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57. Oral literature seems to need markers to set its various segments apart or to facilitate the recall process.

58. This deliberately non-specific statement is based on some of my unpublished and incomplete studies of the MB text in terms of the designations such as *Cūrṇikāra* and *Padakāra* and the use of *na* in the sense of *nanu*. The considerations adduced here should suffice at least to permit the hypothesis that there is, in the MB text, a policy of planting expressional clues.

an expression of either disagreement or endorsement.[59]

(c) In G passages 1 and 2, beginning with *gonardīyas tv āha*, G's view differs from what is advocated in the immediately preceding sentences.[60] The adversative *tu* is naturally called for (cf. notes 27 and 29 for objective text-critical reasons), but, even when Sanskrit has many other ways of expressing 'says, states,' *āha* alone is employed. In the last two G passages, the consequence pointed out by the interlocutor meets G's approval.[61] Hence there is no room for antithesis, *tu* is appropriately missing and *iṣṭam* is expectedly employed.

True, there is the difference that in passage 3, G appears in the genitive case and in passage 4 in the nominative case as the agent of an additional sentence. At the same time, however, there is the constancy of *evaitat* and of putting *iṣṭam eva* at the beginning. The same constancy is noticed in the other eight occurrences of *iṣṭam evaitat saṁgr̥hītam*: MB 2.4.62, p. I.491, 2.4.74, p. I.495, 4.1.74, p. II.228, 4.1.87, p. II.238, 4.3.155, p. II.325, 6.3.43, p. 159.8, 8.1.55, p. III.378, 8.2.25, p. III.403.[62]

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59. The preceding two observations do not apply as strongly to the occurrence of *Goṇ* as they do to the occurrence of G. This is so because *Goṇ* occurs in only one passage and that passage has probably suffered a loss of words or sentences as pointed out on independent grounds in §1.4.

60. What the consequence of the difference is may, however, be understood differently; see notes 27, 29 and 34.

61. The consequence is negative ('Do not accept *kāśa-kaṭīkāra*') under 3.1.92 (see §3.7) and positive ('Accept *atijaram* and *atijaraiḥ* in the place of *atijarasam* and *atijarasaiḥ*') under 7.2.101.

62. Kielhorn, who listed the eight occurrences first, points out the absence of G in them, emphasizing the oddity of the appearance of G in MB 7.2.101 and, possibly, in MB 3.1.92, probably

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Such features of wording establish that a policy of formulaic wording exists in the mind of the composer. Inconsistent or absurd use of personal epithets would then be unlikely to occur in his composition.

§3.4 The points made in the preceding section should take care of the following objection by Kielhorn (1886:84): "[Vāmana] after having on P 7.2.101 copied the statement that one ought to form *atijaram* and *atijaraiḥ*, adds *iti gonardīya-matam* 'such is the opinion of gonardīya,' a remark which would be strange if Vāmana, who repeatedly quotes the Bhāṣya and the Bhāṣyakāra, had identified Gonardīya with the Bhāṣyakāra."

If Vāmana was aware that *G* has a distinct function associated with it, he would naturally try to preserve it as a marker. Secondly, his words are: *prathamaika-vacane tr̥tīyā-bahu-vacane ca atijaraṁ brāhmaṇa-kulaṁ tiṣṭhati, atijaraiḥ iti ca bhavitavyam, iti gonardīya-matena. kiṁ kāraṇam? "saṁnipāta-lakṣaṇo vidhir animittaṁ tad-vighātasye"ti.*[63] *anye tv anityatvāt asyāḥ paribhāṣāyāḥ atijarasaṁ brāhmaṇa-kulaṁ tiṣṭhati, atijarasaiḥ ity-evaṁ bhavitavyam iti manyante.* It is noteworthy that the citation is not followed by any expression of disagreement (the anityatva or non-universal applicability of saṁnipāta-lakṣaṇa vidhi is suggested by Pat° himself under P 1.1.39). Furthermore,

→ suggesting thereby a weakening of the 'G = Pat°' claim. However, the absence of *G* in eight passages does not imply that the presence of *G* in two 'iṣṭam' passages could not have been for a specific reason inapplicable to the other eight (recall that the two passages are similarly structured and worded).

63. The quoted sentence is cited in MB 1.1.4, 20, 24, 39; 3.1.36; 7.2.101; 7.3.118 and 8.2.2 and alluded to with its key words under a few other sūtras. It could have been taken over from an ancient paribhāṣā work such as Vyāḍīya-paribhāṣā-sucana, where it is discussed as paribhāṣā 10. Non-paribhāṣā sources are also possible.

Bhaṭṭoji-dīkṣita, Prauḍha-manoramā, Ajanta-puṁliṅga-prakaraṇa, p. 357, refers to the same passage with: *tathā ca "jarāyā jaras anyatarasyām"* [P 7.2.101] *iti sūtre uktaṁ "gonardīyas tv āha atijarair iti bhavitavyaṁ, saṁnipāta-paribhāṣaye'ti. evaṁ ca "pūrva-vipratiṣedhene"ty-ādi* [source?] *sarvaṁ bhāṣya-viruddham ity arthaḥ.* Here, not being in agreement with G is equated with being opposed to the Bhāṣya. We see the same retention of *G*, although Bhaṭṭoji is aware of the "G : Bhāṣyakāra" equation (cf. note 53b) and mentions the Bhāṣya in the same sentence.

§3.5 The next argument of Kielhorn (1886:83) suffers from inaccuracy and a simplistic view (understandable in his time) of the authorship of verses found in the MB. He says: ". . . an examination of the statements ascribed to Gonardīya would seem to show that in two cases at least those remarks are *quotations*, quotations from a grammatical work which was *in verse*, and the terminology of which differed from that of the Mahābhāṣya, while it agreed with that of the other grammarians. . . . The words [= *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram*] would appear to be a part of a śloka, and that their diction accords with that of other grammatical kārikās becomes evident when we compare, e.g. — vol. I, p. 144 *stoṣyāmy ahaṁ pādikam audavāhiṁ*, vol. II, p. 87 *amāvasor ahaṁ ṇyator nipātayāmy avṛddhitām*, vol. III, p. 183 *śāsmi nivartya suṭīty aviśeṣe*, vol. II, p. 65 *vyatyayam icchati śāstrakṛd eṣāṁ*, and other verses quoted in the Mahābhāṣya. That Gonardīya *was* a writer of grammatical Kārikās is proved more clearly still by the passage (b) [in which *akac-svarau tu kartavyau pratyaṅgaṁ mukta-saṁśayau* occurs]."

The sentence *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram* has ten syllables. The sequence of heavy and light syllables in it gives us ta-ta-ya as the gaṇas followed by a heavy syllable. There is no metre with such a scheme in the nearly comprehensive account of

metres given in appendix A at the end of Apte 1957, not even in the 36 varieties of paṅkti. The conclusion would be the same if one wishes to ascertain if the 17 morae of *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram* form a quarter of a mātrā-vr̥tta. Nor does the scheme of the sentence match the schemes of the other sentences cited by Kielhorn. These consist of eleven and eight syllables and lend themselves to common prosodial labels such as indravajrā, dodhaka and pramāṇikā.

In response to this rejection of Kielhorn's assumption that *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram* is metrical in nature, it might be suggested that Kielhorn had the narrow meaning ('an eight-syllable metre') of *śloka* in mind and, therefore, we should understand him as thinking of only a part of the cited sentence as metrical. Now, if we take this part to be *ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram,* it would be the first or third quarter of an anuṣṭubh. Then *icchāmi* must be the last three syllables of a preceding quarter, fourth of a preceding verse or second of the same verse. However, the second or fourth quarter of an anuṣṭubh cannot have a heavy syllable (*cchā*) in the seventh place. In addition, we would be forced to assume that the metrical division was ignored when *icchāmi* was allowed to change to the saṁdhi form *icchāmy*. To avoid these difficulties, we may think of *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭī* as forming an anuṣṭubh quarter. But then *-kāram* would remain dangling, and Pat° would come across as departing from his usual practice of citing metrically complete quarters.

Further, there are good reasons to believe that Pat° himself composed several of the verses, verse halves or metrical Vts found in the MB (Miśra, 1970:169-172, Tripāṭhī, 2002:89-91).[64]

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64. To the reasons given by Miśra and Tripāṭhī, I would add: Sometimes the specified metrical texts display a sense of humor similar to the one we find in Pat°'s prose.

Kielhorn's listing of verses that contain a first person singular verb or a form of the root *iṣ* is useful, but inadequate to establish that *all* or *most* such verses were composed by G and that this G was different from Pat° (see §3.7 for an independent argument for not taking *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram* as a statement of G). If the context contains an indication of quotation, first person verbs must, of course, be said to come from an author other than the MB author.[65] However, in the case of the three passages listed by Kielhorn, there is no contextual indication of quotation such as *uktam* or *iti*. Nor does the oldest available commentary, namely that of Kaiyaṭa, indicate in the case of the passages any shift of author persona. Just because Pat° sometimes gives up the point of the verses in what he says after presenting them, it does not follow that their author (understood as G or other than G) is different from him. The MB is full of discussions in which points are made (or provisionally made) and points are rejected (absolutely or under certain conditions).

65. The way the sub-sentence *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram* is introduced may lead one to believe that it occurred in an earlier part of the MB either as a proposition or as a quotation, the wording of which was not faulted. Because of such an explicit or implicit seal of approval, the interlocuter may now be raising the possibility of contradiction. However, the sub-sentence does not occur earlier (or later). Another possibility then would be that it was viewed by Pat° as well-known to his intended readers or listeners as coming from him. In that case, we must imagine that there was another work of Pat° that had gained currency (e.g. a collection of iṣṭis). Vis-a'-vis such evidence-empty possibilities, it seems preferable to think of the sub-sentence as coming from some other author's work (assumed by Pat° to be well-known at least to the Pāṇinīyas). Attribution of another grammar work to Pat° is not borne out by our sources. The present active first person singular *icchāmi* is not found anywhere else in the MB, although the root *iṣ* is very commonly used and although, behind the passive *iṣyate*, there may be Pat°'s voice in many cases.

§3.6 In continuation of his argument quoted in §3.5 comes Kielhorn's next argument: ". . . that passage [= MB 1.1.29 cited in §2.4] is of further importance, inasmuch as the half śloka actually furnished by it, and ascribed to Gonardīya, contains two words which are never used by Patañjali, viz. the word *mukta-saṁśaya* which is peculiar to the Vts and the word *pratyaṅga* (for *antar-aṅga*) which in this technical sense is found only in a kārikā on P. 6.4.110, and in the Bhāṣya on P. 6.3.138, where Patañjali repeats a statement of other grammarians (vol. III, p. 177, *ihānya ācāryāś cau pratyaṅgasya pratiṣedham āhuḥ*)."

Kielhorn does not list the instances of *mukta-saṁśaya* in the Vts. With the tools available now, we can list them easily. Excluding the instance under consideration and the quotation of Vt 3.1.26.13 in MB 1.4.55, p. I.339, they are:

MB 1.2.64, Vt 52, p. I.245:: *vyartheṣu ca mukta-saṁśayam*, MB thereon: *ākṛtāv api padārtha eka-śeṣo vaktavyaḥ. akṣāḥ, pādāḥ, māṣā iti.*

MB 3.1.26, Vt 13, p. II.35: *sva-tantra-prayojakatvād aprayojaka iti cen mukta-saṁśayena tulyam.*

MB 3.2.123, Vt 4, p. II.123: *asti ca mukta-saṁśaye virāmaḥ.*

MB 4.3.39, Vt 2, p. II.308: *anitya-bhavaḥ prāya-bhava iti cen mukta-saṁśayena tulyam.*

It is thus true that *mukta-saṁśaya* occurs only in the Vts (as Kielhorn separated them in his edition), if we leave aside the G passage. However, the fact of four occurrences in the Vts does not imply that the fifth occurrence could not have been in a non-Vt text, especially if that non-Vt text was written after the Vts and routinely employs expressions found in the Vts. We should also note that all the four Vts cited above are, in their wording and style, unlike the economically constructed

sūtra-resembling Vts we associate with Kātyāyana (and possibly a few other authors).

Further, the contexts in which *mukta-saṁśaya* occurs leave no doubt that it is used in the expected sense "one about which there is no doubt, acceptable to both parties, unquestionable." Pat° does not feel any need to paraphrase it in any of its occurrences. There is no suggestion of it having any unusual or technical sense. Also, bahu-vrīhi compounds with *mukta, vimukta* etc. as the first member occur frequently in Sanskrit literature. Nor does *mukta-saṁśaya* display an exclusive association with Vts composed in metres, so that one could argue that *akac-svarau . . . mukta-saṁśayau*, being metrical, must be a Vt. There would be no great departure involved if Pat° were to use the word in a verse line of his own (see §3.5 for evidence of Pat°'s verse composition). These considerations weaken Kielhorn's absence-based argument further.

As for *pratyaṅga*, I will point out in a separate article that, while there is some support for Kielhorn's association of the meaning 'antar-aṅga' with *pratyaṅga*, (a) there is no one fixed technical meaning that the commentators have inherited or unanimously accepted, (b) that the commentators waver between taking the word as a noun capable of occurring in various case forms and as an avyayī-bhāva which can at the most be thought of as a neuter accusative singular form, and (c) that the commentators do not assign one meaning to *pratyaṅga* in the Vt contexts and a different meaning when the word occurs in a non-Vt sentence. In short, we cannot use *pratyaṅga* to infer that G, as the author of *akac-svarau tu kartavyau pratyaṅgaṁ* [→ *pratyaṅge*] *mukta-saṁśayau*, must be different from the MB author Pat°.

§3.7 The last argument from Kielhorn (1886:83) that we should consider is this: "From the concluding words of it [=

MB 3.1.92, quoted in §2.6] we learn that it is Gonardīya who maintains that one may form *kāśa-kaṭīkāra;* and if then in the preceding line we read *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram iti,* 'I maintain that *kāśa-kaṭīkāra* is correct Sanskrit,' we are led to conclude that these are the very words in which Gonardīya had expressed his opinion, or, to put it differently, that this sentence is quoted from a work of Gonardīya, which cannot be the Mahābhāṣya."

One's response to the preceding argument should be this: Precisely because *icchāmi* and *iṣṭam* produce redundancy[66] we should either question the authenticity of the reading *icchāmi*[67] or not use that word to derive the implication that G is different from Pat°. Since it is not absolutely necessary that *icchāmi* be changed, since the word of which it could be a corruption cannot be definitely fixed, and since it is a lectio difficilior (because of the interpretational problem it creates through redundancy and because it does not occur in the MB outside of the passage under consideration; cf. note 65), the only alternative that is justifiably open to us is the second one: 'Do not use *icchāmi* and *iṣṭam* the way Kielhorn has used them. Infer, as Kielhorn did, that *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram* comes from one author and *iṣṭam evaitad gonardīyasya* from another, but do not infer that G is the author of *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram*. Do not follow the traditional commentators in this instance and think of Pat° as approving the form *kāśa-kaṭīkāra*. The possibility that G is identical with Pat° is not affected by the quotation.'

66. If *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram* belongs to G, then there will be a restatement of G's wish in *iṣṭam evaitad gonardīyasya,* whether we think of the latter sentence as written by Pat° for G or by G expressing himself in the third person.

67. Since *iṣṭam* occurs several times in the MB in similar contexts, we should not suspect its genuineness.

The referent of *etad* 'this' in *iṣṭam evaitad gonardīyasya* is ambiguous. If it stands for the content of the preceding sentence *na tarhīdānīm idaṁ bhavati icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram iti*, G would come across as endorsing the rejection of what *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram* contains, that is, the rejection of the form *kāśa-kaṭīkāra*. ('It is exactly the outcome you suspect that is wished for by G'). Further, the implication would be that the author of *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram* and G are different, for one and the same person could not be both in favor of *kāśa-kaṭīkāra* and opposed to it. On the other hand, if "this" refers only to the form *kāśa-kaṭīkāra* or the purport of the sub-sentence *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram*, the role of *iṣṭam evaitad gonardīyasya* would be that of an emphatic adversative to *na tarhīdānīm idaṁ bhavati* '(But) indeed this (form *kāśa-kaṭīkāra* or the proposition 'I wish for *kāśa-kaṭīkāra*') is approved by G (therefore, one should allow *kāśa-kaṭīkāra*, even if one does not allow *mr̥t-kumbhīkāra*).'

Kaiyaṭa, probably because he thought of at least some of the iṣṭis as coming from the MB author,"[68] follows the second interpretation, considers his task to be only that of explaining how the MB author could have objected to *mr̥t-kumbhīkāra* but allowed *kāśa-kaṭīkāra* and offers an explanation ending in *ity āhuḥ*, suggesting minimally that it does not originate with him — that he is simply acting as a reporter — and perhaps, additionally, either that he has no solution of his own or that he is not committing himself to the explanation.

There are elements of improbably subtle reasoning and arbitrariness in Kaiyaṭa's explanation. To derive *kāśa-kaṭīkāra*

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68. Kaiyaṭa's acceptance of iṣṭi under 3.1.92 is clear from his wording: *kāśān kaṭīkarotīty atra tv iṣṭyāṇ-pratyayo bhavati*. In thinking of *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśakaṭīkāram* this way, the expressions *icchāmi* and *iṣṭam* could easily have contributed.

from *kāsānāṁ kaṭīkāraḥ* and then to turn around and deny legitimacy to *kāsānāṁ kaṭīkāraḥ* is like claiming validity for a deduction on the basis of a false premise. It is true that in language we allow only compound formations in some situations (just as, in some other situations, we allow only the underlying sentences or the would-be vigraha-vākyas), but that does not authorize us to deem the same sentence as admissible as the starting point of a derivation but inadmissible as a derivation in its own right. Śiva-rāmendra-sarasvatī (p. VI.193) who takes the same position as Kaiyaṭa in accepting *kāśa-kaṭīkāra*, made essentially the same observation as I do here. His words are: *samāsa-rūpasyaiveṣṭatvam ity-atra mānābhāvena kāsānāṁ kaṭīkāra iti vākyābhyupagame bādhakābhāvāc ca.*[69] In short, Kaiyaṭa should have entertained the possibility of taking *etad* as referring to the proposition in *na tarhīdānīm idaṁ bhavati icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram iti* (my first interpretation above).

On the other hand, in Nāgeśa's comment reproduced in §2.6(a), there is an element of circularity. That *kāśa-kaṭīkāra* has gamakatva, i.e. is expressive of the intended meaning, is known because the MB author is first understood as approving its derivation; to use that gamakatva for the derivation of *kāśa-kaṭīkāra* is thus to engage in a circular argument.

The unawareness of Kaiyaṭa etc. that Pat°'s *iṣṭam* might not have been directed at the form *kāśa-kaṭīkāra* thus results either

69. The rest of Śiva-rāmendra's (p. VI.193) statement, however, is arbitrary. It goes thus: *kāsa-śabda-nairapekṣyeṇa kaṭa-śabde cvyanta upapade karoter aṇi kṛte, tato 'ṇantena kāśānāṁ saṁbandhe kṛd-yoga-lakṣaṇa-ṣaṣṭhyāṁ 'ṣaṣṭhī'* [P 2.2.8] *iti samāsaḥ*. Here the stipulatation that the derivation should start without presupposing the presence of *kāśa* has no justification other than Śiva-rāmendra's presumption that *kāśa-kaṭīkāra* is admissible while *mṛt-kumbhīkāra* is not.

in making up ad-hoc principles to justify the derivation of the form or in representing Pat° as arbitrary in his choices — as a grammarian who rejects *mṛt-kumbhīkāra* but recommends *kāśa-kaṭīkāra*, although both forms have identical derivational structures "*mṛdaṁ kumbhī . . .*" and "*kāśān kaṭī . . .*". To say this is not to assume that the MB author must always be consistent but to give him the benefit of a straightforward charitable reading. Such a reading necessitates that the author of *icchāmy ahaṁ kāśa-kaṭīkāram* be seen as different from the MB author but not that the MB author be seen as different from G.

§3.8 Assuming the KS to be a text older than the MB, Mitra (1883:269) mentions and considers the possibility that the G and Goṇ of Vātsyāyana were different and Pat° adopted their names as his aliases. He observes the following, obviously with the intention of pointing out an oddity that should disturb the 'G = Goṇ = Pat°' identity thesis: "he [= Pat°] never even for once used his individual personal name for such a purpose." However, this observation is like a dummy bullet. One of the interesting and intriguing characters of ancient Indian literature is that its authors very commonly make do with patronymics, metronymic etc. (and that, in the case of many, we do not know their personal names at all).[70] One merely has to mention *Kauṭilya/Kauṭalya* and *Vātsyāyana*, present in the immediate context of Mitra's remarks to establish that such indeed is the case.

§3.9 Y. Mīmāṁsaka (saṁvat 2030:334-335, saṁvat 2041:346-347) voices reservation about the validity of G's identification with Pat° because of the conflict he perceives between his

70. In the case of some authors, we know the personal names from works other than their own or from verses appearing at the beginning or end of their main texts.

leaning toward the view that Pat° was a Kashmirian (I support this view of Pat°'s native place in the next essay) and the derivation of G as a taddhita (secondary derivation) according to the rules of Pāṇinian grammar. He says that *gonarda* must be assigned the technical designation *vṛddha* by P 1.1.75 (*eṅ prācāṁ deśe*) before it can take the suffix *cha* (= *īya*) by P 4.2.114 (*vṛddhāc chaḥ*) and become *gonardīya*. But then Gonarda must be an eastern region (prāg-deśa) of India (see §§5.1-2), which would militate against Pat°'s origin in the northern or north-western Kashmir region.[71]

Mīmāṁsaka himself suggests two possible ways of getting over the clash in the evidence he records: (a) Accept the view of some (unspecified) historians that there was a Gonarda region in Kashmir in addition to the Gonarda region in the east. (b) Derive G from *Gonarda* as an epithet of Śiva, attested in the Śiva-sahasra-nāman of *Mahābhārata* Śānti-parvan, applying Vt 1.1.73.5 (*vā nāmadheyasya*). However, Mīmāṁsaka's manner of wording suggests that he is aware of the weaknesses of both ways: less than certain attestation of *Gonarda* as the name of a region in Kashmir and absence of any indication in the MB of Pat°'s closeness to Śaiva tradition. But, as §5.6 below notes, there is some support for way (a). Also, it is not unusual for a term like *prāk* or "eastern" to be relative in nature. Depending on the geographical or topological term present in the context, what is to the west of something in another context can be to the east of something

71. Before Y. Mīmāṁsaka, Sylvain Lévi (1925:199) referred to P 1.1.75 (and Cāndra-vyākaraṇa 3.2.25) as creating a difficulty, but the difficulty was not serious for him because he was not advocating Kashmir as the native place of Pat°. He chose to get over the difficulty by questioning the geographical expertise of the traditional commentators of grammars and lexicons.

in the given context. Furthermore, it would be naïve to presuppose that the boundaries of the area called *kaśmīra/ Kāśmīra* have remained the same (cf. Hanumat-Prasāda Śāstrī, Saṁvat 2024: 6-7; Enomoto 1994).

In addition to way (a), the real solution of the conflict felt by Mīmāṁsaka lies in our recognizing any or all of the following: (a) We should not allow one grammatical nicety to prevail over two or more clear pieces of evidence. (b) Taddhita affixes were not always added in the precise senses the sūtras associate with them; in practice, there was overlapping in their meanings, or the general sense 'associated with' of the taddhita affixes always existed by the side of the precise senses P recorded; cf. the examples discussed in the Kāśikā on the taddhita section; also the proverb *taddhita-mūḍhā vaiyākaraṇāḥ*. (c) As the listing in §5.1 will show, the commentators explaining the formation *G* have not invoked P 1.1.75 and 4.2.114. It is extremely unlikely that all of them did not know the way the Kāśikā derives *G*.[72]

In short, *G* need not be derived from *Gonarda* only in accordance with Kāśikā 1.1.75 and be thought of as precluding G's association with Kashmir and identification with Pat°. In fact, in the present context, *Gonarda* need not even be thought of as the name of a unique or specific geographical or political unit. The derivations by the commentators collected in §5.1 below do not so suggest. The features of the region (*gāvo nardanty asmin* etc.) that are mentioned could put it in more than one province or state. Also, if *G* turns out to be a misnomer for *Gonandīya* (§5.2), the need to connect it with *Gonarda* as a geographical term will no longer be there.

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72. Modern dictionaries compiled by traditional scholars like the Śabdārtha-cintā-maṇi and Śabda-kalpa-druma, however, have followed the Kāśikā derivation of *G*.

§3.10 I should now take up for consideration an argument that does not seem to have been made by any scholar so far but may be made in the future. Its form would be like this: "In the text of Vardhamāna's reference to G cited in §1.6, G is spoken of as supporting saṁprasāraṇa. In the following sentences, Vardhamāna opposes saṁprasāraṇa. It is MB on P 4.1.74 (*yaṅaś cāp*) with Vt (*ṣāc ca yañaś cāp*) that Vardhamāna obviously has in mind, which reads: *ṣāc ca yañaś cāb vaktavyaḥ. śārkarākṣyā. pautimāṣyā. tatrāyam apy arthaḥ. gaukakṣya-śabdaḥ krauḍy-ādiṣu* [P 4.1.80] *paṭhyate. sa na paṭhitavyo bhavati. yadi na paṭhyate, gaukakṣī-putra iti saṁprasāraṇam* [by P 6.1.13] *na prāpnoti. iṣṭam evaitat saṁgr̥hītam. gaukakṣyā-putra ity eva bhavitavyam. evaṁ hi saunāgāḥ paṭhanti "ṣyaṅaḥ saṁprasāraṇe gaukakṣyāyāḥ pratiṣedha"*[source text unknown][73] *iti*. But this MB segment opposes saṁprasāraṇa. Therefore, the MB author could not have been G in Vardhamāna's view.'

This argument is not easy to deal with. Given the testimony of the authors before and after him, it is very unlikely that Vardhamāna would write something conflicting with the 'G = Pat°' identity. But it took me a long time to decide that he was not, in fact, going against the tradition. The problematic sentence is *ṣyaṅaḥ saṁprasāraṇaṁ bhaved iti gonardīyo manyate*. That is what clashes with what we find in the MB. Before it, we have a kecit view. Immediately after it we have Vardhamāna's own view (*asmākaṁ tu mate*). The preceding part is complete in the contextually required details: *kecit go-kakṣa-śabdaṁ yañ-antam atra* [= *krauḍy-ādi-gaṇe*] *peṭhuḥ. tan-mate gaukakṣyā. phalaṁ tu gaukakṣī-patiḥ. gaukakṣī-putraḥ*. So is the subsequent part: *asmākaṁ tu mate pautimāṣyāvat siddhih. tathā*

73. Although the MB cites this Vt under 4.1.74, it could originally have been attached to P 6.1.13 (cf. Tripāṭhī 2002:103) or the krauḍy-ādi gaṇa.

gaukakṣyā-patiḥ, gaukakṣyā-putra ity eva bhavitavyam. atrāpāṭhāt. tathā ca saunāgāḥ paṭhanti "ṣyaṅaḥ saṁprasāraṇe gaukakṣyā-pratiṣedha" iti.[74] But for the G view, we have no details beyond *ṣyaṅ* and saṁprasāraṇa. The latter may be taken as a technical description of what is noticed in the last part of the kecit view (*phalaṁ tu gaukakṣī-patiḥ. gaukakṣī-putraḥ*). But, in that case, the G view does not distinguish itself from the kecit view. The detail *ṣyaṅ* also comes across as suddenly introduced. It does not exactly parallel *yañ-antam*. Nor is any specification of the gaṇa to which a ṣyaṅ-anta *gaukakṣya* belongs or should belong made. The employment of the optative *bhavet* also seems odd. It would be natural if G was pointing out an unwelcome consequence or spelling out specific conditions under which the saṁprasāraṇa substitution (change of *y* to *i*) should be allowed to take place. We do not have indications of either in the single sentence including his name. Thus, we cannot be certain that Vardhamāna's G recommends saṁprasāraṇa. Consequently, we cannot look upon him as differing from the MB author who endorses absence of saṁprasāraṇa. A textual loss has taken place before and/or within the *ṣyaṇaḥ* sentence, although Eggeling's edition does not so indicate.

§3.11 Lastly, the 'G = Pat°' equation may be challenged on the basis of Prabhu-dayāla Agnihotrī's (1963:51-52) view that G is the author of a shorter original bhāṣya incorporated into the MB and Pat° is the author of the latter. As I will state in §3.3, I am inclined to accept more than one textual layer in the MB. Further, I would go along with Agnihotrī to the extent of

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74. Here, Vardhamāna has adopted one sentence found in the MB with a minor change (*tathā ca* for *evaṁ hi*) and added *tathā gaukakṣyā-patiḥ* before *gaukakṣyā-putra ity eva bhavitavyam*. At the same time, he has actually removed *gaukakṣya* from the krauḍy-ādi gaṇa and treated it as a stem ending in *yañ* (like *pautimāṣya*) instead of *ṣyaṅ*.

accepting that the most straightforward explanation of the title *MB* would be one which presupposes the existence of a bhāṣya. The background furnished by titles such as *Mahābhārata* and by several Sanskrit works showing signs of growth makes it most natural that the qualification *mahā/mahat* found in the title *MB* should have a reference to addition or increase. Explanations such as the one given by Puṇya-rāja/Helā-rāja under VP/TK 2.482 (*tac ca bhāṣyaṁ na kevalaṁ vyākaraṇasya nibandhanaṁ yāvat sarveṣāṁ nyāya-bījānāṁ boddhavyam ity-ata eva sarva-nyāya-bīja-hetutvād eva mahacchabdena mahābhāṣyam ity ucyate loke*) would imply that the title was based on a historical and/or comparative consideration of all or at least several important bhāṣyas (particularly in terms of which bhāṣya had the nyāyas, 'interpretational maxims,' first or to an unmistakable extent). For such a consideration, I cannot find any parallel in the Sanskritic tradition. Nor do the realities of ancient Indian life, to the extent we know them, seem to make it plausible (in fact, even feasible). Also, it is not corroborated by any other source, especially by the bhāṣyas in the tradition of Mīmāṁsā or Nyāya and by the commentators of those bhāṣyas. On the other hand, I do not see any evidence that would compel us to assume that Pat° expanded on an earlier bhāṣya authored by someone else. While I must postpone a thorough investigation of this situation to another occasion, I can state for the present that accepting the existence of *functional* layers or divisions in the MB would account for the evidence Agnihotrī has recorded (albeit some of it will turn out to be inapplicable on closer examination) and the evidence I will record. One need not go beyond and assert the existence of *historical* layers. Consequently, a case for associating G with an earlier layer and Pat° with a later one is yet to be made. Nor has any pre-modern source indicated the chronological difference such an

association would entail (unless one decides to read it arbitrarily in the late and minority view of Hari-dīkṣita discussed in §§2.1-10). We would be justified only in seeing signs of difference of authorial personae, not of authors.

Further consideration of Goṇ = G = Pat°

§4.1 It should be clear by now that modern researchers have observed nothing that would *compel* us to conclude that the traditional understanding of *G* and *Goṇ* as Pat°'s epithets is invalid.[75] In the case of the latter, the textual basis in support of the tradition limited. It may become unsteady if a critical edition of the MB based on mss from different regions of India reveals that *goṇikā-putraḥ* cannot be read with certainty in the MB text at 1.4.51. While acknowledging this possibility, however, we must also note that, in the present state of our research, no real justification exists to rule out the possibility that Pat° mentioned himself as Goṇikā's son or to set aside the tradition speaking of him as such, later though it may be in the surviving texts.

§4.2 A section of Indologists obviously believes that ancient India had no sense of history (i.e. no value was attached to the preservation of factual details), especially where personal histories of highly influential authors of the distant past were concerned. Such authors, in the perception of these Indologists, survive entirely or almost entirely as legendary or mythic characters in the traditional sources. Sometimes they consider the general thesis of "no sense of history" as an adequate

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75. Remarks such as the following should, therefore, now be set aside: Agnihotrī 1963:52 (Hindi): *śrī-rājendra-lāla-mitra aura ḍa. kīlaharna ne yukti-pūrvaka gonardīya aura goṇikā-putra ko pataṁjali se bhinna siddha kiyā hai.* Scharfe 1993:74: "Kielhorn proved long ago that Gonardīya is not Patañjali; the same may be said about Goṇikā-putra."

reason in itself to set aside even the down-to-earth information conveyed in a matter-of-fact tone in manuscript colophons, vaṁśāvalīs, commentaries etc. The claim that we have some true details about Pat°'s personal life in G and *Goṇ* may generate some resistance in this coterie of scholars. Some of them may express disbelief at the survival of such details. However, I think that most specialists will see the mūla-kṣati-kāriṇī anavasthā, "an infinite regress that cuts into the basis or starting point (of the undertaken endeavor itself)," implicit in the uncritical and unlimited application of the "no sense of history" view and entertain the possibility of recovering history even from sources that are contaminated or are not concerned with 'history' precisely in our sense of the term.

§4.3 Given the present state of our sources, one cannot disprove the possibility that G,[76] is an author/thinker cited by Pat° (albeit not as a Vt author). Regardless of how much evidence is produced from the tradition, a researcher would, theoretically, be always free to say that the evidence does not rule out the possibility of G being a merely cited predecessor — that the tradition could be wrong. Absence of something ('G was not a merely cited author') cannot be established absolutely. At the most, the older the evidence in the tradition, the less likely it becomes that the tradition could be wrong. For this reason, the question we should be asking in the present case should not be 'why G cannot just be a cited authority historically different from the MB author?' but "why did the tradition think of identifying G and the MB author in the first place?"

76. For the sake of simplicity of phrasing I will leave the less certain Goṇ out of the following statement. I do not mean to suggest that the point is not applicable to Goṇ.

It is highly improbable, since the MB is not a text lacking quotations (Mitra 1883:265-266), that the thought that G is someone quoted by Pat° did not occur to the authors who give us the 'G = Bhāṣyakāra/Pat°' piece of information. Yet they do not give room to this thought. Why? One answer would be that the early Pāṇinīyas were certain that they had reliable information about Pat°'s life as far as what *G* conveys. An additional answer may be that the traditional scholars (more probably very early traditional scholars whose works have not come down to us but have been used as sources by the later works) were aware of at least some of the observations made in §3.3 and §3.11. As a consequence, what seems so odd to us might have seemed quite straightforward to them. Therefore, while not giving up our right to examine their perception critically, we should also be humble enough to acknowledge the principle that 'oddity in evidence can sometimes lead to an entirely new understanding of the whole evidence complex.'

§4.4 If the possibility that both *G* and *Goṇ* are applicable to the same historical person is not to be rejected, how can one account for the *KS* attestations that make sense on the assumption of two distinct persons? Some remarks specifying the manner in which we could account were offered in §1.5. A few more remarks amplifying them can be made here.

A distinctive style of presentation is shared, to a significant extent if not wholly, by Kauṭilya's AŚ, Vātsyāyana's KS (cf. Fezas 1994) and Rāja-śekhara's Kāvya-mīmāṁsā. Thinking that the KS is at least as old as the AŚ, implicitly because of the similarity in presentation and explicitly because of the presumed contemporaneity of Kauṭilya and the Mauryas, Mitra (1883:267) concludes that G and Goṇ must be older than Pat° who is almost universally thought to be a contemporary of

the Śuṅgas, the successors of the Mauryas. However, the dating of the AŚ and KS is not certain. Most scholars in our time tend to assign the KS *to* the third or fourth century CE and the AŚ to a period not later than the second century CE (in fact, to the third or fourth century BCE, with only a few dating what they consider to be latest additions to the second century CE). A reasoning like Mitra's fails to convince for this reason and also because it overlooks the possibility that the common presentation style of the KS and the AŚ could be a result of imitation or convention; works showing a similar style need not be close to each other in time. Moreover, no researcher seems to have argued (as distinct from assumed) that the KS is older than the MB. Therefore, the anachronism suspected by Mitra in identifying G or Goṇ with Pat° is not likely to be felt by contemporary Indologists. We should also bear in mind in the present context that the quotations from G made by the later authors and collected in §1.5 do not indicate any definitely older diction or style. While those verse quotations could belong to the same age as the verses in the AŚ, they could also be later.

As Wilhelm (1979:401-403) has noted, the opening section of the KS, in which the origin and development of the science of kāma is outlined, contains some mythic and conventional elements. However, this feature, as well as the similarity Vātsyāyana maintains in the manner of referring to earlier authors in his field, would not constitute sufficient justification to infer that the author names cited by Vātsyāyana are imitation-based — that, even if there were historical authors corresponding to the names, they did not contribute to the knowledge department(s) covered by the KS.[77] Of the writings

77. (a) Scharfe, 1993:4: "We cannot immediately tell if the names of the quoted authorities [in Vātsyāyana's Kāma-sūtra] . . . are given →

of the thinkers beginning with Bābhravya, Vātsyāyana seems to have sufficient direct or indirect knowledge. In particular, there is nothing in his references to G and Goṇ collected in §1.5 that would suggest that G and Goṇ were not real historical figures to his way of thinking. The work of G in the field of Kāma-śāstra seems to have survived in some form at least in the sources of Aruṇa-giri-nātha and Malli-nātha, that is, up to the 13th/14th century CE. Minimally, the same longevity seems to have been enjoyed by Goṇ's work as note 18 establishes. Therefore, the possibility that Vātsyāyana borrowed the epithets G and *Goṇ*, even though their referents had no standing in the fields covered by the KS, need not be entertained seriously (whether the author(s) of the texts he referred to with G and *Goṇ* borrowed names of earlier authors cannot be determined at present). Vātsyāyana might not have wondered about the possibility that G and Goṇ were just one historical person (i.e. he might have simply cited them according to the attributions seen in mss available to him), and his G and Goṇ could in fact have been different from Pat°'s G and Goṇ (note 14), but it is very unlikely that he set them up in the field of Kāma-śāstra purely as an imitator of the MB or some other śāstra work. As for the next possible question "Did someone else fabricate these authorial personae in the Kāma-śāstra tradition?" before or after Vātsyāyana, the answer would be as open-ended as the question.

→ in imitation of the discussions in the Artha-śāstra or if there were indeed teachers with these names."

(b) Some making up of names as authorities or of connections between well-known names and specifics of contribution is evident in the Kāvya-mīmāṁsā (p. 1) in such alliterative or rhyming pairings as *auktikaṁ ukti-garbhaḥ . . . citraṁ citrāṅgadaḥ* and *śabda-śleṣaṁ śeṣaḥ*.

If in spite of the preceding considerations the presence of *G* and *Goṇ* in both the MB and the *KS* seems too much of a coincidence, we have the freedom to accept any one of the following possibilities, severally or in combination: (a) One and the same person could have composed two works under two different pen-names for the reason stated in §3.3. (b) This person could have been active in fields that seem too distant to us but were not too distant to him or the culture in which he was brought up. (c) The KS is a much older work than it is generally taken to be (in other words, Mitra's assumption about the date of the KS is essentially justified).[78]

§4.5 So far I have discussed the issues surrounding G by assuming that the Pat° meant in the context is the MB author Pat°. To very few researchers who have concerned themselves with the issues, the possibility that Pat° in the traditional 'G = Pat°' equation could be the author of some other text has occurred.[79] Y. Mīmāṁsaka (saṁvat 2041:347) is one such

78. The most extensive discussion of the date of the KS of which I am aware is Chakladar 1929:1-40. In it, I do not see any evidence or argument that would, *in itself*, block the possibility that the Kāma-sūtra is approximately as old as or is older than the MB (which is, of course, not to say that the KS has been *proved* to be equally old or older). A detailed discussion of this important issue, however, must be taken up on another occasion. If a fresh investigation results in assigning the KS to a very early period, we should be open to considering, not necessarily accepting, even such possibilities as the following: (a) Pat° took his epithets G and *Goṇ* from the KS. (b) G and Goṇ were primarily known as Kāma-śāstra authors and Pat° quoted their incidentally expressed views on usage.

79. Pat°, the Yoga-sūtra author and Pat°, the redactor of the Caraka-saṁhitā, have generally been declared by scholars to be distinct from Pat°, the MB author. Other works ascribed to Pat° such as the Nidāna-sūtra have rarely, if ever, received treatment in terms of their being authored by the grammarian or non-grammarian Pat°.

researcher, probably the only one to put this thought in writing. Being aware that the Pāṇinīyas' glossing of G with Bhāṣyakāra leaves only the (nearly uniform) statement of the lexicon compilers open for any other possibility, he says: 'If we rely upon what is definite to the lexicon compilers, then the Pat° in this context may not be the MB author but the author of the Nidāna-sūtra. It is plausible that Kaiyaṭa etc. have been misled by the shared name.'[80]

Accidents such as being misled cannot be ruled out in historical reconstructions. Hardly ever all the elements of an event are recorded for us. But imagining such possibilities as confusion or mistaken identity also needs to be tested on the criteria of probability and plausibility. In its essence, such imagining is not different from imputation of motives to historical persons. Like motive imputation, it can provide one possible explanation of the evidence, but it cannot take the place of evidence. The Nidāna-sūtra author Pat° is not as well known as the MB author Pat° or the Yoga-sūtra author Pat°. It is not likely that none of the many kośa authors cited in §1.6 would not feel the need to clarify that the Pat° meant is different from the one in the Vyākaraṇa or Yoga tradition if the Pat° they had in mind was the one who authored the Nidāna-sūtra. Given that they came from different regions of India and yet gave us the 'G = Pat°' equation without ever qualifying who this Pat° was, one can entertain only the following logical possibilities: (a) They borrow from each other in such an uncritical way as would be incongruent with the critical faculty they display elsewhere in their work. (b) They do not know

80. The Hindi original: *yadi koṣakāroṁ kī prasiddhi ko prāmāṇika mānā jāya, to yaha patañjali mahābhāṣyakāra na hokara nidāna-sūtrakāra patañjali ho sakatā hai. sambhava hai kaiyaṭa ādi ko nāma-sādṛśya se bhrama hu.ā ho.*

Pat° as author of the Nidāna-sūtra. (c) For them, all three Pat°s (and perhaps a few other Pat°s) are historically one and the same person. (d) They expect their readers to associate G only with a/the well-known Pat°. Only the latter three possibilities have some potential to rise to the level of a probability, individually or in combination. The fact that the context of their 'G = Pat°' statement consists of epithets of P and Vyāḍi gives an upper hand to that sub-possibility under (d) which would take the grammarian Pat° to be the intended well-known Pat°.

More pertinently, Rāja-śekhara and Vardhamāna speak of G in such a way that specific MB passages can be associated with that epithet, leaving no doubt that, for our relatively early sources, G made sense only or primarily in the MB context.

Gonarda → Gonardīya → Gonandīya → Gonanda

§5.1 Once we acknowledge that Pat°, the MB author, could be identical with G, we can turn seriously to the question of what G could mean as an epithet in the MB/Pat° context. That G is a secondary derivation from *gonarda* need not be doubted. The traditional explanations based on this understanding, in the probable chronological order, are:

> Hema-candra, Abhidhāna-cintā-maṇi auto-commentary under verse 851cd (= Martya-kāṇḍa verse 515cd): *gonarde bhavo gonardīyaḥ. "dor īyaḥ"* [Siddha-hema-śābdānuśāsana 6.3.32]
>
> Śiva-rāmendra-sarasvatī 1.1.29, p. II.175: *gāvo nardanty asminn iti gonardo deśa-viśeṣaḥ. tatra bhavo gonardīyaḥ. gahāder ākṛti-gaṇatvāc chaḥ* [P 4.2.138]. *bhāṣyakṛta idaṁ yoga-rūḍhaṁ nāma.*

Hari-dīkṣita on P.7.2.101, (Sitaram Shastri edn Vol. I, p. 357): *gonardīya āheti. gonardaḥ parvataḥ. tatra bhavaḥ.*

Nārāyaṇa-śāstrin, p. II.97: *daiśiko 'yaṁ bhāṣyakārasya vyapadeśaḥ.*

Nāgeśa, Śabdendu-śekhara (reference according to Chakravarti 1926:263 and Agnihotrī 1963:51, who do not specify where exactly in the Śabdendu-śekhara/Laghu-śa° the following sentence occurs): *gonarda-deśe kasyacid ṛṣer añjaleḥ saṁdhyā-karaṇa-samaye patita ity aitihyam.*

Vaidya-nātha Pāyaguṇḍe, Chāyā sub-commentary to Nāgeśa's Uddyota as quoted by the NSP editors (p. I.339): ***gonardīya*** *iti. gāvo nardanti yasmin parvata-viśeṣe tatra bhavo bhāṣyakṛt. gahāditvāc chaḥ* [P 4.2.138].

Seelakkhandha: *gonarde tan-nāmaka-parvata-samīpe deśe bhavaḥ.*

Here we notice that the tradition has unanimously taken *gonarda* to be a term for geographical space. Whether that space was something like a specific district or province in our way of thinking is not clear, but the wording would not militate against such a reading, except in the case of Hari-dīkṣita, Vaidya-nātha and Seelakkhandha, who take *Gonarda* to stand for a mountain, exclusively or primarily. The traditional explication (nirvacana) such as "the area characterized by the lowing of bulls/cows" does not preclude development from the etymological meaning to a specific conventional meaning expected of a state or region name.

§5.2 The attempts by modern researchers, then, understandably concentrate on identifying *Gonarda* as a geographic term. R.G. Bhandarkar (1873:70) saw in it district Goṇḍa of modern times, situated about 20 miles to the north-

west of Oudh/Ayodhyā. Srish Chandra Chakravarti (1925: Introduction p. 11) and Y. Mīmāṁsaka (saṁvat 2030:334-335, saṁvat 2041:346, 360) expressed the same view, with both noting that Kāśikā 1.1.75 assumes Gonarda to be an eastern region and the latter adding that some historians see a second Gonarda in Kashmir. Prabhat Chandra Chakravarti (1926:267-268), not indicating any awareness of what Bhandarkar and Srish Chandra Chakravarti had written, places Gonarda in the Deccan. As evidence for this position, he refers to Pat°'s remarks *priya-taddhitā dākṣiṇātyāḥ* (MB p. I.8) and *dakṣiṇā-pathe hi mahānti sarāṁsi sarasya ity ucyante* (MB p. I.73). B. N. Puri (1957: Preface: v; pp. 17-18) rightly observes the following in response: "It seems that Mr. Chakravartty [→ Chakravarti = P.C. Chakravarti] lost sight of the fact that while Patañjali speaks of directions in which the cities of Madhya-deśa were separated from one another, and occasionally distances as well, he does not care to locate the position of Coḍa, Kerala, Kaḍera and Pāṇḍya." Here, Puri could have added as a stronger argument that Chakravarti has committed the mistake of taking MB remarks applicable to the Vt author as applicable to Pat°.

Sylvain Lévi (1925:197-205), giving the issue the most extensive treatment it has so far received, located Gonarda/Gonardana between Ujjayinī (Lat. 23° 11′ 10″ N. and Long. 75° 51′ 45″ E) and Vidiśā (Lat. 23° 31′ 35″ N. and Long. 77° 5′ 39″ E).

Because Lévi's evidence consists of explicit statements and comes from several independent sources, the existence of a Gonarda/Gonardana in the proximity of Ujjayinī and Vidiśā must be admitted (cf. Gupta 1973:114). Bhandarkar's conjecture assumed that the geographical perspective indicated in Pat°'s examples was necessarily the same as what the geographical perspective would have been if he were writing from his native place. There is no reason why such must be the case. Pat° might

have been composing his work in the Pāṭali-putra-Saketa area with readers from that area in mind or he might have taken his examples from some earlier source. What the examples convey to us may not have any bearing on Gonarda or any other supposed place of his birth and growth (see note 16 in the next essay).

Unaware of Lévi's article and influenced by the (weak) arguments in Weber 1873:57, Puri (1957:17-18) does not devote much thought to determining the referent of *Gonarda* and advises us that we should leave the question of Pat°'s native place aside for want of any definite evidence.[81] Agnihotrī (1963:55) does the same, although he is aware of Motīcandra's argument resembling that of Lévi. That Puri and Agnihotrī, concerned with such important themes as India in the time of Pat°, should treat the issue of his nativity so casually and not engage in any first hand analysis of the evidence is regrettable (compare the revisiting of primary evidence in the next essay for an estimate of what they could have discovered if they had chosen to go beyond what the secondary literature created by modern scholars contained).

§5.3 As I have indicated in a few places above, the effort to determine the geographic co-ordinates of Gonarda, while rewarding in general for the study of ancient India, may, in fact, be unnecessary in the context of Pat° and the MB. Georg Bühler observed as early as 1877 (p. 54 = p. 118 of the partial reprints in 1960 and 2000; cf. p. 129 note 27 of the same reprints) that *Gonarda* is a faulty form for *Gonanda* in all the Deva-nāgarī transcripts of the Rāja-taraṅgiṇī (= RT) made (directly or indirectly) from the Śāradā *codex archetypus* written by

81. Also in the 1968 edn of his work, Puri (p. 20) is non-committal. The only relevant addition he makes to the discussion is that Pat° was "close to Pāṭaliputra."

Rājānaka Ratna-kaṇṭha in the seventeenth century and owned by Paṇḍit Keśava-rām and his sons at least in the second half of the nineteenth century.[82] The pre-1877 edns of the RT based on those transcripts contain the error. Restoration of the correct form first took place in M.A. Stein's edn published in 1892. Some of the commonly used dictionaries published thereafter (e.g. Monier-Williams, p. 365) show the relationship of *Gonandīya* and *G*, but the research on the latter carried out in the context of the MB, Pat° or ancient Indian geography has somehow failed to consider the implications of the relationship. Hanumat-prasāda Śāstrī's *Kāśmīretihāsaḥ* (saṁvat 2024:44), which briefly explains why there is no need to continue with derivations such as *'Gonarda → Goṇḍā,'* does not seem to have been noticed by scholars discussing Gonarda or G after 1967 CE.

§5.4 As Wilhelm Rau (1985:101-102) indicated and Michael Witzel (1986) endorsed, all mss of the MB *so far used by the editors* seem to go back to a single original ms.[83] Witzel further

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82. Bühler does not explain why *nand* was misread as *nard*. A comparison of Stein's 1892 photograph of a page from the *codex archetypus* with RT verses 5.140-162 reveals the cause. The writing of *r* before another consonant in Ratna-kaṇṭha's handwriting is hardly distinguishable from the writing of *n* before another consonant. Both are written with a short stroke slanting down to the left in the upper part of the syllable (not as a repha on top of the syllable as is now common in Deva-nāgarī but more like the Deva-nāgarī writing of *r* occurring between two consonants as in *sāmagrya, dāridrya* etc.). We learn from Slaje 1993:55-56 that such is the case in Śāradā writing in general and that *nd* and *rd* are particularly difficult to distinguish.

83. (a) Witzel's actual wording is ". . . all available MSS of the Mahābhāṣya go back to ONE single archetype from which all have been copied." This may give the (obviously) unintended implication that scholars have located and looked at all surviving →

suggested that this archetype came into being as the Early Nāgarī script emerged from the Gupta Nāgarī script. However, in this identification of the period to which the single source ms, no longer accessible to us, belonged, Witzel, in my view, overread the evidence and took it as pointing in too certain a direction, of which it really is not capable.[84] He also does not take into account Kielhorn (1880:8) and (1883:9):

(a) "The Kaśmīr ms [K] generally agrees with g B [= Devanāgarī mss], but it contains also a few valuable readings which are not found in any of the other mss."

→ MB mss. Such indeed is not the case. That is why I have understood Witzel as making a statement about the mss so far studied, which boils down to, as far as I can ascertain, mss used by the editors. In a certain unhelpful sense, all written texts go back to a single original ms. Even a revised archetype given for circulation by an author is based on an earlier autograph. Witzel, given his sophisticated knowledge of manuscriptology and textual criticism, could not have meant his cited sentence to carry this meaning either.

(b) The available edns. are based on Nāgarī mss, except for two partial Kashmirian mss, going back to the same original, that were made accessible to Kielhorn by Bühler (Kielhorn 1880:7-8; 1883 (Preface to vol. II of his MB edn: 8-9).

84. Witzel, 1986:249: "A closer look at some of the mistakes reported in Rau's monograph shows that most of them tend to have occurred in one of the Northern post-Gupta scripts, like the 'Siddha-mātr̥kā.' Licchavi (in Nepal), early Śāradā etc. Some peculiarities, however, may be of South Indian origin." As this wording itself shows, Witzel speaks of a large expanse of land that is unlikely to have developed the potential for confusion of the same letters at about the same time. Also, while we can assert that some confusions are noticed for the first time in a particular script or complex of scripts, we are not in a position to assert that they could not have occurred earlier. A similar consideration applies to having the potential or likelihood for confusion of certain letters (e.g., *bh* and *y* or *bh* and *m*, which Witzel mentions).

(b) "It is difficult to determine precisely the relation of the Kaśmīr mss. to the Deva-nāgarī mss, but in general their text will be found to approach nearest to the text of the mss E g B [= Deva-nāgarī mss]. At the same time I would repeat here that in more cases than one the Kaśmīr mss appear to have preserved readings which are preferable to those of all the known Deva-nāgarī mss."

Nor does Witzel derive, in my view, the right implication from the two oddities his extensive knowledge of Vedic literature enables him to notice:

(a) "The re-interpretation necessary to arrive at [the MB Vedic quotation] #541 [as numbered by Rau] *yadā hy asau matto* < KS [=Kāṭhaka-Saṁhitā] 14.5:205.3 *anr̥taṁ hi so 'matto* . . . cf. MSS 44, p. 167, corresponds exactly to one frequently found in the Kashmir ms of the Paipp. Saṁhitā of the AV . . ."

(b) ". . . the archetype of Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya agrees another time with the Kashmir version of PS, and only with the Kashmir version . . ."

Here, instead of rationalizing the oddities by appealing to his view that the Kashmir ms of the Paippalāda Saṁhitā of the Atharva-veda "goes back to a Deva-nāgarī ms of ca. 1350 CE coming from Gujarat," Witzel should have used the oddities either to modify his conclusion about the nature of the MB archetype[85] or to qualify his earlier determination of the relationship between the Kashmir ms of the Paippalāda Saṁhitā and a postulated Deva-nāgarī ms source for that

85. Such a modification would logically necessitate a modification of Witzel's conclusions regarding where the archetype was copied (Western India) and which part of India was Pat°'s home (following Thieme, Witzel takes it to be Mathurā).

Kashmir ms. Since that determination also rested on a similar analysis of readings, to appeal to it in the present context introduces an element of circularity in Witzel's argument. The moral of Witzel's erudite effort for Indology is really this: While efforts like his must be welcomed and made and while the steps he recommends as needed (preparation of critical edns, paleographic databases, lists of writing mistakes specific to or predominant in certain areas etc.) must be taken,[86] we still have not reached a stage in Indology in which it would be justifiable to attach greater weight to script-based confusions than to what the mutual relations of mss, as expressed in a stemma codicum prepared by an editor or as implicit in the readings recorded by him/her, indicate. In the case of the MB, our knowledge at present justifies only this: the single ms from which the MB mss used by Kielhorn (and the earlier and later editors)[87]

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86. The objective evidence gleaned through such studies should be attached greater weight than the subjective (and frequently simplistic) speculations in which Indologists indulge. It should be used to test if Indologist A's historical reconstruction based on the historical reconstructions by Indologists 'B,' 'C' etc. and/or by himself in another research writing should really be allowed to continue in the field.

87. (a) Prior to Kielhorn's, the only complete edn. of the MB was the 1872 edn published in Benares (= Varanasi). Given the features of Sanskrit works published in Varanasi in the latter half of the nineteenth century, this edn. is unlikely to have been based on mss outside of Benares and written in scripts other than Devanāgarī. Kielhorn (1880-85) does not refer to it in his edn. as far as I can asertain. Abhyankar (1962-72) cites a few readings from it in the footnotes to his republishing of the text constituted by Kielhorn.

(b) No new consultation of mss seems to have taken place in the post-Kielhorn MB edns by Guru-Prasāda Śāstrī (1938) and Vedavrata (1962-63) or in the Nirnaya-Sagar Press, edn (1912, 1937, 1942, 1945, 1951).

descended was a Kaśmīrī ms.[88]

§5.5 Now, if an error similar to the one noticed by Bühler and later editors of the RT was committed at the time the original of the manuscripts used by the MB editors was copied, the form *G* we have so far taken to be unquestionable would cease to be so and could yield its place to *Gonandīya*. We would, in other words, be justified in entertaining the possibility that, at some very early point in manuscript transmission, *ndī* of the Śāradā script or its ancestor script in Kashmir was wrongly transmitted as *rdī* in other parts of India. We may not be able to produce contemporary or undeniable evidence to establish that this indeed is what happened. But since we are dealing with the same basic word *Gonarda*, since the confusingly similar writing of *rd* and *nd* is not confined only to the RT mss (fn 80), and since additional pieces of evidence make it probable that the MB, as the work of a native of Kashmir (see my next essay in this volume), received its first written form, like Kalhaṇa's RT, in a Kashmiri script, we would be justified in inferring that *Gonandīya* changed to *Gonardīya* in the text of the MB.[89]

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88. In this connection, it is important to be aware of the reality that South Indian mss have not been consulted in the preparation of the available MB edns, that most of the Nāgarī mss used by the editors were not very old (especially in the second half of the 19th century when the earliest edns. took shape) and that the demanding work of critically editing all the surviving MB commentaries and checking their readings against those of the MB mss is yet to be carried out.

89. In Seelakkhandha's commentary cited in §1.6(g), *gonandīya* appears without any explanation in the glossing of *G*. Whether he was aware of *gonandīya* as a variant reading in his commentandum, whether the idea occurred to him after reading Bühler's comment, whether, being aware of the Kashmiri connection of *G*, he allowed the possibility of *nd* being mistaken as *rd* or whether he followed the information given on Monier- →

The following is also instructive in this regard:

(a) The relatively more extensive dictionaries of Sanskrit like the Śabdārtha-cintā-maṇi (p. I.ii.839), compiled in 1860 / 1864, and Śabda-kalpa-druma (p. II.357), compiled in 1886, have entries like the following: *gonarda* for the male sārasa bird and *gonandī* for the female sārasa bird, comparable to Monier-Williams, p. 365: *gonarda* 'Ardea sibirica,' *gonandī* 'female of Ardea sibirica.'

(b) On the basis of Hari-vaṁśa 2.35.39 (Citraśāḷā Press edn), Citrāva (1964:194) gives *Gonarda* as the name of the Kashmir king helping Jarāsaṁdha, whereas, as noted above, the Kashmirian works like the RT refer to the Kashmir king with *Gonanda*. When one probes the ms evidence for the Hari-vaṁśa, one finds that, even though the corresponding line in the critical B.O.R.I. edn (81.38) retains the reading *kaśmīra-rājo gonardaḥ*, the variant readings noted for the quarter include *gonaṁhaḥ* (as found in ms K3 of the Śāradā version, which comes close to *gonandaḥ*, since *h* and *d* are similar in appearance) and *gonandaḥ* (as a marginal gloss found in ms D4 of the Deva-nāgarī version).

The greater claim of *gonandīya* to authenticity means that we remain free to proceed on one or more of the following assumptions:

(a) *Gonarda* in G of the MB, as an unintended substitute for *Gonanda*, might not have been intended as a geographic term.

→ Williams, p. 365 is hard to determine. Given the extent and the generally unimpressive standard of scholarship reflected in his commentary, I consider the first and fourth possibilities most likely.

(b) Lévi's success in establishing *Gonarda* as the name of a region between Ujjayinī and Vidiśā may have nothing to do with the history of Pat° or his MB. Lévi's *Gonarda* may be a confusingly similar name that had a different etymology (from root *nard* instead of *nand*) or may be a corruption of *Gonanda* as a shared geographical term; it is not unusual for regions and villages etc. to be named after regions and villages known earlier, especially to new settlers.

(c) The '*G* : *Goṇ*' pair occurring in the current text of the MB need not be viewed as identical with the '*G* : *Goṇ*' pair of the KS, although I consider it more likely (not certain) that G of the KS tradition is also a corruption of *Gonandīya* (and that *Gonarda* and G of the Kāśikā tradition are corruptions of *Gonanda,* taken as a country name applicable to an eastern part of Kashmir (§3.9, §5.6) and *Gonandīya*.

(d) Disbelief in the occurrence of an identical name pair in two widely different texts is not warranted, since, now, the KS may have the pair '*G* : *Goṇ*' but the MB will have the pair '*Gonandīya* : *Goṇ*'[90] or no pair, only *Gonandīya,* if the MB occurrence of *Goṇ* is rejected in a critical edn. (§1.6).

§5.6 *Gonanda* is well-established as a name of some rulers of Kashmir. At least three rulers with that name are mentioned in the RT (1.44, 48, 53, 57-63, 76, 185, 191; 3.472-473, 486, 527, 530; 8.3407-09, 3413, 3419). The first one among them is in fact considered to be a founder of Kashmir as a distinctive geo-political unit. After him, there were several "lost kings" and

90. As (c) indicates, I am not enthusiastic about making this assumption.

kings belonging to other known as well as unknown families. Before Gonanda III, as many as 52 could have ruled Kashmir. The Gonandīya dynasty founded by this third Gonanda ruled for many generations. Even in the subsequent Kārkoṭa dynasty, there was a Gonandīya Bālāditya. The longevity as well as recurrence of *Gonanda*, thus, leaves no room to doubt that the ancient Kashmirians had, on the whole, a positive and strong association with the name. Further, the first explanation for *Gonarda* as a geographical term given in Apte 1957, appendix C, p. 42 is this: "The Punjab. It is so called from king Gonarda of Kashmir who conquered this part." Although the ancient or medieval textual occurrence on which this explanation is based is not specified, it is unlikely to have been made up. It establishes at least that *Gonarda/Gonanda* was used as a designation of a region in the Kashmir-Punjab part of the world. At this time, we may not be able to go beyond the '*Gonanda* ⟶ *Gonandīya*' development and to determine the precise sense or senses in which the epithet *Gonandīya* was used (see §3.9). But such open-endedness about a detail forced upon us by the absence of additional material does not mean that the suggested development did not take place.

§5.7 Returning to the question implicit in the beginning of this essay, I wish to conclude as follows: The equations 'G/Gonandīya = Pat°' and 'Goṇ = Pat°' should not be spoken of as ruled out by the research of Kielhorn, Mitra etc. In the present state of our research, the only justifiable position to take would be that the tradition is very probably right in accepting the first equation and has not been proved to be wrong in accepting the second. Regardless of what one's general view of preservation of reliable historical information in the writings of traditional commentators may be, one should admit that they seem to have succeeded in preserving such information

in the case studied and that the arguments advanced by modern scholars so far are incapable of establishing a view to the contrary. Because of the long period involved, some traditional commentators may naturally have missed the preserved information or experienced moments of uncertainty, but the absence of endorsement or indication of doubt in their writings should not be used to conclude that the information preserved by others and known to the undecided was not factual.

4

Patañjali: a Kashmirian*

Ashok Aklujkar

§1.1 In the preceding two essays, I have already stated or indicated some reasons in support of viewing Kashmir as Pat°'s mother land. Given the special place Nāgas occupy in Kashmirian culture, Pat°'s identification with a Nāga especially venerated in Kashmir and the repeated efforts made by the rulers of Kashmir to maintain MB studies, the path to think of him as Kashmir's son is opened. The epithet *Gonandīya*, associated strongly as it is with Kashmir, makes the path further agreeable, since it can be argued that *Gonandīya* was the real form of the epithet *Gonardīya* quite plausibly taken by the tradition as standing for Pat°. The point made in §5.4 of the second essay, namely that the existing mss of the MB probably go back to a ms written in Kashmir, further supports the conclusion that Pat° hailed from Kashmir. In §3.9 of the same essay, I have also responded to a few possible objections to the conclusion.[1]

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* For printing conventions and abbreviations, see the starred note in my first essay in this volume.

1. Though the three essays are thus mutually supportive, the specific argumentation in each of them is largely independent.

§1.2 It may be asked if the evidence of Pat°'s association with Nāgas and of the MB's association with royalty that I have offered in the preceding essays does not make it at least equally likely that Patañjali was a native of eastern or central-eastern India. A part of the evidence offered for both the associations comes from eastern India (§2.5c and §3.4 of essay 1). In eastern India, too, the cult of snake worship is said to be more prevalent than in most other parts of India. Secondly, while the alternative that *Gonandīya* was applicable to Pat° is plausible, it has not been proved that G was not at all applicable to Pat°. Scholars have identified Gonarda with modern Goṇḍ/Goṇḍa (see §5.2 in the last essay). Thirdly, the following passage in Rāja-śekhara's Kāvya-mīmāṁsā (book 1, adhyāya 10) indicates Pat°'s association with eastern India: *śrūyate ca pāṭali-putre śāstrakāra-parīkṣā. "atropavarṣa-varṣāv, iha pāṇini-piṅgalāv, iha vyāḍiḥ* । *vara-ruci-patañjalī iha, parīkṣitāḥ khyātim upajagmuḥ* ॥ "It is heard (in the tradition in the form of the following verse) that the (more well-known or influential) śāstra authors were examined in Pāṭali-putra: "Here (only, unlike at any other place)[2] Upavarṣa, Varṣa, Pāṇini, Piṅgala, Vyāḍi, Vara-ruci and Patañjali, when examined, attained fame." Why must then we conclude that the associations I have highlighted traveled from Kashmir to the Gauḍa lands (in the narrow sense of *Gauḍa*, that is, to eastern regions of north India) and not vice-versa?

Pat° could have spent a significant part of his life in eastern or central-eastern India.[3] I do not claim to have a piece of

2. The parenthetical addition is my attempt to convey what the verse author could have wished to convey when he repeated *iha*. See §3.3 and note 19.

3. A person can be born in one place and can have his or her whole career in another. It was not uncommon in pre-modern India for a distinguished scholar, thinker or saint of one geographical area to be invited to stay in another.

evidence *so decisive in itself* that it would rule out the possibility of Pat°'s birth in the Goṇḍ/Goṇḍa area. Historical research rarely, if ever, blesses a researcher with inarguable pieces of evidence of the required kind — pieces that would establish absolutely that something did not happen. This is all the more a fact of a scholar's life when the subject of research pertains to the ancient period of India. However, I think that the facts noted in the two preceding essays, *taken collectively*, favor Pat°'s and Pat° legend's association with Kashmir more than with central-eastern or eastern India. In Kashmir, all the elements necessary for linkage with Pat° are clearly and repeatedly found (cf. §2.1 in essay 1). The Goṇḍ/Goṇḍa and Gauḍa lands provide evidence only of some elements and they do so with much less frequency.

§2.1 This third essay will provide additional reasons supporting the converging reasons summarized in §1.1 above. To start with reasons that require little or no interpretive intervention and hence are objective, the base form *Patañjala* of the rare name *Patañjali/Pātañjali* (see note 1 in the first essay) is so far attested, before the presumed composition time of the MB (not later than the second century BCE), only in *patañcala* of Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.3.1 and 3.7.1.[4] In both passages, which are structurally similar, Patañcala Kāvya is said to be a resident of the Madra region. Madra is very close to Kashmir. We thus get corroboration of the currency of *Patañcala* or *Patañjala* and, thereby, of the possibility of *Patañjali/Pātañjali* occurring in

4. The '*c* : *j*' or 'unvoiced : voiced' difference may be historically interesting and important, but it is not great enough to disallow an etymological connection of *Patañcala* with *Patañjali/Pātañjali*.

northwestern India, almost within the borders of Kashmir, at an early time.[5]

§2.2 In Puri 1957:67-88 and Agnihotrī 1963:71-129, the geography of India reflected in the MB has received extensive treatment. Both treatments have frequently become diffused because of inclusion of extraneous material and have sometimes shown laxity in interpretation. However, their coverage is reliable enough to allow us to conclude that Pat° directly knew most of north India and had at least second-hand knowledge of the major political and/or ethnic divisions in south India. In the case of north India, his knowledge of the western part to the south of the river Śutudru (modern Sutlej), that is, of the regions identifiable with the names Sindhu, Sauvīra, Brāhmaṇaka, Surāṣṭra, Yaudheya and Sālva was probably indirect and limited. In other words, his personal geographical knowledge was at its best in the case of the long stretch from Gāndhāra in the northwest to Magadha in the east.

On the background this summation furnishes, the following remarks of Puri and Agnihotrī deserve to be noted:

Puri (1957:86-88): ". . . with reference to villages, only the Vāhīka-grāmas find a prominent place in the Mahābhāṣya. . . . It is really difficult to identify the villages mentioned by

5. In Pāṇinian Gaṇa-pāṭha 29, that is, in the upakādi gaṇa associated with P 2.4.69 (*upakādibhyo 'nyatarasyām advandve*), one finds *patañjala* and *padañjala*. According to Viśva-bandhu's Vaidika-padānu-krama-kośa, *patañjalānām* occurs in Baudhāyana-śrauta-pravara 26.1 and *patañjaliḥ* in Hiraṇya-keśi-śrauta-sūtra 21.1.10. Even if these occurrences were held to be older than the occurrence in the colophons of the MB or any other works ascribed to Pat°, they would not be older than the occurrence in the Bṛhad-āraṇyaka Upaniṣad. Further, being parts of mere lists, they do not help us in any historically or culturally informative way.

Patañjali, though they were mostly located in the land of the Vāhīkas (Vāhīka-deśa) . . . a good many Vāhīka villages, as well as those in the extreme north-west are mentioned by him."[6]

Agnihotrī (1963: 71, 78): *paścimottara pradeśa ke bhī bahuta-se jana-padoṁ, nagaroṁ aura grāmoṁ kā paricaya prāmāṇika rūpa meṁ hameṁ sarva-prathama pataṁjali se hī prāpta hotā hai. . . . darada parvata-śreṇī tathā usake nivāsiyoṁ se bhāṣyakāra kā nikaṭa paricaya jāna paḍatā hai. . . . uttara-paścima parvata-śreṇiyoṁ ko choḍakara himavān ke anya bhāgoṁ kā ullekha bhāṣya meṁ nahīṁ milatā.* "We come to know many of the settlements, towns and villages of the north-west in a reliable way for the first time only from Pat°. . . . It seems that the MB author knew closely the Darada mountain range and its inhabitants.[7] . . . We do not find any mention of divisions of the Himālaya other than the mountain ranges of the northwest in the MB."

Largely in agreement with the preceding is Abhyankar, 1975: Preface iv: "Although some scholars believe that he belonged to the Gonarda country, still, references to various

6. A few lines before the last sentence, Puri concludes, "A study of the data, as one finds [it/them] in the Mahābhāṣya, suggests that Patañjali was more familiar with the geography of Āryāvarta proper . . ." Here, he should have recalled his own remarks about the Vāhīka-grāmas etc. and at least mentioned the north-west (or the Punjab-Kashmir) area along with Āryāvarta.

7. This remark is based on the occurrence of *darad, dārada, darad-vṛndārikā, dārada-vṛndārikā,* and *dāradikā* in MB on P 4.1.120 (p. II.258.6), 6.3.34 (p. III.153.18) and 6.3.42 (p. III.158.16). Abhyankar, in revising Kielhorn, replaces *darad* and *dārada* with *śarad* and *śārada,* and gives the readings adopted by Kielhorn as variants. Since the other words mentioned in MB 4.1.120 have the appearance of proper names, Abhyankar's replacement lacks justification (and makes his edn's agreement with Citrava's word index to the MB inconsistent).

towns and districts and the peculiarity of accents and word-formation therein, noticed and recorded by him in his work, show his admirable familiarity with the different towns and districts of the northwest provinces like Gāndhāra and Vāhīka as well as the south-east provinces such as Vaṅga and Kaliṅga."[8]

Pat°'s greater familiarity with the geographical details of the Indian north-west, particularly with the geographical

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8. (a) Here, Abhyankar should not have parted company with Puri and Agnihotrī in putting the southeastern provinces on the same level as the northwestern provinces. No *parts* of the eastern viṣayas or jana-padas seem to have been mentioned by Pat° (see (b) below), except Pāṭali-putra. As to how the profusion of references to Pāṭali-putra, which could have given Abhyankar a wrong impression, is to be understood, see §3.1-3 below.

(b) There is only one reference to Kaliṅga in MB 3.2.155 p. II.120.25-2 and that too as a part of a quotation. Mention of Kaliṅga in P 4,1,170 does not receive a comment from Pat°, although he addresses some other contents of the sūtra.

Vaṅga is present in MB 4.2.52, p. II.252.8, (in the forms *Vāṅga* and *Vāṅgī*) in 2.4.62, p. I.490.4, (in the form *Vāṅga*) in 4.1.170. p. II.269.17 and (in the form *Vāṅgaka*) in 4.3.120, p. II.318.15.

Aṅga appears in MB 4.2.52, p. II.252.7, in 6.1.2, p. III.7.22 (the printing *Āṅga* is probably a mistake), (in the forms *Āṅga* and *Āṅgī*) in 2.4.62, p. I.490.3-4, 20, (in the form *Āṅga*) in 2.4.64, p. I.493.6, in 4.1.170. p. II.269.16, and (in the form *Āṅgaka*) in 4.3.120, p. II.318.15.

Puṇḍra and Suhma figure in MB 4.2.52, p. II.282.8.

In none of these references any knowledge of details of regional life is reflected. In the case of Magadha, we find Pat° mentioning only the śāli crop and the rājan 'ruler' (MB Śiva-sūtra 1, p. I.19.6, 2.1.2 p. I.375.8), Thus, the MB does not furnish any evidence enabling us to attribute an in-depth knowledge of the eastern areas beyond Magadha to Pat°.

details of the relatively eastern regions of that north-west (namely, Madra, Vāhīka) down to the level of villages, noticed (but not fully or properly utilized) by Puri, Agnihotrī and Abhyankar supports the view that his native place was Kashmir.[9]

§2.3 Further, the astronomical argument Abhyankar (1962:571-572) offers speaks in favor of assigning Pat° to Kashmir. Explaining MB 2.1.29, p. I.384.18 (*ṣaṇ-muhūrtāś carācarāḥ. te kadācid ahar gacchanti, kadācid rātrim*) in a very plausible way, Abhyankar says: "The period from 5:18 a.m. to 7:42 a.m., making 2 hrs and 24 min., i.e. three muhūrtas in the morning, will be some times during day-time and some times during night-time; similarly, the time of three muhūrtas in the evening from 5:18 p.m. to 7:42 p.m. will some times be during day-time and some times during night-time. Thus, six muhūrtas (3 in the morning and 3 in the evening) will be carācara, i.e. some times during daytime and some times during night time. Such a phenomenon occurs in the districts situated at a latitude of 34° north i.e., as far as India is concerned, in a district situated to the west of Shrinagar and

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9. (a) I characterize Puri's, Agnihotrī's and Abhyankar's efforts as deficient for the reasons given in notes 6, 8, 10c and 11.

(b) The difficulty noted by Puri in identifying the villages mentioned by Pat° may at least partially disappear when new efforts to study the geography of ancient India from primary sources are made. Much time has passed after the studies of ancient Indian geography used by Puri and Agnihotrī were prepared. Utilization of the information subsequently recovered from inscriptions, cultural studies of Purāṇas, etc. will result in some new identifications, especially if the studies maintain awareness of a possibly wider underlying linguistic spectrum — do not attempt to find the origins of names of villages etc. only in Indo-Aryan languages.

to the north of Takṣaśilā which appears to be the place of residence of the author of the Mahābhāṣya."[10]

Perhaps Abhyankar should not have been so precise in wording his deduction as to say "to the west of Shrinagar and to the north of Takṣaśilā." He should have entertained the possibility that Pat°'s *ṣaṇ-muhūrtāś carācarāḥ. te kadācid ahar gacchanti, kadācid rātrim* might have been based on a calendar that served the needs of a wider area (as calendars commonly do in most of the world). Secondly, Abhyankar should not have wavered between accepting what he had observed and following Bhandarkar's view.[11] Yet these two considerations

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10. (a) In this citation from Abhyankar, I have changed the punctuation and abbreviations of the original for the sake of clarity.

(b) Scharfe (1977:153), to whom I am indebted for bringing Abhyankar's reasoning to my attention, sets that reasoning aside in favor of the reasoning I examine in §3.4. It would have been better if he had not done so. Abhyankar's reasoning is objective and straightforward, whereas Thieme's inconclusive and roundabout.

(c) That Abhyankar himself does not see the weight of the evidence he discovered and follows the Bhandarkar-Lévi line of thinking in his other writings does not deprive the evidence of its usefulness.

11. (a) Cf. Abhyankar, 1975: Preface iv: "Probably, he [= Pat°] was born in Gonarda in the Central parts of the vast country, was educated in Gāndhāra and was imparting instructions to pupils at Pāṭalī-putra."

(b) I would not spread the geographical associations of Pat°'s life so neatly over three stages of his life as Abhyankar does, but this would be a minor difference in our reconstructions. The major difference is that I reconstruct Pat°'s life as that of a person moving from Kashmir to Magadha (particularly to Pāṭali-putra) and returning to a place much to the west of Pāṭali-putra, the Mathurā-

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should not come in the way of our acknowledging that his explanation of an intriguing line from Pat° is elegant, essentially valid and hence an excellent piece of evidence.

§2.4 Pat°'s closeness to the Atharva-veda, particularly to the Paippalāda Saṁhitā of the Atharva-veda, has been noted at least since 1935.[12] Prevalence of the Paippalāda recension in Kashmir from Pat°'s time to that of Jayāditya-Vāmana, the Kāśikā authors, and re-introduction of the same recension in the time of Zain-ul-abidin have been inferred on the basis of good evidence (cf. Dipak Bhattacharya, 2000: 135-136; Slaje, 2007; indirectly Witzel, 1986:252). Because the recension can also be said to have been current in areas such as Orissa, the Paippalāda connection cannot in itself suffice to assign Pat° to

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→ Ujjayinī area being one probability but Kashmir in the north-west being a stronger probability. The observations made in §§3.1-2 and §§4.1-2 of the first essay, in §5.4 of the second essay and in §2.3, §3.5 (last paragraph) and §4.1 of this essay suggest a stay in Kashmir at the time of MB composition. But it is also possible that Pat° journeyed from Kashmir (or eastern Kashmir close to or overlapping with modern Punjab) to the east more than once, and the MB was composed after one such journey had acquainted him with north India to the east up to Pāṭali-putra.

12. (a) Cf. Witzel, 1986:255, who, at this point, refers to p. 63 of Thieme's 1935 publication *Pāṇini and the Veda*. See also Y. Mīmāṁsaka saṁvat 2041:361. The large number of AV and AV(P) citations by Pat° listed in Rau 1985:79-82 points in the same direction, especially because Rau's listing identifies as many as 17 hapax legomenon instances.

(b) Taking the Paippalāda Atharva-veda as Pat°'s personal Veda is not contradicted by the high frequency with which he cites the Yajur-veda texts (Y. Mīmāṁsaka saṁvat 2041:361-363, Witzel, 1986:255). The concerns and linguistic features of the two Vedas are different as is their use in ritual worship. Besides, P and Kātyāyana, on whom Pat° comments, had already paved the way for referring to several Yajur-veda texts.

Kashmir. However, taken with Witzel's (1986:255) determination that the Paippalāda Saṁhitā "is, at least in the early period, apparently more Western than the Vulgate (AV-Śaunaka)" and the other pieces of evidence gathered in this essay, the connection can serve as another objective piece of evidence favoring the hypothesis of Pat°'s early upbringing in Kashmir.

§2.5 The name *Kaśyapa* goes back to the time(s) of Vedic texts. Its derivatives *Kāśyapa* etc. are also indubitably ancient. Therefore, it is natural that, in the MB under 1.2.25 (p. I.201.21), 4.2.66 (p. II.286.7-17) and 8.4.42 (p. III.463.17), *Kaśyapa* and *Kāśyapa* should occur as words used by P, Kātyāyana and a seer whose composition is included in the Paippalāda Atharva-veda. In MB 1.2.64 (p. I.233.12), 2.4.62 (p. I.491.11) and 4.1.89 (p. II.241.12-13, 242.3), however, we find *kāśyapa-pratikṛtayaḥ kāśyapāḥ* 'the icons resembling Kaśyapa's progeny are [spoken of as] *kāśyapāḥ*,' cited as a usage that would be blocked if P 2.4.64 is understood as effecting elision only when more than two (*bahu*) items are meant. The usage presupposes that icons similar in appearance to Kaśyapa's progeny were manufactured and sold to make a living. Kaśyapa is viewed as a creator (Prajā-pati) seer, and his progeny would be the Ādityas (including the Sun), serpents (including the great Nāgas) and birds (including Garuḍa) etc. (cf. Apte 1957:550-551, 569). While the icons of this progeny were made in more than one part of India, it is in Kashmir, in the present state of our knowledge, that they are more likely to be associated with the name *Kāśyapa*. The importance Kaśyapa had in ancient Kashmir's understanding of itself is writ large over the NMP in verses such as 85, 100-103, 138, 155, 205-219, 226, 237-244, 248, 250, and 275. The same importance is acknowledged implicitly or explicitly in RT 1.26-27, 1.182, 4.486 and 5.113.

Kaśyapa plays the role of a father figure in the settlement of Kashmir. Consequently, even the word *kāśyapī* in the sense of 'earth' seems to have been primarily associated with the land of Kashmir in RT 1.45. The citation of *kāśyapa-pratikṛtayaḥ kāśyapāḥ* in the MB may, therefore, be taken as one more clue regarding the provenance of the author of the MB.

§2.6 What Pat° says under P 2.2.6 and 5.1.115 may also be revealing in the context of our present concern. His words are (the variants from MB 5.1.115, given in angular parentheses, make no significant difference to the overall meaning of the passage): *sarva ete śābdā guṇa-samudāyeṣu vartante brāhmaṇaḥ kṣatriyo vaiśyaḥ śūdra iti. <ātas ca guṇa-samudāya* [. . .?] *evaṁ hy āha> "tapaḥ śrutaṁ ca yoniś cety-etad </ca etad> brāhmaṇa-kārakam / tapaḥ-śrutābhyāṁ yo hīno jāti-brāhmaṇa eva saḥ //* [source?].[13] *tathā gauraḥ śucy-ācāraḥ piṅgālākṣaḥ kapila-keśa*[14] *ity-etān apy*

13. The first half of the verse matches Mahābhārata 13.122.7ab (numbering according to the Poona critical edn). Therefore, it might have come from the same source as the matching line in the Mahābhārata, that is, from a Smṛti or Dharma-śāstra work now lost to us (my thanks to Professor Patrick Olivelle for confirming this guess). Śiva-rāmendra Sarasvatī attributes the verse to Manu, which attribution is not borne out by Professor Olivelle's critical edn of the Mānava-dharma-śāstra.

14. Kielhorn's edn and the NSP edn read *piṅgalaḥ ka°*. We do not know what Kaiyaṭa's reading was, since he cites only *gauraḥ* as a pratīka. Śiva-rāmendra-sarasvatī reads *piṅgala-ka°*, that is, reads three adjectives instead of four. Nāgeśa first follows him and then the uncompounded reading we find in Kielhorn's edn and the NSP edn. He obviously senses redundancy in *gauraḥ* and *piṅgalaḥ* and, to avoid it, suggests an improbable meaning for *gauraḥ* on the basis of a (Smṛti?) verse. Objectively, the reading I have adopted above on the basis of Kielhorn's record of variant readings on p. II.482.4 (corresponding to Abhyankar, p. II.490.4) is stronger. It is found in mss G (a Goldstücker-supplied photo- →

abhyantarān [→ *ābhy°?*] *brāhmaṇye guṇān kurvanti.* Here, after stating the qualities essential to brahminhood through the cited verse, Pat° uses four adjectives to state the additional qualities that some consider integral to or associate strongly with brahminhood. Three of the four adjectives — *gaura* "fair-skinned, one having a light complexion," *piṅgalākṣa* "cat-eyed or brown-eyed" and *kapila-keśa* "one with tawny hair" — refer to physical appearance. All three apply to Kashmirian Brahmins, and are unlikely to be thought of as germane or widely applicable in the case of Brahmins from other parts of India. Hence, the passage very probably reflects a local Kashmirian association that naturally occurs to Pat°.[15]

→ lithographic copy of a Deva-nāgarī ms in India Museum) and K (Bühler-supplied Kashmirian Śāradā-script ms) that were written in two widely separated parts of India and were considered to be most useful by Kielhorn (despite the incompleteness and corruption of the latter). Loss of *kṣaḥ* before *ka* in other mss also comes across as natural if the original reading is assumed to be *piṅgālākṣaḥ ka.* The reading I have adopted also removes the ground for redundancy with *gauraḥ* that Nāgeśa felt, since *piṅgala* need not any longer be taken as referring to skin color; *piṅgālākṣaḥ* informs us about distinctive eyes — eyes that do not have black pupils, which are most common in India, but are brownish or greenish yellow (resembling a cat's eyes; in some uses of *piṅgala,* a shade of golden-yellowish is meant).

15. It would be wrong to think that Pat° was thinking of a Brahmin primarily in racial or skin color terms. He obviously knew that skin color was not a defining characteristic of brahminhood. His commentators rightly and clearly suggest that his reference to the external features of Brahmins is a reference to adventitious qualities (meant to illustrate how a thing is thought of as a bundle of qualities). What the commentators do not realize is the possibility that Pat° could be referring to naturally occurring local associations. Therefore, they explain the sentence concerned only by appealing to the possibility that Pat° spoke of the adventitious qualities on the basis of a tradition valid in a bygone →

§3.1 The MB refers to Pāṭali-putra in no less than twenty-two passages:[16] **1.1.57,** p. I.144.11; **1.2.1,** p. I.192.12; **1.3.1,** p. I.254.19; **1.3.2,** p. I.259.21; **1.3.11,** p. I.273.13; **1.4.24,** p. I.327.1, 7; **1.4.42,** p. I.331.23; **2.1.1,** p. I.360.25; **2.1.16,** p. I.380.19; **2.2.11,** p. I.414.17; **2.3.28,** p. I.455.10, 22; **2.4.7,** p. I.474.8; **2.4.83,** p. I.499.5; **3.2.102,** p. II.114.12-14; **3.3.133,** p. II.160.25, 25; **3.3.136,** p. II.162.7, 11; **4.3.66,** p. II.311.23 - 312.2; **4.3.134,** p. II.321.21; **5.3.57,** p. II.416.20-23; **6.4.22,** p. III.192.12; **7.2.62,** p. III.299.3; **8.2.84** p. III.417.9. This preponderance of references, among possibly other considerations such as the references to Puṣya-mitra, associated as a ruler with Pāṭali-putra, seems to have led some researchers to conclude that Pat° either hailed from central-eastern India or spent a large part of his life in central-eastern India, if not in Pāṭali-putra itself (see §§3.3-4 below). I consider it defensible to hold that he lived for a considerable time in central-eastern India and also that he traveled to Pāṭali-putra on special occasions lasting several days, but I do not

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→ age. In their conception, Brahmins would naturally have light-skinned bodies in an earlier age, since people are said to be more luminescent in the description of that age due to the absence or small quantities of impurities that exist in the Kali age.

16. As my remark regarding Bhandarkar's view made in §5.2 of the second essay suggests, we must be careful in gleaning history from the examples of the grammarians. Some examples could simply be inherited from earlier works. Some might have been formulated without the intention of making their content correspond to anything in the author's life. We use the examples to recover history, because we have no other means or because the evidence available elsewhere is inadequate or unreliable. Our use is justified if some kind of pattern or constant inclination is seen in a grammarian's work or in the works belonging to the genre; that is, if a convention can be said to exist; e.g., in the changing illustrations of the imperfect tense — *aruṇad yavanaḥ sāketam, ajayad jarto hūṇān* etc. — across the schools or systems of Sanskrit grammar.

think that the passages contain anything that would warrant our locating of his birth and formative years outside of Kashmir.

Passages 1.1.57 and 2.1.16 give us only obvious geographical facts regarding where Pāṭali-putra is situated. In passages 1.2.1, 2.2.11, 2.4.7, 2.4.83, 4.3.134, 6.4.22 and 7.2.62, the city name appears only to illustrate grammar. We do not learn anything about Pāṭali-putra that puts it even in a remotely revealing relationship with anything else useful in recovering Pat°'s life history. The most we learn from the seven passages headed by MB 1.2.1 is that Pat° thought of associating two terms and that he knew that there were palaces and surrounding walls in Pāṭali-putra. Therefore, we should set aside such passages as unhelpful to our present concern.

To them, we should add 4.3.66: *iha mā bhūt. pāṭali-putrasya vyākhyānī sukosaleti . . . avayavaśo hy ākhyānaṁ vyākhyānam. pāṭali-putraṁ cāpy avayavaśa ācaṣṭa īdṛśā asya prākārā iti . . . na kaścid āha pāṭali-putraṁ vyākhyāyata iti.* Here, we can reasonably infer that Sukosalā's similarity with Pāṭali-putra made it capable of being used as a tool in giving a sense of what Pāṭali-putra was like, but since we do not know anything about Sukosalā — not even if it was a real city, the inference does not lead us anywhere.[17]

§3.2 Eight passages in the MB inform us in varying degree that the MB author was away from Pāṭali-putra at the time of writing his work.

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17. Agnihotrī (1963:126) takes Sukosalā to be a booklet that served as a guide to the city of Pāṭali-putra. This is not only improbable, it clashes with Pat°'s ruling that *vyā + khyā* can normally be used only in the context of śabda-granthas; if *vyākhyānī* is used with reference to Pāṭali-putra, either the word should have an unusual secondary sense or *Pāṭali-putra* should stand for a text.

Two of the passages do this explicitly. They are 1.3.1 (*athavā yayā deva-datta iha bhūtvā pāṭali-putre bhavati sā nūnaṁ kriyā*) and 1.3.2 (*guṇaiḥ prāpaṇam uddeśaḥ. tad yathā. kaścit kaṁcid āha. deva-dattaṁ me bhavān uddiśatv iti. sa ihasthaḥ pāṭali-putrasthaṁ deva-dattam uddiśati. aṅgadī kuṇḍalī kirīṭī vyuḍhorasko vṛtta-bāhur lohitākṣas tuṅga-nāso vicitrābharaṇa īdṛśo deva-datta iti*). If *iha* in these lines stands for the place the author had in his purview (recall note 16), as would be natural, it would follow that Pāṭali-putra was distant from that place.

This conjecture receives support from the questioner's stance reflected in the exchange found in 2.1.1(*yatra tarhi na samudāyāpekṣā ṣaṣṭhī tatra vṛttir na prāpnoti . . . kuto bhavān pāṭali-putraka iti*) and 2.3.28 (*praśnākhyānayoś ca pañcamī vaktavyā. kuto bhavān. pāṭali-putrāt. . . . idam atra prayoktavyaṁ san na prayujyate. kuto bhavān āgacchati. pāṭali-putrād āgacchāmīti*). Here, the person being questioned is clearly assumed to come from a place the questioner did not know or could not guess.

More indirect and hence faintly corroborating evidence is contained in 3.2.102 (*kaścit pāṭali-putraṁ jigamiṣur ekam ahar gatvāhedam adya gatam iti. na ca tāvatāsya vraji-kriyā parisamāptā bhavati. yat tu gataṁ tad abhisamīkṣyaitat prayujyata idam adya gatam iti*), 3.3.133 (*evaṁ hi kaścit pāṭali-putraṁ jigamiṣur āha. yo 'yam adhvā gantavya ā pāṭali-putrād, etasmin kūpo bhaviṣyati*), 8.2.84 (*dūraṁ mathurāyāḥ pāṭali-putram iti*) and 3.3.136 (*yo 'yam adhvā gata ā pāṭali-putrāt tasya yad avaraṁ sāketād iti. . . . iha mā bhūt. yo 'yam adhvāparimāṇo gantavyas tasya yad avaraṁ sāketād iti. . . . yo 'yam adhvā [= adhvā ā] pāṭali-putrād gantavyas tasya yat paraṁ sāketād iti*). In all these, the author's implicit perception is that a journey from a place presumed by him as the starting point is to take place with Pāṭali-putra as the destination.[18] but a

18. The first passage, MB 3.2.101, conveys that Pāṭali-putra is minimally one day's journey away. The second, MB 3.3.133, may →

word like *iha* is not used for the presumed place. Only *ayam* in the last passage *may* be taken as referring to the path the author had before his mind's eye.

§3.3 On the basis of the following sentence in MB 3.2.123, Y. Mīmāṁsaka (saṁvat 2041:361) conjectures that Pat° resided more in Pāṭali-putra than in other places: *pravr̥ttasyāvirāme śāsitavyā bhavantī, ihādhīmahe. iha vasāmaḥ. iha puṣya-mitraṁ yājayāmaḥ.* "We need (additionally) to prescribe the use of present tense endings when there is (an action) that is begun and has not reached its cessation (to be able to account for usages such as) 'Here we study'; 'Here we dwell'; 'Here we make Puṣya-mitra offer sacrificial worship'."

Even if we go along with Y. Mīmāṁsaka's apparent assumption that the mention of Puṣya-mitra implies performance of the specified actions in Pāṭali-putra, what he infers from the exemplifying sentences does not follow. As the traditional commentators like Kaiyaṭa understand, the purpose of the examples is to illustrate how actions take place intermittently — how other actions intervene in the performance of what we take to be a single action. Proceeding forth with studying does not mean that the actions of dwelling or participating in worship do not take place, and participating in worship does not mean that the actions of studying and dwelling disappear from the scene. If the examples unquestionably meant that first the action of studying took place at place P1, *then* the action of dwelling (as a settled resident) took place at P1 and *then* the action of causing Puṣya-mitra to offer sacrificial worship took place at the same P1 — a meaning Y. Mīmāṁsaka needs for his inference — then the

→ contain an element of anxiety regarding availability of drinking water, which may, in turn, suggest that the distance to be covered was considerable.

inference of Pat°'s long stay in Pāṭali-putra would be justified. But why would examples having such a sequential relationship be cited when the context requires vartamānatā 'presence, existing at the same time as the utterance'?[19]

Thus, there is no support in the MB to attribute a long Pāṭali-putra stay to Pat° (which does not mean that he did not actually stay in Pāṭali-putra for a long time or that he did not sojourn at Pāṭali-putra for significantly long periods; what we have determined is only that we do not have good or adequate evidence to advance such guesses). Pat° was obviously knowledgeable about where Pāṭali-putra was located and what it contained. It is also possible that he participated in Puṣyamitra's sacrifice at Pāṭali-putra, but we must remember that we have no basis to proceed beyond the possibility stage.

§3.4 The penultimate passage in §3.2 leaves room for a researcher to conjecture that the MB or a version or part thereof was composed in Mathurā. The piece of evidence adduced by Scharfe (1977:153) to take Mathurā as Pat°'s home may also be pressed into service at this point: "The popular dialect forms which he [= Pat°] quotes (Mbhāṣ I 259, 6-14) correspond, with their retention of /ś/ and /s/ and the development of /ṣ/>/s/, to the dialect of the gambler Māthura in the drama Mṛcchakaṭika (Act II)."[20] However, the reasoning here is rather

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19. Compare the recurrence of *iha* in the Kāvya-mīmāṁsā citation reproduced in §1.2 above. It is also possible, however, that in some other cases the recurrence of *iha* may signify different locations, conveying a string like "Here . . . There . . . And over there. . ."

20. Witzel (1986:255) credits this piece of reasoning to Professor Paul Thieme's classes in 1966. The additional argument he gives in support of the view that Pat° was a native of Mathurā (explicitly accepted in Witzel, 1994:241) is this: Mathurā is the area where all →

specious and based on meager evidence. Pat° cites only two roots: *kasi* for *kṛṣi* and *diśi* for *dṛśi*. To base a momentous conclusion on two short word forms would hardly be justifiable. Moreover, the forms are mentioned in a way (*ik-śtipau dhātu-nirdeśe*) that the grammarians adopt. They could have resulted from a process of abstraction or generalization. Pat° does not quote actual usages. Also the forms appear in the company of *āṇapayati, vaṭṭati* and *vaḍḍhati*, which belong to a language or dialect like Pāli (Bhandarkar 1877; Aklujkar 2004, fn. 36). If they were genuine Prakrit, they would show at least a noticeable loss of intervocalic consonants. Even if they are taken to be Prakrit and even if the character Māthura in the Mṛcchakaṭika is thought of as meant by the author to reflect the linguistic habits of a Mathurā inhabitant, it would not be justifiable to assume, without independent demonstration, that the retention of /ś/ and /s/ and the development of /ṣ/>/s/ were confined to the Mathurā region.

§3.5 Scharfe's statement that Mathurā "figures prominently in" Pat°'s "examples" should also be checked against the actual

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→ the three Yajur-veda schools quoted prominently by Pat°, namely Kaṭha, Maitrāyaṇī and Taittirīya, existed. While I value the efforts Witzel has made to determine the homes of the various Vedic schools and the methodology he adopted toward that end, I do not consider it necessary that all relevant schools be directly available in the area in which Pat° lived. I also do not see the need to assume that their co-existence in an area was always a case of overlapping that occurred without individual initiative or institutional planning. By the side of 'natural' overlapping, there must have been cases of interpenetration due to mobility at the individual level and efforts on the part of organizations of the school followers to maintain the "outposts." The Yajurveda, being the most practice-related Veda, must have led to the need for its specialists in almost all parts of India.

textual evidence and made precise. There are, in all, seven occurrences of *Mathurā* in the MB, two of which are found in practically identical sentences, leaving us with five distinctive occurrences: (a) Śiva-sūtra 1 p. I.18.12 = 2.1.64 p. I.244.19; (b) Śiva-sūtra 1 p. I.19.7; (c) 1.1.57 p. 144.11; (d) 1.2.1 p. I.192.11-12 = 7.2.62 p. III.299.3; (e) 4.1.14 p. II.205.7. In addition, a taddhita derivative *Māthura* is found in 5.3.55 p. II.413.23-24 and 5.3.57, p. II.416.20-23. If the seven occurrences are examined with the awareness that it can be misleading to go merely by the number of occurrences of a word (cf. the case of Pāṭali-putra above), then only the occurrences of *Mathurā* in 4.1.14 and of *Māthura* in 5.3.55 and 5.3.57 come across as promising. The first (*bahu-kurucarā mathurā, priya-kurucarā mathurā*) tells us that Mathurā had many Kuru dwellers (? on the analogy of *vanacara*?) and it liked them. The second informs us that the prices of cloth produced in Kāśī and Mathurā differed. The third (*sāṁkāśyakebhyaś ca pāṭali-putrakebhyaś ca māthurā abhirūpatarāḥ*) alone can be taken as an indication of the author's preference for the people of Mathurā. On its basis and on the basis of the high regard for the śiṣṭas ('spiritual learned elite') of Āryāvarta expressed in MB 6.3.109, we may speculate that Pat° lived in Mathurā or central-eastern India for a long time, but we will still lack justification to assert that such indeed was the case or to take the position that Mathurā or Āryāvarta was Pat°'s homeland.

The authorial perception reflected in Śiva-sūtra 1, p. I.19.5-7 (*tān eva śāṭakān ācchādayāmo ye mathurāyām. . . . tad evedaṁ bhavataḥ kārṣāpaṇaṁ yan mathurāyāṁ gṛhītam*) is that of a person who has left his Mathurā experience behind. This fact too is not helpful in inferring that Pat° stayed in Mathurā for a long time or hailed from it. Minimally, he must be thought of as going away from Mathurā prior to beginning the composition of the first chapter of his magnum opus.

§4.1 The overall impression one gets from Pat°'s references to Pāṭali-putra, Mathurā and other places in central and eastern India such as Ahicchatra (through the taddhita, *Āhicchatrī*), Hāstina-pura, Kānyakubja (through the taddhita, *Kānyakubjī*), Kāśī, Kauśāmbī, Māhiṣmatī, Sāṁkāśya, Sāketa, Srughna, Ujjayinī, Vārāṇasī etc. is that his interest in them is largely function-oriented or necessity-driven. The limited degree of admiration that may be read in what he writes about Pāṭali-putra and Mathurā has appearance as its basis (in the case of the former, ornaments and impressive structures, that is, signs of wealth, could be the primary basis and, in the case of the latter, abhirūpatva "suitability, being mutually matching" or "attractiveness"). The situation is markedly different in the case of his references to Kashmir:

MB 1.1.44 (on a Vt incorporating P 3.2.114, i.e. *vibhāṣā sākāṅkṣe*) p. I.109-17-19: ***prāpte*** *tāvat. abhijānāsi deva-datta yat kaśmīreṣu vatsyāmaḥ. yat kaśmīreṣv avasāma. yat tatraudanān bhokṣyāmahe. yat tatraudanān abhuñjmahi.* ***aprāpte****. abhijānāsi deva-datta kaśmīrān gamiṣyāmaḥ. kaśmīrān agacchāma. tatraudanān bhokṣyāmahe. tatraudanān abhuñjmahi.*

MB 3.2.114 (*vibhāṣā sākāṅkṣe*) p. II.119.9-17: *kim udāharaṇam? abhijānāsi deva-datta kaśmīrān gamiṣyāmaḥ. tatra saktūn pāsyāmaḥ. abhijānāsi deva-datta kaśmīrān agacchāma. tatra saktūn apibāma. . . .* ***yadi*** [= in the case of *yad* use] *tāvat. abhijānāsi deva-datta yat kaśmīrān gamiṣyāmaḥ. yat kaśmīrān agacchāma. yat tatraudanaṁ bhokṣyāmahe. yat tatraudanam abhuñjmahi.* ***ayadi.*** *abhijānāsi deva-datta kaśmīrān gamiṣyāmaḥ. kaśmīrān agacchāma. tatraudanaṁ bhokṣyāmahe. tatraudanam abhuñjmahi.*

MB 4.1.1 p. II.193.18: *yatheha bhavati madra-rājaḥ kaśmīra-rāja evaṁ madra-rājñī kaśmīra-rājñīty-atrāpi syāt.*[21]

21. *Kaśmīra* occurs in the Gaṇa-pāṭha in the following gaṇas: 35.7 = kacchādi on P 4.2.133; 168.4 = bhargādi on P 4.1.176; 237.3 = →

There is not only a personal tone and touch in these lines, but also a suggestion of longing, as Y. Mīmāṁsaka (saṁvat 2041:361) noted, and a suggestion of attachment to regional food and drinks. The linking of the past and the future seen in the lines and the fact that, apart from the ruler of Magadha (2.1.2 p. I.375.8), the only other rulers mentioned by Pat° are those of Madra and Kaśmīra may also be thought of as corroborating the view I have put forward.

§4.2 Another piece of evidence favoring the domiciling of Pat° in Kashmir that arises from re-examining the geographical data contained in the MB is not as strong or definite as the preceding, but I should note it to complete my statement and to ensure that it becomes available for scrutiny in the future. In the last passage cited in §3.2, i.e. in MB 3.3.136, Pat° speaks of Sāketa as a town or city one would expect to pass through on one's way to Pāṭali-putra. Such a perception of the path seems more natural on the part of a person coming from the north-west (the path becomes relatively straight in that case; as can be seen in the map of India at the time of Pat° printed in Puri 1957) than on the part of a person coming from cities to the south such as Mathurā.

§4.3 The pieces of evidence in §§2.1-6 and §§4.1-2 were put together by studying earlier research on the subject and by re-reading the relevant parts of the MB. I assumed that earlier scholars had carried out a reading of the entire MB with the intention of recovering clues to Pat°'s homeland or life history. However, what has been discussed in the present essay should suffice to indicate that if a thorough reading of the MB along the suggested lines reveals something new, it is

→ saṁkāśādi on P 4.2.80; 245.6 = sindhvādi on P 4.3.93. Patañjali's references to Kashmir are not occasioned by any of these.

more likely to be favorable to the view put forward here. Secondly, if and when a comprehensive linguistic account of pre-Islam Kashmir or north-western India is prepared, a comparison of the lexical and syntactic features of Pat°'s Sanskrit with the data in that account may assist us further in locating Pat° and his truly great work in historical space and time. The space in that case is more likely to be the region between Madra and Punjab, namely Kashmir.

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annot = annotator/annotation by.

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22. Publication details of well-known texts such as the *Kirātārjunīya* cited in support of incidental observations and of texts cited in my quotations from other scholars have not always been given in what follows.

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Aruṇa-giri-nātha: see Kāli-dāsa.

AS = Artha-śāstra

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5

The Three Grammatical Persons and Trika

Bettina Bäumer

idaṁ sarvaṁ trikarūpam eva ।

Everything in this universe is of threefold nature.[1]

IT is a well-known fact that for the Indian philosophers Sanskrit grammar has played a paradigmatic role and has served not only as a hermeneutic device, but as a model for under-standing reality. The "close link between thought and language" and the importance of "linguistic and grammatical speculation . . . (which is) unequalled in any other culture"[2] has been studied by many scholars[3] and has been often contrasted with the Western model,[4] based on mathematics and geometry. "The

1. Abhinavagupta, *Parātriśikā Vivaraṇa* (*PTv.*), Jaideva Singh edition, p. 25 (Sanskrit).
2. Cf. R. Torella, "Examples of the Influence of Sanskrit Grammar on Indian Philosophy," *East and West*, vol. 27, December 1987, pp. 151-52.
3. To mention only a few: L. Renou, D.H.H. Ingalls, F. Staal, A. Padoux, R. Torella.
4. Cf. D. Seyfort Ruegg, "Mathematical and Linguistic Models in Indian Thought: The Case of Zero and Śūnyatā," in: *WZKS*, vol. XXII, 1978, p, 171.

philosopher's frequent adoption of the grammarian's *modus operandi*"[5] which applies to most of Indian philosophical literature, has been particularly important in the context of the thinkers and authors of non-dualistic Śaivism of Kashmir. The influence of Bhartṛhari on Abhinavagupta is an important factor,[6] but the entire speculation on the Word goes back to the Āgamas and has been fully developed in the Tāntric exegesis of Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja. Thus the contribution of Kashmir to Sanskrit grammar includes the metaphysical as well as mystical dimension of *Trika* and *Pratyabhijñā*. The present article will give only one small, but far-reaching example of this interconnectedness between grammar and metaphysics. This example is taken from Abhinavagupta's *Vivaraṇa* commentary on the *Parātriśikā Tantra*.

The metaphysical background for the interrelationship between language and reality is the doctrine of the interconnectedness of all things (*sarvātmakatva*), a theme which has been particularly developed by Abhinavagupta in the *PTv*. *sarvaṁ sarvātmakam* means that the whole is present in each part, that all is related to all, that "all is made of all. No reality may be said to be separate and self-contained, since everything is pervaded by a single nature, *śivatva* (as Somānanda insistently repeats in the *Śivadṛṣṭi*) or the Power. Thus there do not really exist separations or confines of any kind, there is nothing that remains definitively excluded from this circulation of the dynamism of Consciousness."[7]

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5. R. Torella, op. cit., p. 154.
6. See R. Torella, pp. 539-55, in this volume.
7. Raffaele Torella, op. cit., p. 155.

Among the methods applied by Abhinavagupta in commenting on the Tantra there is an extensive etymological hermeneutics or *nirvacana* analysis,[8] and a clear application of grammatical structure and analysis to reveal the meaning implied in the Tantra.

The Parātrīśikā is a text of *Trika*, the triadic reality consisting of the three metaphysical principles: Śiva, Śakti and Nara (man or the created reality). They are equal and yet in a hierarchical order, being one and yet distinguishable as three. Now, Abhinavagupta finds the ideal paradigm for establishing the reality of the Triad in the grammatical as well as psychological structure of the three persons:

I - you - he/she/it
aham - tvam - tat (idam, saḥ, sā)

The basis is again the interconnectedness of everything: *sarvaṁ sarvātmakam*.

The exegetical context is the explanation of the address of Bhairava to the Devī (v.3a) : *śṛṇu devi . . .* First he goes into the aspect of hearing: "The highest goddess hears everything. Abiding as she does in the form of the power of hearing, she has that sovereign power (*svātantrya*) which consists in effecting congruous and suitable connection by blending all sound in a meaningful whole."[9]

The next starting point for interpretation is the vocative, "O Goddess!" and hence the fact that Śiva in the first person addresses Devī in the second person, as a "thou." Here follow both the grammatical and psychological proofs for *Trika*:

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8. Cf. E. Kahrs, *Indian Semantic Analysis*.

9. Jaideva Singh, tr., p. 68.

> Everything in the universe consists of the triad. That, which is only confined to itself (as an object), is insentient and comes chiefly under the category of *nara*, as for instance, "the jar is lying (on the ground)." The above has reference only to the third person (*prathama puruṣa*) which is left to be supplied after the first and second person (*śeṣaḥ*).
>
> — Tr. Jaideva Singh, p. 70.

In the following passage Abhinavagupta is aiming at overcoming the dichotomies (we could also say "trichotomies") usually attached to the three grammatical persons, and he does this by showing the fluidity of the usage of the personal pronouns, as they are interconnected and flow one into the other. However, although the direction of the flow can be in any sense, but ideally it is from below upwards, from the third, inert, person, to the second and finally to the first person: *aham*. However, passing through the second person is necessary in both ways: from the third person (object) to the first (subject), and vice versa.

The grammatical structure of the vocative provides the occasion for analysing the second person in relation to the first:

> That which appears even as "this," when addressed, becomes completely enveloped with the I-feeling of the addressor. The "this" which is different from the addressor, when addressed as "you," becomes a form of "Śakti." In "you are standing" this is the meaning of the second person, and the principle of addressing, viz. as I am standing, even so this is standing. Ordinarily, the I (*ahambhāva*) of the other person is different from the "I" of the person who is to address, but in the process of addressing, the addressor assimilates the delightful autonomy of the addressed characterized by I-feeling to his own, and considering it as

> identical with the uninterrupted delight of his own I-feeling starts addressing him. In this light, he is addressing him in the true sense of the second person. This sense in which the addressor and the addressed, though different, become one in the addressing is indicative of the *parāparā* goddess (whose characteristic is identity in diversity). — pp. 70-71.

The entire argument rests on the importance given to the (absolute, ultimate) "I" in the entire system of *Trika* and *Pratyabhijñā*, developed most vigorously by Utpaladeva,[10] who states in his *Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhiḥ*.

> *prakāśasyātmaviśrāntir ahambhāvo hi kīrtitaḥ* ||
> *uktā saiva ca viśrāntiḥ sarvāpekṣanirodhataḥ* |
> *svātantryam atha kartṛtvam mukhyam īśvaratāpi ca* ||

> The resting in the self of the pure Light is called I-consciousness. It is called "repose" because it is free from all dependency and independent of any other agency or lordship. — vv. 22cd-23

And he adds in his own *vṛtti*:

> It (the Absolute) is established in consciousness (*saṁvit*), therefore it is a repose in nothing but the own being of

10. Cf. Torella, Introduction to *Īśvarapratyabhijñā Kārikā*, p. XXIX : "Utpaladeva is one who chose to use this word (i.e. *aham*) regardless of the associations generally attached to it in Indian thought, being aware of the fact that the risk of reification that has always weighed heavily on the word *ātman* was even more negative, and that this makes it less suitable for expressing the unpredictable overflowing of the divine personality. The term "I" is implicitly aimed against the two conceptions that are, after all, closest to the *Pratyabhijñā* and which it most aspires to differentiate itself from: the consciousness devoid of a subject of the Vijñānavāda and the static *ātman-Brahman* of the Vedānta."

> consciousness; and this is (precisely) called the "I-feeling" (*ahambhāva*) of the nature of the awareness of the fullness of the "I."

In the *Vivaraṇa*, Abhinavagupta supports this preeminence with reference to the *Gītā*:

> In the freedom of the uninterrupted delight of I-consciousness completely independent of any reference to anything else, expressed in the form "I am standing," it is in every respect (*sarvathā*) the revered *parā* (highest) *śakti* that is at work. In that lies the pre-eminence of the first person. As has been said, "Since I transcend the perishable and also the imperishable, therefore, am I known as the highest *puruṣa*, i.e. as the first person." — *Bh.G.* XV, 18.[11]
>
> Here the verb "*asmi*" (am) has been used with reference to "I," the first person, to indicate its pre-eminence over both the perishable and the imperishable. — p. 71.

But the possible misunderstanding of confusing the ultimate "I" with the limited I-consciousness (*mita-pramātṛ*) has to be removed immediately:

> Here in every case, it is not the limited I identified with the body that is referred to. The limited I (identified with the body) being an object of the senses is obviously incompatible with that (the real, unlimited I). Thus this (i.e. unlimited) I is of the nature of the self-luminous Śiva. Therefore of the (universal, unlimited) Consciousness (*bodha*) which is self-luminous, there is neither any diminution nor augmentation. Both diminution and augmentation being of the nature of

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11. Abhinavagupta's commentary on this verse in his *Gītārthasaṁgraha* is revealing in this context.

> *aprakāśa* cannot be an aspect of the Light of Consciousness (lit., cannot enter into consciousness). The middle state which is only relative to the state of diminution and augmentation is also nothing. Therefore the notion of I which is inseparable from the universal consciousness of Śiva (*tadbodhāvicchedarūpa*) and free from all relativity is not applicable to situations of augmentation, diminution, and the middle state between these indicated by thisness, i.e. objectivity and absence of objectivity. — p. 71.

This classification is not only of philosophical importance, but it has far-reaching consequences in the psychological and social fields, where it is mostly not the true, i.e. spiritual "I" which operates, but the *ahaṁkāra*, the artificial (*kṛtrima*) ego which clashes with other egos, as long as they have not recognized their essential oneness in the universal I (*pūrṇāhantā*). Psychologists know exactly what is meant by the diminution or augmentation of the I as ego: the first leading to depression and loss of self-confidence; the second leading to maniac and egocentric behaviour. Both are obviously far removed from the true central I-consciousness or *ahambhāva*.

But the I-thou is not denied as a real personal relationship. In fact, the first and second persons are so close to each other that grammar has expressed this (not only in Sanskrit but in practically all languages):

> The notion of you, i.e. the second person which, though indicative of separateness, is actually similar to that of I. "Therefore both you and I are described as genderless" (i.e. they are used for both genders). The application of number, etc., i.e. dual and plural of these words according to the usage depending on the enumeration or difference of the body is appropriate from the point of view of *parāparā śakti* in the dual and *aparā śakti* in the plural. The difference

> determined by the Śakti of the Divine freedom is considered as one in the case of several bodies which can be traced in such usages as "we two, you two, we all, you all."
>
> Augmentation, etc. being associated with the body cannot be even figuratively employed in the case of consciousness, for diminution and augmentation cannot be reasonably applied to consciousness. — pp. 71-72.

But if we speak of interpersonal relationship at the level of I-you, what about the (so-called) third person which is considered to be insentient (*jaḍa*)?

> "Everything is an epitome of all." According to this universal principle, even the insentient third persons (*narātmāno jaḍā api*) shedding their insentiency can become entitled to [share in] the use of second and first person (*śakti-śaivarūpabhājo bhavanti*), for instance, in "listen, O mountains," the third person has been treated as second person, in "of mountains, I am Meru,"[12] the third person has been treated as the first person. The second person which pertains to *śakti*, can be shedding its *śakti* character, acquire the aspect of the third person, for instance, in "you whose fear has vanished, are fortitude (lit. the power of fortitude) itself," "you" not being used as a form of address has appropriately acquired the aspect of the third person. Usage like *bhavān* (you) with particular, subsequent use of words like *pādāḥ*, *guravaḥ* (revered one) which are used only in the case of another person, being used as third person which is characteristic of *nara* is fairly recognized. The second person also which is characteristic of *śakti*, shedding its particular use acquires the aspect of first person which is characteristic of Śiva, for instance, "O dear friend (female friend), O loved one, thou

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12. *Bhagavad-Gītā*, X.23.

> art I" is an accepted usage. The first person also characteristic of Śiva, shedding its aspect of first person which is *cit*, betakes to the aspect of the third person characteristic of *nara* or second person characteristic of *śakti*. In the following expressions, "Who am I?" "this one am I," "O I," "Fie to me," "Oh to me," etc., the uninterrupted autonomy of I is subdued, and it is chiefly the separate "this one" that becomes predominant. In such a case, it is as if separateness characteristic of *aparā śakti*, in other words, *nara-rūpa* or third person that becomes prominent. In "O I," etc., Śiva contacts the throb of *parāparā śakti* (i.e. enters the sphere of second person). But in such cases, the preceding state acquires the succeeding state without transgressing its previous nature. Thus the third person characteristic of *nara* can clearly mount to the stage of the second (the Śakti stage) and even to the first person (i.e. Śiva stage) but the contrary course of mounting cannot be admissible.
>
> — pp. 72-73.

The entire argument of this passage is based on the usage of language in which the three persons get mixed up and merge in one another. This implies personal relationships even with things — again a common psychological phenomenon — and it implies objectifying the subjective and subjectifying the objective experience.

Among the many identifications of Kṛṣṇa with the most eminent among any group of things or persons in the *Gītā*,[13] Abhinavagupta has here given only an example, but in fact the entire procedure of identification with the (Divine) "I"

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13. *Bhagavad-Gītā*, X.21-38. It is surprising that Abhinavagupta, in his commentary on the *Gītā* (*Gītārthasaṁgraha*) does not use this text for a commentary in the sense of the absolute "I." In the end (on verse 42) he only stresses the implicit non-duality of these statements (cf. tr., p. 236).

illustrates the same principle of transforming the inert third person into the all-encompassing first person, passing through the second. The "it," "he" or "she" becomes personified as a "you" and is then assumed into the "I," the true subject. In terms of *Trika*, *nara* becomes personalized as Śakti and internalized in Śiva.

The identifications of the "I" of Kṛṣṇa with different objects also reveals another aspect, that of symbolization. The "I" or self is after all only experienced in one's own interiority, as Abhinavagupta among many other Indian philosophers stresses. Even in the most abstract of thinkers, e.g. in Vedānta, the self (*ātman*) is expressed by a number of images, most of them taken from the Upaniṣads.[14] Thus the grammatical abstraction is filled with symbols and images of the "I" and these images are again a third person assumed into the first.

In terms of *Trika* we have seen that the first person is at the level of Śiva, of *parā* Śakti; the second person is at the level of Śakti and of *parāparā* Śakti, and the third person at the level of *nara* and *aparā* (see table). Obviously, Śakti and *parāparā* is mediating between the third and the first person, both ways.

Trika	*Śakti*	*Persons*	*Numbers*
Śiva	*parā*	*aham*	singular
Śakti	*parāparā*	*tvam*	dual
Nara	*aparā*	*idam / saḥ / sā*	plural

The grammatical argument for *Trika* is further strengthened by referring to the numbers: singular for Śiva, dual for Śakti, plural for *nara*.

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14. Cf. T. Goudriaan, "Imagery of the Self from Veda to Tantra," in: *The Roots of Tantra*, ed. K.A. Harper and R.L. Brown, Albany: SUNY Press, 2002, pp. 171-92.

"Each of this triad without giving up its nature, becomes of three forms, viz. singular (Śiva-*bhāva*), dual (Śakti-*bhāva*) and plural (*nara-bhāva*)." It has been said,

"One thing becomes dual, and after becoming dual, it becomes plural." Of one and the same thing, when it is only one, then it connotes the nature of Śiva, since there is no other as counterpart. When there is a counterpart, then it is the nature of Śakti. In the case of many denoting difference, there is the nature of *nara*. Thus we have *ghaṭaḥ*, one jar denoting oneness, and thus Śiva-*bhāva*, *ghaṭau*, two jars, denoting Śakti-*bhāva*, *ghaṭāḥ*, many jars, denoting the aspect of *nara*. In a copulative compound (*dvandva samāsa*) in which the members, if uncompounded, would be in the same case and connected by the conjunction "and," we have an example of many things forming a sort of unity, thus denoting Śiva, e.g. *ghaṭapaṭapāṣāṇāḥ* (jar, cloth, stones). In a verb also, e.g. *tiṣṭhati* (one is standing or sitting) denotes Śiva: *tiṣṭhataḥ* (two are standing or sitting) denotes *śakti*, *tiṣṭhanti* (many are standing or sitting) denotes *nara*. In fact, the entire manifestation is the expansion of *kriyāśakti* brought about by one alone (i.e. by Śiva). As has been said:

"By reducing the many (i.e. the *nara-rūpa* and *śakti-rūpa* to one (i.e. Śiva-*rūpa*) who is there who will not be liberated from bondage?"

Therefore, when the third person (*nara*), the second person (Śakti) and the first person (Śiva) are used together, simultaneously there is the absorption of the lower in the higher and higher, because it is the higher that contains the truth of the lower, e.g. in *sa ca tvam ca tiṣṭhathaḥ* (he and you are standing), the number of the verb *sthā-* (to stand) is used in the second person which indicates that the third person (*nara*) has been absorbed in the second (*Śakti*). In *sa ca tvaṁ ca ahaṁ ca tiṣṭhāmaḥ* (he, you and I are standing), the verb *tiṣṭhāmaḥ* which is the plural number of the verb in the first

> person has been used even for the third and the second person which is indicative of the fact that the third and second person are absorbed in the first. — pp. 73-74.

The pre-eminence of oneness over multiplicity, and of pure subjectivity over objectivity, reflects the non-dual nature of the *Trika* system.

If language is a mirror of (metaphysical) reality, it cannot be limited to Sanskrit, and Abhinavagupta is quite conscious of it:

> It is only this state of complete understanding, the essence of the residual traces of the innate, perfect I-consciousness which is followed by the grammarians in their descriptive rules. Similarly, even in local dialects, e.g. the language (e.g. Pāli) used by the Buddhists or used in Āndhra or Draviḍian region, this manner alone of speech and meaning (lit. expressed by words) which originally follows the instinctive feeling of the heart, conveys by its delightful impression this form (viz., the form of *nara*, Śakti and Śiva) or understanding. — p. 74.

Abhinavagupta summarizes the insight into the importance of language by quoting himself (a fragment not traced in his published works), in the incomplete version of the KSTS edition:

> . . . . *na hṛdayaṅgamagāminī gīḥ*

reconstructed by Swami Lakshman Joo to:

> *na sā gīr yā na hṛdayaṅgamagāminī*[15]

and translated by Jaideva Singh:

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15. As contained in the text ed. J. Singh, p. 27. Gnoli translates the first version by: "La parola rivela il cuore" (the word reveals the heart), p. 49.

> That is no speech which does not reach the heart directly.
> — p. 74.

He then sums up the entire argument in terms of *Trika*:

> So in every way, this kind of comprehension is innate. As has been said: "Without the form of Nara, Śakti and Śiva (*tair*), there is neither word, nor meaning, nor mental movement." In *Mālinīvijaya Tantra* also, it has been said:
>
> As the one Śakti of Śiva (*śambhoḥ śaktir ekaiva śāṅkarī*) abides, presiding over the entire class (of words, in first, second and third person), even so has she been related unto you.
> — *MV*, III. 34.
>
> In *Tantrasamuccaya* also, it is said:
>
> This universe is established always and is in every way involved in third person (*nara*), second person (Śakti) and first person (Śiva) both in the dealings of worms and the all-knowing.
>
> Thus this universe consisting of the third, second and first person (*nara-śakti-śivātmakam*) has been explained according to the teaching of the traditional clear comprehension. This all-inclusive order of experience (*sarvaṁsahaḥ pratipattikramaḥ*) consisting of the third, second and first person has been manifested by the free will of the highest Lord. — p. 74.

By this grammatical argument Abhinavagupta has shown the interdependence of the three categories of *Trika*, but also their ultimate oneness in the pervasive nature of the Divine Subject. He concludes with his characteristic self-irony, trying to stop himself from any further elaboration:

> So enough of elaboration of a topic which can appeal to the hearts of only a few people who have received the teaching from a *guru*, who are of refined taste, who are well-read (lit. who have heard from the learned people a great deal), and

who have been purified by the descent of the Supreme grace. So, "listen, O goddess" has been explained. — p. 74.

We find a wonderful theistic confirmation of the argument of the three persons and personal pronouns in Kṣemarāja's commentary on Utpaladeva's *Śivastotrāvalī*, III.14:

uttamaḥ puruṣo 'nyo 'sti yuṣmaccheṣaviśeṣitaḥ ।
tvaṁ mahāpuruṣas tv eko niḥśeṣapuruṣāśrayaḥ ॥

The "first person"
is distinguished from the "second person"
and from the "third person" as well.
You alone are the Great Person,
the refuge of all persons.

— Tr. Bailly

Commentary: "It is well known that Hari (Viṣṇu) is the Supreme Person (*puruṣottama*): He is characterized as second person (and the other grammatical persons) — by "you" — in the case of (all) the subjects who are the superintending (persons) of the non-differentiated essence of all knowledge, being attained through the essential nature of another superintending self — this is well-defined.

Thus the Āgama also says: "He is called Viṣṇu by the Vaiṣṇavas".

You are the Great Person, because of your being the support (substratum) of all persons, from Sakala up to Sadāśiva.[16] By the word "other" he implies a different meaning. "One" means "non-dual." This is one meaning of the verse.

On the other hand, according to the grammatical method, that which is the first person in the sense of *asmad*, he is

16. I.e. all the subjects, from the limited individual up to the level of Sadāśiva in the scale of the *tattvas*.

> characterized as second and third person, i.e. he becomes differentiated. He (i.e. *mahāpuruṣa*) is special because, reflecting on the isolated first person, due to its inclination, it has the sense of the second person.
>
> That which is the support (substratum) of all persons is the state of repose.
>
> Having reflected on the objectivity of everything, and resting only in subjectivity, as when one wants to say: "he cooks, you cook and I cook," one expresses it by saying: "we cook." In such a (grammatical) usage, this is the intended meaning. For you are the support (substratum) of all persons, i.e. the first, second and third persons, being of the nature of unconditioned consciousness underlying all conditioned persons.
>
> Therefore, when there is the reflective awareness "that is seen by me, that was seen by me," "this," "that," the two elements though divided into perceiving subject and perceived object are manifested within the (true) cognizer (*pramātṛ*, subject). — *Īśvarapratyabhijñā Kārikā* I.4.8, tr. Torella.
>
> Therefore (you alone are) *mahāpuruṣa*, the Great Lord, because, like Mahādeva, the word *mahat* is applied to you only."

Besides using the same argument as Abhinavagupta, namely that the collective plural of the first, second and third person takes the form of the first person plural, thus indicating the pre-eminence of the first person, what is important in this passage is the statement about the *mahāpuruṣa* being *uttama puruṣa* and being the substratum of all persons. This is so because he alone is unconditioned consciousness, whereas all other persons are conditioned.

The whole theme has of course been elaborated by Utpaladeva in his *Īśvarapratyabhijñā Kārikā* and *Vṛtti,* and by Abhinavagupta in his commentaries, but this much may suffice to show the grammatical argument for establishing (1) the universality of *Trika,* and (2) the Divine, absolute "I" being pure Consciousness underlying all persons and their relationships.

The psychological, social and spiritual implications of these arguments on the three persons, based on grammatical usage, are far-reaching, because no person, no living being and even no inert thing is isolated, but their true interconnectedness is located in the Divine I, the Consciousness underlying everything, without excluding plurality and relationships. Thus the closer a person comes spiritually to the central I-consciousness, abandoning the limited ego, the more he or she is connected and interconnected with the whole of reality: *sarvaṁ sarvātmakam.*[17]

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The Treatment of the Present Tense in the Kaśmīraśabdāmṛta of Īśvara Kaul

A Pāṇinian Grammar of Kashmiri

*Estella Del Bon & Vincenzo Vergiani**

THIS article is the first outcome of our joint study of the *Kaśmīraśabdāmṛta*[1] (*KŚA*), a grammar of the Kashmiri language composed in Sanskrit by Īśvara Kaul in the nineteenth century. As our study, undertaken in the Spring of 2005, is still ongoing, this article does not aim at being exhaustive, not even on the limited topic that is its object, namely, the treatment of the present tense, and therefore most of its conclusions are to be considered provisional. Nonetheless, we hope that scholars working in different domains of South Asian studies — such as Indo-Aryan linguistics, the history of the Indian

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* The idea to combine our research interests and skills in order to work together on the Kashmiri grammar of Īśvara Kaul was born in the spring of 2005 while both of us were research fellows at the Pondicherry centre of the Ecole Française d'Extrême Orient (EFEO) thanks to a six-month's fellowship granted by the EFEO. Although this article is the fruit of a joint effort of understanding, interpretation and elaboration, it should be noted that, in particular, Estella Del Bon is the author of Parts 1 and 3, while Vincenzo Vergiani is the author of Part 2.

1. Henceforth, *KŚA*.

grammatical traditions, the history of Kashmiri language and culture, and so forth — will be interested in this preliminary introduction to a text that is possibly the first attempt made by a native speaker to provide a description of Kashmiri.

As will be shown below, the terminology used by Īśvara Kaul, as well as the meta-linguistic conventions he follows and — more generally — the organization and style of his description of Kashmiri, are essentially Pāṇinian. As will be shown below, this is at the same time the strength and the weakness of his grammar. The model provided by Pāṇini's work allowed Kaul to conceive the ambitious project of describing the Kashmiri language. His effort is all the more remarkable because, as is known, the Indian grammatical tradition had generally focused on Sanskrit alone. Even when it had ventured to describe other languages, as in the *Prākṛtaprakāśa* of Vararuci (first millennium of the CE) or the eighth chapter of Hemacandra's *Siddhahemaśabdānuśāsana* (eleventh-twelfth century), their rules had been presented as "deviations" from the norm that was Sanskrit.[2] Therefore, these descriptions were neither exhaustive nor systematic. In this light, Īśvara Kaul's enterprise represents an impressive intellectual breakthrough, for he applied the intellectual tools of his Brāhmanical scholarship, which was rooted in the Sanskritic tradition, to an unprecedented task, the composition of a complete and independent grammar of a "vernacular" language. It would be very interesting, in fact, to investigate the historical circumstances that made this breakthrough possible, namely, the social and cultural atmosphere of nineteenth-century Kashmir.

2. An exception is represented by the ancient grammars of Pāli and Tamil, which are written in the languages they describe and consider them independently of Sanskrit.

Furthermore, the vernacular languages described by earlier grammarians such as Vararuci, Hemacandra, etc. were Middle Indo-Aryan (MIA) literary Prākṛts, and therefore not very distant from Sanskrit, whereas the Kashmiri described by Īśvara Kaul is — as far as we can judge — the current spoken and written language of his time, a New Indo-Aryan (NIA) language far removed from Sanskrit in morphology and syntax. Its description was — and still is — a formidable challenge, for which the Pāṇinian terminology and conceptual apparatus, specifically designed for Sanskrit, appears somewhat inadequate. Nonetheless, being the first attempt of its kind, Īśvara Kaul's grammar manages to give a remarkably clear picture of Kashmiri, in spite of an understandable deficit of theoretical elaboration.

In the following pages we will first provide a brief survey of the available information on Īśvara Kaul and situate his work in the context of the beginnings of Kashmiri linguistics (Part 1). Then we will give an account of the structure of the *KŚA*, with some remarks on its terminology and conventions, and a detailed analysis of the contents of the section on the present tense (Part 2). This will be followed by a discussion of one of the most characteristic features of Kashmiri — its system of personal indexes from the point of view of contemporary linguistics (Part 3) — in order to give a concrete example of the complex problems that Īśvara Kaul had to face.

1. Īśvara Kaul and the Other Pioneers of Kashmiri Linguistic Studies

The *KŚA* was published in 1898 by the Royal Asiatic Society on Sir George Abraham Grierson's suggestion, more than twenty years after its composition. Its publication was prepared on the basis of a single manuscript copy, made available to Grierson by Babu Nilambara Mukherji. As Paṇḍit

Īśvara Kaul had died in 1893 at the age of sixty before Grierson became aware of the existence of his grammatical work, the author of the text and its editor never met. The details on the author's life that are at present available to us were collected by Grierson in Srinagar from Paṇḍit Ānanda Kaul — the author's son — and a few other Paṇḍits. Born to a Paṇḍit family of Srinagar, Īśvara Kaul was well versed in both Sanskrit and Persian and held high positions in the state administration throughout his career. At the end of his life, he was Director of the Translation Department created by Mahārājā Raṇavīra Siṁha and *jyotiṣī* (astrologer) of his successor Mahārājā Pratāp Singh. According to Paṇḍit Ānanda Kaul, Īśvara Kaul composed the *KŚA* in 1874 and further revised it in 1879.[3] At the time of its publication the *KŚA* was not the first grammar of the Kashmiri language. However, it was the first of its kind. Previously, a grammar written by a Christian missionary, the Reverend T.R. Wade, had been published in 1888. Even today this remains an excellent work that any linguist or student interested in Kashmiri should start with. However, Wade's grammar was written along the lines of the European grammatical tradition, whereas the *KŚA* — besides being written by a native speaker mastering all the nuances of the language he describes — appears to be a pure product of the North-Indian grammatical tradition of Pāṇinian inspiration.[4]

3. As reported by Grierson. The composition date given in the preface of the *KŚA* itself is 1875.

4. We use the adjective "Pāṇinian" in a broad sense, for at this stage we cannot exclude that Īśvara Kaul may have been — consciously or unconsciously — influenced by some non-Pāṇinian grammars, as certain peculiarities of the terminology used in the *KŚA* suggest. (On the other hand, even non-Pāṇinian grammars to a large extent follow the Pāṇinian theoretical model, which justifies the use of the adjective). This possibility will be investigated in greater depth in the follow-up of this study.

Moreover, although it is not the first work on Kashmiri to be published,[5] we may say that the *KŚA* is the starting point of modern Kashmiri linguistics, for it inspired Grierson — the founder of Kashmiri linguistics — and provided him with the materials he used in his major subsequent works, mainly, his essays published in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal* between 1896 and 1898, later published as a book in 1899 under the title *Essays on Kashmiri Grammar*.

Īśvara Kaul is also the originator of a bilingual dictionary of the Kashmiri language. By the time the *KŚA* was published, Grierson had become aware of the existence of a dictionary of Kashmiri written by Īśvara Kaul, but he had not succeeded yet in procuring the manuscript. After some enquiry, it turned out that Īśvara Kaul had left this work at barely more than the embryonic stage, since it consisted mostly of mere lists of words. But this was sufficient for Grierson to launch — on the basis of the material left by Īśvara Kaul — the project of the composition of *A Dictionary of the Kashmiri Language* that was published between 1916 and 1932 and required the appointment of several Paṇḍits. Among them, it is certainly Paṇḍit Mukunda Rama Shastri of Srinagar to whom Grierson was most indebted for the achievement of this huge task. In fact, not only did he collaborate with Grierson in the composition of the dictionary, but he also joined him in Patna and assisted him in reading the manuscript and proofs of the *KŚA*. He also helped Grierson to read the *Mahānaya Prakāśa*, a manuscript in Kashmiri written in the fifteenth century,[6] by

5. Even before Wade's grammar (1888), the Christian missionaries had published two other works: a Dictionary of Kashmiri Proverbs by Hinton Knowles (1885) and a Vocabulary of Kashmiri by Elmslie (1872).

6. Thirteenth century, according to certain modern Kashmiri authors.

expressly composing a commentary on it in Sanskrit that proved essential to Grierson for his understanding of Kashmiri and Indo-Aryan historical linguistics, and led to a publication in 1918 for the Jammu Kashmir State's Department of Publications.

Finally, mention should be made of the foremost innovation introduced by Īśvara Kaul, namely the use of the Devanāgarī script for the transcription of Kashmiri instead of the Śāradā or Arabic scripts. Grierson found Īśvara Kaul's Devanāgarī system of transcription more convenient and consequently adopted it. Kaul had in fact slightly modified the Devanāgarī script by adding some diacritics in order to render those phonemes that are peculiar to Kashmiri.[7]

For this first collaborative work on the *KŚA* we have chosen to examine the chapter on the present tense, in order to see how Īśvara Kaul describes verbal forms that are mostly analytical within a Pāṇinian framework, developed for a language that is eminently flexional.[8] In this respect it is worth mentioning, as Grierson liked to point out, that Kashmiri is perhaps the less analytical language of the NIA group, and that it represents a sort of transitional stage between flexional languages (namely Sanskrit) and analytical languages (NIA languages such as Urdu or Panjabi) of the Indo-Aryan group. Kashmiri has indeed retained a flexional system at the level

7. Phonemes that both the Śāradā and the Arabic scripts failed to represent.

8. Kashmiri past and future forms can be on the whole categorized if not exactly as flexional, at least as simple forms, whereas verbal forms associated with the present tense are but for one exception all periphrastic and thus analytical. This is the reason why we have chosen the chapter on the present rather than those on the future and past.

of argument marking (i.e. arguments are marked by case), whereas other NIA languages have replaced morphological cases with post-positions.[9] Finally, we may observe that the verbal morphology of Kashmiri is particularly interesting from the point of view of this paper because it has a complex system of personal indexes (roughly, we may say that up to three arguments, namely the subject, the object and the indirect object, can be cross-referenced in the verb by personal markers) that is totally unknown to Sanskrit.[10]

2. The Pāṇinian Background of Īśvara Kaul's Grammar[11]

2.1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE KŚA

Īśvara Kaul's grammar is composed of several hundred *sūtra*-like — i.e. concise, elliptical, formulaic — statements divided into nine chapters. Most *sūtra*s are followed by a *vṛtti*, a commentary in prose composed by the author himself, that

9. Actually, the case system still exists in these languages, but it is limited to a binary opposition, namely, unmarked *vs.* oblique. Arguments that take a postposition are marked by the oblique case. The development of postpositions took place in order to avoid the ambiguity that arose from the formal reduction of the case system. It should be noted that postpositions developed also in Kashmiri, although they are not used to mark arguments.

10. As well as to other modern Indo-Aryan languages, with the exception of Sindhi and Lahanda, which are spoken along the Indo-Pakistani border like Kashmiri. Nevertheless, these two languages have a less complex system of personal indexes.

11. We will quote the Kashmiri examples given by Īśvara Kaul faithfully following his way of rendering the sounds of Kashmiri in the Devanāgarī script. This explains the discrepancy that occurs for certain words with the transliteration adopted in Part 3, which tries to render the specific features of Kashmiri phonology. In the examples taken from *KŚA* the Kashmiri sentence will be reported in bold, while the Sanskrit in italics.

provides the words to be supplied in the *sūtra* by means of *anuvṛtti*,[12] expands on technical and non-technical terms and often glosses them with synonyms, provides examples and, occasionally, counter-examples, and often — in the final part — illustrates the process of derivation (*prakriyā*) by recalling the appropriate *sūtras* from other parts of the work.

The *KŚA* seems to follow the model of the *Kaumudī* commentaries on Pāṇini's grammar, the earliest of which appeared in the tenth or eleventh century CE,[13] but which gained popularity and became widespread around the sixteenth century, the most famous of them being the *Siddhāntakaumudī* of Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita (late sixteenth–early seventeenth century).[14]

In the *Kaumudī* works the rules of Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* are rearranged according to the topics, and approximately the same order of topics as is found in the *Siddhāntakaumudī* can be seen in the *KŚA*. The most striking and significant difference is observed at the very beginning. The *Siddhāntakaumudī* starts with a section including the *sūtras* on the technical terms (*saṁjñā*) and meta-rules (*paribhāṣā*), which is missing in Īśvara Kaul's work.

The *KŚA* begins instead with a chapter on *sandhi*, the rules of euphonic combination, that occupies the second position among the sections of the *Siddhāntakaumudī*. This is followed

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12. This is a typical feature of the *sūtra* genre based on systematic recourse to ellipsis: once a word has been used in a rule, its repetition is avoided in subsequent rules. Therefore, in order to understand and apply them, it is necessary to assume the *anuvṛtti*, i.e. the recurrence of certain words from previous sūtras.

13. It is the *Rūpāvatāra* of the Ceylonese Buddhist Dharmakīrti (see Cardona 1980: p. 285).

14. See Cardona 1980: pp. 283-84 and 285-86.

by the chapter on the nominal declension (*liṅgaprakaraṇa*)*, divided into three sections: the *liṅgapāda*, devoted to nouns, the *sambuddhipāda*, on the vocative, and the *sarvanāmapāda*, on the "pronominal" declension. Chapter 3 deals with the derivation of nominal compounds (*samāsa prakriyā*), Chapter 4 (*taddhita prakriyā*) with the formation of secondary derivatives by means of post-nominal suffixes (*taddhita*), Chapter 5 with the derivation of indeclinables (*avyaya prakriyā*), and Chapter 6 with the formation of feminine nominal bases by means of feminine suffixes (*strīpratyaya prakaraṇa*). This is the concluding chapter of the part on nominal forms and of the first half of the grammar.

The second half, on the derivation of verbal forms (*ākhyāta prakriyā*), is preceded by a *dhātupāṭha*,[15] an exhaustive list of Kashmiri verbal roots accompanied by a concise entry that gives their basic meaning(s), and by an annotation on whether they have accusative/ergative constructions or not (as in the case of intransitive verbs). Chapter 8, on the derivation of finite verbal forms (*ākhyāta*), is divided into four sections (*pāda*s), one for each tense, present (*vartamāna*), future (*bhaviṣyat*) and past (*bhūta*), plus one section on the causative (*hetupāda*, where *hetu*, literally "cause," is used in the sense of "causal agent"). The final chapter deals with the derivation of primary derivatives (*kṛdanta prakriyā*) by means of deverbal

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* Here Kaul uses the word *liṅga* in the sense of *prātipadika* to designate an uninflected nominal stem; the same term is used with this meaning by Śarvavarman in the *Kātantra*, which was very popular – as is well-known – in Kashmir from the 12th century onwards.

15. This is in accordance with the Pāṇinian model, except that the Pāṇinian *dhātupāṭha* is considered an independent (albeit associated) text, not an integral part of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

suffixes (*kṛt*) and is followed by a small *gaṇapāṭha*, once again according to the Pāṇinian model.

2.2. A FEW REMARKS ON ĪŚVARA KAUL'S TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL APPARATUS

The absence of a section devoted to *saṁjñā*s and *paribhāṣā*s shows that Īśvara Kaul did not aim at creating a new and original theoretical model of grammatical description, but mostly relied on the traditional theory and terminology of grammar that had been developed for the description and analysis of Sankrit words and utterances.

Thus, most of the terminology used by Īśvara Kaul, as well as the meta-linguistic conventions he follows and — more generally — the organization and style of his description of Kashmiri, are Pāṇinian. As is known,[16] Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is a derivational grammar that posits basic abstract units which are combined according to the rules provided in his treatise to form inflected words (*pada*) — either nominals or verbs — through the affixation of suffixes (*pratyaya*) of various kinds: declensional endings, conjugational endings, primary and secondary suffixes, etc. Such *padas*, whose syntactic relationships are conveyed by means of the morphemes that constitute them, are in turn the constituents of sentences, that is, of larger meaningful units.

Now, the basic abstract units of Pāṇini's grammar are called *prātipadika* (i.e. nominal base), *dhātu* (i.e. verbal base) and *pratyaya* (i.e. affix). In the *sūtra*s Īśvara Kaul consistently follows the Pāṇinian usage of calling the verbal bases with

16. For a nearly complete and accurate presentation of Pāṇini's grammar, see Cardona, 1997².

the technical name *dhātu*.[17] However, in the heading of Chapter 8, that deals with the derivation (*prakriyā*) of verbal forms, these are called *ākhyāta*, a word already found in the oldest grammatical texts as well as in the *Nirukta* of Yāska. The same word is also used in a loose, i.e non-technical[18] sense, in the works of the Pāṇinīyas, generally to denote finite verb forms (although it is not used by Pāṇini himself). Similarly, in the *vṛtti* Īśvara Kaul also resorts to the terms *ākhyāta* and, occasionally, *kriyā* "action." In the latter case, the signified, i.e. "action," seems to stand for the signifier, for a *dhātu* is regarded as *kriyāvacana* "denoter of action."[19]

Accordingly, *sūtra* 8.1.6, *dhātoḥ pare pratyayāḥ*, prescribes that suffixes (*pratyayāḥ*) follow (*pare*[20]) after a verbal base (*dhātoḥ*). The *vṛtti* specifies that this is a general provision (*paribhāṣyate*) — *kālatrayasaṁbandhivibhaktipratyayā dhātoḥ pare bhavantīti paribhāṣyate* — and illustrates *pratyaya* by means of the term *vibhakti* that in Pāṇinian terminology applies to both

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17. In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* this term is used to designate verbal bases before the affixation of either conjugational endings or *kṛ*ts, i.e. primary suffixes. It is worth noting that the term *dhātu* applies not only to underived roots, but also to derived stems — desideratives, causatives and intensives — that can at least theoretically form complete verbal systems.

18. By "non-technical" we intend a term that does not identify a specific grammatical unit and therefore is not used in operational rules to trigger or prevent the application of certain operations.

19. See, e.g. Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya* on *A* 1.3.1: . . . *kriyāvacano dhātur iti* . . . (Kielhorn edition, I. 254.13).

20. Cf. the use of *para* "subsequent, following" in the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, where it is regularly employed to gloss Pāṇini's metalinguistic usage of *pañcamī* to identify the left context of a grammatical operation according to *A* 1.1.67, *tasmād iti uttarasya*.

verbal (conjugational) and nominal (declensional) endings. Instead of *pratyaya*, the Pāṇinian term *āgama* "increment" is used in the *KŚA* to designate elements such as **an** (*sūtra* 19) that is introduced after the root when it occurs with a form of **as** = "to be" to derive the periphrastic present (e.g.: **karan chuḥ** = *sa karoti* = he makes). Presumably, the designation *āgama* is adopted because, in Īśvara Kaul's description of the present tense, **an** is a recurring element before the "suffixes" **chuḥ**, etc. (for the details of the derivation of the periphrastic present, see 2.3. below).

An interesting terminological innovation is seen in *sūtra* 3 where a definition of the three grammatical persons is given. The rule reads: *aśrotṛśrotṛvaktṛbhedāt prathamamādhyamottamāḥ* "The first, middle and last persons [occur] because of the difference between one who is not the person addressed, the person addressed or the speaker [respectively]." In accordance with the traditional Indian usage, here the first person (*prathama puruṣa*) corresponds to the third in Western grammatical terminology, the middle (*madhyama*) to the second and the last (*uttama*) to the first.[21] However, Pāṇini assigns the first and second persons on the basis of their co-occurrence with the pronouns *asmad* and *yuṣmad* respectively,[22] no matter

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21. For the sake of avoiding confusion and unnecessary complexity, we will refer, in this article, to the grammatical persons according to the Western usage, even when we translate the rules of the *KŚA*.

22. See, *A* 1.4.105, *yuṣmady upapade samānādhikaraṇe sthāniny api madhyamaḥ*, and 107, *asmady uttamaḥ*. *asmad* and *yuṣmad* are the abstract forms posited by Pāṇini for 1st person and 2nd person pronouns respectively, regardless of number. They are recognisable in all the plural forms of the paradigm except for the nominative (acc.: *asmān, yuṣmān*; instr.: *asmābhis, yuṣmābhis*; etc.).

whether they are mentioned or omitted in the utterance, while the third is assigned by default to the remaining cases.[23] Īśvara Kaul chooses instead to assign them on the basis of pragmatic considerations: the first person is prescribed for the speaker (*vaktr̥*), the second to the person addressed (*śrotr̥*, literally "hearer"), and the third to one who is not the person addressed (*aśrotr̥*). This allows him to formulate a rule (*sūtra* 5) for those cases in which there is simultaneous reference to two grammatical persons (you and I, he and you, etc.) in simple and clear terms: *yugapad uktau vācakāsanno mukhyaḥ* "When there is simultaneous reference [to different grammatical persons], the main one is the one that is closer to the speaker (*vācakāsannaḥ*)."[24] Thus the first person will always prevail over the others and determine the verbal ending, while the second will prevail over the third.

2.3. THE SECTION ON THE PRESENT TENSE (VARTAMĀNA PĀDA)

In the following pages we will discuss in some detail several of the rules that form this section, focusing in particular on those prescribing verbal suffixes, in order to compare them, in Part 3, with a treatment of Kashmiri "personal indexes" from the point of view of contemporary linguistics. However, before examining Īśvara Kaul's rules on verbal suffixes, we think it worthwhile to provide the readers with a concise summary of all the topics treated in the *vartamāna pāda*, in the form of a table of contents.

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23. *A* 1.4.108: *śeṣe prathamaḥ*.

24. It is not clear, though, why Kaul uses *vācaka* in *sūtra* 5 instead of *vaktr̥*, as in *sūtra* 3, although the two terms are derivationally equivalent (both are agent nouns from the root *vac-*, "to speak") and therefore synonymous.

2.3.1. Table of Contents of the Section on the Present Tense

1. Definition of verb (*ākhyāta*);
2. Definition of the three tenses;
3. Definition of the three grammatical persons (*puruṣa*);
4. Grammatical numbers;
5. Simultaneous reference to different grammatical persons;
6. Section-governing rule assigning the name *pratyaya* to post-verbal affixes;

7-10. Semantic conditions for the introduction of present-tense affixes;

11-12. Masculine and feminine present-tense "affixes";

13. Post-verbal negative "affix" **na**;

14. Post-verbal interrogative marker **ā**;

15-18. Other interrogative markers;

19. Post-verbal pre-suffixal increment **an**;

20. Introduction of *-v-* before **an** after roots ending in — *i*;

21. Deletion of **an** and of the root itself in the present tense of the verb **as-** "to be";

22-24. Pragmatic rules on the word order in the utterance when present tense "affixes" are used;

25. Suffix **sana** after the verb or after interrogative pronouns/adverbs to convey doubt;

26. Suffixes **tañ** and **tañt** after interrogative/indefinite pronouns/adverbs to convey uncertainty;

27. Use of particle **ḍyaṭha** before interrogative/indefinite pronouns/adverbs to convey highest degree;

28. Optional introduction of **ā** after **sana**;
29. Optional use of particle **mā** before or after the verb;

30-32. *anuprāsika* (i.e. echo) words with initial **v** or with **p**, or with other initial sounds;

33. Post-verbal suffix **as** denoting a singular 3rd-person beneficiary;
34. Post-verbal suffix **an** denoting a singular 3rd-person object;
35. Post-verbal suffix **akh** denoting a plural 3rd-person object or beneficiary;
36. **akh** denoting a 2nd-person object with past tense verbal forms;
37. Post-verbal suffix **ath** denoting a 2nd-person object with present and future verbal forms;
38. Substitution of **h** for suffix-final **kh** before a suffix;
39. Deletion of suffix-initial **a** after a vowel;
40. Post-verbal suffix **ay** denoting a singular 2nd-person beneficiary;
41. Post-verbal suffix **ava** denoting a plural 2nd-person beneficiary;
42. Post-verbal suffix **am** denoting a singular 1st-person object or beneficiary;
43. Post-verbal suffix **as** denoting the same with past tense verbal forms;
44. Absence of post-verbal suffix for plural 1st-person beneficiary (as well as object);
45. "Relational" (dative) post-verbal suffixes with verbs of feeling;

46. "Genitive" case-marker denoting the experiential agent of such verbs;
47. "Genitive" agent of **gatśa** in the sense of "being suitable";
48. And always in the 3rd-person (sing. and pl.);

49-50. Passive construction of transitive verbs: post-verbal suffix **ana** + present tense of **yi**;

51. Optional passive construction of intransitive verbs;
52. Compulsory passive construction of the verb **boza** when it denotes "visual knowledge";
53. Of the verb **gara**, in all its meanings;
54. Of **dremṭh** (for **ḍeśa** + **ana**);
55. Of **ni** also in the sense of "being unstable";
56. Of **hi** also in the sense of "buying";
57. Past tense of **hi** + infinitive in the sense of "having begun to" with reference to the present;
58. Future tense of **zana** + infinitive in sense of "knowing how to" with reference to the present;
59. Future tense forms of the verb **patha** in the sense of "existing" with reference to the present.

2.3.2. Some Major Sūtras in the Vartamāna Pāda

The chapter opens with a definition of "verb" (*ākhyāta*) in *sūtra* 1, *kālatrayatadviśeṣakriyākarmakartravabodhakṛd ākhyātaḥ*. A verb is said to be that "which causes the understanding" (*avabodhakṛt*) of an action (*kriyā*) in one of the three tenses (*kālatraya*) with their characteristics (*tadviśeṣa*, possibly "modes"), as well as of the object (*karman*) and the agent (*kartṛ*). In the *vṛtti*, *tadviśeṣa* is glossed with *vidhyādīnām* "injunction, etc.," possibly an allusion to the different senses a verb can have, inspired by a rule in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (henceforth, *A*), *sūtra*

3.3.161,[25] which lists the senses of *liṅ*, the optative, headed by *vidhi*.

The mention of the agent and the object clearly reflects the Pāṇinian notion that verbal endings denote either the former or the latter *kāraka* in active and passive constructions respectively, while the corresponding nominal base is followed by a nominative ending.[26] This feature of Pāṇinian grammar may have been usefully adapted in order to capture the complexity of the Kashmiri system of verbal indexes affixed to the verb, but this opportunity does not seem to have been fully exploited in the *KŚA*.

Moreover, it should be noted that, unlike the *KŚA*, the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* does not contain any definition of notions such as "verb." A "verbal base" (*dhātu*) is simply said to be one of the items listed in the *dhātupaṭha* (*A* 1.3.1: *bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ*). The semantics of the fundamentals of Sanskrit is taken for granted

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25. *A* 3.3.161: *vidhinimantraṇāmantraṇādhīṣṭasaṁpraśnaprārthaneṣu liṅ*.

26. There is no scope here for a thorough treatment of the Pāṇinian morphosyntax of case endings and finite verbal endings, for which see Cardona, 1997, in particular pp. 144-66. It will be sufficient to say that, according to Pāṇini, a finite verbal ending denotes either the agent or the object in active or passive constructions respectively (or the action itself in stative constructions); being already expressed by the verbal ending, a syntactic role such as agent or object will not be expressed again by the appropriate case ending — instrumental or accusative, respectively. The nominative case ending (*prathamā*) is prescribed instead to denote nothing more than the base meaning, gender, measure and number. Thus, the word denoting the agent will be in the nominative in an active clause, where the verbal ending denotes the agent, and in the instrumental in a passive clause; vice versa, the word denoting the object will be in the nominative in a passive clause, where the verbal ending denotes the object, and in the accusative in an active one.

by Pāṇini, who assumes a readership who has a natural knowledge of it.

Sūtra 2 gives a definition of the three tenses — present (*vartamāna*), future (*bhaviṣyat*) and past (*bhūta*) — as designating an action that has begun (*ārabdha*) but is not completed, an action that has not begun yet (*anārabdha*), and an action that has been completed (*samāpita*) respectively.[27] No explicit attention is paid here to the aspectual feature of verbs that, nonetheless, plays an important role in the derivation of Kashmiri verbal forms.

Sūtra 4, *ekānekābhyāṁ dve dve vacane*, specifies that for each of the persons defined in *sūtra* 3 (see 2.2 above) there are two grammatical numbers (*vacana*) depending on whether the items denoted are one (*eka*) or many (*aneka*). Note that while the corresponding rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* are *saṁjñāsūtra*s, delimiting the usage of the technical terms *ekavacana*, *dvivacana* and *bahuvacana*, this *sūtra* seems to be purely descriptive, for in the following rules Īśvara Kaul indifferently refers to the plural number either with the term *aneka* or with the term *bahu* (or one of their derivatives). Possibly the author felt it was necessary to stress that Kashmiri has only two numbers, singular and plural, whereas Sanskrit has three (these two plus the dual).

Sūtra 6, *dhātoḥ pare pratyayāḥ*, already discussed above, (see 2.2), is clearly a synthesis of three Pāṇinian *sūtra*s — *A* 3.1.1,

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27. Here, as generally elsewhere, Īśvara Kaul follows the Pāṇinian metarule *A* 1.3.10, *yathāsaṅkhyam anudeśaḥ samānām*, according to which, when two series of elements having the same number of members are stated in a rule, their members are related to one another according to the order of their occurrence in each series (the first to the first, the second to the second, etc.).

pratyayaḥ, 3.1.2, *paraś ca*, and 3.1.91, *dhātoḥ* — the first two governing the whole section of verbal and nominal affixes in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, the third delimiting the domain of post-verbal affixes. It also serves the purpose of establishing the conventional use of cases in this chapter: in the following rules affixes are given in the nominative, while verbal roots, when mentioned, are in the ablative. The word *para* is not used, generally, in the rules themselves, but it reappears in the *vṛtti* thereon. The *vṛtti* on this *sūtra* also introduces the term *vibhakti* that is sometimes used in the rules, as in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, to designate finite verbal endings. It is worth noting that Kaul explicitly relates these endings to the three tenses, although they depend on the aspect (perfective/imperfective) rather than on the tense. Moreover, the Kashmiri present tense is a periphrastic form, but this is overlooked by Kaul. As will be shown below, this depends on his peculiar treatment of the auxiliary verb **as-**, "to be," as an affix (in fact, a series of affixes) in *sūtra*s 11-12.

Before these, however, there are four *sūtra*s stating the semantic conditions for the introduction of present tense affixes: *sūtra* 7, *tadātvārabdhe vartamānā*, says that a present tense ending (*vibhaktiḥ*, as is specified in the *vṛtti*, which explains why the term for "present," *vartamāna*, is feminine in the rule) occurs when the action has begun in the present time (*tadātva*); *sūtra* 8, *nairantaryārabdhe ca*,[28] adds actions that, having begun, have uninterrupted continuity; *sūtra* 9, *niyamārabdhe ca*, provides for actions that, having begun, recur in an invariable (*niyama*)

28. The printed edition has *nairyantarārabdhe* that is clearly a misprint, for the *vṛtti* correctly talks of a *nirantarārabdham karma* "an uninterrupted action" and gives two examples, one of which is: **īśvar zagatas racān chuh** = *īśvaro jagad rakṣati* = the Lord protects the world.

fashion;[29] and *sūtra* 10 seems to prescribe present tense endings for general statements about sentient agents.[30]

The following two rules give the series of present tense "suffixes" for the masculine and the feminine respectively:

[The suffixes] **chuh, chih, chukh, chiva, chus, chih** [are introduced] to denote the present tense (*vartamānāyām*) when [the agent[31] is] masculine (*puṁsi*).

When [the agent is] feminine (*striyām*), [the endings] for the present tense are **chyah, chyah, chyakh, chyava, chyas, chyah**.

As was mentioned above, this is in fact the paradigm of the present tense of the verb **as-** "to be," conjugated in the masculine and in the feminine, in the Pāṇinian order of presentation:[32] first, the couple of 3rd-person endings (singular and plural), then the 2nd-person, and finally the 1st-person. Now, Īśvara Kaul was faced with the problem of providing for the derivation of a periphrastic verbal form with the conceptual tools of a grammatical system such as the Pāṇinian that lacked a formally defined category of periphrasis. And

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29. Ex.: **gaṁgāya gatshān chuh prath kuṁbas** = *gaṅgāṁ gacchati pratikumbham* = he goes to the Ganges for each vase (i.e. to wash or to fill each vase).

30. Ex.: **kyāh chuh rut gyavān?** = *kiṁ sādhu gāyann asti* = does he sing well? We do not discuss sūtra 10 in more detail because its wording and exact purport are not clear to us.

31. The *vṛtti* specifies that here a masculine *agent* (*puṁkartari*) is meant.

32. Cf. *A* 3.4.78, *tiP-tas-jhi, siP-thas-tha, miP-vas-mas . . .*, which lists all the verbal endings of the present system, first the *parasmaipada* 'other–oriented meaning element/aspect' and then the *ātmanepada* 'agent–oriented meaning element'. Of course, in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* one finds a triplet of endings for each person — singular, dual and plural — instead of simply two.

yet, Sanskrit has two periphrastic verbal forms, the perfect of certain verbs[33] and one of the two types of future tense, for whose derivation Pāṇini adopts different procedures. We can ignore here the derivation of the periphrastic perfect and focus on that of the periphrastic future, which has some points in common with that of the present tense in the *KŚA*.

The latter verbal form, known as *luṭ* in Pāṇinian terminology,[34] consists of the nominative of an agent noun in *-tṛ* (e.g. *kartā* from *kṛ-* > *kartṛ*), unchanged for the 1st and the 2nd person in the three numbers,[35] followed by the appropriate form of the present tense of *as-*, e.g. *kartāsmi* "I shall make," *kartāsi* "you will make," etc. However, *A* 3.1.33, *syatāsī lṛluṭoḥ*, prescribes that the *vikaraṇa*[36] affix *-tāsi* (= *-tās*) is introduced after a verbal base before *luṭ* endings. These are identical with present tense endings, but they are replaced in the 3rd person by *ḍā* (= *-ā*), *rau* and *ras* (singular, dual and plural, respectively) according to *A* 2.4.85.[37] Thus, the derivation will be as follows: (1st s.) *kṛ* + *tās* + *mi* = *kartāsmi*; (1st du.) *kṛ* + *tās* + *vaḥ* = *kartāsvaḥ*,

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33. On the contrary, the perfect tense of most underived verbal bases is a morphologically independent simple formation.

34. *A* 3.3.15, *anadyatane luṭ*, prescribes the endings of this type of future (collectively referred to by the artificial technical term *luṭ*) when the action is situated in the future excluding today (*an-adyatane*).

35. In the third person, the auxiliary is dropped and only the agent noun appears in the appropriate number: thus, *kartā* "he will make," *kartārau* "the two of them will make" and *kartāraḥ*, "they will make."

36. These are formative affixes, the introduction of which is determined by the following verbal suffixes. For instance, the various class markers of the present tense are regarded as *vikaraṇas*.

37. *luṭaḥ prathamasya ḍāraurasaḥ*.

etc. As is evident, neither the agent noun nor the auxiliary *as-* are recognized as such. The transparent etymology of these forms is disregarded and their constituents are disassembled, as it were, into distinct abstract building blocks.

This procedure has possibly inspired Īśvara Kaul for his treatment of the Kashmiri periphrastic present. In fact, he adopts the ingenious solution of treating the forms of the auxiliary verb as suffixes, in keeping with a purely formal approach. With regard to the main verb, a subsequent rule, *sūtra* 19, *dhātor anāgamaḥ*, states that the increment (*āgama*)[38] ***an*** is introduced after the verbal base,[39] and it is in turn followed by the present tense "suffixes" listed in *sūtra* 11-12, e.g.: **karān chuh** = *sa karoti* = he makes.

However, this treatment of the auxiliary verb raises some problems. One is that the verb **as-** is also used as an independent verb with its own meaning. For that reason *sūtra* 21, *āso lopo dhātoś ca*, states that after the root **as-** there is deletion (*lopa*) of the increment **ān** (that is read here by *anuvṛtti* from *sūtra* 19) as well as of the root itself, so that the suffix alone is left to denote the present tense of "to be." Here, the inability to

38. In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* the technical name *āgama* is assigned to formative elements that are not meaning-bearing and can be either prefixed (like *a-* of the imperfect) or infixed (like the *n* of the ending in *vana* + *Śi* → *vanāni*).

39. *dhātoḥ*, ablative of *dhātu*. In the Pāṇinian metalinguistic use of morphological cases, the ablative marks the left context of a grammatical operation: in this case it is the element *after which* the increment is introduced. In the following rule, *sūtra* 20, *ikarantād vapūrvaḥ*, Kaul provides for the introduction of a euphonic *-v-* before **ān** after roots ending in *-i*, e.g.: **nivān chuh** = *harati* = he takes. The *vṛtti* reports additional morphological and euphonic rules from different chapters of the grammar that are required for the correct derivation of various verbal forms.

recognize the existence of a system of personal indexes prevents Īśvara Kaul from noting that the endings of the present tense paradigm of **as-** are also found elsewhere. In other words, **chuh,** etc. are morphologically complex forms composed of a root plus suffixes that are not characteristic of the present as such, for they are personal indexes of set II (see 3.2.2.2. below) denoting the morphosyntactic subject of the action, according to its person and number, while the gender is indicated by a vowel alteration in the verbal base.

Moreover, even when **as-** is used as a present tense auxiliary, its forms do not necessarily follow the verb form ending in **-ān.** In fact, the unmarked order of words in Kashmiri requires that they *precede* the main verb. Clearly, here the *KŚA* precludes a possible negative influence of the Pāṇinian model, for the latter was devised for a language like Sanskrit that has a rather free word order and therefore has virtually no rules on this matter. But even more serious is the fact that if **chuh,** etc. are classified as suffixes, the word order found in actual use — and reflected by some of the examples given by Kaul himself — will contradict *sūtra* 6, where *pratyaya*s are said to *follow* the verbal base.

The subsequent rules (25-32) deal with disparate topics (see 2.3.1. above) and can be regarded as digressions insofar as they are not directly connected with the derivation of the present tense. This topic is only resumed in *sūtra* 33, *tacchabdasyaikatvena kriyāsaṁbandhe,* which prescribes that the suffix **as** should occur after a verbal base — i.e. after the verbal base incremented with **ān** followed by the "affixes" **chuh,** etc. — to indicate that the action is connected with a singular (*ekatvena*) 3rd-person.[40] By the phrase *kriyāsaṁbandha* "relation

40. Referred to with *tad,* the basic form of the 3rd-person pronoun.

with an action" Īśvara Kaul seems to indicate a semantic-syntactic role other than object or agent. In fact, the *vṛtti* specifies that this is a beneficiary by saying that "the agent performs the action for his sake,"[41] as shown by the examples: **karān chus** = *tasyārthaṁ karoti* = he makes for him; **karān chusas** = *tasyārthaṁ karomi* = I make for him.

Sūtra 34, *karmaṇy an*, provides for the introduction of the suffix **an** after a verbal base to denote a singular 3rd-person object, as in the examples: **karān chuhan** = *taṁ karoṣi* = you make him; **khyavān chuhan** = *taṁ khādasi* = you eat him.

The next rule, *sūtra* 35, simply reads *bahutvenākh*. We should read here *tacchabdasya*, *kriyāsaṁbandhe* and *karmaṇi* by *anuvṛtti* from the previous two *sūtras*, while the *vidheya*, that which is prescribed, is the suffix **akh**, so that **an** is discontinued, and the semantic condition *ekatvena* is replaced by *bahutvena* "(connected) with a plural (form)." Thus, as the *vṛtti* explains, the suffix **akh** is introduced after a verbal base to denote that the action is connected with a plural 3rd-person that can serve either as the object or the beneficiary. For example: **karān chukh** = *teṣām arthe karoti* = he makes for them; **karān chusakh** = *teṣām arthe karomi* = I make for them.[42]

Since the same suffix **akh** is also used in the past tense (*bhūte*) to denote a singular 2nd-person (*tvad*) object, *sūtra* 36, *tvacchabde karmaṇi bhūte ca*, provides for it.[43] This kind of

41. *kartā . . . kriyāṁ tasyārthaṁ vidadhāti.*

42. The examples and their Sanskrit translations are taken from the *vṛtti*. However, these translations only present one of the two uses of **akh**, when it refers to the indirect object or beneficiary. They should also illustrate the other use, when it refers to the direct object: *tān karoti* = he makes them; *tān karomi* = I make them.

43. As the *vidheya* is the same, it is not repeated in the *sūtra*.

digression is in keeping with the procedure followed by Pāṇini in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, but it appears out of place in the chapter on the present tense, as this is a grammar that is to a large extent arranged by topic. Furthermore, the examples show that this suffix appears in the context of ergative clauses where the object serves as the subject, e.g.: **karyonakh** = *tena cakṛṣe*, literally, in Sanskrit, "you were made by him."

In *sūtra* 37, *bhaviṣyadvartamānottame 'py ath*, a different suffix, **ath**, is introduced to denote a singular 2nd-person object[44] in the present and in the future (*bhaviṣyad*) when there is a 1st-person agent, e.g.: **karān chusath** = *tvāṁ karomi* = I make you; **karath** = *tvāṁ kariṣyāmi* = I will make you.

After another short digression on some internal-*sandhi* rules (38-39), the *sūtras* 40, *tvacchabdenāy*, and 41, *yuṣmadāvaḥ*, provide for the post-verbal suffixes referring to 2nd-person beneficiaries, singular (*tvad*) and plural (*yuṣmad*), respectively. The use of the instrumental after *tvad* (i.e. *tvad-śabda*) and *yuṣmad* recalls *ekatvena . . . kriyāsaṁbandhe* in *sūtra* 33 above and therefore suggests that *kriyāsaṁbandhe* is to be supplied here, thus establishing their syntactic role, that of beneficiaries. Thus, the suffix **ay** is introduced for the singular, e.g. **karān chuy** = *tubhyaṁ karoti* = he makes for you (sing.), while the suffix **ava** occurs for the plural, e.g. **karān chuva** = *vaḥ karoti* = he makes for you (pl.).

The following three *sūtras* complete the picture of the present tense post-verbal suffixes. According to *sūtra* 42, *macchabdenās*, the suffix **as** occurs after a verbal base to convey that the action is connected with a 1st person (*mad*) that serves

44. *tvacchabde karmaṇi* is read here by *anuvṛtti* from the previous *sūtra*.

as the object or beneficiary. The *vṛtti* specifies that this usage is restricted to the singular of the 1st person.[45]

This is an interesting remark, because it gives us a clue about the kind of readership Īśvara Kaul had in mind while writing his grammar. In fact, it can be fully appreciated only if we remember that in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, when Pāṇini refers to 1st- and 2nd-person pronouns regardless of number, he uses the basic abstract forms of the plural: *asmad* and *yuṣmad*, respectively. By mentioning *mad* in the *sūtra*, the author restricts the domain of the rule to the singular. Nonetheless, as he most probably assumed his readers to be learned paṇḍits who were familiar with Pāṇinian grammar, he feels obliged to state this restriction clearly in the *vṛtti*. It should also be noticed that neither the *sūtra* nor the *vṛtti* say anything about the syntactic role denoted by **am**. However, from the examples it becomes clear that the suffix may refer either to a direct or an indirect object, e.g.:

> **karān chum** = *māṁ* [*vā*] *me karoti* = he makes me [or] for me;
> **karān chim** = *māṁ* [*vā*] *me kurvanti* = they make me [or] for me.

The next rule, *sūtra* 43, *karmaṇy as bhūte*, can be regarded as an exception (*apavāda*) to the previous one, which explains its being stated in this chapter although it refers to the past tense (*bhūta*). A 1st-person serving as the direct object (*karman*) of the action is denoted by the post-verbal suffix **as** instead of **am**. Once again (cf. above, *sūtra* 36), the syntactic environment in which this happens is not specified. However, the examples reveal that the context is that of ergative clauses, where the direct object serves as the subject, e.g.:

45. *asmacchabdenaikatvaniyataprayogeṇa macchabdena.*

karyonas = *tenāhaṁ cakre* = (literally, in Sanskrit) I was made by him.

karyothas = *tvayāhaṁ cakre* = (literally, in Sanskrit) I was made by you.

In other words, this is not just a simple change of suffix under different semantic conditions, but it reflects the complete and, moreover, compulsory morphosyntactic re-structuring of the clause (from accusative to ergative) in the opposition between present and past tense, or rather, as will be pointed out below, (see Part 3) between perfective and imperfective.

Finally, in *sūtra* 44, *bahutve 'smatprayogasaṁbandha eva ca*, it is stated that when the action is connected with a plural (*bahutve*) 1st-person — denoting either the object or the beneficiary, but this is not explicitly stated either in the *sūtra* or in the *vṛtti* — this relationship will be shown only by the use of a 1st-person plural pronoun (*asmad*), but no suffix denoting its role will be introduced after the verb. The *vṛtti* specifies that the 1st-person pronoun will appear either before or after the verb, as is illustrated by the examples (where **asya** is the dative of the 1st-person plural pronoun):

karān chuh asya = *naḥ karoti* = he makes for us.

asya karān chukh = *naḥ karoṣi* = you (sing.) make for us.

Here it is worth noting that Īśvara Kaul follows a non-Pāṇinian procedure, for he formulates a rule that is merely descriptive, instead of an operational rule prescribing a post-verbal suffix to be deleted at the final stage of derivation — in other words, a suffix having the value of Ø (zero). Such a "zero" suffix would in fact be structurally equivalent to the non-zero suffixes

prescribed for most of the other grammatical persons in the same syntactic roles.[46]

In *sūtra* 45, the relational (i.e. dative) post-verbal suffixes prescribed so far are introduced obligatorily with a number of verbs of feeling that are enumerated in the *sūtra*, while the next rule, *sūtra* 46, *ṣaṣṭhī kartari sarvatra*, states that in all these cases the word denoting the agent — namely, the experiential agent — is followed by a genitive ending.[47] Now, in Kashmiri there is no morphologically marked genitive, and in fact the pronominal form (**tamis**) appearing in the only example given for this *sūtra* is in the dative:

> [1]**tamis** [2]**tsarān** [3]**chyah** = he is angry
> (literally) "[1]to him [2]feeling angry [3]is"

Regardless of the terminology employed, it clearly appears that, together, these two rules describe a dative-subject construction.

The rest of the chapter is devoted to the formation and application of the periphrastic passive — composed of a verbal noun plus an active form, itself periphrastic, of the present tense of **yi** — under the misleading Pāṇinian label of

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46. Some of the 3rd-person — singular and plural — roles also lack a formal marker (see Table of personal indexes below).

47. The term used by Īśvara Kaul, *ṣaṣṭhī*, designates the genitive in the Pāṇinian system, where the nominal endings (morphological cases) are named according to the order in which they are traditionally listed. Thus, *ṣaṣṭhī* (presupposing *vibhaktiḥ* "ending") is literally "the sixth (ending) triplet."

karmakartṛ,[48] and to the exceptional use of the future of two quite common verbs to convey the present tense.

3. The Kashmiri Present Tense as Described by Īśvara Kaul

3.1. INTRODUCTION

In this section we shall consider the description of the Kashmiri present tense alone leaving aside, for the time being, the Pāṇinian theoretical apparatus as used by Īśvara Kaul.

A detailed account of the chapter structure has already been given above. Hence, it is not necessary to go back to it but for a few points to be highlighted from the perspective of the Kashmiri language.

Interestingly, the chapter deals at the same time with sandhi, Tense/Aspect/Mood (TAM) (7, 11-12, 19-21: present tense formation; 8-10: aspectual values of the present tense form), morphosyntactic aspects (33-49: personal indexes), pragmatics (25-29: particles indicating various degrees of doubt and uncertainty, or "highest degree"; to these we can add 13-18: negation and interrogation) and lexical aspects (30-31: formation and value of echo words, specifically verbs). At first glance — and if one looks at them only from the point of

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48. In Pāṇinian terminology, this term applies, according to *A* 3.1.87, *karmavat karmaṇā tulyakriyaḥ*, to an agent whose action is similar to the activity it performs when it is the object of the same action; such an agent is treated as an object, that is, it requires passive verbal morphology, as in *odanaḥ pacyate* "the rice cooks." However, in the Sanskrit *karmakartṛ* constructions a syntactical constraint applies to these forms: they cannot occur if the "real" agent is expressed. On the contrary, in Kashmiri the agent may be expressed, and therefore the use of the term *karmakartṛ* seems misleading, for these are simply passives.

view of modern descriptive linguistics — this assortment of disparate pieces of information gives a somewhat confused picture of what is expected to be a mere description of a tense formation. At the same time, we may say that it is precisely these wide-ranging topics — from morphonemics to pragmatics — that make Īśvara Kaul's grammar so valuable, for in many a case it accounts for forms or usages that have been largely ignored in later grammatical works.

Nevertheless, this wide coverage does not fit in the model of a three-tense-based division. As a matter of fact, in many cases the topics dealt with are not specific to present forms alone: the *sūtra*s dealing with the formation of echo-words, negation, interrogation, pragmatic particles and word order (22-24[49]) are relevant to the description of the past and future tenses as well.

Moreover, we will argue here that choosing to present the verbal system on the basis of past, present and future tenses makes it impossible to give a comprehensive account of Kashmiri verbal morphology (and related morphosyntax). However, it is extremely interesting to see how Īśvara Kaul copes with this structural difficulty.

We will focus only on *sūtra*s 7, 11-12, 19, 21, and 33-44, for they deal with a major distinctive feature of Kashmiri, i.e. personal indexes (as it has already been pointed out, this feature is totally absent in Sanskrit), and give a somehow intriguing description, in theoretical terms, of what modern

49. We could not arrive at a satisfying interpretation of *sūtra*s 22-24. Therefore, readers should bear in mind that at this stage of our study we are not able to say with certainty whether these three *sūtra*s really deal with word order.

grammars identify as the present tense auxiliary (7, 11-12, 21). Since the readers may not be acquainted with the Kashmiri language, a sketchy description of its main argument structures and system of personal indexes is given here along with the commentary on Īśvara Kaul's *sūtras*.

3.2. Kashmiri Argument Structures and Personal Indexes

3.2.1. MORPHOLOGICAL DEVICES AND ARGUMENT STRUCTURES

Like other North-Western Indo-Aryan languages, Kashmiri transitive clauses show an ergative structure in the perfective aspect and an accusative structure in the imperfective. And, as in most South Asian languages, intransitive clauses are divided into one-argument clauses and "dative subject construction clauses."[50]

Syntactic relations are indicated by the morphological cases of the arguments (unmarked, i.e. nominative/absolutive, dative and ergative[51]), and on the finite verb by personal indexes and by gender/number or number/person agreement.

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50. The designation "dative construction" would be more appropriate than "dative subject construction" because the dative case-marked argument does not fulfil all the criteria expected of a subject. For instance, it has most — but not all — of the semantic and pragmatic properties usually ascribed to the category of subject, but it does not control its formal properties (for, being marked, it does not control verbal agreement). In the present paper the term "subject" will be used to refer to the morphosyntactic subject alone, i.e. the unmarked argument which controls verbal agreement (depending on the verbal form, the verb may agree either in gender and number or in number and person). Accordingly, we will retain the "dative construction" designation throughout this paper.

51. Unlike other modern Indo-Aryan languages, in which arguments are marked by postpositions. In some particular cases postpositions may also be used in Kashmiri, e.g. with the overt agent of the passive.

In the perfective, the argument referring to the agent is marked by the ergative case, while that of the patient is unmarked and controls verb agreement. In the imperfective, it is the argument referring to the agent which is unmarked and controls verb agreement, whereas the argument of the patient is either unmarked (if non-human, or human but inferior to the agent in person[52]) or dative case marked (if human and equal or superior to the agent in person).

The following are examples of ergative and accusative clauses.

Ergative Clause

1. haṁsa:y-av vIch[53] maha:ren'
   neighbours.MP-ER see/watch.**PTFS** **bride.FS-Ø**[54]
   [Our] neighbours saw the bride.

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52. A hierarchy of grammatical persons is to be understood here: the first person is superior to the second, and the second person to third.

53. The gender/number agreement of the verb *vuch* "see/watch" in the preterit is marked through the phonological alternation of the internal vowel. The feminine singular is marked by the centralization of the back vowel: *-u-* > *-I-*.

54. Abbreviations used in this section are: M masculine; F feminine; S singular; P plural; ER ergative; DA dative; Ø unmarked (nominative/absolutive); IN infinitive; IM imperfective participle; PE perfective participle; PR present; PA past; FU future; PT preterit. In the examples, verbal agreement with the (morphosyntactic) subject will be shown in bold.

The transcription used in the present section is as follows: long vowels are indicated by ":," as in *a* (short) *vs a:* (long). "*I*" and "*A*" are used for the high central vowel and mid central vowel →

Accusative Clauses

2. (with a non-human patient)

puj	ma:r-**i**	kaTh
butcher.**MS-Ø**	kill-FU.**I3S**	goat.**MS-Ø**

The butcher will kill the goat.

3. (with a human patient, inferior to the agent: 1>3)

As	nim-on	Haphsa	ti	tuur
	nim-**av**-n			
1P-Ø	take-FU.**I1P**-III3S	Haphsa	too	there

We will take Haphsa too [there].

4. (with a human patient, superior to the agent: 3 < 1)

su	**o:**s[55]	asi	vuch-a:n
3MS-Ø	be.**PA.MS**	1P.DA	watch-IM

He was watching us.

5. (with a human patient, equal to the agent: 3 = 3)

su	ch-**u**[56]	tAmis	vuch-a:n
3MS-Ø	be.PR-**MS**	3S.DA	watch-IM

He is watching him.

→ respectively. Retroflex consonants are shown in capitals, as in *ToTh* "dear." Palatalization of final consonants is indicated by a final " ' ", as in *maha:ren.'* Kashmiri shows complex morphophonemics and *sandhi* phenomena. These will be detailed only when necessary.

55. Gender/number agreement of the verb *a:s* "be" in the preterit is marked through phonological alterations. Masculine singular is marked by the vocalic alteration *a:-* > *o:-*.

56. The verb *a:s* "be" has a distinct theme for the present, i.e. *ch-* (as opposed to *a:s-* used with all other finite and non finite verbal forms).

In both transitive and intransitive clauses, the beneficiary is represented by a dative case-marked argument. Dative construction clauses have their initial term, corresponding to the experiencer/possessor/recipient,[57] in the dative, while it is the second argument of the clause — which may not be fully referential[58] — that assumes subject properties:

6. me ch-**u** kal-as dod

1S.DA be.PR-**MS** head-DA **pain.MS-Ø**

I have a headache.

3.2.2. Personal Indexes

3.2.2.1. INTRODUCTION

Personal indexes are usually referred to in the literature on Kashmiri as pronominal suffixes or clitics.[59] There are four sets of such personal indexes. The finite verb can have up to

57. The dative construction expresses experiential, possessive, obligative, subjective and other similar processes.

58. It may not be possible to identify it as a true participant. There are even cases in which it is not clear whether it is to be considered as autonomous (in both semantic and morphosyntactic terms) from the verb. As a matter of fact, there are plenty of compound verbs in Kashmiri, formed by combination of a basic verb (i.e. carrying basic lexical meaning, such as *a:s-* "be", *di-* "give", *kar-* "do/make," etc.) and a noun (or, in a few cases, an adjective or adverb).

59. We do not retain the term "clitics" because it is normally used for morphemes that attach to different word categories (noun, verb, postposition), as it happens in many of the neighbouring Iranian and Dardic languages. Kashmiri personal indexes are exclusively verbal morphemes. On the other hand, we use "personal indexes"

→

three of them simultaneously. It will be shown below that the formal distinction into four sets reflects alterations in the argument structures, roughly speaking, the syntactic function or morphological case (depending on the set) of the corresponding argument. Out of four, two sets (referred to in this paper as sets I and II)[60] play the same syntactic function. These two sets actually occur in alternation to one another according to the verbal form. This explains why the finite verb can have a maximum of three personal indexes, instead of four. Sets I and II further differ according to position and realization. As a matter of fact, the whole system is divided into various sub-categories of personal indexes, depending on whether or not the set can be considered as a personal

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→ rather than "pronominal suffixes" for the following reasons: (1) the latter designation does not implicitly carry the idea that the suffixes are verbal morphemes, whereas the former does; (2) the terminological opposition "personal indexes" *vs.* "personal pronouns" is more symmetrical than "pronominal suffixes" *vs.* "personal pronouns."

60. For the sake of the description, the sets of personal indexes will be labelled through numbering (see Table below). For those who are acquainted with the works on Kashmiri of Wali and Koul (1997) and Hook and Koul (1984), our set II corresponds to those authors' nominative/absolutive and absolutive sets respectively, our sets III to their ergative and anti-absolutive sets, and our set IV to the set labelled as dative in both studies. In these authors' works our set I is treated separately, since it corresponds to a particular verbal paradigm. Our study aims at giving a more comprehensive picture of all verbal personal markers, taking into account the fact that these markers are subdivided into various sub-categories. This is the reason why the set of personal inflexions (our set I) is described along with the other categories of personal indexes.

inflexion paradigm, or according to alternations in position and realization. Alternations in realization will not be treated here,[61] but variations in the position of personal indexes will be briefly described, for the description will help the reader in understanding the examples.

It should be mentioned that in the section on the present tense Īśvara Kaul does not deal at all with the position and realization of personal indexes. The function of a personal index is sometimes given, but not always. For instance, *sūtra*s 33 and 40-42 all deal with forms corresponding to dative case-marked arguments, but Īśvara Kaul only mentions that the form is connected with a particular person (40-42) or with a 3rd person beneficiary (33: here the semantic role is mentioned, but not the case of the corresponding argument). Finally, it is worth noting that sets II, III and IV do not know of any formal marker for the 1st person plural.[62] At this stage of our research we are unable to offer any convincing explanation for this common zero morpheme.[63]

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61. The purpose of the present paper does not require it.

62. See our remarks on this *sūtra* in 2.3.2 above. On the contrary, set I has formal markers for each person/number (i.e. six distinct forms).

63. Set I paradigm also includes two zero morphemes for the singular and plural 3rd persons, which are easily explainable, unlike those of the 1st person plural. In fact, set I corresponds to the morphosyntactic subject of the clause, and it is a very common feature among world languages that the 3rd person subject should be unmarked (as a non-person, or as the person who is not central in the interlocution process) in opposition to 1st and 2nd persons ("true" persons, directly involved in the interlocution process).

3.2.2.2. Personal Inflexions

PERSONAL INDEXES

grammatical status of the referent		*morphosyntactic subject* (*future/ conditional*)	*morphosyntactic subject* (*non-future/ conditional*)	*ergative agent/ unmarked patient*	*dative case-marked argument*
	Person	set I	set II	set III	set IV
	1	-I	-s	-m	-m
singular	2	-kh	-kh	-th	-y
	3	-i	-Ø (/-n*)	-n	-s
	1	-av	Ø	Ø	Ø
plural	2	-iv	-v(I)	-v(I)	-v(I)
	3	-n	-Ø (/-kh*)	-kh	-kh

* Exceptional forms occurring optionally and in exceptional contexts. For lack of space these exceptions will not be treated in this paper.

Out of the four sets, one is directly inherited from the Old Indo-Aryan present paradigm and can therefore be considered as a true set of personal inflexions. It is the only set that can be regarded as such: it has a fixed position (first position before all other personal indexes) and is obligatory, whereas the position (first, second or third) and realization (obligatory, optional or impossible) of other personal indexes vary according to heterogeneous semantic and pragmatic criteria.

In the context of this paper, we will refer to this personal inflexion set as set I. This set is used for future forms only[64] and is affixed directly to the verb base. It corresponds to the

64. It is also used with the conditional mood, with the only difference that the personal inflexion is not directly added to the verbal base: an additional affix *-h-* is inserted. Since this paper deals with indicative forms only, we will not make reference to the conditional again.

subject argument.[65] As we will see, imperfective verbal forms[66] are divided into the future tense, on the one hand, to which specific personal indexes are assigned, and the remaining imperfective forms,[67] on the other hand, for which the subject is indexed on the verb by a different set of personal indexes. This latter set, which we will refer to as set II, is not specific to any verbal form in particular, if not in negative terms since it cannot appear with future verbal form.

At this stage it is important to point out that set I and set II are not restricted to the imperfective aspect. A distinction should be made between aspect of the clause and aspect of the finite verbal form itself.[68] This is to be considered with regard to a TAM system which includes both simple and periphrastic forms and is aspect-based rather than tense-based.

With set I, since it is restricted to the future, all simple and periphrastic forms of both the imperfective and perfective aspects will have their finite verbal form (the main verb or the auxiliary) in the future. Thus, whatever may be the aspect of the clause, imperfective or perfective, the finite verb will always be in the imperfective aspect (future).

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65. It is an inherent property of personal inflexions to correspond to the subject agreement. The personal inflexion is nothing but the agreement marker of the verb with the subject.
66. That may be either simple or periphrastic forms.
67. These are all periphrastic: in the present tense, the personal index is attached to the auxiliary *a:s-* "be", which appears with its specific present-tense stem *ch-* (see par. 2.3 above, for the peculiar treatment of this auxiliary verb in the *KŚA*).
68. If we consider periphrastic forms, the clause may be, for example, in the perfective aspect, while the form of the finite verb will be in the imperfective, as is the case with present perfect (see ex. 11).

This is not the case with set II. With clauses in the imperfective aspect, the finite verbal form will always be the verb **a:s-** "be" in the present form (as an independent verb, copula or auxiliary), therefore in the imperfective aspect. But with clauses in the perfective aspect, the finite verbal form may be either in the present (of the verb **a:s-** "be": ex.11) or in the preterit (of any verb: ex.7), thus either in the imperfective or perfective aspect.

7.	tse	v**u**ch-<u>th</u>-**as**[69]	bI	
	<u>2S.ER</u>	see/watch.PT**MS**-<u>III2S</u>-**II1S**	**1S (M)**	**-Ø**

You watched me.

The fact that set II is not attached to any particular verbal form (for instance, it can occur either with the present or with the preterit) makes it clear that set II cannot be considered as a personal inflexion set, though it shares most of its characteristics with set I (both sets correspond to the subject and are obligatorily affixed to the finite verb).[70] This is further confirmed by the varying position (either first or second) of set II, as opposed to the fixed position (first) of set I.

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69. The following sandhi rules apply: (1) after addition of a personal index beginning with a consonant to a verbal base ending with a consonant (such as *vuch-* "see"), a vowel must be inserted. According to vowel harmony the inserted vowel here is *-u-*: *vuch-* + *-th* > *vuch-u-th*. (2) if an additional personal index is further suffixed, then this vowel will be deleted, while the low central vowel *-a-* (indifferent to vowel harmony) is inserted between the two personal indexes: *vuch-u-th* + *-s* > *vuch-th-a-s* .

70. With one exception, indicated with * in the Table above.

3.2.2.3. POSITION OF PERSONAL INDEXES

The verb can have up to three personal indexes. This is the case with transitive clauses, where in the sequence of personal indexes attached to the verb the agent comes first, the patient second, and the beneficiary third.[71] Here the sequence of personal indexes reflects the linear order of the process.

In intransitive clauses, the linear order is based on a morphological constraint, i.e. the first position of set I. Modelled, as it is, on set I, set II also occurs in the first position.[72] Thus, since the subject index always appears in the first position, an additional personal index (belonging to set IV only)[73] will logically occur in the second position. This happens, for instance, with the index of the beneficiary and that of the experiencer/possessor/recipient (in dative construction clauses).

3.2.2.4. Formal Distinctions Reflect Alternations in Argument Marking and Argument Structures

3.2.2.4.1. SETS I AND II: THE MORPHOSYNTACTIC SUBJECT

It has already been said that both sets I and II correspond to the subject, namely, the unmarked argument which controls the verb agreement and corresponds to one of the following:[74]

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71. Except for one small exception, in which the agent-patient positions are reversed. The purpose of the present paper does not require that this exception be described.

72. Unlike what happens in transitive clauses, set II always occurs in the first position in intransitive clauses.

73. Since set III is confined to transitive clauses alone.

74. Examples are given here for set I and set II, but we will not give examples of both sets for each type of clause.

The main participant of one-argument clauses:

8.	tuh'	kar	yi-**vI**
	2P-**Ø**	when	come-FU.**I2P**

When will you come?

The stimulus/possession, etc. of dative construction clauses:

9.	tsI	ch-**u-kh**	me	ToTh
	2S(M)-Ø	be.PR-**MS-II2S**	1S(F).DA	dear

You are my dear / You are dear to me.

The agent of imperfective clauses:

10.	bI	ch-**u-s-**ath[75]	tsI	vuch-a:n
	1S(M)-Ø	be.PR-**MS-II1S**-III2S	2S(F)-Ø	watch-IM.

I am watching you.

The patient of perfective clauses:

11.	tse	ch-**u**-th-as[76]	bI	vuchm**ut**
	2S.ER	be.PR-**MS**-III2S-**II1S**	**1S(M)-Ø**	watch-PF**MS**

You have watched me.

3.2.2.4.2. Set IV: Dative Case Arguments

Set IV correspond to a dative case-marked argument, whatever

75. The following *sandhi* rule applies in examples 10 and 11: when an additional personal index is suffixed, the vowel *-a-* must be inserted between the two personal indexes. For instance ex. 10: *ch-u-s* + -*th* > *ch-u-s-a-th*; and ex.11: *ch-u-th* + -s > *ch-u-th-a-s*.

76. The perfective participle agrees in gender and number with the morphosyntactic subject (here in the masculine singular).

may be the semantic role of the participant and the argument structure of the clause:

The beneficiary of intransitive (ex.12) and transitive (ex.13) clauses:

12.	su	a:-m[77]
		a:-**v**-m
	3S-Ø	come.PT-**MS**-IV1S

He came to me.

13.	bI	dim-ay[78]	tse	ca:y
		dim-**I**-y		
	1S-Ø	give-FU.**I1S**-IV2S	2S.DA	tea

I will give you (some) tea.

The main participant (experiencer/possessor/recipient/etc.) in dative construction clauses:

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77. The 1st person singular index of set IV cannot co-occur with the corresponding (dative case-marked) 1st person singular personal pronoun. The alternative clause to sentence 12 would be:

su	a:v	me
3S-Ø	come-PT**MA**	1S.DA

In ex. 12, according to sandhi rules, the final semi-vowel — *v* (masculine singular marker of the preterit form of the verb **yi-** "come," which has a distinct stem in the preterit, **a:-**) is deleted after the addition of the personal index — *m*: *a:v* + *-m* > *a:-m*.

78. According to sandhi rules, when a set I personal index is added to a verbal base ending in a vowel (such as **di-** "give") the consonant *m-* must be inserted between the verb stem and the personal-index: *di-* + - *I* > *di-m-I*. Further suffixation of an additional personal index gives place to the replacement of *-I* by *-a*. For instance here: *di-m-I* + *-y* > *di-m-a-y*.

14. bI ch-**a-s**-ay[79] tse ku:r

1S-Ø be.PR-**FS-II1S**-IV2S 2S.DA daughter.FS-Ø

I am [just like] your daughter.

The patient of imperfective clauses, when the referent is human, and equal or superior in person to the agent.

15. su **o:su**-y[80] tse vuch-a:n

3**MS-Ø** be.PA**MS**-IV2S 2S.DA see/watch-IM

He was watching you.

3.2.2.4.3. Set III: "Marked" Agent vs. **"Unmarked" Patient of Transitive Clauses**

Set III is specific to transitive clauses only, where it alternatively refers to the agent or to the patient:

- The agent in perfective clauses (ex.16).
- The patient in imperfective clauses, when the referent is non human, or human but inferior to the agent in person (ex.17).

16. tse ch-**u**-th-**as** bI vuchm**u**t

2S.ER be.PR-**MS**-III2S-**II1S** **1S(M)-Ø** watch.PF**MS**

agent-patient

You have watched me.

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79. According to *sandhi* rule already presented in note 29: *ch-a-s* + *-y*> *ch-a-s-a-y*.

80. As described above, a vowel must be inserted after the addition of a personal index to the preterit form of the verb. Here, according to vowel harmony the inserted vowel is the back vowel-*u*-: *o:s-* + *-y* > *o:s-u-y*.

17.	bI	ch-**u-s**-ath	tsI	vuch-a:n
	1S(M)-Ø	be.PR-**MS-II1S**-III2S agent-patient	2S-Ø	watch-IM

I am watching you.

3.2.3. Why is the Three-tense Based Distinction Problematic?

First of all, it should be noted that the Kashmiri verbal system is aspect-based rather than tense-based. Except for the simple forms of the preterit and the future (plus the present tense of the copula *as*- "be"), all the other verbal forms are periphrastic.[81] They are constructed by means of a participial form, either perfective or imperfective, accompanied by the auxiliary *as*- "be" conjugated in the present, past or future. Thus most of the verbal forms are to be distinguished according to the aspectual opposition perfective vs. imperfective. Since preterit and future do fit in this aspectual opposition, we may say that the whole system is globally aspect-based.[82]

Moreover, the Kashmiri transitive argument structures also vary according to the same aspectual opposition, and the division of personal indexes into four sets reflects this alternation in the argument structures.

In his chapter on the present tense, Īśvara Kaul treats morphosyntactic features along with TAM morphemes and aspectual values of the present tense. In this way the author

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81. The present paper is not concerned with forms pertaining to moods other than the indicative. The imperative, optative and conditional moods have periphrastic as well as simple forms.

82. As an isolated case, the verb *a:s*- "be", which takes a simple form in the present tense (when used as copula or auxiliary), can be ignored here.

deals at length with personal indexes. Now, it is important to bear in mind that a comprehensive description of personal indexes cannot be done separately with respect to each tense. As a matter of fact, except for one case (set I), the sets of personal indexes are not related to specific tenses. In other words, there are no personal indexes associated with the present tense alone. One can therefore hardly describe the present tense without mentioning the parallel usage of the very same personal indexes with other verbal forms. And this is indeed what Īśvara Kaul himself does in *sūtra*s 36-37 and 43, although the chapter is presented as devoted to the present tense alone:

> 36. [The suffix **-akh**] also occurs [after a verbal base] in the past tense as a morpheme denoting a singular 2nd-person object. [. . .] **karyon-akh** = *tena cakṛṣe* = You were made by him.
>
> 37. [The suffix **-ath**] occurs [after a verbal base] in the future as well as in the present tense [as a morpheme denoting a singular 2nd-person object] also in the presence of a 1st-person agent. [. . .] **kar-ath** = *tvāṁ kariṣyāmi* = I will make you.
>
> 43. [The suffix] **-as** occurs [after a verbal base] in the past tense [as a morpheme denoting a singular 1st-person] object. [. . .] **karyon-as** = *tenāhaṁ cakṛṣe* = I was made by him.

It is interesting to note how the digression from the present to the past and future tenses proceeds: on the basis of both formal[83] and functional (object) analogy in *sūtra* 36 (see *sūtra* 35, quoted below); on the basis of a functional analogy alone in *sūtra* 43 and 37 (see *sūtra* 42 and 36 respectively).

83. Homophony is a major phenomenon in Kashmiri.

35. The suffix **-akh** occurs after a verbal base, in the presence of any verbal ending (*vibhakti*), as a morpheme denoting that the agent performs the action for a (masculine) plural 3rd-person or that there is a plural (3rd-person) object. [. . .] **kara:n chu-kh**[84] = *teṣām arthe karoti* = he makes them/for them.

42. [The suffix] **-am** occurs [after a verbal base] as a morpheme denoting [that the action is connected with] a singular 1st person. [. . .] **kara:n chu-m**[85] = *māṁ [vā] me karoti* = He makes me [or] for me.

Finally, since Īśvara Kaul treats the full copula/auxiliary *as-* "be" conjugated in the present tense — i.e. bearing gender/number marker and subject personal index — as if it were a mere affix (namely, the present tense suffix), an entire set of personal indexes (our set II) is totally ignored in this section. What is striking here is that set II may actually be the only set that one could legitimately associate with the present tense, since it is used to index the subject in the present tense of the verb *a:s-* "be" (see *sūtras* 7, 11-12, 19-21). Even though it may seem questionable, Īśvara Kaul's theoretical stand has to be accurately investigated because it is not without relevance when taken into account in the context of the historical evolution of the Kashmiri verbal system.

Three pieces of evidence suggest, in fact, that set II might be a later development that took place along with the creation of new verbal forms, in particular the periphrastic verbal forms that came to replace the old simple forms. First, set I forms

84. Here *sandhi* rules apply: according to Īśvara Kaul, the initial vowel of the suffix *-akh* is deleted here.

85. According to Īśvara Kaul, the same *sandhi* rules described above (see note 38) apply here.

are directly inherited from the Old Indo-Aryan present tense personal inflexions. Although the paradigm serves to express the future tense in modern Kashmiri, it retained its present-tense meaning until at least the fifteenth century (as can be seen in the language of the *Mahānaya Prakāśa*)[86] and still retains this meaning, exceptionally, in a few verbs (as *za:n-* "know")[87] in the modern language. Second, the behaviour of the personal indexes of set II, which are used with the present tense of the copula/auxiliary *a:s-* "be," is modelled on that of set I. Third, the fact that a specific stem, *ch-*, is used for the present tense of the verb *a:s-* "be," as opposed to *a:s-*, which is used with all the other finite and non-finite forms of the verb. Īśvara Kaul may have observed these facts and, possibly, on the basis of these historical considerations he may have chosen to describe as a mere present suffix what we would rather describe as the auxiliary in the present tense, bearing gender/number and person-marker agreement. However, before we can address this hypothetical question, we first need to further investigate into Īśvara Kaul's description of the past and future tenses, in order to see how the whole verbal system is treated in a comprehensive manner.

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86. A printed version of this manuscript with a Sanskrit commentary was published by the Jammu and Kashmir Research and Publication Department in 1918. Sir George Abraham Grierson himself published a study of the language used in this text in 1929.

87. See *sūtras* 8.1.58-59 of the *KŚA*.

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7

A Note on Kashmir and Orthodox Pāṇinian Grammar*

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IN an article that came out in 1983 I proposed the following translation for the first six of the ten verses[1] that are found at the end of the second *kāṇḍa* of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*:[2]

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* This note explores the possibility that Kashmir may have saved the now orthodox tradition of Pāṇinian interpretation. Since this is no occasion to chew the cud and repeat all the issues that have been raised in this connection, it can safely be accused of "self-serving eclecticism" (Aklujkar, 1991: 32 n. 13).

1. Aklujkar (1978) is of the opinion that these ten verses were not written by Bhartṛhari but by a student of his. I agree, but not for the same reasons. These are the concluding verses of the *Vṛtti* (so Aklujkar) which was probably written by someone different from Bhartṛhari (here Aklujkar prefers to think otherwise), perhaps one of his students.

2. Bronkhorst, 1983: 392 ff. This is a translation of *Vkp* II.481-486:
prāyeṇa saṁkṣeparucīn alpavidyāparigrahān ।
saṁprāpya vaiyākaraṇān saṁgrahe 'stam upāgate ॥

kṛte 'tha pātañjalinā guruṇā tīrthadarśinā ।
sarveṣāṁ nyāyabījānāṁ mahābhāṣye nibandhane ॥

alabdhagādhe gāmbhīryād uttāna iva sauṣṭhavāt ।
tasminn akṛtabuddhīnāṁ naivāvāsthita niścayaḥ ॥

→

When the *Saṁgraha*, upon reaching grammarians who in general liked abridgements and possessed little knowledge, had ceased to be studied, subsequently definite knowledge [regarding the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*] was not, according to [scholars] who did not use their intellect, to be found in the *Mahābhāṣya*, [a work] which had been composed by the *guru* Patañjali, thoroughly versed in different systems of knowledge, [the *Mahābhāṣya*] which is the basis of all sources of interpretational principles, which is unfathomable on account of its depth [but all the same] appearing shallow on account of its excellence. When the work of the *ṛṣi* (Pāṇini), of which the defensive armour (*pratikañcuka*) [had been] the *saṁgraha*, had been mutilated by Vaiji, Saubhava and Haryakṣa, because [in trying to understand it] they had followed their bare reasoning [not taking Patañjali's views as authoritative], the traditional knowledge of grammar — which, in the course of time, in the south, had fallen from the pupils of Patañjali, [and] existed [there] only in the form of the book (i.e. the *Mahābhāṣya*) — was made by Candrācārya and others, who followed the seed-like *bhāṣya*, into a many-branched [tree] again, after they had obtained the [correct] traditional knowledge from the mountain-range (Himalaya?).

The interpretation that finds expression in this translation is based on the circumstance, pointed out in the 1983 article,[3]

→ *vaijisaubhavaharyakṣaiḥ śuṣkatarkānusāribhiḥ* ।
ārṣe viplāvite granthe saṁgrahapratikañcuke ॥

yaḥ pātañjaliśiṣyebhyo bhraṣṭo vyākaraṇāgamaḥ ।
kālena dākṣiṇātyeṣu granthamātro vyavasthitaḥ ॥

parvatād āgamaṁ labdhvā bhāṣyabījānusāribhiḥ ।
sa nīto bahuśākhatvaṁ candrācāryādibhiḥ punaḥ ॥

This is the text as it appears in Rau's critical edition, with one exception: verse 486 has *cāndrā°* in Rau's edition, *candrā°* here.

3. See further Bronkhorst, 2002; forthcoming.

that there is no evidence that Pāṇini's grammar was ever neglected, but all the more that Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* was not considered authoritative during a certain period of Indian intellectual history.[4] There is no need to take up this issue once again. However, in the 1983 article I too easily brushed aside the often discussed verse of Kalhaṇa's *Rājataraṅgiṇī* (I.176) which, too, mentions both Candrācārya and the *Mahābhāṣya*. It is frequently understood to refer to a revival of *Mahābhāṣya* studies in Kashmir, most recently perhaps by Ashok Aklujkar in 1997, who states: "In Kashmir, there is a tradition, written down in the twelfth century AD, which tells us that the rulers of that region made attempts to revive *Mahābhāṣya* studies at three widely separated times." A closer inspection of the verse brings to light that this is not its only, nor indeed its most convincing interpretation. Paul Thieme (1956: 20 [592] n. 48) arrived at something quite different. He accepted the following reading:

> *candrācāryādibhir labdhvā deśāt tasmāt tadāgamaṁ* ।
> *pravartitaṁ mahābhāṣyaṁ svaṁ ca vyākaraṇaṁ kṛtam* ॥

and translated:

> Candrācārya and others, after having received its oral tradition (its true traditional explanation) from that place, let start (brought to life) the *Mahābhāṣya* [again], and [Candra] made his own grammar.

Thieme is aware of the variant *deśaṁ* for *deśāt*, which Vishva Bandhu's edition presents as the more common reading of the manuscripts.[5] This would allow the following translation

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4. See also "Ubdhaṭa, grammarian and Cārvāka", elsewhere in this volume.

5. See also Stein, 1892: 9n. 176.

(reading *labdhvādeśaṁ*<*labdhvā ādeśaṁ*): "Candrācārya and others, after having received instruction [and] its oral tradition (or perhaps better: after having received instruction, i.e. its oral tradition) from there, moved [the study of] the *Mahābhāṣya* forward, and [Candra] made his own grammar." Both interpretations suggest that the renewed study of the *Mahābhāṣya* took place in a region different from the one in which the tradition had been recuperated.

The question that poses itself in both these translations is: which is "that [place]"?[6] Thieme had no doubts about the correct answer, stating, "'From that place' can, of course, only mean the Śiva [-temple], by which, according to *Rājataraṅgiṇī* I.175, the preceding verse, King Abhimanyu crested the new town Abhimanyupura (*. . . śaśāṅkāṅkaśekharaṁ viracayya. . . abhimanyupuraṁ vyadhāt*), that is: which he placed on a hill within or near the town." Having chosen this interpretation, he then continued:

> The verse does not add anything relevant to what we know from Bhartṛhari, it has no particular historical interest. . . : it contains nothing more than an attempt to interpret Bhartṛhari's *parvatāt* in *majorem gloriam* of the Śiva-temple founded by King Abhimanyu.

Thieme's conclusion depends essentially on an interpretation of the words (*deśāt*) *tasmāt* which is far from obvious. The

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6. Aklujkar (1991: 42 n. 40) accepts the reading *labdhvādeśaṃ tasmāt* and believes that *tasmāt* refers to King Abhimanyu. This is a strange belief — does it follow that Candra received instruction from the king himself? — but Aklujkar is more or less obliged to take this position in view of his conviction that "ablative + *labh*" in constructions like this must refer to a person. This conviction has of course an effect of Aklujkar's interpretaion of *Vkp* 2.486.

preceding verse I.175 primarily concerns the town Abhimanyupura, not the Śiva-temple with which it is crested. In other words, verse I.176 may simply tell us that Candrācārya obtained the oral tradition accompanying the *Mahābhāṣya*, perhaps in the form of instruction (*ādeśa*), from the town Abhimanyupura. Having obtained it from there, the text does not tell us where he made the study of the *Mahābhāṣya* move forward, nor where he composed his own grammar, but it seems licit to conclude that all this happened outside Kashmir. Kashmir, if we understand the verse in this way, was not in need of a revival of *Mahābhāṣya* studies; far from it. Quite on the contrary, Kashmir was the place where people like Candra, who wished to revive *Mahābhāṣya* studies elsewhere in India, would go because it was one, perhaps the one, region where this oral tradition was still alive.

Thieme was probably right in assuming that Kalhaṇa was acquainted with verse II.486 of the *Vākyapadīya*: the two verses have too many elements in common (*candrācāryādibhiḥ, labdhvā, āgamaṁ, mahābhāṣya*) to assume coincidence. This does not necessarily mean that verse I.176 contains nothing more than an attempt to give an interpretation to Bhartṛhari's *parvatāt* that would add to the glory of King Abhimanyu. Indeed, if this verse refers to a town rather than a temple, it cannot contain such an attempt. In that case it is a complete riddle why Kalhaṇa should have added the verse, which is not at all required by its context. The least we can conclude from it is that, in Kalhaṇa's opinion, Bhartṛhari's *parvatāt* allowed of such an interpretation that it would not contradict the idea that Candra obtained the oral tradition of the *Mahābhāṣya* in a town in Kashmir. In other words, Kalhaṇa would probably approve of the translation proposed above for part of Bhartṛhari's II.486: "after they had obtained the [correct] traditional

knowledge from the mountain-range (Himalaya)." The word *parvata* can mean "mountain-range," and is sometimes specifically used to designate the Himalayan mountain range.[7] The daughter of the Himalaya, moreover, is called Pārvatī "daughter of *parvata*." The town of Abhimanyupura was situated in Kashmir, and therefore within the northern mountain range. Everything obtained from there could be considered as coming from the mountain range, *parvatāt*.

There is no compelling reason to stop here. We may have no evidence to prove it, but it is certainly possible that the *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, in spite of the critical remarks that have been addressed at it, did record in verse I.176 a historical memory that had somehow survived.[8] It is therefore possible that Kashmir had played a key role in the preservation of the commentatorial tradition associated with the *Mahābhāṣya*, a tradition which was in due time to become the only orthodox tradition of interpreting Pāṇini's grammar. This tradition was then, according to verse II.486 of the *Vākyapadīya* as interpreted above, introduced among the southerners where only the book, i.e. the *Mahābhāṣya*, had survived, but not the commentatorial tradition.

This understanding of the word *parvata* in *Vkp* II.486 is helpful in interpreting another part of the preceding verse *Vkp* II.485. This verse tells us, as we have seen, that the

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7. So, for example, at Mbh. 3.36.22: *himavantaṁ. . . parvatam.*

8. Note in this connection that Kalhaṇa used a wide variety of historical sources, among them "eleven works of former scholars containing the chronicles of kings," other literary works, founding inscriptions of temples, royal charters of land donations, copper-plate inscriptions, and coins; see Kulke, 2001: 74-75; Kölver, 1971: 2 ff.

traditional knowledge of grammar, in the course of time, in the south, had fallen from the pupils of Patañjali, [and] existed [there] only in the form of the book (i.e. the *Mahābhāṣya*). "In the south" translates *dākṣiṇātyeṣu*, lit. among the southerners. Aklujkar (1991: 24 n. 3) is of the opinion that "it is reasonable to assume that in most Classical Indian uses of *dākṣiṇātya* the reference would be to persons or objects of the Dakṣiṇāpatha." However, this word is derived (by *P.* 4.2.98) from the indeclinable *dakṣiṇā*, which is formed by *P.* 5.3.36 in the meaning "nearby towards the south" (*anuvṛtti* of *adūre* from rule 35). Strictly speaking, *dākṣiṇātyeṣu* means therefore "among those who live nearby towards the south."[9] If we read this in combination with the interpretation of *parvata* as Kashmir, we can conclude that the *Mahābhāṣya* had survived only in the form of the book south of Kashmir, whereas the oral tradition was still alive in Kashmir.[10] Candra lived to the south of Kashmir (if not, he would not have to recuperate the oral tradition of the *Mahābhāṣya* from Kashmir), but *Vkp* II.485-486 do not tell us where exactly.

We know from an "index fossil" in the *Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa*[11] that its author or authors lived several days travel west of

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9. For details, see Bronkhorst, 2004: 50

10. This scenario satisfactorily answers all the critical questions raised in Aklujkar, 1991: 5.

11. *Vkp* II.486 does not say that its Candrācārya is the author of the *Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa*. *Rājataraṅgiṇī* I.176 states that its Candrācārya composed a grammar; this allows us to deduce that in Kalhaṇa's opinion the Candrācārya of *Vkp* II.486 was the author of the *Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa*. Kalhaṇa was probably right, for the *Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa* closely follows Patañjali and obviously accepts his authority.

Kauśāmbī. The index fossil does not tell us whether he (or they) lived south-west, north-west or just plain west of that town.[12]

The information it provides clearly agrees with the assumption that Candra lived south of Kashmir. What can we conclude from all this? We cannot conclude from it with certainty that Kashmir played a key role in preserving the tradition of Pāṇinian grammar that came to be the only orthodox one. This possibility cannot however be excluded, and the surviving textual evidence provides some evidence in support of it. The importance of the role possibly played by Kashmir can easily be underestimated if one is not aware of the shape Pāṇinian interpretation could take in circles that neglected the *Mahābhāṣya*. Knowledge about these alternative ways is nowadays hard to get at, and we depend on some few fragments and other minor indications. The grammatical fragments of Udbhaṭa, discussed elsewhere in this volume, are unusually clear examples of what Pāṇinian grammar could come to in the hands of those free-thinkers.

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12. See Bronkhorst, 2002: 195 f. That same publication shows (p. 182 ff.) that the two parts of the *Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa*, the *Sūtra* and the *Vṛtti*, were conceived of together, so that either they had one single author or two who worked together. See further Aklujkar, 1991: 29 f. n. 11.

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Abbreviation

Vkp Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya*, ed. W. Rau, Wiesbaden 1977.

8

Udbhaṭa, a Grammarian and a Cārvāka

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THE great history of Sanskrit grammar by Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṁsaka (*Saṁskṛta Vyākaraṇa-Śāstra kā Itihāsa*) mentions Kashmir (if one can rely on its index) in connection with only three grammatical authors: Patañjali the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, Kaiyaṭa its commentator, and Kṣīrasvāmin the author of a commentary on the Pāṇinian *Dhātupāṭha*. The link of none of these authors with Kashmir is beyond doubt; nor is the Kashmirian connection of the grammarian to be introduced in this article, Udbhaṭa. This link, in the case of Udbhaṭa, is circumstantial: (i) We learn a great deal about him from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, who was a Kashmirian; and (ii) he may have been identical with the learned *sabhāpati* of King Jayāpīḍa of Kashmir called Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa, mentioned in the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* (4.495).

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The commentator Cakradhara, who may have lived in the eleventh century, refers in his *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* to the work of a certain Udbhaṭa in connection with the words *śobhā*, *cīrṇa*, *varṇa*, *vareṇya*, *gaṇeya*, *bhrājiṣṇu*, and *kāndiśīka*, whose derivation presents difficulties. Since this passage continues (and even refers back to) an earlier one, we will consider both, and also the passages from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī* which they explain.

The first passage from the *Nyāyamañjarī* occurs in the middle of a long critique of the reliability of Pāṇini's grammar. Here it states:[1]

Ny1

> *anye tu śobheti cīrṇam iti na yāti pratibhettum iti mātur anuharatīti phalinabarhiṇau hy adyāseti*[2] *kāndiśīka iti bhrājiṣṇur iti gaṇeya iti vareṇya iti lakṣyasaṁgrahabahiṣkr̥tasmr̥tisaṁdeha-viparyayāpratipādakatva-lakṣaṇaskhalitaṁ*[3] *viplutaṁ ca pāṇinitantraṁ iti manyamānāḥ*[4] *tatra mahāntam ākṣepam atāniṣuḥ, sa tu sthūlodaraprāya itīha granthagauravabhayān na likhyate* ।

The second passage from the Nyāyamañjarī occurs in a long defence of Pāṇini's grammar and responds to the first one:[5]

Ny2

> *etena śobhā-cīrṇa-varṇa*[6]*-vareṇya-gaṇeya-bhrājiṣṇu-kāndiśīkādiśabdāsaṁgrahasmr̥tisaṁdehaviparyayādidūṣaṇāny api kaiścid utprekṣitāni pratikṣiptāni mantavyāni, tāni ca tair eva samāhitānīti* ।

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1. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Nyāyamañjarī*, ed. Varadācārya, vol. II, pp. 245-46; ed. Śukla, vol. I, p. 385; ed. Gaurinath Sastri, vol. II, pp. 182-83.

2. Instead of *phalinabarhiṇau hy adyāseti* two editions read *phalinabarhiṇaṁ balavānohyadyāseti* (Varadācārya) and *phalinabarhiṇau ghāsīti* (Śukla); the adopted reading seems to be the one known to Cakradhara.

3. The editions read °*viparyayapratipādakatva*°; Cakradhara's explanation shows that he had °*viparyayāpratipādakatva*°. See note 7 below.

4. Ed. Gaurinath Sastri reads *pāṇinitantramanyamānāḥ*.

5. *Nyāyamañjarī*, ed. Varadācārya, vol. II, p. 259; ed. Śukla, vol. I, p. 391; ed. Gaurinath Sastri, vol. II, p. 195.

6. Ed. Gaurinath Sastri omits °*varṇa*°.

These passages deal with a number of words and phrases that are problematic from the Pāṇinian point of view. Some authors (*anye*, "others") are of the opinion that Pāṇini's grammar is wrong in that it creates doubts and incorrect impressions and does not teach what it should teach,[7] this on account of these words which fall outside the collection of words produced by it. The second passage adds that these faults believed to be present by these authors (*kaiścid*, "some") must be considered to have been refuted, and that they have as a matter of fact been answered by those authors themselves (*tair eva*). It will become clear from Cakradhara's commentary that with "those authors" Udbhaṭa is meant.

The problematic words and phrases mentioned in **Ny1** are: (i) *śobhā*, (ii) *cīrṇa*, (iii) *na yāti pratibhettum*, (iv) *mātur anuharati*, (v) *phalinabarhiṇau hy adyāsa*, (vi) *kāndiśīka*, (vii) *bhrājiṣṇu*, (viii) *gaṇeya*, (ix) *vareṇya*. Those mentioned in **Ny2** all also occur in **Ny1** — in a different order: (i), (ii), (ix), (viii), (vii), (vi) —, with the exception of (x) *varṇa*. Note that **Ny2** has dropped the three phrases or sentences that occur in **Ny1**, and has therefore only simple words.

Let us now turn to Cakradhara's comments on these two passages. The problematic cases in **Ny1** are explained as follows:[8]

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7. Cakradhara, *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, ed. Shah, p. 176 explains the compound *smṛtisaṁdehaviparyay[ā]pratipādakatvalakṣaṇaskhalitaṁ* as follows: *smṛtisaṁdehalakṣaṇaṁ viparyayalakṣaṇam apratipādakatvalakṣaṇaṁ ca skhalitaṁ doṣo yasya tad evaitat.*

8. Cakradhara, *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, ed. Shah, p. 176; ed. Gaurinath Sastri, vol. II, pp. 182-83.

Gb1 anye tu śobhā cīrṇam iti

(i) *tatra śobhety atra striyām ākārapratyayasyābhidhānābhāvād asādhutā aṅi tu śubheti syāt* ।

(ii) *cīrṇam ity atra prāptasya iṭaḥ akaraṇam aprāptasya ca ītvasya karaṇam* ।

(iii) *na yāti pratibhettum īdṛśa*[9] *ity atra ca yātiśabde upapade tumun prayukto*[10] *na ca tatra prāptir asti yānakriyāyāḥ, pratibhedena kriyārthatvābhāvāt* । **śakadhṛṣa°** (*P.* 3.4.65) *ityādau ca yāter apāṭhāt* ।

(iv) *mātur anuharatīti atra ca karmaṇi dvitīyāyāḥ prāptāyāḥ aprayogaḥ* ।

(v) *phalinabarhiṇau*[11] *hy adyāsety atra aster asārvadhātuke 'pi bhūrādeśo na kṛtaḥ* । *balavān āyuṣkāmaṁ rohan vṛddhaṁ . . . .*

(what follows is lost)

Cakradhara's comments on **Ny2** read as follows:[12]

Gb2 *tenaiva pratisamāhitānīti* । *tathāhi śobhetyādau udbhaṭenaiva pratisamādhānaṁ kṛtam* ।

(i) ***a pratyayāt*** (*P.* 3.3.102) *iti prāk prakṛtinirdeśe kartavye prāk pratyayanirdeśād yogavibhāgakaraṇenāpratyayaṁ kṛtvā śobhā iti sādhayet* ।

(ii) *cīrṇam ity atra ca pratiṣedhavidher balīyastvāt kvacid vihitabādhaḥ, teneha vihitasyeṭo bādhaḥ* । *anityam āgamaśāsanam iti vā* । *utvaṁ tu* **ti ca** (*P.* 7.4.89) *ity anena*

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9. Ed. Gaurinath Sastri omits *īdṛśa.*

10. Ed. Gaurinath Sastri reads *pratyayaḥ.*

11. So ed. Gaurinath Sastri. The editor of the other edition (Shah) proposes this as emendation for *phalabarhiṇaṁ.*

12. Cakradhara, *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, ed. Shah, pp. 180-81; ed. Gaurinath Sastri, vol. II, p. 195.

sūtreṇa gatyarthacares[13] *tena lakṣaṇārthasyetvena bhavitavyam* । ***ṝta id dhātoḥ*** (P. 7.1.100) *ity ataḥ sūtrād anantaraṁ* ***kṛtaś ca*** *iti kartavye yad upadhāgrahaṇaṁ tad āvṛttijñāpanārthaṁ cagrahaṇaṁ caitad rephāntam avaseyam* । ***upadhāyāś ca*** (P. 7.1.101) *upadhāyā ṝta itvaṁ bhavati* । *caḥ caraś copadhāyā itvam ity arthaḥ* । *car iti luptaṣaṣṭhyantam* ।

(iii) *na yāti vākyaṁ pratibhettum ity atra ca yāti iti tiṅantapratirūpako nipātaḥ śakyate ity arthe vartate* ।

(v) *evaṁ hi adyāsa ity atrāpi āsaśabdo nipāta eva babhūva ity asyārthe* ।

(iv) ***kṛtyānāṁ kartari vā*** (P. 2.3.71) *ity anantare 'pi vāgrahaṇe* ***tulyārthair atulopamābhyāṁ tṛtīyānyatarasyām*** (P. 2.3.72) *ity atra yad vikalpavāci anyatarasyāṁgrahaṇaṁ tad vyavasthitavibhāṣārthaṁ tena kvacid dvitīyayāpi saha vikalpaḥ siddho bhavati tena mātur anukaroti iti siddham* ।

(vi) *kāndiśīka ity atrāpi abhiyuktair vyutpattiḥ kṛtaiva* । *sā ca darśitā* । *pratyayaḥ vibhaktyaluk cātrāpi prāṅnītyā prakāraviśeṣāśrayaṇena samarthayitavyaḥ* ।

(vii) *bhrājiṣṇur ity atra tu* ***bhuvaś ca*** (P. 3.2.138) *iti caśabdasyānuktasamuccayatvād iṣṇupratyayo vṛttikāreṇa darśitaḥ* ।

(viii) *auṇādikānām api gamigāmibhāviprabhṛtīnāṁ yaugikatvadarśanāt* ***vṛña eṇyaḥ*** (*Uṇādi* 3.98) *iti eṇyapratyayena vareṇyaḥ* ।

(ix) *evaṁ gaṇeyaśabde 'pi ṇer alopaḥ kayāpi bhaṅgyā cīrṇam itivat samarthyaḥ* ।

Cakradhara's two passages, unfortunately incomplete, supposedly present us with some difficulties (**Gb1**) and the

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13. So ed. Gaurinath Sastri. Ed. Shah reads *gatyarthavaces*.

solutions suggested by Udbhaṭa (**Gb2**). Let us first concentrate on the five problematic words and phrases that are dealt with in both **Gb1** and **Gb2**.

(i) The feminine noun *śobhā* is derived from the root *śubh*, but it is not clear what exact shape this derivation takes in terms of Pāṇini's grammar. The *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Kāśikā* offer no help in this respect. According to **Gb1**, the feminine suffix *ā* (no doubt *ṬāP* by *P*. 4.1.4 **ajādyataṣ ṭāp**) cannot be added, because this requires first a suffix *a* after *śubh*. If one first adds the suffix *aṄ*, by *P*. 3.3.104 **ṣidbhidādibhyo 'ṅ**, the result will be *śubhā*.

Gb2 offers the following solution. Split *P*. 3.3.102 **a pratyayāt** into two rules by *yogavibhāga*, which gives (1) **a** and (2) **pratyayāt**. The combined rule **a pratyayāt** allows for the addition of the suffix *a* to roots formed with a suffix. This suffix *a* would be very useful in the formation of *śobhā*, but the root *śubh* is not formed with a suffix. After *yogavibhāga* however, *P*. 3.3.102(1) **a** will not be subject to the condition that the root must itself be formed with a suffix, so that the suffix *a* can now be added to *śubh*. This in its turn will then justify the addition of the feminine suffix *ṬāP*, and the desired form *śobhā* will be obtained.

It is clear from Bhānujidīkṣita's *Rāmāśramī*[14] that the formation of *śobhā* occupied the minds of other

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14. Bhānujidīkṣita, *Rāmāśramī*, p. 45 (on *Amara* 1.3.17): *śobheti* ॥ *śobhayati "śubha śumbha śobhāyām" padādyac* । *yat tu mukuṭenoktam — śobhate 'nayā* । *"śubha śumbha śobhārthau" iti nirdeśāt* ***guroś ca halaḥ*** *ity akāraḥ — iti* । *tan na* । *arthanirdeśasyānārṣatvāt* । *yad api —* ***guroś ca halaḥ*** *iti cakārād apratyayaḥ iti tu vayam — iti* । *tad api na* । *ākare tathānukteḥ* । *uktarītyā nirvāhāc ca* ।

grammarians as well. Bhānuji himself proposes to add the suffix *aC*, by *P*.3.1.134 **nandigrahipacādibhyo lyuṇinyacaḥ**, which will lead to the desired result. More interesting in the present context is his rejection of the position of a certain Mukuṭa, who proposed to add the suffix *a* by virtue of the rule *P*. 3.3.103 **guroś ca halaḥ**. This is the rule that immediately follows *P*. 3.3.102 **a pratyayāt**; Mukuṭa therefore opts for the same suffix *a* as Udbhaṭa, but in a slightly different way. However, Mukuṭa's solution is not without difficulties either, for *P*. 3.3.103 only applies to roots that have a metrically "heavy" syllable, which is not true for *śubh*. Mukuṭa tries to get around this difficulty, but his attempts do not carry much conviction. There is still a third option mentioned (and rejected) by Bhānuji: the word *ca* in *P*. 3.3.103 **guroś ca halaḥ** indicates that also cases like *śobhā* are covered by this rule.

We see that Udbhaṭa was not the only one concerned with the word *śobhā*. He may however have been the only one to propose *yogavibhāga* of *P*. 3.3.102. The *Mahābhāṣya* does not comment on this rule but mentions it once and silently uses it a few more times,[15] without ever suggesting *yogavibhāga*. The *Kāśikā* and its two commentaries *Nyāsa* and *Padamañjarī* do not suggest *yogavibhāga* in this connection either.

(ii) It appears that *cīrṇa* is looked upon as a past passive participle of the root *car*, presumably besides *carita*, formed with the suffix *Kta*. **Gb1** points out two weaknesses in its derivation: (a) the augment *iṬ* (prescribed by *P*. 7.2.35 **ārdhadhātukasyeḍ valādeḥ**,

15. See Lahiri, 1935: 32.

as in *carita*) is not introduced, as it should, and (b) the long *ī*, which should not be there, is introduced.

Gb2 is not fully clear. It suppresses the augment *iṬ*, either on the authority of the rule *pratiṣedhasya vidher balīyastvāt kvacid vihitabādhaḥ* "because a prohibition is stronger than an injunction, what is enjoined is sometimes suppressed,"[16] or because the addition of augments is never obligatory.

From this point onward two alternatives seem to be presented in **Gb2** to account for *ī* rather than *a* in *cīrṇa*. The first one takes as point of departure *P.* 7.4.89 **ti ca**, which normally prescribes substitution of *u* for *a* in *car* and *phal* before a suffix beginning with *t*. For a reason that remains obscure to me, *i* must replace *a*, presumably only in the case of *cīrṇa*.

The second alternative is different. It starts from an observation with regard to the two *sūtras* *P.* 7.1.100 **ṝta id dhātoḥ** and 7.1.101 **upadhāyāś ca**. The first of these two rules accounts for the substitution of *i* for *ṝ* in roots that end in *ṝ*, as in *kirati* from *kṝ*; the second rule prescribes a similar substitution for roots whose penultimate is *ṝ*. The second rule is peculiar, because there is only one such root, *kṝt*. Pāṇini would have saved space by formulating this rule *kṝtaś ca*, which he has not done. The reason, we are told, is that 7.1.101 must really be read **upadhāyāś caḥ**, i.e. **upadhāyāś**

16. I read *pratiṣedhasya vidher balīyastvāt* instead of *pratiṣedhavidher balīyastvāt*, on the authority of *Mahā-bh* II, p. 38, l. 23-24 (on *P.* 3.1.30 vt. 1): *pratiṣedhabalīyastvāt pratiṣedhaḥ prāpnoti*. Cp. the *paribhāṣā niṣedhāś ca balīyāṁso bhavanti*, which occurs in various *paribhāṣā* works (Abhyankar, 1967: 480-81).

car. This *car* is, in spite of appearances, a genitive singular. *P.* 7.1.101, thus interpreted, does not only express its usual meaning, it also accounts for substitution of *i* for *a* in *car* so as to arrive at *cīrṇa*.

These explanations of the derivation of *cīrṇa* (or what we understand of them) differ from the one proposed in two modern Sanskrit dictionaries. Both the *Vācaspatya* and the *Śabdakalpadruma* derive *cīrṇa* from *car* with a suffix *naK*; the presence of *ī* instead of *a* is explained with the help of *P.* 6.3.109 **pṛṣodarādīni yathopadiṣṭam**; the *Śabdakalpadruma* refers in this connection to the *Trikāṇḍaśeṣa*, a commentary on the *Amarakoṣa*.

(iii) The phrase *na yāti pratibhettum* appears to be a citation from literature. According to **Gb1** it goes against Pāṇini's grammar, because *pratibhettum* does not express the meaning prescribed by *P.* 3.3.10 **tumunṇvulau kriyāyāṁ kriyārthāyām**, nor is the root *yā* one of those enumerated in *sūtra*s like *P.* 3.4.65 **śakadhṛṣajñāglāghaṭarabhalabhakram-asahārhāstyartheṣu tumun** which can be followed by an infinitive in *tum*.

Gb2 counters that *yāti* is here not a verbal form, but a particle (*nipāta*) meaning *śakyate*. The phrase *na yāti pratibhettum* means therefore something like "It cannot be broken."

(iv) The expressions *mātur anuharati* (**Gb1**) and *mātur anukaroti* (**Gb2**) "he/she resembles his/her mother" should use an accusative rather than a genitive according to **Gb1**.

Gb2 presents the curious argument that, because the two succeeding rules *P.* 2.3.71 and 72 each prescribe

optionality, this has been done in view of *vyavasthitavibhāṣā* "an option which does not apply universally in all the instances of a rule, which prescribes an operation optionally, but applies necessarily in some cases, and does not apply at all in the other cases" (Abhyankar, *DSG*). This supposedly entails that also the accusative prescribed by *P.* 2.3.2 **karmaṇi dvitīyā** can in certain cases be optional.

(v) The crucial word in this case appears to be *āsa*, third person singular perfect of the root *as*. This form is problematic because *as* should have been replaced by *bhū* before *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes, including the *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes of the perfect, by *P.* 2.4.52 **aster bhūḥ**. **Gb1** notes the difficulty. **Gb2** resolves it by stating that *āsa* is an indeclinable particle (*nipāta*) meaning *babhūva*. *Babhūva* is, of course, the form the perfect of *as* takes in case *as* is replaced by *bhū*.

Only **Gb2** preserves the discussion of four more problematic words:

(vi) "With regard to the form kāndiśīka, too, the derivation has already been given by the expert, and it has already been shown. Here, too, the suffix [*ika*] and the non-elision of the [accusative] case-ending have to be justified in the previous manner by resorting to a specific procedure."

This translation has been inspired by Bhānujidīkṣita's explanation of the same word (p. 490, on *Amara* 3.1.42): *"kāṁ diśaṁ yāmi" ity āha* | *tad āheti māśabdādibhyaḥ* (*P.* 4.4.1 vt. 1) *iti ṭhak* | ***pṛṣodarādiḥ*** (*P.* 6.3.109). The suffix *ṭhak* (= *ika*) is in this manner added to the words *kāṁ diśam*, and the accusative ending of *kām* is maintained inside the new formation.

Bhānuji also gives another possible derivation of the word *kāndiśīka*, this one proposed, once again, by Mukuṭa, with which he does not express disagreement. Since it is very different from the one first proposed by Bhānuji, and from the one presented in the passage under consideration, we will not deal with it.

(vii) "In the case of *bhrājiṣṇu*, however, the suffix *iṣṇu* has been shown [to be applicable] by the *vṛttikāra* because the word *ca* in [*P*. 3.2.138] **bhuvaś ca** is [for the sake of] including cases not mentioned."

The *vṛttikāra* is most probably the author of the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, which indeed contains under *sūtra* 3.2.138 **bhuvaś ca** the remark: *cakāro 'nuktasamuccayārthaḥ/ bhrājiṣṇunā lohitacandanena*.

(viii) "In the same way in the case of the word *gaṇeya*, too, the absence of elision of [the suffix] *Ṇi* has to be justified by some tortuous method, as in the case of *cīrṇa*."

(ix) *vareṇya* is here clearly derived with the help of the suffix *eṇya* prescribed in *Uṇādi Sūtra* 3.98 **vṛña eṇyaḥ**.

(x) *varṇa* is dealt with neither in **Gb1** nor in **Gb2**.

The derivations proposed in **Gb2** fall automatically into two groups. Cases (i)-(v) strike us through their audacity. Their inventor, no doubt Udbhaṭa, does not hesitate to split a rule in order to accommodate the word *śobhā*; reckless changes in some rules do not deter him, if he can in this way find a derivation for *cīrṇa*; the decision to call *yāti* and *āsa*, in (iii) and (v) respectively, *nipātas*, is daring but not very imaginative; the *vyavasthitavibhāṣā* presented in (iv) is artificial to the extreme. The derivations proposed in (vi)-(ix), in contrast, are completely regular, and refer to recognized authorities. The expert (*abhiyukta*) of section (vi) is either Kātyāyana (the author of *P*. 4.4.1 vt. 1), or Patañjali (who is

also elsewhere called *abhiyukta*). Section (vii), similarly, refers to the author of the *Kāśikā*. And section (ix) cites an *Uṇādi sūtra* to justify its derivation. The two groups represent in this manner derivations that seem to make fun of the Pāṇinian tradition and such as are examples of the correct use of that tradition, respectively.

This differentiation between two altogether different kinds of derivations is confirmed by passage (viii). This passage does not offer any derivation at all, but makes fun of another one. It obviously criticizes a derivation that arrives at the form *gaṇeya* by suppressing "by some tortuous method" the suffix *Ṇi* that follows the root *gaṇ* because it belongs to the tenth class. In passing it also makes a scathing remark about the derivation of *cīrṇa*.

What can we conclude from all this? It seems beyond doubt that passage **Gb2** is corrupt. It starts off as what looks like a direct quotation from a work of Udbhaṭa. Passages (i)-(v) no doubt belonged to this work. Passages (vi)-(ix) disagree with Udbhaṭa and show the correct Pāṇinian derivations of some of the words concerned. Passage (viii) confirms that Udbhaṭa is being criticized here.

There is no reason to doubt that passages (vi)-(ix) represent Cakradhara's own opinion. In the original version of his text he no doubt cited passages from Udbhaṭa's work that dealt with **all** the difficult words announced at the beginning: *śobhā*, *cīrṇa*, *varṇa*, *vareṇya*, *gaṇeya*, *bhrājiṣṇu*, and *kāndiśīka*. Somehow only Udbhaṭa's discussion of the first two words was preserved in the one manuscript used for the edition of Cakradhara's text, followed by Cakradhara's discussion of the last four. The derivation of *varṇa* somehow lost out altogether.

This incomplete analysis of the text allows us to draw certain further conclusions. Udbhaṭa was obviously a

grammarian, or at least someone who felt entitled to propose Pāṇinian derivations for difficult words. In doing so he felt almost completely free from the traditional interpreters of Pāṇini's grammar, most notably Patañjali and the author of the *Kāśikā*. He split rules where this suited him, and gave forced interpretations where this helped him to obtain the results he wanted. In a way he behaved in the same way as Patañjali had behaved many centuries earlier, but he did so at a time when many other grammarians had opted to recognize Patañjali as an authority. Udbhaṭa did not, apparently, look upon Patañjali as an authority.

This conclusion is confirmed when we consider the passage of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī* on which Cakradhara comments. We find here a long section dealing with grammar as an instrument for Vedic interpretation.[17] Jayanta represents the opinion that grammar, like the Veda, is either beginningless (this is the Mīmāṁsā position) or it was pronounced by God at the beginning of creation (the Naiyāyika position); either way Pāṇini was not its real author. If people think that Pāṇini made it, that merely means that Pāṇini gave a specific shape to contents that are beginningless or created by God.[18] Jayanta

17. *Nyāyamañjarī*, ed. Varadācārya, vol. II, p. 219 ff.; ed. Śukla, vol. I, p. 373 ff.

18. *Nyāyamañjarī*, ed. Varadācārya, vol. II, p. 258; ed. Śukla, vol. I, p. 391: *vedavat aṁgānāṁ*[a] *anāditvāt īśvarapraṇītatvād vā . . .* । *saṁkṣepavistaravivakṣayā hi pāṇinipiṁgalaparāśaraprabhṛtayaḥ tatra tatra kartāraḥ prasiddhiṁ gatāḥ* । *paramārthatas tu veda iva tadartho 'pi, tadarthāvagamopāyo*[b] *'pi hi*[c] *sarva evānādayaḥ, prajāpatinirmitā vety evam aparyanuyojyā eva* ।

(a) Ed. Śukla has *vedavedāṅgānām*.

(b) Ed. Śukla has *tadarthāvagamo*.

(c) Ed. Śukla has *prāyo hi*.

further points out that problems raised by the critic have been satisfactorily dealt with by the expert (*abhiyukta*), no doubt Patañjali.[19] Intelligent people (*nipuṇamati*), who according to Cakradhara are "Bhartṛhari, etc." have explained the irregularities that occur in Pāṇini's grammar.[20] It is clear from these passages that for Jayanta, Pāṇini's grammar contains the words of God himself and represents therefore the highest authority, if only interpreted in accordance with Patañjali's and Bhartṛhari's comments.[21] For him free interpretations of Pāṇini's rules that deviate from these commentators are inadmissable. Clearly Udbhaṭa was one of those who did not abide by these rules.

Our discussion so far has brought to light the existence of two kinds of grammarians, both apparently within the Pāṇinian tradition. On the one hand there were those who followed the rules of this grammar as interpreted by Patañjali and Bhartṛhari. Others, however, did not feel bound by the interpretations proposed by these commentators, and felt free

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19. *Nyāyamañjarī*, ed. Varadācārya, vol. II, p. 259; ed. Śukla, vol. I, p. 391: *yat tu śiṣṭānām api pramāditvam upavarṇitaṁ kila purāṇair munibhir api bahubhir apaśabdāḥ prayuktā iti tatrābhiyuktaiḥ tadapanayanamārgaḥ pradarśita eva* ı

20. *Nyāyamañjarī*, ed. Varadācārya, vol. II, p. 259; ed. Śukla, vol. I, p. 391: *yad api pāṇinitantre dhātuprātipadikakārakādyanuśāsanavisaṁsṭhulatvam anekaśākham ākhyāpitaṁ tad api nipuṇamatibhiḥ pratisamāhitam eva* ı

21. This traditional attitude already finds expression in an introductory verse (no. 8) to his *Nyāyamañjarī*, translated as follows by B.K. Matilal (as cited in Pollock, 1985: 515): "How can we discover any new fact or truth? One should consider novelty only in rephrasing the older truths of the ancients in modern terminology." (*kuto vā nūtanaṁ vastu vayam utprekṣituṁ kṣamāḥ* ı *vacovinyāsavaicitryamātram atra vicāryatām* ıı)

to propose altogether different interpretations where this seemed useful; one of these relative freethinkers was Udbhaṭa.

We know from some verses at the end of the second *kāṇḍa* of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*[22] that some time before Bhartṛhari, Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* had been recovered (by Candra) and made the basis of grammatical studies. The implication is that Pāṇini's grammar was, until that recovery, studied rather independently of the *Mahābhāṣya*. Various indications confirm that this was indeed the case.[23] The question that has not yet been answered is whether even after this turning point there were grammarians in the Pāṇinian tradition who did not follow the example of Candra and Bhartṛhari, and went on interpreting Pāṇini's grammar independently. The data discussed above show that Udbhaṭa was one such grammarian. We can conclude from this that there were "non-orthodox" Pāṇinian grammarians at least until the date of Udbhaṭa.

Of the writings of these "non-orthodox" Pāṇinian grammarians virtually nothing has survived.[24] This is not surprising. Orthodox grammar — i.e. grammar that looked upon Patañjali as the highest authority — gained the upper hand in the Pāṇinian tradition, so that works by unorthodox grammarians were no longer copied. Our information about these "deviant" grammarians depends therefore on references in works that *have* survived. Given the lacunary nature of our

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22. These are the concluding verses of the commentary (*vṛtti*) on the *Vākyapadīya*, and were written by someone different from Bhartṛhari.

23. Some of these indications have been collected and studied in Bronkhorst, 1983; see further Bronkhorst, forthcoming.

24. The one exception is the *Paribhāṣāsūcana* or *Paribhāṣāvṛtti* probably wrongly attributed to Vyāḍi; see Abhyankar, 1967: 1-38; Wujastyk, 1993.

information even about the orthodox grammarians, it comes as no surprise that we know very little about the unorthodox ones. Cakradhara's remarks about the grammatical views of Udbhaṭa are therefore most welcome.

Let us now turn to what else we know about Udbhaṭa. As it so happens, Cakradhara's *Granthibhaṅga* offers us various pieces of information about this remarkable person. It tells us that he was a Cārvāka, a denier of a yonder world. But within the Cārvāka movement, we further learn, he was a bit of a rogue (*dhūrta*). He interpreted the Lokāyata *sūtras* in ways that suited him, but were different from tradition (*yathāśrutārthatyāgenānyathā varṇayām āsa*).[25] Perhaps his most daring reinterpretation of Lokāyata *sūtras* concerned the *sūtra* **bhūtebhyaś caitanyam**. Earlier Cārvākas had interpreted this to mean "Consciousness out of the elements," taking the word *bhūtebhyaḥ* to be an ablative. Udbhaṭa preferred to read it as a dative, "Consciousness for the elements," which profoundly changed a fundamental tenet of the system.[26] But Cakradhara

25. Cakradhara, *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, ed. Shah, p. 43; ed. Gaurinatha Sastri, I, p. 100: ***cārvākadhūrtas tv*** *iti udbhaṭaḥ, sa hi lokāyatasūtreṣu vivṛtiṁ kurvan 'athātas tattvaṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ' 'pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti' sūtradvayaṁ yathāśrutārthatyāgenānyathā varṇayām āsa* I *prathamasūtre tattvapadena pramāṇaprameyasaṅkhyā-lakṣaṇaniyamāśakyakaraṇīyatām āha, dvitāyasūtram api prameyāniyamapratipādakaṁ tena vyākhyātam* I *tatra hi 'pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti' ya itiśabdaḥ sa evaṁprāyaprameyāntaropalakṣaṇatvena tasyābhimataḥ* I

26. Cakradhara, *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, ed. Shah, p. 197; ed. Gaurinatha Sastri, II, pp. 257-58: *cirantanacārvākair hi bhāviviktaprabhṛtibhiḥ bhūtebhyaḥ caitanyam iti sūtraṁ bhūtebhya iti pañcamyantapadayojanayā vyākhyātam, bhūtebhya utpadyate caitanyam iti* I *udbhaṭena tu bhūtebhyaḥ iti padaṁ caturthyantatayā vyākhyātam, bhūtebhyaś caitanyaṁ bhūtārthaṁ caitanyaṁ svatantram eva śarīrārambhakabhūtopakārakam ity arthaḥ* I

also identifies Udbhaṭa as one of the "well-educated Cārvākas" (*suśikṣitacārvāka*) mentioned by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa.[27] This suggests that Udbhaṭa's learning was generally recognized.

Further information about Udbhaṭa has been collected and discussed by E.A. Solomon (1978). She points out that he may have written a sub-commentary on the *Nyāya Sūtra* and may have been an *ālaṅkārika* as well. (Does this explain Jayanta's characterization "well-educated Cārvāka"?) She dates him in "the final quarter of the eighth century and the first quarter of the ninth century" or somewhat later.

For our present purposes it is of interest to note that at this relatively late date, around the year 800, Udbhaṭa united in his person two intellectual traditions which were both destined to disappear from Indian soil during the following centuries. The philosophy of the Cārvākas was of course one of these two. No texts of this school have survived, with the single exception of Jayarāśi's Tattvopaplavasiṁha, which also contentwise is a special case. Around the year 800 the Cārvākas apparently still constituted a living tradition which had not yet disappeared.

But Udbhaṭa's style of practising grammar, too, was to disappear. Our reflections may have created the impression that he was a unique kind of theoriser, sometimes reckless in his proposals. However, this was more than just a personal trait of this particular person. We know that Pāṇinian grammar had gone through a period in which Patañjali's authority was not recognized and grammarians felt free to invent new interpretations of *sūtra*s of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. This lineage of

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27. Cakradhara, *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, ed. Shah, p. 19; ed. Gaurinatha Sastri, I, p. 52: ***suśikṣitacārvākā*** *udbhaṭādayaḥ*.

Pāṇinian freethinkers had to compete with an orthodox tradition at least from the time of Bhartṛhari onward, a competition which the orthodox tradition won, so that the freethinkers lost out. Almost no texts belonging to the lineage of freethinkers have been preserved, partly no doubt because orthodox authors and readers felt no need to copy those texts. Some of their ideas can however be reconstituted by analysing the texts that have reached us.

It may be more than coincidence that Udbhaṭa united in his person these two lost traditions. Neither of these traditions was slavishly traditional. The Cārvākas were against the belief in a hereafter, and we have seen already that Udbhaṭa was not even willing to continue the Cārvāka tradition unchanged. The lineage of Pāṇinian freethinkers, too, was not willing to accept the final authority of a person such as Patañjali. It is true that they went on using Pāṇini's grammar; to the best of our knowledge they did not write altogether new grammars. Did they consider Pāṇini an authority, or did they just use his grammar for convenience's sake? It is hard to be sure about this. The way Udbhaṭa felt free to apply almost any trick to the rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, and to those of the Lokāyata *sūtra*, suggests that he at any rate hardly looked upon these texts as authoritative in any literal sense.

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Abbreviations

Abhyankar, *DSG*: Kashinath Vasudev Abhyankar and J.M. Shukla, *A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar*, 2nd rev. edn., Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1977.

9

Theoretical Precedents of the Kātantra

George Cardona

I

I.1. Śarvavarman's grammar, the *Kātantra*, as represented in the text of the Kashmir tradition by Ugrabhūti's *Śiṣyahitānyāsa*, includes sections of *sūtra*s that are not part of the text received and commented on earlier by Durgasiṁha.[1] Thus, Ugrabhūti's text contains a section (1.6) concerning particles (*nipāta*), which in turn includes a *sūtra*[2] stating that items of the set beginning with *anu* are called *karmapravacanīya*. It is hardly coincidental that the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* has a section of rules[3] providing that certain items, under conditions stated, are called *nipāta*, that this group includes a subset of *sūtra*s assigning the class name *karmapravacanīya* to particular items, and that the first rule of the sub-section concerns *anu*,[4] just as it is no accident that Ugrabhūti's explanation of the term *karmapravacanīya* obviously replicates what was said by Patañjali and Bhartṛhari.[5]

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1. See Liebich 1919: 10, Mishra 1991: 23.
2. *Kāt*. 1.6.4: अन्वाद्याः कर्मप्रवचनीयाः ।
3. Under the heading of *A* 1.4.56: प्राग्रीश्वरान्निपाताः ।
4. *A* 1.4.83-86: कर्मप्रवचनीयाः । अनुर्लक्षणे । तृतीयार्थे । हीने ।
5. *KātŚ* 1.6.4: कर्म प्रोक्तवन्तः कर्मप्रवचनीयाः । अतीते काले कृत्ययुटोऽन्यत्रापि (*का०* ४/५/९२) इति कर्तर्यनीयः प्रत्ययः । कर्मशब्दः क्रियावचनः । वचिरप्यनेकार्थत्वाद् →

Ugrabhūti's text also contains a distinct section (2.7) devoted to feminine suffixes, which pretty clearly mirrors Pāṇini.[6] The version on which Durgasiṁha comments lacks a comparable complete section, although it does include, as the final part of the fourth *pāda* of the second chapter, four *sūtra*s that have to do with gender. Only two of these[7] concern the introduction of feminine affixes. The other two deal with dropping a base-

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→ द्योतने वर्तते। तेन ये प्रयुज्यमाने (प्रयुज्यमानाः) क्रियापदे क्रियाविशेषं द्योतितवन्तः अप्रयुज्यमाने (प्रयुज्यमाने) तु वक्ष्यमाणस्य सम्बन्धस्य विशेषस्य (सम्बन्धविशेषस्य?) द्योतकास्ते कर्मप्रवचनीया इत्युक्तं भवति। Cf. *Bh*. I.346.16-18 (on *A* 1.4.83) किमर्थं महती सञ्ज्ञा क्रियते। अन्वर्थसञ्ज्ञा यथा विज्ञायेत। कर्म प्रोक्तवन्तः कर्मप्रवचनीया इति। के पुनः कर्म प्रोक्तवन्तः। ये सम्प्रति क्रियां नाहुः। के च सम्प्रति क्रियां नाहुः। येऽप्रयुज्यमानस्य क्रियामाहुस्ते कर्मप्रवचनीयाः। *VP* 2.204: क्रियाया द्योतको नायं न सम्बन्धस्य वाचकः। नापि क्रियाक्षेपी सम्बन्धस्य तु भेदकः॥ In accordance with what is said in the *Mahābhāṣya* and other Pāṇinīya works, I suggest reading *prayujyamāne* and *aprayujyamāne* instead of *prayujyamānāḥ* and *prayujyamāne* of Mishra's edition and possibily *sambandhaviśeṣasya* for *sambandhasya viśeṣasya*, though the last would also be acceptable. Ugrabhūti's addition is the explicit statement that *vac* in *karmapravacanīya* has the sense of co-signifying. *Vacanīya* of *pravacanīya* contains the *kṛtya* affix *anīyar*, and *kṛtya* affixes generally do not signify agents and are not introduced when an action is referred to past time. Nevertheless, under the explanation Patañjali gives, *pravacanīya* in *karmapravacanīya*, considered equivalent to *proktavat*, clearly signifies an agent of an action referred to the past. The derivate is justifiable as explained, since, as provided for in *A* 3.3.113: कृत्यल्युटो बहुलम् (to which *Kāt*. 4.5.92 is a counterpart), *kṛtya* affixes and *lyuṭ* occur variously (*bahulam*), under conditions other than those specified elsewhere. This is the explanation which Pāṇinīyas adopt; e.g. *PM* 1.4.83 (I.615): कर्म क्रियां प्रोक्तवन्तः कर्मप्रवचनीया इति। भूते कृत्यल्युटो बहुलमिति कर्तरि कृत्यः।

6. E.g. *Kāt*. 2.7.1-2: स्त्रियाम्। अजाद्यन्तादाप्। *A* 4.1.3-4: स्त्रियाम्। अजाद्यतष्टाप्।

7. *Kāt*. 2.4.49-50: स्त्रियामादा। नदाद्यन्चिवाह्यन्स्यन्तृसखिनान्तेभ्य ई।

final *-a* before a feminine suffix *-ī* and the shortening of a final vowel in a neuter nominal base.[8]

I.2. There are also parts of the *Kātantra* which constitute part of the received text on which Durgasiṁha and others comment but which nevertheless are considered additions to Śarvavarman's original set of *sūtra*s. Modern scholars have noted on several occasions[9] that the *Kātantra*'s fourth chapter, covering *kr̥t* affixes, was not part of Śarvavarman's original text and that Durgasiṁha recognized this. The first *sūtra* of the chapter in question[10] begins with *siddhiḥ*, and Durga considers this an indication that the author of this chapter is distinct from the author of what precedes, so that he uses *siddhiḥ* for the sake of auspiciousness at the beginning of a new piece.[11] In a verse introducing the fourth chapter, moreover, Durga says that the learned Śarvavarman did not compose rules for *kr̥danta* derivates, considering them separate lexical items with established meanings and known from their being used in particular ways, in the same manner as terms like *vr̥kṣa*, but Kātyāyana did derive these, for the enlightenment of those who lacked the insight to know them.[12] Commenting on the *vr̥tti* to 4.1.1, both Durga the *ṭīkākāra* and

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8. *Kāt*. 2.4.51-52: ईकारे स्त्रीकृतेऽलोप्यः। स्वरो ह्रस्वो नपुंसके। Cf. *A* 6.4.148: यस्येति च।, 1.2.47: ह्रस्वो नपुंसके प्रातिपदिकस्य।

9. See Belvalkar 1915: 84, Liebich 1919: 10, Chintamani 1934: xiii-xiv, Dwivedī 1975: 7. Belvalkar (1915: 85-86) and Liebich (1919: 10) also noted that the sections on *taddhita* affixes and compounds were not part of Śarvavarman's original text, though they constitute part of the text on which Durgasiṁha and others comment. See below.

10. *Kāt*. 4.1.1: सिद्धिरिज्वद् ञ्णानुबन्धे।

11. *KātDVr̥*. 4.1.1 (VI.3.19): सिद्धिग्रहणं भिन्नकर्तृकत्वान्मङ्गलार्थम्।

12. *KātDVr̥*. 4.1.1 (VI.1.4-5): वृक्षादिवदमी रूढाः कृतिना न कृताः कृतः। कात्यायनेन ते सृष्टा विबुद्धिप्रतिबुद्धये॥

Trilocana not only remark that the learned (*kṛtinā*) person referred to is Śarvavarman and that Kātyāyana is Vararuci but also that, as a matter of principle, *kṛt* derivates and *taddhita* derivates as well as compounds are determined by their usage in signifiying particular meanings, not by rules of grammar, so that Śarvavarman did not consider rules for their derivation necessary.[13] The principle they invoke is अभिधानलक्षणाः कृत्तद्धितसमासाः, which was formulated much earlier and is stated in this form by Patañjali.[14]

In another context also, Durga the *vṛttiṭīkā* author, Trilocana and Kavirāja explicitly say that Śarvavarman did not compose *sūtra*s to derive *kṛdanta* derivates, in particular those with the

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13. *Kāt VṛṬī.* 4.1.1 (VI.1.7-12): यथा वृक्षादयः सञ्ज्ञाशब्दा विशिष्टत्वेन व्यवस्थितास्तथा पाचकादयोऽपीति कृतिना पण्डितेन शर्ववर्मणा कृतो न कृताः। कृल्लक्षणं न कृतमित्यर्थः। . . . तथा चोद्घुष्यते अभिधानलक्षणा हि कृत्तद्धितसमासा इति। अभिधानं हि शब्दः। स एव लक्षणमेषाम् लक्षणं नियामकमित्यर्थः। *KātVṛP* 4.1.1 (VI.1.15-2.3): वृक्षादिवदित्यादि। वृक्षादय इव वृक्षादिवत्। यथा वृक्षादयः शब्दा लोके [संज्ञाशब्दा रूढा लोके] विशिष्टविषयतया प्रसिद्धास्तथामी कृतः कृदन्ता [कृत्प्रत्ययान्ता] अपि शब्दा इति कृत्वा [मत्वा] कृतिना न कृताः। प्रस्तावादिह कृती पण्डितः शर्ववर्मैवोच्यते। शर्ववर्मणा कृल्लक्षणं न कृतमित्यर्थः। तथा चाहुः। अभिधानलक्षणा हि कृत्तद्धितसमासा भवन्तीति [कृत्तद्धितसमासा इति]। अभिधानं शब्दः [शब्दश्रवणं]। स एव लक्षणं नियामकमेषां [शब्दश्रवणं लक्षणमेतेषां नियामकं] न सूत्रमित्यर्थः। तर्हि केन नाम कृतः कृता [केन नाम तर्हि कृता] इत्याह कात्यायनेन वररुचिना [कात्यायनेन वररुचिनेत्यर्थः]। Square brackets enclose readings given in Eggeling's notes (pp. 537-38). I do not have sufficient manuscript materials to comment.

14. See § **IV.3** and note 94. As can be seen from the citations in note 13, the *Ṭīkā* considers *abhidhāna* to be an instrument noun referring to a speech unit (*śabda*); similar to Trilocana in the text as edited by Dwivedī. On the other hand, this can also be an action noun. The syntax of passages where Patañjali invokes the principle shows that he uses *abhidhāna* as an action noun; see notes 96, 104. The text of the *Pañjikā* given in Eggeling's note (see my note 13) glosses *abhidhānam* with *śabdaśravaṇam*, in which case *abhidhāna* is interpreted as an action noun.

suffixes ***tṛc*** and ***tṛn***. Now, Śarvavarman does provide[15] for *-ār* to occur instead of *-ṛ* in a verbal derivate with *-tṛ* when this is followed by an ending of the *ghuṭ* set (see note 15), as in *kartārau, kartāraḥ, kartāram* (*kartṛ* "one who does, agent"). The *sūtra* uses *dhātoḥ* and *tṛśabdasya*, which call for comment. In his *Vṛtti*, Durga notes that *Kāt*. 2.1.68 lets *ār* occur for *ṛ* that is part of a speech unit *tṛ* (*tṛśabdasya*) which has been introduced (*vihitasya*) to a verbal base (*dhātoḥ*).[16] The *Ṭīkā* on this notes further that *dhātoḥ* is an ablative form and that *tṛ* refers to ***tṛc*** and ***tṛn*** stripped of their markers.[17] The two affixes in question are introduced by *sūtra*s in the fourth chapter of the *Kātantravyākaraṇa*.[18] Now, in explaining how one determines that the operation stated in *Kāt*. 2.1.68 applies to *ṛ* of an element *tṛ* which has been introduced to a verbal base, Kavirāja notes that *śabda* is used in speaking of a signifying (*vācaka*) item, so that the *sūtra* refers to an item *tṛ* which signifies an agent and so on.[19] Once it is accepted that *tṛśabdasya* of the *Kātantra* rule

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15. *Kāt*. 2.1.68: धातोस्तृशब्दस्यार् (घुटि 67) । *Ghuṭ* refers to the first five nominal endings ***si*** *au jas am au* after masculine and neuter bases and *jas śas* used with a neuter base (*Kāt*. 2.1.3-4: पञ्चादौ घुट्। जस्शसौ नपुंसके ।) and is thus equivalent to the Pāṇinian class name *sarvanāmasthāna* (*A* 1.1.42-43: शि सर्वनामस्थानम्। सुडनपुंसकस्य ।).

16. *KātDVṛ*. 2.1.68 (II.162.21): धातोर्विहितस्य तृशब्दस्य ऋत आर्भवति घुटि परे।

17. *KātVṛṬī*. 2.1.68 (II.163.1-3): धातोरिति पञ्चमीयम्। उत्सृष्टानुबन्धस्तृन्तृज्वा तृशब्दवाच्यः। स च धातोर्विधीयत इत्याह धातोर्विहितस्येति। The edition reads उत्सृष्टानुबन्धस्थस्तृन् which I have emended as shown.

18. *Kāt*. 4.2.47, 4.4.14-15: वुण्तृचौ। तच्छीलतद्धर्मतत्साधुकारिष्वा क्वेः। तृन्।, comparable to *A* 3.1.133, 3.2.134-35: ण्वुल्तृचौ। आ क्वेस्तच्छील-तद्धर्मतत्साधुकारिषु। तृन्।

19. *KātKC* 2.1.68 (II.165.14-16): ननु पञ्चमीयमिति कथं निश्चितं चेत् शब्दग्रहणमेव पञ्चमीनिश्चये कारणम्। तथा हि शब्दस्तु वाचक उच्यते कर्त्राद्यर्थवाचको यस्तृशब्दः स च . . . विहितविशेषणं विना न घटते° I have omitted a word of the text because of interpretational issues that do not concern the present discussion.

refers to the two affixes *tṛc* and *tṛn*, which signify agents, an issue can be brought up concerning economy of expression: why was the *sūtra* not formulated more briefly as तृन्तृचोरार्, thus doing without *dhātoḥ* and *śabda* (in *tṛśabdasya*)? Durga's answer in the *Ṭīkā* is that indeed the question is valid, except that it is established (*sthitam*) that Śarvavarman has merely given (*darśitam* "shown") complexes of bases and affixes (*prakṛtipratyayasaṁgatimātram* "only the coming together of base and affix"), he has not provided by rules for the introduction of any particular affix.[20] The fact remains, of course, that in his *Vṛtti* Durgasiṁha does comment on the *kṛt* affixation rules and Durga's *Ṭīkā* comments on the *Vṛtti*. Given this, Kavirāja remarks that Vararuci provided separately for *tṛn* and such, then Durgasiṁha treated him and Śarvavarman the same.[21]

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20. *KātVṛṬī* 2.1.68 (II.163.4-6): यद्येवं तृन्तृचोरारिति कथन्न कृतम्। एतेन धातुग्रहणं शब्दग्रहणं च न कृतमेव स्यात्। सत्यम्। प्रकृतिप्रत्ययसङ्गतिमात्रमेव शर्ववर्मणा दर्शितं न विशेषप्रत्ययविधानं तेन कृतमिति स्थितम्। See § V.2 and note 149.

21. *KātKC* 2.1.68 (II.165.17-20): शर्ववमणेत्यादि। ननु कथं निष्ठादिषु तृन्प्रत्ययस्य परिगणनमिति चेत् प्रकृतिप्रत्ययविभागेन प्राप्तस्यैवोदाहरणं बोद्धव्यम्। तर्हि प्रकृतेऽपि दीयतां दृष्टिः। सत्यम्। वररुचिना तृनादिकं पृथगेवोक्तम् ततश्च वररुचिसर्ववर्मणोरेकबुद्ध्या दुर्गसिंहेनोक्तमिति कतमोऽयं पूर्वपक्षः शर्ववर्मणानुक्तत्वात्। As shown, Kavirāja's statement is part of an argument. This discussion involves the *Vṛtti* on *Kāt*. 2.4.42: न निष्ठादिषु, which disallows the occurrence of a sixth-triplet ending to signify an agent or an object in a construction with a *kṛt*- derivate if such a derivate is formed with an affix of the set beginning with *niṣṭhā* suffixes. In his *Vṛtti* on this *sūtra*, Durgasiṁha gives the full list of affixes in question, which includes *tṛn*. Durga is thus seen to treat this item as a separate unit, which appears to conflict with what he says in commenting on *Kāt*. 2.1.68 as interpreted in the *Ṭīkā*. To be sure, one could consider that in his *Vṛtti* on *Kāt*. 2.4.42, Durga simply gives *tṛn* as one example solely of a unit that is obtained by dividing bases and affixes. But then the question arises why should he not be allowed the same position in respect →

I.3. In sum, commentators agree that the original set of *sūtras* composed by Śarvavarman lacked rules for introducing *kṛt* suffixes, for introducing *taddhita* affixes, and for deriving compounds. Under the assumption, which is well founded, that the *Kātantra* is indebted to Pāṇini's work, the questions arise: what is the reason for so curtailing a grammar and are there precedents for this? Modern scholars have stressed one reason: in accordance with the well-known legend, Śarvavarman's work was intended as a handbook for instruction in Sanskrit. Thus, Belvalkar says (1915: 85-86),

> If Śarvavarman did not think it necessary to teach the कृत् section to his Royal pupil, no more did he care to teach him the तद्धित section (or the स्त्रीप्रत्यय section). And as it cannot be urged that the तद्धित section formed for the king a harder nut to crack than, for instance, the आख्यात section, there was no apparent need for Śarvavarman's running into poetry and for one or two sections only. The facts may have been these: A manual which made the king proficient in grammar in a few months' time must have attracted the early notice of courtiers and subjects of the king. The omission of तद्धित and other sections may then have been noticed and rectified — either by the original author or some other scholar. And the impetus to such additions being once given, the *Kātantra* from being a mere handbook issued forth into a full-blown system.

→ of *Kāt*. 2.1.68, so that one cannot really assert that he thinks Śarvavarman did not observe such a division. The answer is that in saying what he does, Durgasiṁha has treated Vararuci (Kātyāyana) and Śarvavarman on the same level: Vararuci refers to *tṛn* and so on separately, then subsequently Durgasiṁha says this also, considering that Vararuci and Śarvavarman share the same opinion, although the latter has not explicitly said what Vararuci does say. See also Dwivedī 1975: 7 with note 2, 1988: editorial introd. 40.

Similarly, Liebich (1919: 11) remarks that we can accept with a high degree of certainty that Śarvavarman's second chapter consisted of only four *padas*, so that we may accept that he considered compounding and *taddhita* affixation as dispensible in an elementary grammar as the formation of derivates with *kṛt* suffixes.

Without rejecting the view that originally the *Kātantra* was indeed intended to be used as an elementary pedagogical grammar, I consider it appropriate to consider possible precedents for the position which Śarvavarman takes. For such precedents are indeed to be found in statements by Pāṇinīyas from Kātyāyana and Patañjali onwards. Moreover, the contrasting approaches evident in Pāṇini's and Śarvavarman's works illustrate for an earlier time a theoretical contrast that is very much alive currently.

II

II.1. To approach these points, it is well to begin by considering another important statement of the *Kātantra*, since this assumes that certain rules formulated in the Pāṇinian system can be left unstated. The *sūtra* is 1.1.23: लोकोपचाराद् ग्रहणसिद्धिः. According to Durgasiṁha,[22] *lokopacāra* refers to the usage (*upacāraḥ* = *vyavahāraḥ*) of ordinary people (*lokānām*).[23] Thus, *Kāt*. 1.1.23 states that the established status (*siddhiḥ*) of any term of

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22. *KātDVṛ*. 1.1.23 (I.111.26): लोकानामुपचारो व्यवहारः तस्मादनुक्तस्यापि सिद्धिर्वेदितव्येति। *grahaṇam* here signifies an item by means of which a meaning is grasped, that is, a speech term (*śabda*), a signifier (*abhidhāna*). *KātVṛṬī*. 1.1.23 (I.112.9): गृह्यते येनेति तद् ग्रहणमभिधानम्। *KātVṛP* 1.1.23 (I.113.16): गृह्यतेऽनेनार्थ इति ग्रहणं शब्दः तस्य सिद्धिरिति विग्रहः।

23. The *Ṭīkā* and Trilocanadāsa on *Kāt*. 1.1.23 remark that this includes both authors of works like the *Kātantra* and others: *KātVṛṬī*. I.112.9., *KātVṛP* I.113.15: इहोभये लोकाः शास्त्रकारा इतरेऽपि।

ordinary usage (*grahaṇasya*, see note 22) which is not explicitly derived by rule (*anuktasya*) is understood to be valid from such usage, even though (*api*) the term in question is not derived in the grammar. Durga goes on to illustrate with a series of terms which, in Pāṇini's system, are derived with *taddhita* affixes (see § **III**) but are not so derived in Śarvavarman's grammar.

He begins with *varaṇāḥ* and *pañcālāḥ*. The former is a noun that names (*saṁjñā*) not only a cluster of *varaṇa* trees but also a city situated not far from such a cluster, and the latter names not only kṣatriyas who are descendants of Pañcāla but also a district named after them.[24] He considers also other terms that are derived with *taddhita* affixes in Pāṇini's system. For example, *harītakī* signifies not only a tree but also the fruits of that tree, with the feminine gender retained. One says:

(1) हरीतक्यः फलानि। "*harītakī* fruits," "The fruits are *harītakī*." which is equivalent to

(2) हरीतक्याः फलानि। "(These are) fruits of the *harītakī*."

In (1) *harītakyaḥ* (nom. pl. fem.) is co-referential with *phalāni* (nom. pl. nt.).[25] There are other terms, such as *khalatika* — the

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24. *KātDVṛ*. 1.1.23 (I.111.27-112.1): तथा वरणा इति नगरस्यापि सञ्ज्ञा पञ्चाला इति जनपदस्यापि। For the Pāṇinian derivation of *pañcālāḥ, varaṇāḥ* see §§ **III.1 – III.2**.

25. *KātDVṛ*. 1.1.23 (I.112.2): हरीतक्यः फलानीति फलेष्वपि स्त्रियां वृत्तिः। In the *Ṭīkā* to the *Vṛtti*, as also in Trilocanadāsa's *Pañjikā*, (1) हरीतक्यः फलानि is interpreted as a statement concerning a set of items used to refer to fruits and this interpretation is justified on the basis of the plural *harītakyaḥ*: *KātVṛṬī*. 1.1.23 (I.112.17): हरीतक्यः फलानीति बहुवचनेन गणः संसूच्यते। *KātVṛP* 1.1.23 (I.114.14): हरीतक्य इति बहुवचनेन गणः कथ्यते। This is noteworthy. There are indeed references in *koṣas* to a set of terms, beginning with *harītakī*, which are exclusively feminine; e.g. *Amara* 2.4.18b: हरीतक्यादयः स्त्रियाम्। →

name of a mountain — which retain their number while showing the gender of a co-referential term; whether this is used to name a mountain or forests situated near the mountain, one uses the singular *khalatika*, as in

(3) खलतिकं वनानि।

equivalent to

(4) खलतिकस्य पर्वतस्यादूरभवानि वनानि "forests not far from mount Khalatika."[26]

Durgasiṁha emphatically notes that all such words, which are otherwise derived with *taddhita* affixes, are established from mundane usage in the same manner as words like *vṛkṣa*, which are known from mundane usage as terms denoting particular things, so that they are not separately derived.[27] He also remarks on the gender and number features of the terms in question, again saying that these do not require particular statements in the grammar. Thus, *pañcālāḥ, varaṇāḥ* do not have the gender and number of *janapadaḥ, nagaram*, with which they can be co-referential.[28] He draws a parallel

→ *Vaijayantī* 3.3.21c: हरीतक्यादिकं स्त्री स्यात्। However, as far as I know, (1) is not such a lexical statement. In his third *vārttika* on *A* 1.2.52, Kātyāyana notes (हरीतक्यादिषु व्यक्तिः।) that for items of the set beginning with *harītakī* only the gender of a derivate denoting a fruit is that of the base — so that such derivates are feminine — with the number depending on co-reference with another term. Patañjali illustrates (*Bh*. I.228.23-24: हरीतक्याः फलानि हरीतक्यः फलानि।) with (1), equivalent to (2). In the present discussion, it is not crucial to discuss further what Durga and Trilocana have said.

26. 1.2.52 *vt*. 4: खलतिकादिषु वचनम्॥ *Bh*. I.229.2-3: खलतिकस्य पर्वतस्यादूरभवानि वनानि खलतिकं वनानि। *KātDVṛ*. 1.1.23 (I.112.3): खलतिकं वनानीति तेषां वनानामेकवचनान्तमेव नाम।

27. *KātDVṛ*. 1.1.23 (I.112.2-3): एवमन्येऽपि सञ्ज्ञाशब्दा इव तद्धिता लोकतः सिद्धाः।

28. As in examples (7), (8) (§§ **III.1 – III.2**). *KātDVṛ*. 1.1.23 (I.112.1): पञ्चाला वरणा इति योगो न दृश्यते सञ्ज्ञाशब्दत्वात्। What I have said accords →

with well-known synonyms, which show gender and number differences though they refer to a single object: *āpaḥ* (feminine and plural) : *jalam* (neuter) "water," *dārāḥ* (masculine and plural): *kalatram* (neuter) : *bhāryā* (feminine) "wife."[29]

II.2. In the *Ṭīkā* on *Kāt*. 1.1.23, Durga gives additional instances illustrating the same principle.

II.2.1. Consider, for example, the pairs *āmalakī* : *āmalakam* "fruit of the *āmalakī* tree," *badarī* : *badaram* "fruit of the *badarī* tree." Instead of treating the second term of each such pair as

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→ with Trilocanadāsa's first interpretation of the passage cited: *KātVṛP* 1.1.23 (I.114.1-5): यद्येवं वरणापञ्चालशब्दौ समानाधिकरणत्वात्कथं नगरजनपदयोर्लिङ्गसङ्ख्ये न गृह्णीत इति। तस्मात्तद्धितलोपं कृत्वा लुपि युक्तवद्व्यक्तिवचने इति युक्तवद्भावो वक्तव्यः। नेत्याह पञ्चाला वरणा इति। नगरजनपदयोर्लिङ्गसङ्ख्याभ्यां योगः सम्बन्धो न दृश्यते। कुत इत्याह सञ्ज्ञाशब्दत्वादिति। ईदृशावेवामू विशिष्टलिङ्गसङ्ख्यकौ नगरजनपदयोः सञ्ज्ञात्वेन प्रसिद्धौ। अतः सञ्ज्ञैव प्रमाणमिति। As shown, Trilocanadāsa cites *A* 1.2.51 (see § **IV.6.1**) while stating a position which, from the *Kātantra* viewpoint, is a *pūrvapakṣa*. He goes on to cite other pertinent Pāṇinian *sūtras* (*A* 1.2.53-54, see §§ **IV.6.1-IV.6.2**) and to give an alternative: Others consider that what is meant is that there is no necessary connection between particular people and a place in which they live when one uses *pañcālāḥ* and such, since these are purely conventional names. As Jayāditya says (see note 129), these are not analysable terms but rather conventional names. *KātVṛP* 1.1.23 (I.114.5-10): तथा च भगवान् पाणिनिर्युक्तवद्भावलुकोः प्रतिषेधमाह तदशिष्यं सञ्ज्ञाप्रमाणत्वात् लुब्योगाप्रख्यानादिति। अन्ये तु योगो न दृश्यत इति पञ्चालाः क्षत्रियाः सन्त्यस्मिन्देश इत्यादिरन्वयो न दृश्यते सञ्ज्ञाशब्दत्वादिति मन्यन्ते। यदाह जयादित्यः पञ्चाला वरणा इति नैते योगशब्दा अपि तु सञ्ज्ञाशब्दा इति। I have emended सञ्ज्ञाशब्दत्वादिति of the printed edition to सञ्ज्ञाशब्दा इति because of syntax and of what is actually said in the *Kāśikā*; see note 129. Kavirāja also cites and explains *A* 1.2.53-54, along with *A* 1.2.51 (*KātKC* 1.1.23 [I.115.27-116.9]); it is not necessary here to go into what he says.

29. *KātDVṛ*. 1.1.23 (I.112.3-4): शब्दानामेकार्थेऽपि लिङ्गवचनभेदः यथा आपो जलम् दाराः कलत्रं भार्येति। See § IV.6.1.

derived from the first, one simply considers *āmalaka* and so on separate bases (*prakṛtyantaram*).[30] He also gives reasons for this stance. To begin with, one should not claim that a *taddhita* suffix is introduced to underlying *pada*s that result in *āmalakyāḥ, badaryāḥ* — as in § **III.4**(10)-(11) — to derive terms denoting a fruit of each tree, since in actual usage one does not understand such a fruit from hearing such a derivate; one uses *āmalaka-* and *badara-*, which lack any *taddhita* affix, to refer to fruits.[31] Durga adds that if one did not accept the position stated and insisted instead on deriving the fruit names from tree names by adding a *taddhita* affix, one could also equally derive the tree names from the fruit names.[32]

Of course, one has to admit that there are some items that are clearly derivates that serve to denote fruits, as in the case of *jāmbava-*, which signifies the fruit of the *jambū* tree.[33] Durga nevertheless defends the position adopted by arguing against the view adopted by those who consider terms like *āmalaka-* and *badara-* to be derivates formed with *taddhita* suffixes instead of separate underived lexical items. Under the derivational position, such a derivate is considered to signify a modification

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30. *KātVṛṬī.* 1.1.23 (I.112.21-22): आमलकं कुवलम्बदरमिति प्रकृत्यन्तरमेव फले वर्तते। For the Pāṇinian derivation of the terms in question, see § **III.4**.

31. *KātVṛṬī.* 1.1.23 (I.112.22-23): आमलक्याः कुवल्या बदर्याः फलमित्येवमादावर्थेऽणपि न भवति तदन्तात्फलस्याप्रतीतेः। In Pāṇini's system the suffixes *mayaṭ* and *añ* (see § **III.4** with notes 52, 56) — not *aṇ* — are introduced to derive these terms.

32. *KātVṛṬī.* 1.1.23 (I.112.23-24): अन्यथा हि फलादपि वृक्षे स्यात्। Cf. § **IV.6.3** with note 137.

33. *KātVṛṬī.* 1.1.23 (I.112.24-25): फलप्रतीतौ भवन्त्येके — अश्वत्थस्य फलमाश्वत्थं वैणवम् प्लाक्षं जाम्बवम्। For the present discussion, it is not necessary to consider all the examples given; on *jāmbava-*, see § **III.5**. I have emended भवत्येके of the printed text.

(*vikāra*) or a constituent part (*avayava*) of the entity signified by the nominal base included in the *pada* to which a *taddhita* suffix is added (*A* 4.3.134-35, see note 52). The question is: how can a fruit be a modification or part of a tree? To begin with, a modification of something can be of two kinds: either something that does away (*upamardakaḥ*) with and replaces the original entity (*prakṛteḥ*) or something that, while not doing away with the original entity, nevertheless is a product that entails a name different from that of the original source. For example, *khādira-*[34] can be used with reference to the ashes (*bhasma*) that result from burning *khadira* wood and is thereby a modification of this source. The same term can also be used to qualify a sacrificial pole (*yūpaḥ*) to which an animal is tied and which is made of *khadira* wood; in this case, a separate term (*yūpa-*) is used to refer to the modified entity.[35] Terms such as *āmalaka-* and *badira-* do not fit either type. A fruit of the tree named *āmalakī-*/*āmalaka-* or *badarī-*/*badara-* does not do away with its source, nor does it bear a name totally distinct from that of the tree from which it stems. Further, the fruit of

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34. This is derived optionally with the suffix *añ* or *aṇ*. Since the base *khadirá-* is accented as shown, the former affix would apply obligatorily by *A* 4.3.140 (note 52). However, *A* 4.3.141: पलाशादिभ्यो वा provides for optional affixation with *añ* if the base of the *pada* in question is one of the set beginning with *palāśa-*, which includes *khadirá-*. The major heading *A* 4.1.83: प्राग्दीव्यतोऽण् lets *aṇ* be introduced except under other conditions specified in particular *sūtras*. The derivate with *aṇ* has high pitch on its final vowel according to the general rule that an affix is high-pitched when introduced (*A* 3.1.3: आद्युदात्तश्च ।), but the first vowel of a derivate with an affix that bears a marker *ñ* is high-pitched (*A* 6.1.197: ञ्नित्यादिर्नित्यम् ।): *khā́dira-*, *khādirá-*.

35. *KātVṛṬī.* 1.1.23 (I.112.25-26): किञ्च वृक्षस्य विकारोऽवयवो वा फलं कथं भवितुमर्हति । विकारो द्विविधः प्रकृतेरुपमर्दकः व्यपदेशान्तरकृच्च यथा खादिरं भस्म खादिरो यूप इति ।

a tree cannot be considered a constitutent part in the sense that it might bring about a tree in the way that threads can be considered to constitute a piece of cloth; for a fruit is produced after a tree has already come into existence.[36] The *Ṭīkā* goes on to present an additional argument that may be brought up in defence of the derivational position, as follows. One may consider that when a tree bears a fruit, the fruit is a modification of an original state and a constituent part of a new state of the tree because it does away with a previously existing fruited state (*phalitāvasthām*) by bringing about (*ārabhamāṇam*) a new distinct (*anyam* "other") whole (*vṛkṣāvayavinam*) consisting of itself along with other parts of the tree such as its branches, just as a new shoot is a part and modification of a tree. Durga also rejects this, however, on the grounds that it is a reasoning (*yuktiḥ*) that is outside the scope of common usage (*lokavyavahārātiriktā*).[37]

II.2.2. In connection with the usages जम्बु फलम् (cf. § **III.5**(12)) and जम्बूः फलम् (cf. § **III.5**(14)), with the neuter *jambu* and feminine *jambūḥ* used with reference to a fruit, Durga again asserts that no derivation is in question. *Jambu-* is a completely separate neuter base, not a derivate with shortening of the

36. *KātVṛṬī*. 1.1.23 (I.113.1): नाप्यवयवोऽनारम्भकत्वात्। वृक्षे हि जाते खलु फलमुत्पद्यते।

37. *KātVṛṬī*. 1.1.23 (I.113.1-3): तथा फलितावस्थामुपमृद्नन् शाखाद्यवयवसहायमन्यमेव विशिष्टं वृक्षावयविनमारभमाणं फलं विकारोऽवयवो भवति यथा पल्लवमिति चेल्लोकव्यवहारातिरिक्तेयं युक्तिरिति। I have emended the printed text, which has फलितावस्थामुपमर्दम् (उत्पाद्य) शाखाद्यवयवसहायमन्यमेव। The *Ṭīkā* text is also ambiguous in that तथाफलितावस्थाम° could have *aphalitāvasthām* "a state without fruit." I have kept the edition's reading both because it is a *lectio difficilior* from the point of view of the sense and because it has support elsewhere, in the *Kāśikā* on *A* 4.3.163 and the Nyāsa thereon, where the argument Durga gives also appears; see § **IV.6.3** with note 143.

long vowel in an original base *jambū-*.[38] As for the feminine *jambū-* instead of a neuter used with reference to a fruit, this is accounted for on the basis of metaphor, considering that the neuter fruit and the feminine tree are identified, so that the gender of the latter alone obtains; moreover, since the base in question is now treated as a distinct lexical term and not a derivate with a *taddhita* suffix, one has recourse to the principle that the gender (*liṅgam*) of a nominal is known from common use (*lokāśrayatvāt*), hence does not have to be taught by rule (*aśiṣyam*).[39]

II.2.3. To the example *khalatikam* which Durgasiṁha cites in his *Vṛtti* (§ **II.1**(3)), the *Ṭīkā* adds the sets of synonyms *eka-*, *ekaka-*, *ekākin-* "unaccompanied"; *mṛd-*, *mṛttikā-* "clay"; as well as *mṛtsā-*, *mṛtsnā-* "excellent clay." He adds that these are merely examples of *taddhita* derivates, meant to illustrate what is at issue: *ekaka-*, *ekākin-* have the same status as *eka-*; *mṛttikā-* the same status as *mṛd-*; and the last two examples also are not treated as derivates from *mṛd*.[40]

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38. *KātVṛṬī.* 1.1.23 (I.113.3-4): जम्बु फलमिति प्रकृत्यन्तरमेव न तु फलेन स्वरो ह्रस्वो नपुंसके (का° २/४/५२) इति। I have emended जम्बू फलमिति of the printed text. The *sūtra* cited is the *Kātantra* equivalent of *A* 1.2.47: ह्रस्वो नपुंसके प्रातिपादिकस्य.

39. *KātVṛṬī.* 1.1.23 (I.113.4-5): जम्बूः फलमित्यभेदोपचारात्स्त्रीलिङ्गमेव। तथा चाह लिङ्गमशिष्यं लोकाश्रयत्वात्। The principle to which Durga alludes is stated in the fuller form लिङ्गमशिष्यं लोकाश्रयत्वाल्लिङ्गस्य in the *Mahābhāṣya*, where it is generalized to include derived nominal bases (see Cardona 1997: 598-99 [**870-871**]), and in some later collections of *paribhāṣā*s (Abhyankar 1967: 486, no. 418).

40. *KātVṛṬī.* 1.1.23 (I.113.6-8): एवमन्येऽपीत्यादि (*KātVṛ.* I.112.2f). न खलतिकस्यादूरभवानि वनानि खलतिकमिति। एवं यथैकस्तथैकक एकाकी यथा मृत्तथा मृत्तिका प्रशस्ता मृन्मृत्स्ना मृत्सा च। तदिह दिङ्मात्रमेव तद्धितनिदर्शनमिति। I have emended तथैकः एकाकी of the printed edition.

III

As I have noted, commentators themselves accept that the *Kātantra* position taken with respect to such items is opposed explicitly to the stance which Pāṇini takes in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Though Durgasiṁha's *Vṛtti* and the *Ṭīkā* thereon only exceptionally cite Pāṇinian *sūtra*s explicitly in their discussions, Trilocanadāsa cites Pāṇini extensively, emphasizing that the provisions for derivation with *taddhita* affixes do not have to be formulated because the terms in question are established from common usage as having particular domains of reference in the same way that terms like *vṛkṣa-* are established.[41] Let us now consider briefly the rules at issue in deriving such terms within the Pāṇinian system.

III.1. *pañcālāḥ* : The base *pañcāla-*$_1$ signifies in the first instance a particular kṣatriya and names a certain district. To derive *pāñcāla-* signifying a descendant of a Pañcāla, the *taddhita* suffix *añ* is introduced[42] after a *pada* $\mathbf{P}_1$ that contains a sixth-

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41. *KātVṛP* 1.1.23 (I.114.10-18): हरीतक्यः फलानीति हरीतक्याः फलं विकारोऽवयवो वेति प्लक्षादिभ्योऽण् (अष्टा॰ ४/३/१६४) इत्यणि कृते हरीतक्यादिभ्यश्च (अष्टा० ४/३/१६७) इति फले लुक् (अष्टा॰ ४/३/१६३) (इति) न वक्तव्यम्। हरीतकीशब्दो हि वृक्षे पुंसि फले नपुंसके लोकत एव प्रवर्तते। स च स्वभावात्स्त्रीलिङ्ग एवेत्याह फलेष्वपि (*KātVṛ* I.112.2) इति। . . . एवमन्येपीति। एकादाकिनिच्चासहाये (अष्टा॰ ५/३/५२) मृदस्तिकन् सस्नौ च प्रशंसायाम् (अष्टा॰ ५/४/३९-४०) इत्यादयो न वक्तव्याः। एक एकक एकाकी मृत्तिका मृत्सा मृत्स्ना चेत्यादयो हि तद्धिता वृक्षादिवल्लोकत एव विशिष्टविषयतया प्रसिद्धाः। एतदेवाह सञ्ज्ञाशब्दा इवेति। See §§ **III.3**, **III.6**. I have emended प्लक्षादिभ्यश्च (अष्टा॰ ४/३/६४) of the printed edition and added इति shown in parentheses.

42. By *A* 4.1.168: जनपदशब्दात्क्षत्रियादञ्। This *sūtra* comes under three headings: *A* 4.1.76: तद्धिताः, 4.1.82: समर्थानाम्प्रथमाद्वा, 4.1.92: तस्यापत्यम्। See Cardona 1997:69, 229-230, 233 (**111**, **331**, **335**). A derivate with a *taddhita* suffix is a nominal base (*prātipadika*, *A* 1.2.46: कृत्तद्धितसमासाश्च [प्रतिपादिकम् 45]).

triplet ending (*tasya*)[43] and is syntactically and semantically related to a *pada* $\mathbf{P}_2$ which includes a base meaning "offspring, descendant" (*apatyam*) to form a derived nominal base *pañcāla-as-a*, the ending contained in which is deleted.[44] A form of the resulting *taddhitānta* derivate *pāñcāla* (← *pañcāla-as-a*) is equivalent to and alternates with a string containing a term which signifies the meaning attributed to the suffix:

(5) पाञ्चालः = पञ्चालस्यापत्यम् "descendant of a Pañcāla kṣatriya"

There is also a plural of *pañcāla-* (e.g. nom. *pañcālāḥ*) that is homophonous with the plural of the base *pañcāla-*$_1$ but is used to signify both a group of descendants of a Pañcāla and a district (*janapada*):

(6) पञ्चालाः = पञ्चालस्यापत्यानि

(7) पञ्चाला जनपदः । (see note 47)

The nominal base of *pañcālāḥ* in (6) refers to descendants of a Pañcāla kṣatriya and not to several such kṣatriyas alone; the corresponding singular is *pāñcālaḥ*. Accordingly, Pāṇini relates this to the derivate *pāñcāla-*: if one refers to many of what is signified by the *taddhita* affix, except in the feminine, the suffix is replaced by zero which leaves no trace.[45] The plural *pañcālāḥ* of (7) also differs semantically from a plural of *pañcāla-*$_1$ and Pāṇini accounts for this too. The item *pañcāla-* of *pañcālāḥ* in (7) is again treated as a derivate with a *taddhita* affix that is dropped. This derivate refers to an abode (*nivāsaḥ*) of Pañcālas.

43. In this instance *pañcāla-as-*, with the genitive singular ending *ṅas*. This ending is itself introduced, by *A* 2.3.50: षष्ठी शेषे, on condition that the significand of the nominal base partakes in a relation that is residual with respect to conditions stated in preceding rules.

44. *A* 2.4.71: सुपो धातुप्रातिपदिकयोः ।

45. *A* 2.4.62: तद्राजस्य बहुषु तेनैवास्त्रियाम् । See Cardona 1997: 308 (**465**).

Since a plurality of Pañcāla descendants is involved, one starts with the base of the plural *pañcālāḥ* in (6). A *taddhita* affix may be optionally introduced to signify an abode after a *pada* P_1 with a sixth-triplet ending which refers to those whose abode is in question.[46] However, the affix is dropped when the derivate refers to a district.[47] Here again, the zero substitute is one that leaves no trace — *pañcālāḥ*, not *pāñcālāḥ* — but there is an additional feature to be accounted for: although *pañcālāḥ* of (7) refers to a single entity — a district — which is associated with masculine gender, the gender and number of *pañcālāḥ* referring to the district are those of the original base. Accordingly, Pāṇini once more makes a special provision. He lets the suffix be replaced by a particular zero (*lup*) and provides that, where such a zero replacement applies the derivate in question has the gender and number of the nominal base originally followed by the deleted suffix.[48]

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46. *A* 4.2.69: तस्य निवासः।

47. *A* 4.2.81: जनपदे लुप्। After explaining that a *janapada* is a group of villages, the *Kāśikā* on this *sūtra* gives the example पञ्चालानां निवासो जनपदः पञ्चालाः। "Pañcālāḥ is the *janapada* that is the abode of the Pañcālas."

48. *A* 1.2.51: लुपि युक्तवद्व्यक्तिवचने। The locative *lupi* has been interpreted in two ways: as a term designating a locus (*adhikaraṇa*, *A* 2.3.36: सप्तम्यधिकरणे च); as a locative absolute (*A* 2.3.37: यस्य च भावेन भावलक्षणम्). *Lup* itself is interpreted as referring either to the absence of an affix (*A* 1.1.61: प्रत्ययस्य लुक्श्लुलुपः [अदर्शनम् 60]) or to the meaning of an affix that is replaced by the zero *lup* designates. *Yuktavadvyaktivacane* is also interpreted in alternative ways: (a) *yuktavat* construed with *vyaktivacane* is a derivate with *yukta* "meaning of a nominal base" followed by the *taddhita vati* (*A* 5.1.116: तत्र तस्येव [वतिः 115]); (b) *yuktavadvyaktivacane* is a *ṣaṣṭhī tatpuruṣa* compound in which *yuktavat* is a derivate of *yuj* with the participial affix (*niṣṭhā*, *A* 1.1.26: क्तक्तवतू निष्ठा, 3.2.102: निष्ठा). For

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III.2. *varaṇāḥ* : This term can refer to a town (*nagaram*) located not far (*adūrabhavam*) from a cluster of *varaṇa* trees:

(8) वरणाः = वरणानामदूरभवं नगरम् (*Kāś*. 4.2.82)

In terms of its meaning, *varaṇāḥ* is comparable to a derivate such as *vaidiśam*, used to refer to a city that is near the Vidiśā river:

(9) वैदिशम् = विदिशाया अदूरभवं नगरम् (*Kāś*. 4.2.70)

In Pāṇini's system, *vaidiśa-* is derived from a *pada* in which *vidiśā-* is followed by a sixth-triplet ending.[49] After such a *pada*, a *taddhita* affix *aṇ* is optionally introduced signifying "located not far from":[50] *vidiśā-as-a-* → *vidiśā-a-* → *vidiś-a-* → *vaidiśa-* "located not far from the Vidiśā." In accordance with its meaning, then, *varaṇa-* of *varaṇāḥ* in (8) is derived by introducing a *taddhita* affix (*A* 4.2.70, note 50) after a *pada varaṇa-ām* (→ *varaṇānām*) with the sixth-triplet ending *ām*: *varaṇa-ām-a-* → *varaṇa-a-*. Now, if the derivation were allowed to proceed on a normal path, one would derive *vāraṇa-* instead of *varaṇa-* meaning "located not far from *varaṇa* trees." In addition, such a derivate would have the gender and number of the referent

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→ example: *Kāś*. 1.2.51: लुपीति लुप्सञ्ज्ञया लुप्तस्य प्रत्ययस्यार्थ उच्यते। तत्र लुपि युक्तवद्व्यक्तिवचने भवतः। युक्तवदिति निष्ठाप्रत्ययेन क्तवतुना प्रकृत्यर्थ उच्यते। स हि प्रत्ययार्थमात्मना युनक्ति। तस्य युक्तवतो व्यक्तिवचने लुबर्थे विधीयेते। अथवा युक्तः प्रकृत्यर्थः प्रत्ययार्थेन सम्बद्धः। तस्मिन्निव व्यक्तिवचने लुबर्थे भवतः। सप्तम्यर्थे वतिः। *PK* 1.2.51 (I.763), *SK* 1294 (*A* 1.2.51 [II.377]): लुपि सति प्रकृतिवल्लिङ्गवचने स्तः। Additional evidence and details need not be considered here.

49. The sixth-triplet ending of *vidiśā-as* construed with *adūrabhava-am* is accounted for by *A* 2.3.34: दूरान्तिकार्थैः षष्ठ्यन्यतरस्याम्, according to which such an ending is introduced optionally — in alternation with a fifth-triplet ending — after a nominal base construed with terms meaning "distant" and "near."

50. *A* 4.2.70: अदूरभवश्च।

in question — as does *vaideśam* of (9) — so that in construction with the neuter *nagaram*, it would be neuter and singular, contrary to the usage exemplified in (8). To account for the usage, therefore, Pāṇini provides that the *taddhita* affix introduced after *varaṇa-ām* is replaced by a zero that leaves no trace (*lup*).[51] In addition, by the same rule (*A* 1.2.51, note 48) that applies for the gender and number of *pañcāla-* in (7), *varaṇa-* of (8) is masculine and plural.

III.3. *harītakī* : The term *kāpittha-* refers to the fruit of the *kapittha*. In the Pāṇinian system, it is derived from a *pada* consisting of the base *kapitthá-* and the sixth-triplet ending *ṅas*, after which the *taddhita* suffix *añ* is introduced (*kapittha-as-a* → . . . *kāpittha-*) signifying what is a modification (*vikāra*) of the *kapittha*, its fruit.[52] Now, *harītakī-*[53] and *kapitthá-* are accentually of the same type, so that the former should serve to provide the same type of derivate signifying a fruit. Yet the derivate is *harītakī-*, not **hārītaka-*. In accordance with these facts, Pāṇini allows the *taddhita* affix tentatively to occur after a *pada* with *harītakī-*, but then provides for replacing it with a zero that leaves no trace.[54] Moreover, this is the particular zero substitute labelled *lup*, so that the gender of the original base applies (*A* 1.2.51, note 48).

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51. *A* 4.2.82: वरणादिभ्यश्च । This rule with *A* 4.2.70 (note 50) accounts also for *khalatikam* (§ **II.1**(3)).

52. *A* 4.3.140: अनुदात्तादेश्च (अञ् 139). This comes under the heading of *A* 4.3.134-35 (तस्य विकारः । अवयवे च प्राण्योषधिवृक्षेभ्यः ।), which specify the type of *pada* after which a *taddhita* is introduced — one that is a value of *tasya* — and the meanings of the affixes to be introduced: a modification (*vikāraḥ*) and, after *padas* whose bases denote living beings, plants, and trees, also a part (*avayavaḥ*). *A* 4.3.140 further specifies that the base of the *pada* should have a low-pitched initial syllable.

53. With the accented feminine affix *ṅīṣ* (*A* 4.1.63: जातेरस्त्रीविषयादयोपधात्).

54. *A* 4.3.167: हरीतक्यादिभ्यश्च (लुप् 166).

III.4. *āmalakam, badaram*: These terms are comparable in two ways. To begin with, there are pairs of synonyms, one masculine and the other feminine, referring to trees: *āmalaka-*, *āmalakī-* and *badara-*, *badarī-*; the second of each pair ends in the feminine affix *ṅīṣ*.[55] In addition, the neuters *āmalaka-*, *badara-* refer to fruits of the trees in question:

(10) आमलकम् = आमलक्याः फलम् (*Kāś*. 4.3.163)

(11) बदरम् = बदर्याः फलम्।

To account for these fruit names, Pāṇini lets *taddhita* affixes provisionally be introduced after *pada*s consisting of *āmalakī-*, *badarī-* with a sixth-triplet ending to form a derivate meaning "modification of X, part of X" (see note 52): *āmalakī-as-maya-*,[56] *badarī-as-a-* (*A* 4.3.140, note 52). If such a derivate signifies a fruit, the *taddhita* affix is replaced by a zero that leaves no trace, in this case the one referred to as *luk*.[57] In addition, once the *taddhita* affix has thus been replaced (*taddhitaluki*), the feminine suffix is itself replaced by zero (*luk*):[58] *āmalakī-as-maya-* → *āmalakī-maya-* → *āmalakī-* → *āmalaka-*, *badarī-as-a-* → *badarī-a-* → *badarī-* → *badara-*.

III.5. In this context, let us consider finally terms referring to the fruit of the *jambū* tree: *jāmbava-*, *jambu-*, *jambū-*. The first of these is structurally comparable to a term like *daivadārava-*, which signifies something that is a modification or part of a *devadāru* tree. After a *pada* with a sixth-triplet ending following a base in *-u/-ū*, the *taddhita* suffix *aṅ* is introduced to form a

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55. *A* 4.1.41: षिद्गौरादिभ्यश्च (ङीष् 40). The *gaṇa* beginning with *gaura-* includes *badara-* and *āmalaka-*; see Kapila Deva Shastri 1967:105.

56. *A* 4.3.144: नित्यं वृद्धशरादिभ्यः (मयट् 143).

57. *A* 4.3.163: फले लुक्। See § **IV.6.3**.

58. *A* 1.2.49: लुक्तद्धितलुकि (गोस्त्रियोरुपसर्जनस्य 48).

derivate with such a meaning:[59] *devadāru-as-a-* → . . . *daivadārava-*. Similarly, *jāmbava-* is derived from *jambū-as-a*, with the *taddhita* suffix *añ*, to designate something that is made of or is a part of a *jambū* tree. On the other hand, the same suffix is subject to deletion if the derivate refers to a fruit (*A* 4.3.163, note 57):

(12) जम्बु = जम्ब्वाः फलम् ।[60]

There is, nevertheless, a term *jāmbavá-* that refers to a fruit. Accordingly, Pāṇini provides that the *taddhita aṇ* is optionally introduced after *jambū-as* to form a derivate signifying a fruit.[61] Further, a third term, *jambū-* is used to designate the fruit of a *jambū*. Moreover, contrary to *jambu-* and *jāmbava-* which are neuter and can be used in numbers other than the singular, as in

(13) जम्बूनि फलानि । जाम्बवानि फलानि ।[62]

jambū- referring to a fruit or fruits retains the gender and number of the base:

(14) जम्ब्वाः फलं जम्बूः फलम् । (*Kāś*. 4.3.166)

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59. *A* 4.3.139: ओरञ् । This comes under the heading of *A* 4.3.134-35 (note 52). The suffix is marked with *ñ* to show that it conditions replacement by a *vṛddhi* vowel for the first vowel of a preceding base (*A* 7.2.117: तद्धितेष्वचामादेः ।).

60. *Kāś*. 4.3.166: जम्ब्वाः फलं जम्बूः फलं जम्बु फलं जाम्बवमिति वा । *jambū-* referring to a fruit is neuter, so that its final vowel is replaced by a short vowel (*A* 1.2.47: ह्रस्वो नपुंसके प्रतिपादिकस्य ।).

61. *A* 4.3.165: जम्ब्वा वा (अण् 164). The derivate's final vowel is high-pitched according to the general rule that an affix is high-pitched when introduced (*A* 3.1.3). On the other hand, *jā́mbava-* with *añ* is accented as shown: the first vowel of a derivate with an affix that bears a marker *ñ* is high-pitched (*A* 6.1.197); see note 34.

62. *Kāś*. 4.3.165: जाम्बवानि फलानि जम्बूनि वा ।

Accordingly, Pāṇini lets the zero replacement *lup* substitute for the *taddhita* suffix,[63] so that the gender and number of the base are retained (*A* 1.2.51, note 48).

III.6. All the derivates with *taddhita* suffixes considered thus far have clear and definable semantic differences that set them apart from the base nominals to which they are related, even if in some instances the base and the derivate are homophonous. Similarly, a semantic difference is evident between *mṛd-* "clay" and *mṛtsā-*, *mṛtsnā-* "fine, excellent clay," so that suffixes associated with a particular meaning — praise (*praśaṁsā*) — can be considered to follow *mṛd*.[64] There are, in addition, cases where base nominals and derivates do not exhibit such semantic differences. Thus, *eka-*, *ekaka-* and *ekākin-* all mean "alone, unaccompanied." There is, of course, a term *eka-*$_1$ meaning "one" homophonous with *eka-*$_2$ "alone, unaccompanied," so that the set *eka-*, *ekaka-*, *ekākin-* parallels a set like *jambū-*, *jāmbava-* (§ **III.5**), justifying a derivation of *ekaka-*, *ekākin-* with *taddhita* affixes *ka*, *ākin* and of *eka-*$_2$ with deletion of such affixes.[65] On the other hand, *mṛttikā* and *mṛd-* do not differ semantically; they both signify clay. Nevertheless, Pāṇini does derive the former from the latter by introducing a *taddhita* suffix *tikan*.[66] In a comparable manner, Pāṇini derives *avika-*, which is synomynous with *avi-*$_1$ "sheep," with the *taddhita* affix

63. *A* 4.3.166: लुप् च ।

64. The suffixes are *sa* and *sna*, provided for by *A* 5.4.40: सस्नौ प्रशंसायाम् (मृदः 39). Since the derivate is feminine and ends in *-a*, the feminine affix *ṭāp* is introduced (*A* 4.1.4: अजाद्यतष्टाप् ।): *mṛtsa-ā* → *mṛtsā-*, *mṛtsna-ā* → *mṛtsnā-*.

65. *A* 5.3.52: एकादाकिनिच्चासहाये (कन्लुकौ 51) provides for the suffixes *ākin* and *kan* as well as their deletion after *eka* meaning "unaccompanied" (*asahāye*).

66. *A* 5.4.39: मृदस्तिकन् ।

ka following an abstracted base *avi-*$_2$,[67] which is also synonymous with *avi-*$_1$. In the Pāṇinian tradition, such affixes are said to be redundant (*svārthika*) in that they simply echo meanings attributed to the bases with which they occur, so that they do not independently convey meanings of their own.[68]

The fact remains that terms like *avika-* are indeed synonymous with simpler terms like *avi-*$_1$, so that semantically they can be considered simply distinct lexical units of their own, although the existence of terms like *avi-*$_1$ serves to justify treating these also as consisting of a base with an affix.

IV

It is clear from what has been shown in §§ **III.1-III.6** that there are good structural reasons justifying Pāṇini's decision to treat terms like *pañcāla-* as derivates with *taddhita* suffixes. As I said earlier (§§ **II.1-II.2**), commentators on *Kāt*. 1.1.23 argue against the Pāṇinian derivations, preferring to treat pairs like *pañcāla-*$_1$, *pañcāla-*$_2$ as semantically distinct and independent homophonous items. They also give reasons for this decision. Durgasiṁha's main argument (§ **II.1**) amounts to the assertion that items such as *pañcāla-* may be considered to have the same status as ordinary words like *vṛkṣa-*, for which no rules are required in the grammar proper.[69] In his *Ṭīkā*, Durga has to admit that words like *jāmbava-* can indeed be treated as derivates with an affix signifying the fruit of a tree (§ **II.2.2**), yet he again argues that all such terms should be treated as distinct lexical units that do not contain any derivational affix, and he gives a logical argument in support of this view (§ **II.2.1**). Moreover, he pointedly brings in sets

67. *A* 5.4.28: अवेः कः।

68. See Cardona 1983: 67-74.

69. Whether such terms are derived by *uṇādi-sūtras* is a separate issue, which need not be considered here.

like *eka-*, *ekaka-*, *ekākin-* (§ **II.2.3**), which in Pāṇini's system are treated as derivates with *taddhita* affixes (§ **III.6**). Finally, Trilocanadāsa explicitly refers to the Pāṇinian derivations and says the derivational rules should not be stated (§ **III**, note 41).

IV.1. All this conforms with the *Kātantra* rule 1.1.23: लोकोपचाराद् ग्रहणसिद्धिः (§ **II.1**). The point of view held in the *Kātantra* tradition and arguments given in defence of this position, however, have a background in the Pāṇinian tradition itself. Let us now consider what major Pāṇinīyas say with respect to this issue.

IV.1.1. In keeping with what has been discussed, let me begin with *taddhita* affixation. Most such affixes are introduced by *sūtra*s under the heading of *A* 4.1.82: समर्थानां प्रथमाद्वा, which lets three major conditions hold: if more than one *pada* is referred to in a *sūtra* introducing an affix, the affix is to occur after the first (*prathamāt*) *pada*; this should be one of semantically and syntactically related (*samarthānām*) *pada*s; unless otherwise provided for, an affix is optionally (*vā*) introduced. A standard example, cited not only in Pāṇinian commentaries but also in commentaries on the *Kātantra*,[70] is *aupagava-* "offspring, descendant of Upagu," derived by optionally introducing *aṇ*[71] when a descendant or offspring is to be signified, after a *pada* that is the first of two *pada*s and is a value of *tad*-6 (*tasya*) in an abstract string of the type

70. *KātDVṛ*. 2.6.1 (III.414.9): षष्ठ्यन्तान्नाम्नोऽपत्येऽभिधेयेऽण्प्रत्ययो भवति वा। उपगोरपत्यमौपगवः। I omit discussing here how the *sūtra* (*Kāt*. 2.6.1: वाणपत्ये) is interpreted to provide for a nominal *pada* with a sixth-triplet ending, given that it explicitly says only that the affix *aṇ* occurs optionally when an offspring is to be signified.

71. This is the general suffix introduced by rules of the section headed by *A* 4.1.83: प्राग्दीव्यतोऽण्, which extends up to the section beginning with *A* 4.4.2: तेन दीव्यति खनति जयति जितम्।

(15) तद्-अस् अपत्य-स्[72]

The optional affixation accounts for the fact that a form such as *aupagavam* corresponds to and alternates with a string

(16) उपगोरपत्यम्।

as in

(17) उपगोरपत्यमानय। "Bring the son of Upagu."

(18) औपगवमानय। "Bring the son of Upagu." (*Bh.* 2.1.1 [I.364.8]).

The *Mahābhāṣya* discusses why *A* 4.1.82 should include *vā* "optionally," and Patañjali notes that this is intended to allow not only expressions like *aupagavam* but also corresponding strings such as उपगोरपत्यम् in (17).[73] Subsequently, however, the argument is presented that *vā* has no purpose, as follows. There are two possible options: (a) a complex item such as *aupagava-* in *aupagavam* of (17), such that there is an integration in a single lexical unit of a complex of meanings (*vṛttipakṣaḥ*); (b) a string (*vākyam*) like उपगोरपत्यम्, which does not involve such integration (*avṛttipakṣaḥ*), since separate lexical units are used. Further, (a) and (b) occur of their own nature (*svabhāvataḥ*) as distinct possibilities. Within these options, moreover, if there is an integration of meanings an affix necessarily (*nitye*) obtains (*prāpte*) in this domain. Consequently, nothing other than a name (*saṁjñāyāḥ*) *taddhita* or *pratyaya*[74] could possibly be connected with the option stated by using *vā*; yet the optional

72. *A* 4.1.92: तस्यापत्यम्।

73. *Bh.* 4.1.82 (II.234.12): अथ वावचनं किमर्थम्। वाक्यमपि यथा स्यात् उपगोरपत्यमिति।

74. These class names apply by the headings *A* 3.1.1: प्रत्ययः and *A* 4.1.76: तद्धिताः।

application and non-application of such a class name is not acceptable, so that stating *vā* serves no purpose.[75]

The basic argument is that strings like उपगोरपत्यम् and nominal bases like *aupagava-* belong to distinct domains such that one does not affect the other. In other words, even if *aupagava-* is indeed considered a complex derivate with an affix, it is not derived as an option to a related syntactic string.

IV.1.2. The opinion advanced in the *Mahābhāṣya* on *A* 4.1.82 is not peculiar to Patañjali, who is actually fleshing out what Kātyāyana says. The *Bhāṣya* passage summarized in § **IV.1.1** has to do with a *vārttika*[76] that alludes to what has been said (*uktam*) elsewhere with respect to stating *vā* in a *sūtra*. This concerns *A* 3.1.7: धातोः कर्मणः समानकर्तृकादिच्छायां वा (सन् 5), which provides that the suffix *san* optionally follows a verbal base (*dhātoḥ*) signifying an action that is the immediate object (*karmaṇaḥ*) of desiring (*icchāyām* "when desiring is to be expressed"), provided the action signified by the base has the same agent (*samānakartṛkāt*) as desiring. This *sūtra* serves to derive desiderative verbal bases of the type *cikīrṣa-* "wish to do, make," which alternate with strings that contain infinitives

75. *Bh.* 4.1.82 (II.234.15-18): इह द्वौ पक्षौ वृत्तिपक्षश्चावृत्तिपक्षश्च। स्वभावतश्चैतद्भवति वाक्यं च वृत्तिश्च। तत्र स्वाभाविके वृत्तिविषये नित्ये प्रत्यये प्राप्ते वावचनेन किमन्यच्छक्यमभिसम्बन्धुमन्यदतः सञ्ज्ञायाः। न च सञ्ज्ञाया भावाभावाविष्येते। तस्मान्नार्थो वावचनेन। Arguments are also given to show that *samarthānām* and *prathamāt* also serve no purpose, so that, in effect, the *sūtra* 4.1.82 is purposeless and can be omitted. I will come back to the argument just given concerning *vā* (see §§ **IV.4-IV.5**) as well as *samarthānām* (see § **IV.3.1**).

76. 4.1.82 *vt*. 3: वावचने चोक्तम्। Kātyāyana says the same thing in 3.1.2 *vt*. 8, which I do not go into here, since the argument in question does not add to the principal point I am concerned with. For the same reason, I omit considering what Patañjali says in the *Mahābhāṣya* on *A* 3.1.8 (*Bh*. II.19.7-9).

of the type *kartum* "do, make" construed with a verb meaning "wish, desire,"[77] as in

(19) कटं चिकीर्षति। ". . . wishes to make a mat."

(20) कटं कर्तुमिच्छति। ". . . wishes to make a mat."

In a *vārttika* on *A* 3.1.7,[78] Kātyāyana proposes the view maintaining the uselessness (*ānarthakyam*) of stating *vā* in this rule, because ***san*** is obligatory (*nityatvāt*) in its domain. Patañjali's *Bhāṣya* on this *vārttika*[79] is almost identical with what he says in his comments on 4.1.82 *vt.* 3. Nothing other than a name (*saṁjñāyāḥ*) *pratyaya*[80] could possibly be connected with the option stated by using *vā*, and the optional application and non-application of this class name is not acceptable, so that stating *vā* serves no purpose.

Again, the argument presented is that a derivate like *cikīrṣa-* and a string like कर्तुमिच्छति belong to separate domains, with one not affecting the other. Even if *cikīrṣa-* is in fact derived with an affix ***san***, it is not derived as an option to a related syntactic string.

IV.1.3. Still another derivational process that involves optional rules in Pāṇini's system is the formation of compounds (*samāsa*), by *sūtra*s under the heading of *A* 2.1.3: प्राक्कडारात्समासः.[81] This set of *sūtra*s includes a group of rules,

77. *A* 3.3.158: समानकर्तृकेषु तुमुन् (इच्छार्थेषु 157).

78. 3.1.7 *vt.* 9: वावचनानर्थक्यं च तत्र नित्यत्वात्सनः।

79. *Bh.* 3.1.7 (II.14.4-7): वावचनं चानर्थकम्। किं कारणम्। तत्र नित्यत्वात्सनः। इह द्वौ पक्षौ वृत्तिपक्षश्चावृत्तिपक्षश्च। स्वभावतश्चैतद्भवति वाक्यं च वृत्तिश्च। तत्र स्वाभाविके वृत्तिविषये नित्ये प्रत्यये प्राप्ते वावचनेन किमन्यच्छक्यमभिसम्बन्द्धुमन्यदतः सञ्ज्ञायाः न च सञ्ज्ञाया भावाभावाविष्येते। तस्मान्नार्थो वावचनेन।

80. By the heading *A* 3.1.1 (see note 74).

81. See Cardona 1997: 205-29.

headed by *A* 2.1.11: विभाषा, which provide for syntactically and semantically related *padas* optionally to combine, forming derived nominal bases called *samāsa*. For example, the derived nominal *rājapuruṣa-* "king's servant" as in *rājapuruṣam* of

(21) राजपुरुषमानय। "Bring the king's servant." (*Bh.* 2.1.1 [I.364.8])

is derived from an abstract string of the type

(22) राजन-अस् पुरुष-अम्

from which is also derived the string राज्ञः पुरुषम् of

(23) राज्ञः पुरुषमानय।

equivalent to (21). (22) contains two syntactically connected *padas*: the genitive singular *rājñaḥ* (← *rājan-as*) "of the king" and the accusative singular *puruṣam* (← *puruṣa-am*) "man." The *padas* of (22) can also optionally be combined[82] to form the compound *rājan-as-puruṣa-am*. This is a derived nominal base (*prātipadika*),[83] so that the nominal endings *ṅas* and *am* included in it are deleted.[84] In his second *vārttika* on *A* 2.1.1, Kātyāyana asserts that stating the option (*vā* "optionally") in question has no purpose (*vāvacanānarthakyam*), because a compound supposed to be formed optionally is established by its very nature (*svabhāvataḥ*) as part of the language.[85] Here too Patañjali sets forth the arguments I have noted earlier (§§ **IV.1-IV.2**). Nothing other than a name (*sañjñāyāḥ*) *samāsa* could possibly be connected with the option stated, and the optional

82. By *A* 2.2.8: षष्ठी।

83. *A* 1.2.46: कृत्तद्धितसमासाश्च (प्रातिपदिकम् 45).

84. *A* 2.4.71: सुपो धातुप्रातिपदिकयोः (लुक् 58).

85. 2.1.1 *vt.* 2: वावचनानर्थक्यं च स्वभावसिद्धत्वात्।

application and non-application of this class name is not acceptable, so that stating an option serves no purpose.[86]

Once more, the argument presented is that a compound like *rājapuruṣam* and a corresponding string like राज्ञः पुरुषम् have distinct domains that do not affect each other.

IV.2. As I have mentioned, the claim that *vā* and *vibhāṣā* need not be included to provide for options concerning formations with *taddhita* affixes, derived verbal bases, or compounds is based on the assumption that such derivates and the strings with which they are associated belong to distinct and independent domains (*viṣaya*). This point is brought home repeatedly in commentaries.

Commenting on the *Mahābhāṣya* on *vārttika* 3 to *A* 4.1.82,[87] Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa bring out the essential differences between the relations that hold between the referents of a terms like *upagu-* and *apatya-* in strings such as (16) and between the meanings of *upagu-* and a *taddhita* affix in a derivate like *aupagava-*. In the case of a string, the semantic-syntactic relation (*sāmarthyam*) is that of dependence (*vyapekṣā*): the terms and their referents have a dependence with respect to each other. The bases *upagu-* and *apatya-* have discriminate meanings; thus, *apatya-* signifies a member of a set, and one understands from this term an offspring qualified by the property of being an offspring (*apatyatva*). In a derivate like *aupagava-*, the meanings of constituents are fused in a single meaning of a derived base. Here, the suffix *aṇ* signifies not an offspring qualified

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86. *Bh.* 2.1.1 (I.364.2-5): वावचनमनर्थकम्। किं कारणम्। स्वभावसिद्धत्वात्। इह द्वौ पक्षौ वृत्तिपक्षश्चावृत्तिपक्षश्च। स्वभावतश्चैतद्भवति वाक्यं च समासश्च। तत्र स्वाभाविके वृत्तिविषये नित्ये समासे प्राप्ते वावचनेन किमन्यच्छक्यमभिसम्बन्द्धुमन्यदतः सञ्ज्ञायाः न च सञ्ज्ञाया भावाभावाविष्येते। तस्मान्नार्थो वावचनेन।

87. See § **IV.1.1** and notes 74, 75.

by the class property of being an offspring but an offspring qualified by its relation to Upagu.[88] Consequently, in terms of the relations involved — dependence (*vyapekṣā*) and unification of meaning (*ekārthībhāva*) — a string is semantically totally distinct from a derivate and the latter is not included in the domain of the former, so that the string will not be susceptible to blocking (*bādhanam*) by the derivate (*vṛttyā*).[89] Similarly, in his comments to the *Bhāṣya* on *A* 3.1.7 *vārttika* 9,[90] Kaiyaṭa remarks that Kātyāyana's intent is to point out that a blocking relation does not come into question due to the differences in domains of a derivate such as *cikīrṣa-* and a string like कर्तुमिच्छति. The former has a unification of meanings — the meanings assigned to the base *kṛ* and the suffix *san* — as its domain, and the latter has for its domain an expectancy relation between the meanings separately signified by *kṛ* in *kartum* and *iṣ* in *icchati*, so that the two are semantically distinct. Hence, there is no occasion for a blocking relation to hold between one and the other.[91] The Pradīpa on the *Bhāṣya* to *A* 2.1.2 makes the same point concerning Kātyāyana's second *vārttika* on this *sūtra*.[92] A compound such as *rājapuruṣam* does not occur if there

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88. *Ud.* 4.1.82 (III.543): वाक्येऽपत्यशब्देनापत्यत्वप्रकारकोपस्थितिः वृत्तौ त्वणोपगुसम्बन्धविशिष्टस्येति भावः। Nāgeśa says this in explaining what Kaiyaṭa has in mind when he speaks of a subordinate difference (*avāntarabhedaḥ*) between the meanings of a string and a derivate opposed to the main meaning (*pradhānārtha*) they have in common; see § **IV.4** with note 113.

89. *Pr.* 4.1.82 (III.542): इहेति। व्यपेक्षैकार्थीभावयोरत्यन्तभेदाद्भिन्नार्थस्य वाक्यस्य वृत्त्या बाधनं न भविष्यतीत्यर्थः। The same point is made earlier in the Nyāsa on *Kāś.* 4.1.82 (III.398): न च वृत्तिवाक्ययोः समानोऽर्थः। वृत्तौ ह्येकार्थीभावः सामर्थ्यं वाक्ये तु व्यपेक्षा।

90. See § **IV.1.2** with notes 78, 79.

91. *Pr.* 3.1.7 (III.39): वावचनानर्थक्यं चेति। वृत्तेरेकार्थीभावविषयत्वाद्व्यपेक्षाविषयत्वाच्च वाक्यस्य भिन्नार्थत्वाद्बाध्यबाधकभावाप्रसङ्गादिति भावः।

92. See § **IV.1.3** with notes 85, 86.

is a dependency relation (*vyapekṣāyām*) between the meanings of the constituents, and if there is a unification of these meanings (*ekārthībhāve*) in the meaning of a derived nominal, a string such as राज्ञः पुरुषम् does not occur. Since, therefore, these two have distinct domains (*viviktaviṣayatvāt*), they will not have a blocking relation (*bādhyabādhakabhāvaḥ*), so that there is no purpose in formulating an option, because an option is provided between alternate entities with the same semantics (*ekārthānām*).[93]

IV.3. Even granting this position, it is undeniable that the derivates and corresponding strings of such pairs as (17), (18) (§ **IV.1.1**) and (21), (23) (§ **IV.1.3**), though they be considered to have independent domains, both were in use in the language current at Kātyāyana's and Patañjali's times and it is agreed that Pāṇinian rules should account for them. There are also instances where certain strings were used but corresponding derivates were not. One has to decide, then, an issue of some importance: if such potential derivates accord with the grammatical system being described, is it appropriate to consider that they simply happen not to occur? Or should one assume that the grammar excludes these simply because they are not part of the known language? For such situations, Kātyāyana and Patañjali take the second viewpoint and operate with a principle whereby particular derivates which could be allowed by Pāṇinian rules are disallowed — filtered out, so to speak — because they are not used to signify (*anabhidhānāt*) the meanings in question. Derivates with *kṛt* or *taddhita* suffixes as well as compounds (*kṛttaddhitasamāsāḥ*) are determined by the use of such derivates to express given meanings

93. *Pr*. 2.1.2 (II.516): वावचनानर्थक्यं चेति। इह व्यपेक्षायां समासो न भवति एकार्थीभावे वाक्यं नेति विविक्तविषयत्वादनयोर्बाध्यबाधकभावो न भविष्यतीति नार्थो विकल्पेन एकार्थानां विकल्पनात्।

(*abhidhānalakṣaṇāḥ*), so that a given possible derivate is disallowed because such a term is not used to signify a meaning.[94] This filtering procedure is applied both where Pāṇinian *sūtra*s as formulated would allow derivates that conform to grammatical norms but happen not to be used and where Pāṇinian rules, under suggested reformulations, would tentatively allow ungrammatical results. The following examples will illustrate the point.

IV.3.1. The *Mahābhāṣya* discussion of *A* 4.1.82 (§ **IV.1.1**) begins by asking what the purpose is for stating *samarthānām*. Patañjali gives the expected answer: so that an affix occurs after an item that is semantically and syntactically related to another and not after one that does not meet this criterion; and he cites.

(24) उपगोरपत्यम् "offspring of Upagu"

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94. 3.2.1 *vt*. 5: अनभिधानात्॥ *Bh*. II.94.15: अनभिधानादेव न भविष्यति। *Bh*. 3.3.19 (II.146.7): अभिधानलक्षणाः कृत्तद्धितसमासाः। अनभिधानान्न भविष्यन्ति। The *Ratnaprakāśa* on the first *Bhāṣya* passage cited here refers to the statement अभिधानलक्षणाः कृत्तद्धितसमासाः as a *paribhāṣā* (*RPra*. VI.228: अनभिधानादिति अभिधानलक्षणाः कृत्तद्धितसमासा इति परिभाषितत्वादिति भावः।) अभिधानलक्षणाः कृत्तद्धितसमासाः is part of Vyāḍi's set of *paribhāṣā*s (no. 66 in Wujastyk's edition, 72 in Abhyankar 1967), is included in other *paribhāṣā* collections (Abhyankar 1967: 469, no. 50), and is invoked by commentators on *Kāt*. 1.1.23 (see note 13). Like many generalized principles adopted by Pāṇinīyas, this has a parallel in Pāṇinian procedure. Thus, for example, *A* 2.1.26: खट्वा क्षेपे provides for a compound *khaṭvārūḍha-* on condition that censure is to be conveyed, so that the semantic link between this and its corresponding string is broken and the compound is obligatory, although Pāṇini does not explicitly say it is; see Cardona 1997: 206, 215. On the *anabhidhāna* principle see also Cardona 1976: 254-55, 2002: 224-30.

(25) कम्बल उपगोरपत्यं देवदत्तस्य "Upagu's blanket, Devadatta's offspring."[95]

That is, *upagoḥ* and *apatyam* of (24) are semantically and syntactically related to each other, so that the *taddhita* suffix *aṇ* is allowed for forming a derivate *aupagava-*, as in (18), which is equivalent to and alternates with (17). On the other hand, *upagoḥ* in (25) is related to *kambalaḥ*, not to *devadattasya*, so that the *taddhita* affix is now not introduced after *upagu-as* of an abstract string *kambala-s upagu-as* to form *aupagava-* "offspring of Upagu." If the affixation were not restricted to items meeting the stated criterion, it would be allowed here also, as though *aupagava-* could be used as an equivalent to कम्बल उपगोः of (25). Still, Kātyāyana rejects the inclusion of *samarthānām*. He argues that stating this in *A* 4.1.82 has no purpose, since introducing an affix after an item that does not meet the criterion of being semantically and syntactically related to an appropriate term would result in a derivate that is not used to signify the meaning in question, hence is precluded.[96]

IV.3.2. *A* 3.3.19: अकर्तरि च कारके सञ्ज्ञायाम (भावे 18, घञ् 16) provides that the *kṛt* suffix *ghañ* follow a verbal base not only when an action in the abstract is signified (*bhāve*) but also when there is to be signified a direct participant (*kārake*) other than an agent (*akartari*). The *sūtra* also specifies that this applies on condition that a derivate names a particular individual (*saṁjñāyām*), not just any participant in an action; e.g., *āhāra-* signifies food, from which one draws flavour, not just anything from which one draws something. On the other hand, there

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95. *Bh*. 4.1.82 (II.234.2-3): समर्थवचनं किमर्थम्। समर्थादुत्पत्तिर्यथा स्यात् उपगोरपत्यम्। असमर्थान्मा भूदिति कम्बल उपगोरपत्यं देवदत्तस्येति।

96. 4.1.82 *vt*. 1: समर्थवचनमनर्थकम् न ह्यसमर्थेनार्थाभिधानम्॥ *Bh*. II.234.5-6: समर्थवचनमनर्थकम्॥ किं करणम्। न ह्यसमर्थेनार्थाभिधानम्। न ह्यसमर्थादुत्पद्यमानेन प्रत्ययेनार्थाभिधानं स्यात्। अनभिधानात्तत उत्पत्तिर्न भविष्यति॥

are terms like *lābha-* "gain, profit," to be derived from *labh* "obtain." Hence, Kātyāyana objects that saying *saṁjñāyām* in the *sūtra* serves no purpose (*saṁjñāgrahaṇānarthakyam*), since *ghañ* is seen to occur generally (*sarvatra* "everywhere").[97] This meets with an objection: if *saṁjñāyām* is omitted from *A* 3.3.19, the *sūtra* allows for overextension, so that, for example, one could have *kāra-*, with *ghañ*, used interchangeably with *kṛta-* "made."[98] Responding to such an objection, Kātyāyana answers that the desired result is established because the introduction of the affix is determined by the use of a derivate to signify a given meaning (*abhidhānalakṣaṇatvāt*).[99] Patañjali goes on to state the general principle (note 94).

IV.3.3. *A* 3.2.1: कर्मण्यण् introduces the *kṛt* affix *aṇ* after any verbal base on condition that it co-occurs with a nominal signifying the object of the action denoted. This affixation

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97. 3.3.19 *vt*. 2: सञ्ज्ञाग्रहणानर्थक्यं च सर्वत्र घञो दर्शनात्। *Bh*. II.146.2-3: सञ्ज्ञाग्रहणं चानर्थकम्। किं कारणम्। सर्वत्र घञो दर्शनात्। असञ्ज्ञायामपि हि घञ्दृश्यते। को भवता दायो दत्तः को भवता लाभो लब्ध इति। I have not used the example *dāya-*, which Patañjali also gives, because for Pāṇini this derivate may have had only a specialized meaning ("gift made on a special occasion, inheritance"), not the general meaning of anything given. Pāṇini may also have considered that *lābha-* qualified as a *saṁjñā* meaning "profit" and not just anything gained. These considerations do not, however, affect the main point being discussed here.

98. *Bh*. 3.3.19 (II.146.3-4): यदि सञ्ज्ञाग्रहणं न क्रियतेऽतिप्रसङ्गो भवति। कृतः कट इत्यत्र कारः कट इति प्राप्नोति।

99. 3.3.19 *vt*. 3: अतिप्रसङ्ग इति चेदभिधानलक्षणत्वात्प्रत्ययस्य सिद्धम्॥ *Bh*. II.146.6: अतिप्रसङ्ग इति चेत्तन्न। किं कारणम्। अभिधानलक्षणत्वात्प्रत्ययस्य सिद्धम्। Another way of allowing the broader application is to construe *ca* with *sañjñāyām*, so that the rule provides for the affixation when a *sañjñā* is to be signified as well as elsewhere. This interpretation is adopted, for example, in the *Kāśikā* (चकारः सञ्ज्ञाव्यभिचारार्थः।).

serves to form derivates such as *kāra-* included in obligatory compounds like *kumbhakāra-* "potter." On the other hand, there is no comparable compound *ādityadarśa-** referring to someone who looks at the sun. To allow the proper distribution of derivates, it is suggested that there be supplied an enumeration (*parigaṇana*) of the types of objects denoted by terms subject to composition with derivates ending in *añ*, namely an object that is something brought into being (*nirvartyamāna*) or modified (*vikriyamāṇa*).[100] The discussion of this issue ends, however, with Kātyāyana saying it is unnecessary to have such an enumeration, since any undesired derivate is not provided for in the grammar because it is not used to signify the meaning in question.[101]

IV.3.4. The composition rule *A* 2.2.24: अनेकमन्यपदार्थे serves to derive compounds called *bahuvrīhi* by optionally combining any number (*anekam*) of related *padas* to form a compound referring to something other than what any of its constituents signifies (*anyapadārthe*). For example, the first two *padas* of

(26) पञ्च-अस् भुक्त-अस् इदम्-अस्

can combine to derive *pañca-as-bhukta-as*, whence *pañcabhukta-* (nom. sg. *pañcabhuktaḥ*), referring to someone five portions of whose food have been eaten. (26) can also serve to derive a string

(27) पञ्च भुक्तान्यस्य। "Five of this have been consumed."

However, a *bahuvrīhi* compound *pañcabhukta-* should not correspond to

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100. *Bh.* 3.2.1 (II.94.2-3): कर्मणि निर्वर्त्यमानविक्रियमाण इति वक्तव्यम्। इह मा भूत् आदित्यं पश्यति हिमवन्तं शृणोति ग्रामं गच्छतीति।

101. 3.2.1 *vt.* 4-5: अपरिगणनं वा। अनभिधानात्॥ *Bh.* II.94.13-14, 16: न वार्थः परिगणनेन। कस्मान्न भवति आदित्यं पश्यति हिमवन्तं शृणोति ग्रामं गच्छतीति। अनभिधानादेव न भविष्यति।

(28) पञ्चभिर्भुक्तमस्य। "Five of his have eaten." "Five have partaken of this." (*Bh.* I.423.18).

In (26)-(27) *pañca-as* (→ *pañca*) and *bhukta-as* (→ *bhuktāni*) refer to the same thing (*samānādhikaraṇa*), but in (28) *pañcabhiḥ* and *bhuktam* have different referents (*vyadhikaraṇa*). A *vārttika* is formulated according to which a *bahuvrīhi* is composed of elements that are co-referential (*samānādhikaraṇānām*), so that there should not be allowed a *bahuvrīhi* with constituents that are not co-referential (*vyadhikaraṇānām*).[102] Subsequently, however, Kātyāyana argues that this need not be stated: a *bahuvrīhi* whose constituents are not co-referential is disallowed because it would not be used to signify the meaning of a string with these constituents.[103]

IV.3.5. Although Patañjali and others formulate the principle अभिधानलक्षणा कृत्तद्धितसमासाः (note 94), the argument that a given derivate is disallowed because it is not used to signify (*anabhidhānāt*) a given meaning is not restricted to derivatives with *kṛt* and *taddhita* affixes and to compounds. For example, this principle is brought into play to argue that *karmaṇaḥ* and

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102. 2.2.24 *vt.* 10: बहुव्रीहिः समानाधिकरणानाम्॥ *Bh.* I.423.17-18: समानाधिकरणानां बहुव्रीहिर्वक्तव्यः। किं प्रयोजनम्। व्यधिकरणानां मा भूदिति पञ्चभिर्भुक्तमस्येति।

103. 2.2.24 *vt.* 16: न वानभिधानादसमानाधिकरणे सञ्ज्ञाभावः। *Bh.* I.424.11-12: न वा वक्तव्यम्। असमानाधिकरणानां बहुव्रीहिः कस्मान्न भवति पञ्चभिर्भुक्तमस्येति। अनभिधानात्। In my presentation, I have followed Patañjali. Kātyāyana says that the class name *bahuvrīhi* will not apply to a derivate whose constituents are not co-referential. In his commentary on *Kāś.* 2.2.24, Jinendrabuddhi (Nyāsa II.130) invokes the general principle formulated by Patañjali (see note 94): तत्रेदं व्याख्यानम्। अभिधानलक्षणा हि कृत्तद्धितसमासा भवन्ति। न च व्यधिकरणानां बहुव्रीहौ कृते विवक्षितार्थाभिधानमस्ति। न हि पञ्चभिर्भुक्तमस्येति वाक्याद्योऽर्थः प्रतीयते स पञ्चभुक्तशब्दात्। तस्मादनभिधानाद्व्यधिकरणानां बहुव्रीहिर्न भविष्यति। Jinendra goes on to note that where a *bahuvrīhi* whose constitutents are not co-referential is found in usage, the derivation is allowed; e.g. *kaṇṭhekāla-* "Śiva (who has black on his throat)."

samānakartṛkāt are not required in *A* 3.1.7 (§ **IV.1.2**). These do not serve a purpose in the *sūtra*, argues Kātyāyana, because the affix is provided for if wishing is to be signified (*icchābhidhāne* "when there is the expression of wishing") and there would be no expression (*anabhidhānam*) of wishing if there were no object and the action serving as the object did not have the same agent as wishing. Since there would be no expression of wishing by the affix ***san*** if it were to be introduced (*utpadyamānena* "arising") after a base which did not signify an action that is an object or which did not have the same agent as wishing, the affix will not be introduced.[104]

IV.3.6. Patañjali and other Pāṇinīyas make it clear that, at least in some cases, invoking the *anabhidhāna* principle is a way followed when there is no other way to go. Consider still again *A* 3.1.7, which as formulated includes *dhātoḥ* "(following) a verbal base." The *bhāṣya* on this rule begins by discussing the reason for including this term, and two reasons are taken up. For the present discussion, only the second of these need be considered. It is proposed that *dhātoḥ* is necessary so that ***san*** not be allowed to occur after a *pada* terminating in a nominal ending (*subantāt*), and two reasons are then given to demonstrate that this would not be allowed even if *A* 3.1.7 lacked *dhātoḥ*. First, there are rules which introduce other

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104. 3.1.7 *vt*. 6-7: कर्मसमानकर्तृकग्रहणानर्थक्यं चेच्छाभिधाने प्रत्ययविधानात्॥ अकर्मणो ह्यसमानकर्तृकाद्वानभिधानम्॥ *Bh*. II.13.9-10, 12-13: कर्मसमानकर्तृकग्रहणं चानर्थकम्। किं कारणम्। इच्छाभिधाने प्रत्ययविधानात्। इच्छायामभिधेयायां सन्विधीयते। न चाकर्मणोऽसमानकर्तृकाद्वोत्पद्यमानेन सनेच्छाया अभिधानं स्यात्। अनभिधानात्तत उत्पत्तिर्न भविष्यति। Kātyāyana goes on to justify Pāṇini's formulation otherwise. I omit this and details concerning the interpretation of *vārttikas* 6-7. The argumentation stated in these *vārttikas* is later invoked in Kātyāyana's second *vārttika* (एकाज्झलादिग्रहणे च॥) on *A* 3.1.22 (धातोरेकाचो हलादेः क्रियासमभिहारे यङ्।), which I also do not take up here.

affixes after such nominal terms, and one of them in particular[105] provides for *kyac* optionally to follow a *pada* that terminates with a nominal ending to form a derived verbal base meaning "wishes . . . for himself," as in *putrīya-* (← *putra-am-ya-*) of

(29) पुत्रीयति ।

which is equivalent to

(30) आत्मनः पुत्रमिच्छति । ". . . wishes a son for himself."

Secondly, *A* 3.1.7 reformulated without *dhātoḥ* would introduce *san* in a general domain, after any term denoting an immediate object of desiring. Other related rules (note 105) would now introduce affixes in a sub-domain of this, namely where the item to be followed by an affix is a *subanta*. Thus, these rules would now be exceptions to *A* 3.1.7, blocking affixation with *saṇ*, so that there would be no occasion for this affix to follow a *pada* terminating with a nominal ending.[106] An alternative way of achieving the same exclusion while not including *dhātoḥ* in *A* 3.1.7 is proposed in the next *vārttika*: the affix will not be allowed to occur after a nominal *pada* because the meaning in question would not thereby be signified.[107]

Patañjali immediately goes on to characterize this as an *agatikā gatiḥ*,[108] a solution proposed by someone who in

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105. *A* 3.1.8: सुप आत्मनः क्यच् (इच्छायां वा); *A* 3.1.9: काम्यच्च allows for the use also of *kāmyac* under the same conditions.

106. *Bh*. II.12.12: इदं तर्हि प्रयोजनम् सुबन्तादुत्पत्तिर्मा भूत्। 3.1.7 *vt*. 4: सुबन्ताच्चाप्रसङ्गः क्यजादीनामपवादत्वात्॥ *Bh*. II.12.14-15: सुबन्ताच्च सनोऽप्रसङ्गः। किं कारणम्। क्यजादीनामपवादत्वात्। सुबन्तात्क्यजादयो विधीयन्ते। तेऽपवादत्वाद्बाधका भविष्यन्ति।

107. 3.1.7 *vt*. 5: अनभिधानाद्वा॥ *Bh*. II.12.17-18: अथवानभिधानात्सुबुत्पत्तिर्न भविष्यति। न हि सुबन्तादुत्पद्यमानेन सनेच्छाया अभिधानं स्यात्। अनभिधानात्तत उत्पत्तिर्न भविष्यति।

108. *Bh*. 3.1.7 (II.12.19): इयं तावदगतिका गतिर्यदुच्यतेऽनभिधानादिति।

desperation suggests this because he can think of no other way. Kaiyaṭa makes an important and appropriate remark in this context. The determination (*vyavasthā*) of any speech item that is to be accounted for by the grammar (*lakṣyasya*) is appropriately based on the rules (*lakṣaṇāśrayā*) of the grammar; one determines how rules should apply (*lakṣaṇavyavasthāpanam*) by means of the items of usage that are to be described (*lakṣyāśrayeṇa*), on the other hand, when there is no other way (*gatyantarābhāvāt*).[109]

IV.3.7. The *anabhidhāna* principle is thus admittedly invoked in extreme cases, where derivations that should indeed be kept from applying can more appropriately be disallowed in another way. It is also obvious from the arguments Kātyāyana and Patañjali propose when they invoke *anabhidhāna* to claim that parts of *sūtra*s Pāṇini formulated have

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109. *Pr.* 3.1.7 (III.35): इयं तावदिति। लक्षणाश्रया लक्ष्यस्य व्यवस्था न्याय्या। लक्ष्याश्रयेण तु लक्षणव्यवस्थापनं गत्यन्तराभावादिति भावः। Śivarāmendrasarasvatī (*RPra.* 3.1.7 [VI.38]) makes a comparable statement: it is appropriate to resort to *anabhidhāna* where there is no other answer available to an objection, but not in the present case: यत्र समाधानान्तरं नास्ति तत्रानभिधानमाश्रयितुं युक्तं नत्वत्र। Commenting on the Pradīpa's statement, Nāgeśa (*Ud.* III.35) remarks that Kaiyaṭa intends thereby to indicate that those to whom grammatical rules are addressed depend solely on grammatical rules for knowledge of correct usage (*lakṣaṇaikacakṣuṣkatvāt* "because they are such that they have only grammatical rules for eyes"): लक्षणाश्रयेति। बोद्धॄणां लक्षणैकचक्षुष्कत्वादिति भावः This view cannot be upheld if one means that students of Pāṇini's grammar who in fact were native speakers of the object language could know correct usage only from rules of the grammar. The position can be maintained, on the other hand, if one means that even such native speakers depended on the grammar for an authoritative explanation of the distinction between correct Sanskrit usage and vernacular usage, both of which they used in everyday life.

no purpose (see §§ **IV.3.1**, **IV.3.5**) that Pāṇini himself did not operate with this principle in these cases. Moreover, in cases such as certain compounds (§§ **IV.3.3-IV.3.4**), one can justifiably invoke the principle in another way, taking the position that some derivates which would be allowed by *sūtra* as Pāṇini formulated them simply happen not to be used to signify the meanings expressed by strings to which they would correspond.

Such strings alternate with forms of equivalent derivates. This brings us back to the question whether the *sūtra*s Pāṇini formulated in connection with these equivalents should, despite the claims Kātyāyana makes (§§ **IV.1.1-IV.1.3**), explicitly provide for optional operations.

IV.4. Patañjali remarks that *vā* in *A* 4.1.82 is required in order to allow not only terms with *taddhita* affixes but also corresponding strings.[110] For this to be true, it must be the case that, in the absence of a provision for the optional introduction of such *taddhita*s, a string would be contravened by the formation with a *taddhita*. In turn, this requires that *taddhita* derivates and related strings share a domain: a string would have a general domain, included in which would be the domain of a formation with a *taddhita*, of a derived verb, and of a compound. The most immediate interpretation of the *Bhāṣya's* remark is as follows. An asbstract string such as

(24) उपगु-अस् अपत्य-अम् आ-स् नी-ल्[111]

is posited to account for (17) उपगोरपत्यमानय (§ **IV.1.1**). The *pada upagu-as* of this string is optionally followed by the *taddhita*

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110. See § **IV.1.1** with note 73.

111. *nī-l*, whence the imperative form *naya* is derived, contains the base *nī* with the L-affix *loṭ*, and *ā-s* contains the preverb (*upasarga*) *āṅ*.

suffix *aṇ*, which is treated as signifying the meaning of *apatya-* in the *pada apatya-am*. This affixation has to be optional in order to allow both (17) and its equivalent utterance (18) औपगवमानय. If, on the contrary, *A* 4.1.82 simply stated that an affix is to be introduced after the first of related *pada*s, *aṇ* would then be introduced obligatorily after *upagu-as* of (24). For any string of the type (15) belongs to a subset of all possible strings, so that, technically, an operation provided for a *pada* in such a string would constitute an exception (*apavāda*) to an operation provided for a *pada* of any string, so that it would block the general operation. Moreover, one cannot claim truly that the domains of a *taddhita* formation and of a string are absolutely distinct. For, although there are indeed differences between the two,[112] (17) and (18) are semantically equivalent in the general sense that both state commands to someone that he bring a person who is an offspring of Upagu.[113]

There is thus a difference in emphasis on the basis of which on the one hand Patañjali asserts the need to state an option in order to allow both a derivate and a corresponding string and, on the other hand, Kātyāyana asserts that such an option serves no purpose.

IV.5. The *Mahābhāṣya* discussion of *A* 4.1.82 ends with Patañjali reasserting the need to state *vā*. The purpose for this,

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112. See § **IV.2** with notes 89, 91.

113. Kaiyaṭa makes this point, emphasizing a distinction between the main meaning (*pradhānārtha*) and subsidiary meanings (*avāntarārtha*) of the utterances in question: whether one uses (18) or (17), the object brought is an offspring of Upagu: *Pr.* III.543: वृत्तिवाक्ययोरवान्तरार्थभेदेऽपि प्रधानार्थाभेदादैकार्थ्याद्वाक्यस्य वृत्त्या बाधः स्यात्। तथा ह्यौपगवमानयेत्युक्ते योऽर्थ आनीयते स एवोपगोरपत्यमानयेत्युक्ते। The point Kaiyaṭa makes was made earlier also, by Jinendrabuddhi in his commentary on *Kāś.* 4.1.82 (III.398).

however, is now different from the purpose considered earlier in the *Bhāṣya*: not so as to allow a string in addition to a derivate but to show that a string is correct. In Patañjali's words, "Speech units (*śabdāḥ*) are eternal (*nityāḥ*); speech units being eternal,[114] thereby, the correctness (*sādhutvam*) of a string (*vākyasya*) is explained (*anvākhyāyate*)."[115] Later Pāṇinīyas draw a parallel between this situation and that of a correct speech item (*śabda*) like *go-* "cow, bull, ox," and corresponding incorrect speech items (*apaśabda, apabhraṁśa*) such as *gāvī-*, *goṇī-*, *gotā-*, *gopotalikā-* "cow."[116] Although one understands femininity from *gāvī-* but not necessarily from *go*, both of these have in common that they signify an object qualified by a class property (*jāti*), so that the incorrect item can be contravened by the correct speech unit. Similarly, the status of a string as a correct unit could be set aside by the derivate formation.[117]

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114. नित्येषु शब्देषु. This can be a locative absolute (*sati saptamī*, *A* 2.3.37: यस्य च भावेन भाववचनम्) or a locative of specification (*nirdhāraṇa*, *A* 2.3.41: यतश्च निर्धारणम्): utterances are singled out from among speech units.

115. *Bh.* 4.1.82 (II.234.21-23): अथ तद्वावचनं नैव कर्तव्यम्। कर्तव्यं च। किं प्रयोजनम्। नित्याः शब्दाः। नित्येषु शब्देषु वाक्यस्यानेन साधुत्वमन्वाख्यायते।

116. In two sections of the *Paspaśā* (*Bh.* I.2.21-25, 10.6-9), Patañjali brings up *go-* and its corresponding incorrect speech forms, in connection with the accrual of merit from knowing the former and demerit from knowledge of the latter. Details need not be dealt with here.

117. *Pr.* 4.1.82 (III.543): तत्र यथा गोशब्देन गावीशब्दो निवर्त्यते सत्यामपि गावीशब्दादधिकस्य स्त्रीत्वस्य प्रतिपत्तौ जातिलक्षणार्थाभेदादेवं वाक्यस्यापि वृत्त्या निवृत्तिः स्यादिति तदभ्यनुज्ञानाय वावचनम्। Nāgeśa brings out that by वाक्यस्य निवृत्तिः Kaiyaṭa means not that a string would cease to be but that a string's status as a correct speech item would be eliminated: *Ud.* III.543: वाक्यस्यापि वृत्त्या निवृत्तिरित्यस्य तस्य साधुत्वनिवृत्तिः स्यादित्यर्थः। The point Kaiyaṭa makes is also made in Jinendrabuddhi's and Haradatta's commentaries on what the →

Given the context of the *Mahābhāṣya*'s last statement concerning *A* 4.1.82, it is appropriate to consider that Patañjali here means to show a purpose for *vā* in the *sūtra* despite the claim made in Kātyāyana's third *vārttika*. Moreover, Patañjali now does not simply say that *vā* is meant to allow a string in addition to a derivate. On the contrary, *vā* is now considered necessary in order to allow the correctness of a string as well as of a derivate. One is justified in concluding that two different points of view are at issue. Further, the most immediate interpretation of Patañjali's first statement is the one I have given in § **IV.4**. Accordingly, Patañjali's last statement fits in a theoretical framework that considers a string like (16) उपगोरपत्यम् (§ **IV.1.1**) and a derivate like *aupagavam* simply equivalent, without a commitment to considering the derivate to derive from an abstract string (24) (§ **IV.4**). The *Bhāṣya*'s last statement nevertheless does not unequivocally indicate such a stance.

In another context, however, Patañjali does contrast two positions on this issue. After elaborating on Kātyāyana's second *vārttika* on *A* 2.1.1,[118] he poses a question: what do those who allow a derivational procedure (*vṛttim*) to take place (*vartayanti*) say?[119] The answer given is: they say *vṛtti* is the

→ *Kāśikā* says in connection with the use of *vā* in *A* 4.1.82 (Nyāsa, *PM* III.398). The *Kāśikā*, however, says what Patañjali said earlier (see note 73): it asks why the *sūtra* states *vā* and answers that this is meant to allow a string also, then cites (16) उपगोरपत्यम्ः वाग्रहणं किम्। वाक्यमपि हि यथा स्यात् उपगोरपत्यम्।

118. See § **IV.1.3** with note 86.

119. *Bh*. 2.1.1 (I.364.6): अथ ये वृत्तिं वर्तयन्ति किं त आहुः। Kaiyaṭa notes (*Pr*. II.517: अथेति। कार्यशब्दिका वाक्यादेव विकल्पेन वृत्तिं निष्पाद्यां मन्यमानाः किं वृत्तेर्लक्षणं कुर्वन्तीति प्रश्नः।) that this question asks what those grammarians who consider secondary formation to be products of derivation, produced optionally from strings, treat as the →

expression of the meaning of another term.[120] The *Bhāṣya* goes on to discuss two alternatives: the derivational procedure and a derivate gotten thereby are such that the separate meanings of constituents are given up (*jahatsvārthā*) or not (*ajahatsvārthā*). The former is clearly preferred, along with the position that, although constituents lose their independent meanings in derivates, a trace remains: *rājan-* and *upagu-* in the derivates *rājapuruṣa-* and *aupagava-* cease to signify independently a king and the person named Upagu, but the derivates signify a man qualified as belonging to a king and an offspring qualified as being Upagu's.[121]

→ defining characteristic of a *Vṛtti*. Nāgeśa remarks that *Vṛtti* here is the unification of meaning (*ekārthībhāvarūpām*), which the grammarians in question bring about (*vartayanti* = *niṣpādayanti*) by means of grammatical rules (*śāstreṇa*), and that these grammarians are those who consider that a semantic and syntactic relation (*sāmarthyam*) is learned solely from the grammar (*śāstraikagamyam*): *Ud.* II.517: अथ ये वृत्तिं वर्तयन्तीति। वृत्तिम् एकार्थीभावरूपां वर्तयन्ति शास्त्रेण निष्पादयन्ति। ये शास्त्रैकगम्यं सामर्थ्यं मन्यन्त इत्यर्थः। Later (*Ud.* II.517: वृत्तिं वृत्त्याश्रयसमासादिरूपाम्) Nāgeśa also characterizes *Vṛtti* as derivates — compounds and so on — which are loci of a derivational procedure (*vṛttyāśraya*). Accordingly, I have used "derivational procedure" and "derivate." Additional details concerning types and numbers of *Vṛtti* (see § **V.4** with note 163) need not be discussed. Note that the Śivarāmendrasarasvatī (*RPra.* V.28) considers that *vṛttiśabdārtham* "the meaning of the term *vṛtti*" is to be supplied in the *Bhāṣya*'s question: किं त आहुरिति। वृत्तिशब्दार्थमिति शेषः। I have translated as shown in view of the syntax of the *Bhāṣya*'s answer (see note 120).

120. *Bh.* I.364.6: परार्थाभिधानं वृत्तिरित्याहुः।

121. A full discussion of the issues involved here is beyond the scope of the present paper. It is nevertheless worth pointing out that Pāṇinīyas maintain that *taddhita* derivates and compounds constitute distinct derived lexical units with separate meanings of their own. This view differs from that of some other scholars, →

Patañjali here definitely speaks of those who let a derivational prodedure take effect in order to account for speech units such as compounds. The *Bhāṣya* passage at issue follows immediately upon a *vārttika* and accompanying *Bhāṣya* which have to do with the position that such derivates and corresponding strings by their very nature have independent domains. Accordingly, it is appropriate to conclude that, at least according to Patañjali, under the position espoused in the second *vārttika* to *A* 2.1.1, compounds, nominals containing *taddhita* affixes, and verbal bases such as desideratives, are considered to be separate lexical units, related semantically to corresponding strings but not derived as alternative formations based on abstract strings of the type (24), from which actually used strings such as (16) are derived.

It is, of course, possible to conclude that there were grammarians who truly considered such derivates to be products (*kārya*) to be produced (*niṣpādya*) through optional rules (see note 119). On the other hand, one can also reconcile this procedure with the theoretical stance most strongly set forth by Bhartṛhari, namely that the derivation of compounds, *taddhita* formations, and derived verbal bases by means of

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→ such as Naiyāyikas, who, for reasons of brevity, do not accept that each such derivate bears a distinct word-meaning relation (*śakti*) with what is signified. Thus, for example, Gaṅgeśa denies a *śakti* for a compound of the type *rājapuruṣa-* on the ground that the understanding of the meaning in question is accounted for otherwise, by assuming a frozen secondary meaning relation (*nirūḍhalakṣaṇayā*) for the constituent *rāja-*, considered here to signify secondarily a man related to a king. On the principle that a meaning is attributable to a speech unit only if this cannot be explained otherwise (*ananyalabhyasya*), then, a separate lexical meaning is not attributed to such a compound as a whole. *TC* IV.2.753: तत्पुरुषेऽपि राजपुरुष इत्यादौ पूर्वपदस्य षष्ठ्यर्थसम्बन्धे निरूढलक्षणयैव राजसम्बन्धिपुरुषबुद्ध्युपत्तेर्न समासे शक्तिः अनन्यलभ्यस्य शब्दार्थत्वात्।

grammatical rules is a fiction adopted in order to explain the relations between such units and corresponding strings. The most important point in the present context is that there were grammarians who went no farther than to assert that units like compounds and corresponding strings have independent domains such that one is not derived from the other, and others — Pāṇini being the most prominent member of this group — who did account for derivates with *taddhita* suffixes and for compounds by deriving them from abstract strings.

IV.6. Let me revert now to derivates considered in §§ **III.1 – III.5.**

IV.6.1. As I pointed out earlier, there is a special rule meant to account for the number and gender of derivates such as *pañcāla-* in usages like (7) पञ्चाला जनपदः, namely *A* 1.2.51: लुपि युक्तवद्व्यक्तिवचने. This is one of a set of seven related *sūtra*s that are part of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* as transmitted in the *Kāśikā* and later commentaries, although there are *vārttika*s only on the first two *sūtra*s and Patañjali comments only on the first three. Most modern scholars consider five of these, *A* 1.2.53-57, to be interpolations.[122]

The *Kāśikā* remarks that *vyaktivacane* of *A* 1.2.51 states terms used by earlier teachers for gender and number instead of *liṅga* and *saṁkhyā*, and goes on to say that the *sūtra* itself stems from these early teachers.[123] The reason for accepting this,

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122. See Cardona 1976: 158-59, 193-94 with notes 69-73, 192, 193, 1997: 593-96 (**867-870**). For the present discussion, it does not matter whether *A* 1.2.53 is an interpolation or, as Pāṇinīyas commonly accept, it is a Pāṇinian *sūtra* in which Pāṇini states his disagreement with the procedure of earlier grammarians.

123. *Kāś.* 1.2.51: व्यक्तिवचने इति च लिङ्गसङ्ख्ययोः पूर्वाचार्यनिर्देशः। तदीययमेवेदं सूत्रम्। Jayāditya also gives two interpretations of *yuktavadvyaktivacane*; see note 48.

Jayāditya points out, is that *A* 1.2.51, along with its companion rule *A* 1.2.52: विशेषणानां चाजातेः, will be rejected in *A* 1.2.53: तदशिष्यं सञ्ज्ञाप्रमाणत्वात्.[124]

As interpreted by Patañjali, *A* 1.2.53 states that what is provided for in the two preceding rules is not to be taught (*aśiṣyam*) because the understanding (*saṁjñā*) imparted from witnessing common usage serves as a means for knowing (*pramāṇa*) the gender and number of the terms in question.[125] Under a more prevalent interpretation, however, *sañjñā* of *sañjñāpramāṇatvāt* in *A* 1.2.53 is considered to mean "name." As the *Kāśikā* says, for example,[126] what is provided for in *A* 1.2.51-52 does not have to be taught — formally stated — and the reason for this is that the names themselves serve to make known the genders and numbers: for name words

124. *Kāś*. 1.2.51: तथा चास्य प्रत्याख्यानं भविष्यति तदशिष्यं सञ्ज्ञाप्रमाणत्वादिति। Similarly, Bhaṭṭoji, *ŚK* 1.2.51: प्राचामिदं सूत्रं दूषणार्थं पाणिनिरनुवदति।

125. *Bh*. 1.2.53 (I.229.7-8): किं या एताः कृत्रिमाष्टिघुघभादिसञ्ज्ञास्तत्प्रामाण्यादशिष्यम्। नेत्याह। सञ्ज्ञानं सञ्ज्ञा। Patañjali remarks that *sañjñā* used here does not have the sense "name," in particular a short class name like *ṭi, ghu, gha, bha*. It is instead an action noun equivalent to *saṁjñānam*. Kaiyaṭa (*Pr*. II.105: सञ्ज्ञानमिति। अवगमः सम्प्रत्यय इत्यर्थः।) clarifies by supplying the additional synonyms *avagama, sampratyaya* "understanding, comprehension." He goes on to say (*Pr*. II.105-06: तत्र यथापो दाराः सिकता वर्षा इत्युक्ते लिङ्गसङ्ख्याविशेषावगतिरुत्पद्यमाना प्रमाणमेवं पञ्चाला वरणा इत्यादावपि।) that the understanding of particular genders and numbers that arises when one says *āpaḥ* ("water"), *dārāḥ* ("wife"), *sikatāḥ* ("sand"), *varṣāḥ* ("rain") is a means of knowing the genders and numbers associated with these terms and that the knowledge of genders and numbers one understands when terms like *pañcālāḥ, varaṇāḥ* are used (see §§ **III.1-III.2**) is comparably a means of knowing the gender and number of these terms.

126. *Kāś*. 1.2.53: तदिति प्रकृतं युक्तवद्भावलक्षणं निर्दिश्यते। तदशिष्यं न वक्तव्यम्। कस्मात्। सञ्ज्ञाप्रमाणत्वात्। सञ्ज्ञाशब्दा हि नानालिङ्गसङ्ख्याः प्रमाणम्।

(*sañjñāśabdāḥ*) with various genders and numbers are the means whereby one understands these genders and numbers as pertaining to their meanings.[127] Moreover, terms like *pañcālāḥ* and *varaṇāḥ* are not etymologically analysable derivates with constituents (*yogaśabdāḥ*) but simply fixed names (*saṁjñāḥ*) of districts and so on (*janapadādīnām*), whose gender and number is established from the very nature of their use (*svabhāvasiddham*), so that they do not require being taught through the effort of any grammatical rule (*yatnapratipādyam*), just as *āpaḥ, dārāḥ, gṛhāḥ, sikatāḥ, varṣāḥ* are associated with particular genders and numbers[128] by convention.[129]

Regardless of the interpretation accepted for *sañjñā* in *A* 1.2.53, it is agreed that according to this *sūtra*, the provisions made in the two preceding rules do not have to be made, so that these rules themselves are unnecessary.

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127. *pramāṇa-* is usually used as an instrument noun (*A* 3.3.117: करणाधिकरणयोश्च [ल्युट् 115]) signifying a means (*karaṇa*) of cognizing. The words in question are such a means by virtue of conveying as parts of their meanings the genders and numbers in question. This point is made both in the *Nyāsa* (I.358: प्रमाणत्वं पुनः प्रत्ययलक्षणम्।) and the Padamañjarī (I.358: प्रमाणानां हि प्रमाणत्वं प्रतिपादकत्वं स्वार्थप्रत्यायनलक्षणम्।). However, Haradatta interprets *pramāṇa* here as an agent noun meaning "signifier" (*pratipādaka, PM* I.358: ये सञ्ज्ञाशब्दास्ते नानालिङ्गसङ्ख्या अपि स्वाभिधेयगतलिङ्गसङ्ख्यापेक्षयाभिन्नलिङ्गसङ्ख्या अपि प्रमाणम् स्वार्थस्य प्रतिपादका इत्यर्थः। See note 131.

128. I use this phrasing so as not to appear strange to modern and Western grammarians. Gender and number are considered properties of the meanings denoted by such terms; for example, though a wife is characterized by femininity and singularity, conventionally *dārāḥ* "wife" is masculine and plural.

129. *Kāś*. 1.2.53: पञ्चाला वरणा इति च नैते योगशब्दाः किन्तर्हि जनपदादीनां सञ्ज्ञा एताः। तत्र लिङ्गं वचनं च स्वभावसिद्धमेव न यत्नप्रतिपाद्यम् यथा आपो दारा गृहाः सिकता वर्षा इति। I refrain from discussing what is said in later Pāṇinīya works; see note 28.

§ **IV.6.2**. In addition, the procedure of introducing *taddhita* affixes and then providing that they are replaced by the zero referred to as *lup* in order to account for derivates like *pañcālāḥ* and *varaṇāḥ* is also rejected. According to *A* 1.2.54: लुब्योगाप्रख्यानात् replacement of *taddhita*s by *lup* is not to be taught, because the connection (*yoga*) between the meanings in question is not understood (*aprakhyānāt*). The *Kāśikā* explains as follows:[130]

> *Lup* also is not to be taught, that is, the replacement by *lup* which is stated in *A* 4.2.81, 82 (notes 47, 51) is not to be stated. The reason for this is that a relation is not conveyed by the terms in question. For it is not the case that when one says *pañcālāḥ* or *varaṇāḥ* a relation is conveyed; we do not perceive, for example, that *varaṇāḥ* is used with reference to a city because of its connection with trees. On the contrary, these are names of places. Therefore, in these terms a *taddhita* affix as provided for by *A* 4.2.69, 70 (notes 46, 50) does not at all come into play, so that having it replaced by *lup* serves no purpose.

A 1.2.55: योगप्रमाणे च तदभावेऽदर्शनं स्यात् goes on to add a reason for this, which the *Kāśikā* explains as follows:[131]

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130. *Kāś*. 1.2.54: लुबप्यशिष्यः। योऽयं जनपदे लुप् (अष्टा° ४/२/८१) वरणादिभ्यश्च (अष्टा० ४/२/८२) इति लुबुच्यते अयं न वक्तव्यः। किं कारणम्। योगाप्रख्यानात्। न हि पञ्चाला वरणा इति योगः सम्बन्धः प्रख्यायते। नैतदुपलभामहे वृक्षयोगान्नगरे वरणा इति। किन्तर्हि सञ्ज्ञा एताः। तस्मादत्र तस्य निवासः (अष्टा° ४/२/६९) अदूरभवश्च (अष्टा° ४/२/७०) इति तद्धितो नैवोत्पद्यते किं लुपो विधानेन। Jinendra explains (*Nyāsa* I.360: प्रख्यायते कथ्यते प्रकाश्यते बुद्धेर्विषय आपद्यत इति यावत्।) that *prakhyāyate* means "is stated," "is brought to light," which amounts to saying "becomes the object of a cognition." Other commentators directly understand *prakhyāna* to mean "cognition, understanding" (*pratīti*); e.g. Bhaṭṭoji, *ŚK* 1296 (*A* 1.2.54 [II.378]): लुबपि न कर्तव्योऽवयवार्थस्येहाप्रतीतेः।

131. *Kāś*. 1.2.55: पञ्चालादयः सञ्ज्ञाशब्दा न योगनिमित्ता इत्युक्तम्। तच्चावश्यमेवाभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। योगप्रमाणे हि तदभावेऽदर्शनं स्यात्। यदि पञ्चालादिशब्दो योगस्य प्रमाणं योगस्य वाचकः स्यात्ततस्तदभावेऽदर्शनमप्रयोगः स्यात्। दृश्यते च →

The position that words like *pañcālāḥ* used with reference to places are simply names and not terms whose sense is analytically determined by constituent meanings must be accepted. For, if it were true that such a term signified constituent meaning — including a connection with Pañcāla kṣatriyas — then in the absence of such a connection, the term would not occur. Yet at present it is the case that a term like *pañcālāḥ* is used with reference to a district even without there being a connection with kṣatriyas. From this one concludes that the term does not have its referential meaning determined by any analytical constituent meaning; on the contrary, it is simply a conventionally used name referring to a place.

IV.6.3. Kātyāyana and Patañjali are aware of the position that fruit names like *āmalaka-*, *badara-* and tree names like *āmalakī-*, *badarī-* (§ **III.4**) should be considered distinct lexical items with no derivational relation. In his first *vārttika* on *A* 4.3.163 (note 57), Kātyāyana remarks that saying *luk*-replacement applies when a fruit is signified serves no purpose, since the fruit name in each case is a distinct base (*prakṛtyantaratvāt*). Patañjali supplies an example, noting that *āmalaka-* used with reference to a fruit is a different base from the tree name.[132] That is, a

→ सम्प्रति विनैव क्षत्रियसम्बन्धेन जनपदेषु पञ्चालादिशब्दः। ततोऽवसीयते नायं योगनिमित्तकः किन्तर्हि रूढिरूपेणैव तत्र प्रवृत्त इति। As can be seen, Jayāditya glosses *yogapramāṇam* with *yogasya vācakaḥ*. Other Pāṇinīyas gloss comparably. For example, Bhaṭṭoji on *ŚK* 1297 (*A* 1.2.54 [II.379]) glosses *yoga* with *avayavārtha* "constituent meaning" and *pramāṇa* with *bodhaka* "which makes understood, conveys" (यदि हि योगस्यावयवार्थस्येदं बोधकं स्यात्तदा तद्भावे न दृश्येत।) and Vāsudeva (*SKBāl.* 1297 [II.379: पञ्चालाङ्गवङ्गादिशब्देषु योगस्यावयवार्थस्य प्रमापकत्वे सति°) uses *pramāpakatva*.

132. 4.3.163 *vt*. 1: फले लुग्वचनानर्थक्यं प्रकृत्यन्तरत्वात्॥ *Bh*. II.327.15-16: फले लुग्वचनमनर्थकम्। किं कारणम्। प्रकृत्यन्तरत्वात्। प्रकृत्यन्तरमामलकशब्दः फले वर्तते।

term like *āmalaka-* used of a fruit is simply another word signifying a member of a class (*jātiśabdāḥ*), not an analytic term with constituent meanings (*yaugikaḥ*) and equivalent to a phrase as in § **III.4**(10).[133] Both Kātyāyana and Patañjali, however, accept that a fruit can also legitimately be considered a part (*ekāntaḥ = avayavaḥ*) of a tree that bears it, hence the point is made that an affix would apply (*prāpnoti* "obtains") because this is seen to be so (*ekāntadarśanāt*).[134] As Kaiyaṭa remarks, this is stated under the view that, because *āmalaka-* is seen to be used with reference to something that is a part of an *āmalakī* tree, namely its fruit, this term is not merely a distinct word signifying a member of a class; on the contrary, *āmalaka-* is a derivative with an analytic meaning.[135] The second *vārttika* to *A* 4.3.163, however, brings up an objection to this view. If one maintains that, because it is observed that a fruit is part of a tree that bears it, an affix could have occasion to occur signifying something related to the tree, then one would also have to provide for an affix and its deletion to account for the tree name, since the tree is also related to its part.[136] That is, once one takes the step of deriving *āmalaka-* referring to the fruit of an *āmalakī* tree by introducing an affix and then deleting it, one could equally well be asked to derive the tree name

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133. *Pr.* 4.3.163 (III.740): प्रकृत्यन्तरत्वादिति। आमलकादिशब्दः फले न यौगिकः आमलक्याः फलमिति किन्तर्हि जातिशब्द एवेत्यर्थः।

134. *Bh.* 4.3.163 (II.327.16): एकान्तदर्शनात्प्राप्नोति।

135. *Pr.* 4.3.163 (III.740): एकान्तदर्शनादिति। आमलक्या अवयव आमलकं दृश्यते ततश्च यौगिक एव फल आमलकशब्द इत्यर्थः।

136. 4.3.163 *vt.* 2: एकान्तदर्शनात्प्रसङ्ग इति चेद् वृक्षे लुग्वचनम्॥ *Bh.* II.327.18: एकान्तदर्शनात्प्रसङ्ग इति चेद् वृक्षेऽपि लुग्वक्तव्यः। वृक्षोऽपि हि फलैकान्तः। As Kaiyaṭa observes (*Pr.* III.740: फलैकान्त इति। फलमेकान्तोऽस्येति बहुव्रीहिः), when Patañjali says that a tree also is *phalaikānta*, he uses this term as a *bahuvrīhi* referring to a tree that has a fruit as a part.

from the fruit name by introducing an affix and deleting it. For the part-whole relation equally holds for both. Just as one can say

(29) आमलक्या इदमामलकं फलम्। "This fruit is the *āmalaka* related to the *āmalakī*"

one can also say

(30) आमलकस्येयमामलकी वृक्षः। "This tree is the *āmalakī* related to the *āmalaka*."[137]

The discussion just noted assumes that a fruit of a tree is seen to be a part of that tree. Of course, since the fruit does not exist before the tree from which it is born, it cannot be treated as a part that constitutes a whole entity *ab initio*. Nevertheless, it can justifiably be considered a part of a tree in the same way that the teeth or horns of an animal such as a cow are viewed as parts of the animal.[138] Now, in its commentary on *A* 4.3.163, the *Kāśikā* remarks that a fruit is not only a part of the tree that bears it but also a modification thereof, and compares this relation to that which holds between a shoot and a tree that already has shoots.[139] In connection with this, commentators bring up the arguments and answers that Durga presents in the *Ṭīkā* on *Kāt*. 1.1.23 (§ **II.2.1**), though in greater detail. Consider first the claim that a fruit cannot be considered a part of a tree because it does not constitute it from the very beginning. There are two ways to meet this objection. First, one should accept that not everything that is

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137. *Pr*. 4.3.163 (III.741): यदि सम्बन्धदर्शनाद्यौगिकत्वमामलकशब्दस्य फले व्यवस्थाप्यते तदा सम्बन्धाविशेषादामलकस्येयमामलकी वृक्ष इति वृक्षावयविनि प्रत्ययमुत्पाद्य लुग्विधेयः। Cf. § **II.2.1** with note 32.

138. *Ud*. 4.3.163 (III.740): आमलक्या अवयव इति। अवयव्युत्पत्तेः प्रागसत्त्वादनारम्भकेऽपि दन्तशृङ्गादौ गवाद्यवयवत्ववत्फलमप्यवयव इति भावः। Cf. note 140.

139. *Kāś*. 4.3.163: फलितस्य वृक्षस्य फलममवयवो भवति विकारश्च पल्लवितस्येव पल्लवः।

treated as a part of a related whole must exist before the whole and serve to bring a whole into existence. The horns, teeth and so on of an animal are treated as parts of the whole animal.[140] Moreover, a fruit that is part of a tree may properly be said to bring about (*ārambhaka*) some new whole in the sense that it produces a new state. As a new shoot is part of a tree while bringing into being a new assemblage qualified by its being a part of the whole tree, so also does a fruit, when it comes into being, bring about a new particular part of a qualified whole that includes other parts of the tree, its branches and so on, just as a sprout is a part of a tree when it brings about a new whole.[141] In addition, a modification need not be solely one of two types: something that does away with the original or that results in an entity with a different name.[142] It can be a different state (*avasthā*) of a thing. Thus, a tree can be considered at a stage where it lacks fruit or where it already is fruitful (*phalitāvasthā*). A fruit being borne by a tree then results in a new state of fruitfulness succeeding a fruitless or a prior fruitful state, and in both the prior and

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140. *PM* 4.3.163 (III.729): सर्वश्चावयवः स्वोत्पत्तेः प्राग्नोपस्थितो नास्यारम्भकः यथा शृङ्गदन्तादिरथ च गवादेरवयवो भवति। तदेतत्फलेऽपि समानम्। Cf. note 138.

141. *Nyāsa* 4.3.163 (III.729): यदप्युक्तम् नावयवोऽनारम्भकत्वादिति तदप्ययुक्तम्। फलं ह्युपजायमानं शाखाद्यवयवसहायमन्यमेव विशिष्टं वृक्षावयवमारभते। तद्यथा पल्लवो विशिष्टं समुदायान्तरमारभमाणोऽवयवो भवति तथा फलमपीति वेदितव्यम्। It is tempting to emend *avayavam* to *avayavinam* "whole" to maintain the parallelism with the sprout that is a part while it brings about (*ārabhamāṇaḥ*) a qualified (*viśiṣṭam*) other complex (*samudāyāntaram*).

142. *Nyāsa* 4.3.163 (III.729): विकारो द्विधा भवति यो वा प्रकृतं निगृह्णाति खादिरं भस्मेति यो वा प्रकृतिव्यपदेशं करोति खादिरो यूप इति। Similarly *PM* III.728, except that Haradatta's example for the second type is *khādiraḥ sruvaḥ* "a sacrificial ladle made of *khadira* wood."

succeeding states the tree continues to have the status of being a tree.[143]

V

V.1. It is patent that the stance taken in *A* 1.2.54-55 with respect to the derivational status of terms such as *pañcālāḥ* accords with the position reflected by what Śarvavarman says in *Kāt.* 1.1.23 (§ **II.1**) and what commentators on this *sūtra* have to say.[144] Although neither Kātyāyana nor Patañjali comments on

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143. Commentators represent both views. For example, commenting on the *Kāśikā* to *A* 4.3.163, Haradatta says (*PM* III.728-29): a modification is another state (*avasthāntaram*) of an original entity (*prakṛteḥ*), and there is such a state relative to a state where a tree has no fruit (*aphalitāvasthāyāḥ*): प्रकृतेरवस्थान्तरं विकार इत्युक्तम्। अफलितावस्थायाश्च फलितावस्थान्तरं भवत्येव। तत्र वृक्षत्वं तूभयत्रानुवर्तते। Similarly, *PKPr.* 4.3.163 (II.329): प्रकृतेरवस्थान्तरं हि विकारः वृक्षस्य चाफलितावस्थायाः फलितावस्था भवति विकारः। वृक्षत्वं ह्युभयत्रानुवर्तत इति। *Ud.* 4.3.163 (III.740): एवं विकारत्वमपि बोध्यम् प्रकृतेरवस्थान्तरस्यैव विकारत्वात्। भवति चाफलितावस्थायाः फलितावस्थान्तरमिति। Jinendrabuddhi, on the other hand, speaks of a fruit doing away with (*apagṛhṇan* "removing") a fruitful state (*phalitāvasthām*) of a tree in the same way that a sprout removes a prior state of a tree's having sprouts (*pallavitāvasthām*): *Nyāsa* 4.3.163 (III.729): पल्लवितावस्थां वृक्षस्यापगृह्णन्पल्लव उपजायते।अतो युक्ता तस्य तद्विकारावयवतेति। फलमपि तस्य फलितावस्थां वृक्षस्यापगृह्णन्फलमुपजायते तस्यापि युक्त एव तद्विकारभावः।

144. This position is also reflected in Candragomin's grammar to a lesser extent. Candragomin's *sūtrapāṭha* does include rules such as *Cāndravyākaraṇa* 3.1.65: अदूरभवे, comparable to *A* 4.2.70 (note 50), but not rules comparable to *A* 4.2.81, 82 (notes 47, 51). In the *Vṛtti* to *Cāndravyākaraṇa* 3.1.68, Dharmadāsa makes comments similar to those of commentators to *Kāt.* 1.1.23. For example, he remarks that *pañcālāḥ* is also a name (*nāma*) of a district (*janapadasya*), but that a derivate with *aṇ* is not such a name, so that this affix is not introduced after a *pada* with *pañcāla-* to form such a derivate: पञ्चाला इति जनपदस्यापि नाम। अणन्तं तु जनपदनाम न भवतीति नातोऽण्भवति।

A 1.2.54-55, moreover, the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* text they received definitely included *A* 1.2.53 (§ **IV.6.1**), so that by their times the position was already maintained that the special provision made in *A* 1.2.51-52 to account for the number and gender of derivates like *pañcālāḥ*, *varaṇāḥ* was not necessary because such features were assumed known from established usage. In addition, Kātyāyana was aware of the view that fruit names like *āmalaka-* and tree names like *āmalakī-* should be considered merely separate lexical items (§ **IV.6.3**). Further, Kātyāyana remarks that options are not necessary concerning rules for forming derivates with *taddhita* affixes, derived verbs, and compounds because strings and their corresponding derivates have distinct spheres (§§ **IV.1-IV.3**). In this context Patañjali notes a contrast between the positions of those grammarians who provide for such formations by rules of derivation and those who do not (§ **IV.5**). A consequence of carrying through on the position of those who deny the formation of such derivates from abstract syntactic strings is the denial that derivational rules accounting for such formations are to be formulated at all.[145] By Jayāditya's time, around the seventh century, this point had been envisioned, entailing the excision of at least some *taddhita* affixation rules from the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.[146]

V.2. This step is also reflected in the *Kātantra* as originally composed. In brief, the theoretical position that Śarvavarman adopted for his original text of *sūtra*s reflects a general stance

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145. The rules in question could be of two types. They could operate on abstract syntactic strings such as (15), (22) (§§ **IV.1.1**, **IV.1.3**), so that what nowadays is called derivational morphology would in general be based on the syntax; alternatively, the syntax would not be the source for derivates, so that, for example, *taddhita* affixes would be added directly to nominal bases. Pāṇini obviously adopted the first procedure.

146. See § **IV.6.2** with note 130.

defended by certain grammarians centuries earlier and known to Pāṇinīyas as early as Kātyāyana, carried to an extreme conclusion: a core grammar that excludes not only rules of *taddhita* affixation and nominal composition but also rules introducing *kṛt* suffixes.

There can be no doubt, moreover, that the core grammar Śarvavarman composed was influenced by and indebted to Pāṇini's grammar.[147] There is irrefutable evidence showing Śarvavarman's dependence on Pāṇini, right down to the identity of some *sūtra*s and terms. For example, *Kāt.* 2.2.10: जश्शसोः शि is identical to *A* 7.1.20 and uses the same *anubandha*s *j* and *ś* to distinguish the *bahuvacana* endings *as* of the first and second triplets as well as the *anubandha ś* marking the replacement *i*. In addition, although Śarvavarman's basic text lacked rules introducing *kṛt* and *taddhita* affixes, he in fact assumes the existence of such affixes in derivates. Thus, for example, *Kāt.* 2.4.41: कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति नित्यम् (षष्ठी 37), the counterpart of *A* 2.3.65: कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति, provides that a nominal ending of the sixth triplet occurs to signify an agent or an immediate object, as in *bhavataḥ* "your" of भवत आसिका "your turn to sit." There is a *Kātantra sūtra* that serves to derive *āsikā*, namely *Kāt.* 4.5.89: पर्यार्हर्णेषु च (वुञ् 87), which introduces the *kṛt* suffix *vuñ* and is the counterpart of *A* 3.3.111: पर्यायार्हर्णोत्पत्तिषु ण्वुच्, whereby the *kṛt* suffix *ṇvuc* is introduced. *Kāt.* 2.4.41 belongs to the core grammar Śarvavarman composed, but *Kāt.* 4.5.89 is admittedly part of a section of rules that was added to the

147. It was chronologically more immediately connected with Kumāralāta's work (see Lüders 1930: 714-19 and note 162), only fragments of which are known. Accepting that Śarvavarman adapted Kumāralāta's grammar entails that the theoretical position reflected in the former had been adopted in the latter.

original corpus. Yet *Kāt.* 2.4.41 specifies *kr̥ti.*[148] One can rightly ask how it is possible to accept that Śarvavarman did not recognize derivates with *kr̥t* suffixes and still formulated *Kāt.* 2.4.41-42 in order to disallow the use of a sixth-triplet ending in construction with a *kr̥t* derivate. This situation receives a satisfactory explanation under the assumption that *kr̥ti* refers to an item that ends in a *kr̥t* affix, that Śarvavarman recognized such terms as distinct from unanalysable words like *go* "cow," but did not himself derive *kr̥danta* items by means of rules in his grammar introducing *kr̥t* suffixes.[149]

There is, in addition, evidence best understood under the view that Śarvavarman was influenced by Kātyāyana. *Kāt.* 3.2.2: गुप्तिज्किद्भ्यश्च is identical to *A* 3.1.5, and *Kāt.* 3.2.3: मान्बध्दान्शान्भ्यो दीर्घश्चाभ्यासस्य differs from *A* 3.1.6: मान्बधदान्शान्भ्यो दीर्घश्चाभ्यासस्य only in having *badh* instead of *badha*. On the other hand, the *sūtra* corresponding to *A* 3.1.7 (§ **IV.1.2**) is *Kāt.* 3.2.4: धातोर्वा तुमन्तादिच्छतिनैककर्तृकात्.[150] It is noteworthy that Kātyāyana suggests a reformulation of *A* 3.1.7 such that ***san*** is introduced after an item ending with ***tumun***, which is then deleted, thus accounting for the type चिकीर्षति corresponding to कर्तुमिच्छति (§

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148. This implies, as Durgasiṁha notes (*KātDVr̥* 2.4.41 [III.201.24]: कृतीति किम्। तद्धितप्रयोगे मा भूत्।), acknowledging *taddhita* affixes in that the rule specifies *kr̥ti* so as to disallow a sixth-triplet ending where a derivate with a *taddhita* is used.

149. *KātKC* VI.3.3-5: अथ शर्ववर्मणा न व्युत्पादिता इति कथं ज्ञातम्। कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति नित्यम् न निष्ठादिषु (का° २/४/४१-४२) इति कथमन्यथा षष्ठीविधिप्रतिषेधार्थं सूत्रद्वयमुक्तम्। सत्यम्। सूत्रद्वारा न व्युत्पादिताः। See § **I.2** with note 20.

150. Lüders (1930: 675) pointed out that the Turkestan version has *karmaṇaḥ* preceding *tumantād*. He explained this convincingly as due to influence of the Pāṇinian *sūtra*, but did not mention 3.1.7 *vt*. 10 (see below with note 151).

IV.1.2 (20)).[151] *Kāt*. 3.2.4 is obviously not a replica of a Pāṇinian rule, as are the two preceding *sūtras*. The most plausible explanation for the wording of the *Kātantra* rule, I submit, is that it is an adaptation of the alternative *sūtra* Kātyāyana proposed. This fits well, moreover, with the general background I have sketched, a piece of direct evidence showing how Śarvavarman adopted views proposed over the centuries preceding his composition of the *Kātantra*.

V.3. The evidence presented earlier in this paper (§§ **I.2)** shows that, as one expects, Durgasiṁha and other commentators on the *Kātantra* knew full well that Śarvavarman differed in principle from Pāṇini in major theoretical aims. In fact, what commentators say concerning the very first *sūtra* of the *Kātantra* demonstrates this and more concerning the position of Śarvavarman's work in the history of Indian grammar. *Kāt*. 1.1.1: **सिद्धो वर्णसमाम्नायः** states that the arrangement of sounds[152] is established (*siddhaḥ*). Durgasiṁha notes that according to this *sūtra* the established order of sounds is to be recognized, so that the order of sounds is not to be taught otherwise.[153] Durga's *Ṭīkā* adds that the order in question is well known solely from the ordinary world (*lokata*

151. 3.1.7 *vt*. 10: तुमुनन्ताद्वा तस्य च लुग्वचनम्॥ *Bh*. II.14.9: तुमुनन्ताद्वा सन्वक्तव्यस्तस्य च तुमुनो लुग्वक्तव्यः। कर्तुमिच्छति चिकीर्षति॥ I cannot take up here subtleties connected with this formulation or that of the *Kātantra*.

152. *varṇasamāmnāyaḥ*. In his *Ṭīkā*, Durga explains that this term refers to the arrangement (*vyūhaḥ*) of sounds, in which the sounds are made known (*jñāyante* "are known") precisely (*samyak*); see note 154. Durgasiṁha simply glosses *samāmnāya* with *pāṭhakrama* "order of recitation": *KātDVṛ*. 1.1.1 (I.31.4): वर्णा अकारादयः। तेषां समाम्नायः पाठक्रमः।

153. *KātDVṛ*. 1.1.1 (I.31.2): सिद्धः खलु वर्णानां समाम्नायो वेदितव्यः। न पुनरन्यथोपदेष्टव्य इत्यर्थः।

eva),[154] which implies another order. He goes on to say that the *sūtra* does not serve to introduce any class name, that it serves instead to negate teaching the sounds arranged in any other order.[155] Trilocanadāsa explicitly brings in the Pāṇinian system when he explains what Durgasiṁha intends to say by remarking that according to *Kāt.* 1.1.1 the sounds are not to be taught in any other manner. He remarks that some grammarians set aside traditional names like *svara* and *vyañjana*, which were well established among early teachers, and composed new names like *ac, hal*; the first *sūtra* of the *Kātantra* is stated in order to reject this.[156] Obviously, *ac, hal*, and so on are Pāṇinian abbreviatory terms, based on the set of sounds in the Pāṇinian *akṣarasamāmnāya*, so that Trilocanadāsa here refers to Pāṇini and those who followed his example.[157] Under this view, which is clearly justified historically, Pāṇini departed from predecessors with respect to phonology[158] and instituted a new order of sounds allowing the formation of abbreviations such as *ac* and *hal*, intended to formulate Pāṇinian phonological rules, and the *Kātantra* represents a reaction against this departure from early tradition.

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154. *KātVṛṬī.* 1.1.1 (I.31.7-8): सम्यगाम्नायन्ते ज्ञायन्तेऽस्मिन्निति समाम्नायः वर्णानां व्यूहो लोकत एव सिद्धो न पुनरन्यथोपदेष्टव्यः।

155. *KātVṛṬī.* 1.1.1 (I.31.13): नायं सञ्ज्ञाविधिरपि तु वर्णानामन्यथोपदेशप्रतिषेधः।

156. *KātVṛP* 1.1.1 (I.32.17-19): सिद्ध इत्यादि। अस्यैव तात्पर्यार्थमाह न पुनन्यथोपदेष्टव्य इति। अयमर्थः पूर्वाचार्यप्रसिद्धां स्वरव्यञ्जनादिसञ्ज्ञामपनीय केचिदपूर्वामेवाज्झलादिसञ्ज्ञां प्रणीतवन्तः तत्प्रतिषेधार्थमिदमुच्यते।

157. In note 2 of page 31 in volume I of his *Kātantra* edition, Dwivedī identifies the grammarians as Pāṇini and those who followed him, Candra, Jinendra, and others.

158. It is well known that Pāṇini differed from earlier grammarians — including authors of *Prātiśākhya*s — in other aspects also, and these need not be considered here.

The phonological rules of the *Kātantra* differ, nevertheless, not only from Pāṇini's but also from those of early *prātiśākhya*s, in ways that cannot be considered here in any detail. A single example will serve to illustrate. The second *pāda* of the first chapter deals with vocalic *sandhi*. *Kāt*. 1.2.1: समानः सवर्णे दीर्घीभवति परश्च लोपम् states that a vowel of the *samāna* class is lengthened (*dīrghī bhavati* "becomes long") when a sound *savarṇa* with it follows, and the latter (*paraḥ* "the following vowel") undergoes deletion (*lopam*). By *Kāt*. 1.1.2-4: तत्र चतुर्दशादौ स्वराः। दश समानाः। तेषां द्वौ द्वावन्योन्यस्य सवर्णौ the fourteen sounds that begin the sound catalog have the name *svara* ("vowel"), the first ten of these are called *samāna* ("simple vowels"), and the members of successive pairs of these are called *savarṇa* with respect to each other. Thus, by *Kāt*. 1.2.1, a single long vowel results from sequences *a+a/a+ā/ā+a/ā+ā* and so on (e.g. *daṇḍāgra-* ["tip of a staff"] ← *daṇḍa-agra-*) by lengthening the first vowel and dropping the second: $V_1V_2 \rightarrow V_1\emptyset$. The *Taittirīyaprātiśākhya* has a section of rules, beginning with *TPr*. 10.1: अथैकमुभे whereby two contiguous vowels both become one. *TPr*. 10.2: दीर्घं समानाक्षरे सवर्णपरे provides that if a *samānākṣara* is followed by a sound *savarṇa* with it, both become a single long vowel. According to *TPr*. 1.2-3: अथ नवादितस्समानाक्षराणि। द्वेद्वे सवर्णे ह्रस्वदीर्घे the first nine sounds of its sound catalog are called *samānākṣara* and the short and long vowels of each pair within this set — that is, *a ā, i ī* and *u ū* — are called *savarṇa* sounds. Accordingly, by *TPr*. 10.2 *a a* changes to a single *ā*, and other sequences are treated similarly. The *Taittirīyaprātiśākhya* and *Kātantra* systems have contiguous sounds become other sounds, but they operate with different sets of vowels and differ with respect to how sounds undergo change. The corresponding Pāṇinian *sūtra, A* 6.1.101: अकः सवर्णे दीर्घः provides for a single long vowel to occur in place of both a vowei denoted by *ak* and a following

vowel that is *savarṇa* with it.[159] Pāṇini's operation is substitution, and the contiguous sounds are made left and right contexts for the replacement. In addition, Pāṇini uses the abbreviation *ak*, which presupposes his own sound catalog, and he assigns sounds to sets called *savarṇa* by phonetic criteria, not on the basis of his sound list (Cardona 1997:16-17 [**33-34**]).

V.4. The literary tradition connected with Śarvavarman also views the *Kātantra* as a candidate for replacing Pāṇini's work. The legend relating how Śarvavarman received and composed his grammar under the inspiration of Kārttikeya is well known. Part of the story recounts that Kārttikeya recited the first *sūtra* **सिद्धो वर्णसमाम्नायः** to Śarvavarman, who then inferred and recited the following *sūtra*, upon which the god rebuked him, saying that, had Śarvavarman not recited the text himself, this work would have supplanted Pāṇini's (*pāṇinīyopamardakam*). Now, however, the new grammar would bear the name *Kātantram* due to it having very few *sūtra*s (*svalpatantratvāt*) as well as being called *Kālāpakam* after the peacock tail of Kārttikeya's mount. Saying this, the god revealed to Śarvavaman a new short grammar.[160]

In view of the evidence, modern scholars of course also accept that the *Kātantra* is ultimately based on

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159. *A* 6.1.101 comes under the heading of *A* 6.1.84: एक पूर्वपरयोः। Rules under this heading let one element occur in place of both a preceding and a following stated element.

160. *KSS* 1.7.10-14: अथासौ भगवान्साक्षात्षड्भिराननपङ्कजैः। सिद्धोवर्णसमाम्नाय इति सूत्रमुदैरयत्॥ तच्छ्रुत्वैव मनुष्यत्वसुलभचापलाद्धत। उत्तरं सूत्रमभ्यूह्य स्वयमेव मयोदितम्॥ अथाब्रवीत्स देवो मां नावदिष्यः स्वयं यदि। अभविष्यदिदं शास्त्रं पाणिनीयोपमर्दकम्॥ अधुना स्वल्पतन्त्रत्वात्कातन्त्राख्यं भविष्यति। मद्वाहनकलापस्य नाम्ना कालापकं तथा॥ इत्युक्त्वा शब्दशास्त्रं तत्प्रकाश्याभिनवं लघु। साक्षादेव स मां देवः पुनरेवमभाषत॥

Pāṇini's grammar.[161]

It is also well known that according to literary tradition the *Kātantra* was introduced by Śarvavarman as a work to instruct Sātavāhana in grammar within the very short time of six months. Whatever else one may say about this tradition,[162]

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161. In addition, as Liebich noted (1919:5), in his commentary on *Kāt.* 3.8.10 (not 4.4.10, as Liebich says): भृजः स्वरात्स्वे द्विः Durgasiṁha remarks (*KātDVṛ.* V.441.30-31: आद्यव्याकरणमतमेतत्।) that the *sūtra* reflects what is accepted in an early grammar (*ādyavyākaraṇa-*). Durga's *Ṭīkā* (V.441.33-34: आधुनिकव्याकरणेषु नैतल्लक्षणमस्तीति भावः।) and Trilocanadāsa's *Pañjikā* (V.442.2: अर्वाचीनेषु व्याकरणेषु नैतल्लक्षणमस्तीति भावः।) merely note that what Durgasiṁha means to say is that such a rule does not occur in later grammars. It is a fact that Pāṇini and later grammarians do not account for a form like the perfect *babhṛjje* instead of *babhṛje*; the *Kātantra sūtra* provides for doubling of the consonant following the vowel of *bhṛjī* "roast."

162. It has been observed that the *Kātantra* and a grammar of Kumāralāta were both used by monks in eastern Turkestan for the study of Sanskrit ((Lüders 1930: 681). Lüders presented evidence (1930: 716) which, though limited, is sufficient to support the thesis he maintains, namely that Kumāralāta's grammar preceded the *Kātantra* and that the latter was based on this work. Lüders also argues (1930: 718-19) that the name *kaumāra* used for the *Kātantra* should be considered an abbreviated term reflecting Kumāralāta's composition of the earlier work. He also maintains (1930: 718) that the legend according to which Śarvavarman received his grammar as a revelation of Kumāra/Kārttikeya, so that the *Kātantra* is called *kaumāra,* was obviously first invented to explain the use of this name. This all has chronological implications. Under Lüders' thesis — which I think should be accepted even if details remain to be ironed out — the composition of the *Kātantra* was completed in the fourth century. According to the literary tradition, Śarvavarman composed his work in order to instruct king Sātavāhana, who is commonly dated in the first century. I have not considered it necessary to discuss here the thesis that the Kātantra is an abbreviated version of Kāśakṛtsna's grammar, itself assumed to be pre-Pāṇinian.

it is not sufficient to say merely that the brevity of the original *Kātantra* is due to the need for a very short work that would suffice to teach Sātavāhana grammar in six months, or as a pedagogical work in general. It is striking that the original corpus of *Kātantra sūtra*s lacked rules concerning what in the Pāṇinian tradition are called *vṛtti* (note 120), generally said to be of five types: derivates with *kṛt* and *taddhita* affixes, compounds, single remainder (*ekaśeṣa*), and derived verbs with affixes *san* and so on.[163] Well before Śarvavarman, Pāṇinīyas were debating whether a grammar had to include options concerning *taddhita* derivates, compounds and derived verbal bases, and the view was entertained that two special rules relative to particular *taddhita* derivates should not be included in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. It is possible also, though not demonstrable, that the further step, evinced in the *Kāśikā*, of eliminating a series of *taddhita* affixation rules, was being entertained by Śarvavarman's time.[164]

Granting that the *Kātantra* was used for teaching Sanskrit — whether to Buddhist monks or, according to the legend, to Sātavāhana — in view of the evidence presented, I think it is undeniable that the *Kātantra*'s brevity is not just grounded in pedagogical requirements but also has definite

163. E.g. *ŚK sarvasamāsaśeṣaprakaraṇam* (II.215): कृत्तद्धितसमासैक-शेषसनाद्यन्तधातुरूपाः पञ्च वृत्तयः। परार्थाभिधानं वृत्तिः। Bhaṭṭoji quotes the *Bhāṣya* definition cited in note 120. It is possible that Śarvavarman followed the principle अभिधानलक्षणाः कृत्तद्धितसमासाः (see notes 13, 94), so that he included in his original grammar rules such as *Kāt*. 3.2.4, for derived verbal bases. I do not see a way of demonstrating that such rules were excluded from the original corpus.

164. It is at least noteworthy that in his *Vṛtti* to *Kāt*. 1.1.23 Durgasiṁha concentrates on *taddhita* formations and specifies derivates of the type *pañcālāḥ*.

antecedents in theoretical discussions among earlier grammarians, including, most prominently, Pāṇinīyas.[165]

Abbreviations

A — *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini, cited by *adhyāya, pāda, sūtra.*

अष्टा॰ — अष्टाध्यायी.

Amara — *Amarakośa*. See Oka.

Bh. — Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, cited by volume, page and line of Kielhorn's edn., revised by K.V. Abhyankar.

CV— *Cāndra-Vyākaraṇa* of Candragomin, ed. K.C. Chatterji.

का॰ — कातन्त्रम्.

Kāś. — *Kāśikāvṛtti*, Osmania University edition.

Kāt. — *Kātantra*; see Dwivedī 1997-2005, Eggeling, Liebich. [References to *adhyāya, pāda, sūtra* of Dwivedī's edition. References to commentaries include also volumes, pages and lines of Dwivedī's edition.]

KātKC — Kavirāja Suṣeṇaśarman's *Kalāpacandra*.

KātDVṛ. — Durgasiṁha's *Vṛtti* on the *Kātantra*.

KātŚ — Ugrabhūti's *Śiṣyahitānyāsa* on the *Kātantra*.

KātVṛṬī. — Durgasiṁha's *Ṭīkā* to the *Vṛtti* on the *Kātantra*.

KātVṛP — Trilocanadāsa's *Kātantravṛttipañjikā*.

PK — Rāmacandra's *Prakriyākaumudī*, ed. K.P. Trivedi. [References to *sūtra*, volume, page.]

PKPr. — Śrīkṛṣṇācārya's *Prakriyākaumudīprakāśa*, ed. Muralīdhara Miśra. [Reference to *sūtra*, volume, page.]

PM — Haradatta's *Padamañjarī*, in Dwarikadas Shastri and Kalikaprasad Shukla's edition of the *Kāśikā* with the *Kāśikāvivaraṇapañjikā* and Haradatta's *Padamañjarī*. [References to *sūtra*, volume, page.]

RPra. — Śivarāmendrasarasvatī's *Ratnaprakāśa* on the *Mahābhāṣya*, ed., M.S. Narasimhacharya. [References to volume, page.]

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165. I am grateful to Ashok Aklujkar for carefully reading the text on this chapter, correcting typographical errors, and making stylistic suggestions.

ŚK — Bhaṭṭoji's *Śabdakaustubha*, ed., Gopāla Śastrī Nene. [References to *sūtra*, volume, page.]

SK — Bhaṭṭoji's *Siddhāntakaumudī*, ed., Giridhara Sharma Chaturvedi and Parameshvarananda Shama. [References to serially ordered *sūtra*, *Aṣṭādhyāyī* number, volume, page.]

SKBāl. — *Bālamanoramā on Siddāntakaumudī*. See *SK*.

TC IV.2 — *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, vol. IV.2: see Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīça.

TPr. — *Taittirīyaprātiśākhya*, ed. R. Shama Sastri and K. Rangacarya.

Vaijayantī — *Vaijayantīkoṣa*. See Haragovinda Śāstrī.

VP — Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, ed. W. Rau.

vt. — *vārttika* of Kātyāyana.

Vyāḍi — Vyāḍi's *Paribhāṣāvṛtti*, ed. Dominik Wujastyk.

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———, 1997-2005, *Kātantravyākaraṇa of Ācārya Śarvavarmā with four commentaries: Vṛtti* and *Ṭīkā by Śrī Durgasiṁha, Kātantravṛttipañjikā by Śrī Trilocanadāsa, Kalāpacandra by Kavirāja Suṣeṇaśarmā, Samīkṣā by editor.* आचार्यसर्ववर्मप्रणीतं कातन्त्रव्याकरणम् श्रीदुर्गसिंहकृताभ्यां कातन्त्रवृत्तिटीकाभ्यां श्रीमत्त्रिलोचनदासकृतया 'कातन्त्रवृत्तिपञ्जिका'-टीकया कविराजसुषेणशर्मकृतया 'कलापचन्द्र'-टीकया . . . समलङ्कृतम् (Sarasvatībhavana-Granthamālā 135), Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University. [Four parts (1, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 4) in 6 volumes; volumes IV-V (parts 3.1-3.2) also include a *ṭīkā* by Ācārya Bilveśvara.]

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10

Kṣīrākhyātā Catuṣpadī
Notes on Kṣīrasvāmin's Comments on the Four Basic Grammatical Categories*

M.G. Dhadphale

A Squarely Treatment

I INTENTIONALLY chose a Sanskrit title for this paper. The 'octogrammatic' title, according to me, sums up the main contribution of Kṣīrasvāmin (henceforth Kṣ). Amongst the later Sanskrit grammarians (in the sense of analysts of language forms, not necessarily as authors of independent grammars), our author alone seems to be an exceptional grammarian (*vaiyākaraṇa*), dealing with (all) the four grammatical categories namely *nāma, ākhyāta, upasarga* and *nipāta*.

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* My young and enthusiastic friend Mrinal Kaul 'Martand' phoned me that I should contribute an article on the contribution of Kṣīrasvāmin to Sanskrit Grammar for his contemplated *Linguistic Traditions of Kashmir*, to be dedicated to the memory of Paṇḍit Dinanath Yaksha. Being impressed by the nobility of the cause, I agreed to the proposal without even thinking for a moment about my competence to do justice to the subject. If I still do not repent about my inadvertent acceptance of Mrinal's proposal, it is solely because I thereby get the rare opportunity to pay my respects to the pious memory of a great Kashmirian Paṇḍit. I wish to say *kāśmīrajasya yakṣasya pūjanīyā vidagdhatā*.

The above fourfold division is recognized right from the time of Yāska. It is based on the kind of sense words convey.[1] Nouns convey the sense of substance (*sattva*, accomplished existence), and verbs (*ākhyāta*) denote *bhāva* (the process of being). The third group of words is that which conveys neither *bhāva* nor *sattva* but becomes meaningful only when associated with verbal activities. The group is known by the term *upasarga* (preposition).[2] The fourth group, called *nipāta*, defies any exact or single definition, because its constituents express 'high and low' (*uccāvaca*) that is, identifiable and not-so-identifiable or promiscuous and non-promiscuous senses. The group is divided into three subgroups: (a) *upamārthīya*, (b) *karmopasaṁgrahārthīya* and (c) *pāda-pūraṇa*.[3]

Kṣ has written about every type in the fourfold classification, based on the criterion of the general meanings of words, described above. In his celebrated commentary on Amara's lexicon, *Amarakoṣodghāṭana*, he has marked in detail the grammatical formulations and senses of *nāmans* (nouns). In his *Vṛtti* titled *Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī*, sometimes called *Amṛtataraṅgiṇī*, on Pāṇini's *Dhātupāṭha*, he minutely notes the many differences in the *Dhātupāṭha* text consisting of roots and their meanings and gives us a tool to understand the *ākhyātas*.[4] Coming to the remaining two types, naturally

1. *tad yāni catvāri padajātāni nāmākhyāte copasarganipātāś ca tānīmāni bhavanti* (Nirukta 1.1.8). The *Paspaśāhnika* of *Mahābhāṣya* also says *catvāri padajātāni nāmākhyātopasarganipātāś ca.*

2. *na nirbaddhā upasargā arthān nirahur iti śākaṭāyanaḥ* (Nirukta 1.3.3-6).

3. (a) See Aklujkar 1999 for details and especially for the discussion of *karmopasaṁgraha nipāta.*

4. (a) The same is the case with the other two *Dhātuvṛttis* namely those of Sāyaṇa/Mādhava and Maitreyarakṣita.

→

containing lesser words than the first two,[5] we should note that Kṣ has written a small tract entitled *Nipātāvyayopasargavṛtti.*

Kṣ's *Nighaṇṭu-vṛtti,* mentioned by Devarāja in his *Nirvacana* gloss on the Nighaṇṭu part of Yāska's *Nirukta,* may be only another name of Kṣ's commentary on the *Amarakoṣa.* Kṣ's *Gaṇavṛtti* is mentioned by Vardhamāna in his *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi.* In his *Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī,* Kṣ has dealt with the *gaṇa* division in the commentaries on the *sūtra*s of Pāṇini, its usefulness and the *seṭ* and *aniṭ* dichotomy pertaining to certain special usages of the roots. Therefore, the *Gaṇavṛtti* known to Vardhamāna may not be a separate work.

The late Professor K.V. Abhyankar may have been confused when in his entry (*Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar,* Baroda, 1986) of *Nipātāvyayopasargavṛtti* he attributed the work to a Kashmirian grammarian Tilaka. Tilaka is not the author of the *Vṛtti;* he has only written a brief gloss on the *Vṛtti.* Abhyankar was for a very long time actively associated with the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute in Pune. But it seems that he did not refer to the manuscript of this tract in the Institute's collection that mentions, at the beginning and at the end, that the original work is that of Kṣ and the writer of the gloss is Tilaka.[6]

→ (b) For the *Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī,* see Bruno Liebich's excellent edition of it. For the *Dhātupāṭhas* of non-Pāṇinian schools like those of Candra, Śākaṭāyana, Hemacandra and the like, see Palsule (1957) and Palsule (1955) that stand as a unique contribution.

5. In any natural language, the number of nouns and verbs is bound to exceed that of prepositions and particles.

6. (a) *Nipātāvyayopasargavṛtti* by Kṣīrasvāmin. Acc. No. 290 in the Bühler Collection of 1875-76 (18 Folia, 12 Lines, Devanāgarī Script). See also *Avyayavṛtti* by Kṣīrasvāmin (?) Acc. No. 272 in the same collection (10 Folia, 15 Lines, Śāradā script).

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Besides his books exploring Sanskrit as a language, Kṣ is said to have written a drama named *Abhinavarāghava*. The *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* (Baroda, edn., p. 1550) says *yathā kṣīrasvāmiviracite abhinavarāghave sūtradhāraḥ*. One other verse of the *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* has the wording *kṣīrasya nāṭakam ananyasamānasāram*.

Time, Place and Personality

It has not yet been determined if the Kṣīra mentioned by Kalhaṇa in his *Rāja-taraṅgiṇī* (4.489) as a *śabda-vidyopādhyāya* 'teacher of language science' of King Jayāpīḍa is the same person as our Kṣ. The areas of their expertise agree. If this is taken as sufficient proof of identity, Kṣ should be placed in the eighth century CE. Most of the scholars who have studied the afore-mentioned works, however, express the view that he belonged to a period CE 1115-65. Only K.V. Abhyankar (1961) and K.G. Oak (1913:3), as far as I know, think that he existed in the eighth century CE. That he is quoted by Hemacandra (1089-1172) would speak against CE 1115-65 as his period.

Oak (1913:3) believes that our author's name and the title of his work (*Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī*) suggest a relation to Kṣīreśvara Mahādeva of Kakupada near Kanoj and, therefore, he belonged to Central India. I am inclined to believe that the reference is to the famous Kṣīrasarovara (milky lake) in Kashmir.[7]

→ (b) Addition by Ashok Aklujkar: A *Nipātāvyayopasarga-vṛtti*, with Tilaka as the author, has been published in South India. It should be ascertained if it is a work based on Kṣ's statements in his various works, particularly the *Amarakośodghāṭana* and the *Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī*, or genuinely a work of Tilaka.

7. The milky-spring of the Goddess Kṣīrabhavānī is the most famous pilgrimage place among the Paṇḍits of Kashmir. This shrine is situated towards the north-west in Ganderbal at a distance of 24 km from Srinagar. The village in which the shrine is situated is locally known as Tula-Mūla.

Kṣ was a devotee of Śiva as is clear from the introductory verse(s) and other indications in his commentaries.

Kṣ offers a historically valuable testimony regarding the tradition of listing Sanskrit verbal roots. In this testimony we see a combination of confidence and admission of personal limits. On the one hand, he may be understood as suggesting that where his great predecessors like Candra failed to do justice to the *Dhātupāṭha*, he could do justice to the text. "Authorities like Candra have also 'broken down' and 'become confused' (in this task)," says he.[8] On the other hand, he also says, "The text of Pāṇini's *Dhātupāṭha*, because of its loss of tradition, has confused even great authorities. Under such circumstances we (= Kṣ) do not know which readings are to be rejected and which are to be retained."[9]

Two observations regarding the Amarakośodghāṭana

In the case of only a few words Kṣ gives *deśī* words for the Sanskrit vocables. Liṅgayya-sūrin, on the other hand, gives many Telugu words while explaining the medicinal plants. For *kārpāsa* (cotton) he gives *pratti, patti, putti* (Kannada: *hatti*).

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8. *bhagnāḥ pārāyaṇikāś candrādyā api ca yatra vibhrāntāḥ* (*Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī* verse 6ab in the prefatory section).

9. *pāṭhe'rthe cāgamabhraṁśān mahatām api mohataḥ* । *na vidamaḥ kiṁ nu jahīmaḥ kiṁ vā 'trādadhmahe vayam* ॥ (at the end of the *Curādigaṇa* in *Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī*).

   Sāyaṇa/Mādhava in his *Dhātuvṛtti* indirectly supports the observation of Kṣ saying, "Here some read the root *dhṛ* in the sense of *dhāraṇa* (to retain, to preserve, to hold) but this is not in keeping with the sage (*ṛṣi*, i.e. Pāṇini). We have, therefore, followed Maitreyarakṣita and others and noted it as being *hṛ*." *iha kecid dhṛñ dhāraṇe iti paṭhanti, so 'nārṣaḥ . . . asmābhis tu maitreyādyanurodhena harater anantaraṁ paṭhitvā 'yam udāhṛtaḥ* (p. 184)

He clearly states *iha vṛkṣalatāuṣadhīnām nāmāni āndhrabhāṣayā vakṣyāmaḥ* (p. 229).

The phenomenon of the blind leading the blind is not uncommon in lexical traditions. Kṣ (*Amarakoṣa*, Poona Edition, 1941, p. 104) remarks that Amarasiṁha was misled by Bhāguri who wrongly identified a class of prickly nightshade (*vidagdhikā*) with the plant *Bṛhatī*, when actually these two are quite distinct plants (*bṛhatī tu nidigdhiketi bhāguri-vākyāt granthakṛd bhrāntaḥ*). Again in the *Vaiśya-varga* (ibid. p. 148) he says Mālākāra was led astray by Bhāguri who equated *sara* (dental *s*) with *śara* (a palatal one) (*etac ca drapsaṁ śaram*). The implication would be that the 'blind' Mālākāra misled Amara.

Some observations regarding the Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī:

Kṣ, at times, refers to a Vṛttikāra. Generally in Pāṇinian tradition the title refers to the Kāśikākāra. But it seems from Kṣ's references that, at least for some authors in the Sanskrit grammatical tradition, the epithet stood for a Dhātuvṛttikāra unknown to us at present. This comes out in the discussion of root *śrath*. Kṣ states that the root *śrath* being *idit* does not admit a loss of *n* and, therefore, the Vṛttikāra noting the form *śrethe* is deluded (*iditvād aunāsikalopābhāvaḥ. śrethe iti tūdāharan vṛttikṛd bhrāntaḥ* (*Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī* 1.291). Sāyaṇa/Mādhava quotes Kṣ's view in the following remark: *iditvād anunāsikalopābhāvad . . . vṛttikṛd bhrāntaḥ* and further explains that here the Vṛttikṛt is some Dhātuvṛttikṛt (*atra vṛttikāro dhātuvṛttikṛd ucyate*). See Mīmāṁsaka, p. 46.

Kṣ is respectfully followed by Hemacandra when the latter in his *Dhātupāṭha* (1.897) considers *paribhāṣaṇa* and *yācanā* as two meanings of the root *reṭṭ*. However, in my view, Kṣ has here misled Hemacandra; *ca* does not attract *yācanā* from the earlier *cate cade ca yācane*. In fact, *cate cade ca yācane* is only Kṣ's

reading. Maitreyarakṣita does not mention *ca*, and Sāyaṇa/Mādhava does a good job by shifting the position of *ca* by reading *yācane ca*. This makes it clear that Sāyaṇa/Mādhava considers the *cakāra* as being used to attract the meaning *paribhāṣaṇa* in the earlier *Dhātupāṭha* item.

A more glaring mistake of Kṣ may be the following. Under the *svādigaṇa*, there are four consecutive entries: (1) *ṣṭigha āskandane*, (2) *udāttānudāttāt tetau*, (3) *tika tiga ca*, and (4) *ṣadha hiṁsāyām* (*Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī* 5.22-25). Now *ca* is in the third entry; *āskandane* occurs in the first entry. In between occurs the second entry, which prevents *ca* from operating as an *ākarṣaka pada* 'a word causing *anuvṛtti* or continuation.' But Kṣ has forcibly attracted *āskandana* from the first to the third. In this, Maitreyarakṣita has followed him, but Kāśakṛtsna, Kātantra, Hemacandra and Śākaṭāyana have not done the same mistake.

As a similar case we should note that Kṣ also mentions an attempt of someone who joined the *ca* in the third entry with the root mentioned in the fourth entry and contributed to Sanskrit a novel root *caṣagh*. Kṣ must have noted this with a smile on his face as he writes *tika tiga caṣagha, hiṁsāyāṁ ity eke. caṣaghnoti.* (*Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī* 5.25).

Further, it is interesting to note the meanings given of the two roots *śas* and *vaś*. Patañjali says *ṣasi-vaśī chāndasau* (the roots *ṣas* and *vaś* are of Vedic usage). Kaiyaṭa explains that Patañjali is voicing the opinion of those according to whom *ṣas* only means 'to sleep' and *vaś* only 'to shine.' These scholars do not attach both the meanings to the root *ṣas*.'[10] Kṣ says *ṣas svapne* and *vaś kāntau*, while Maitreyarakṣita in his *Dhātupradīpa* notes two meanings of *ṣas* (*śas, sasti svapne*).

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10. *ṣas svapne iti ye na paṭhanti, kevalaṁ ṣas svapne, vaś kāntau iti, tanmatenaitad uktam.*

In statements regarding the formation of nominal derivates (nouns, adjectives, participles, etc.), the division between *kṛdanta* and *taddhita* is well known. But in certain cases of words like *homī, vadhya, drāḍhima* and *nediṣṭha,* the grammarians are not unanimous regarding the group to which these words should belong. According to Yāska, the form *homī* is a *kṛdanta,* but the Pāṇinian tradition explains it as *homo 'syāstīti,* which contains the possessive suffix *in* (*homa* + *in*), making *homī* a *taddhitānta.* Patañjali explains the noun *vadhya* as *vadham arhati* and considers it not as a *kṛdanta* but as a *taddhitānta* (*hano vā vadha ca, taddhito vā* III.1.97). Kṣ observes that the nouns *drādhima* and *nediṣṭha,* which at present are considered as formed by applying *taddhita* suffixes, were in the past considered as *kṛdantas* (*drādhimādayaḥ kasmiṁścid vyākaraṇe dhātor eva sādhitāḥ, evaṁ nediṣṭhādayo nedatyādeḥ* (*Kṣīrataraṅgiṇī* 1.80).

A provisional assessment

Kṣ's successors in the field of verb studies such as Hemacandra and Sāyaṇa/Mādhava have evidently followed him with trust. Fellow commentators of the *Amarakoṣa* such as Liṅgayasūrin (author of the *Amarapadavivṛti*) speak respectfully about him. They duly consulted his works and spoke of him, along with some other scholars, as 'knowers of grammar, Mīmāṁsā and logic' (*padavākyapramāṇajñaiḥ kṣīrasvāmyādisūribhiḥ kṛtān granthān samālocya* . . .). At present, I value him mainly for one thing: He is a scholar who wrote about all the four cardinal categories of words, viz. *nāma, ākhyāta, upasarga* and *nipāta.* Sanskrit Grammar was for a long time known as *pada-śāstra*. Our Kṣ covered the whole *pada-śāstra.* Further, Amara's lexicon is the oldest available work of its kind, and Kṣ's commentary is the earliest available one on *Amarakoṣa.* In the extant lexicographical literature Amara's lexicon and Kṣ's commentary are the pioneering Works. The same is true with his *Dhātuvṛtti.* It is

the earliest extant *Vṛtti* on Pāṇini's *Dhātupāṭha*. While giving him credit for his *catuṣpadī vyākhyā*, I would also note that there is a need to study his statements critically and to determine the extent of his maturity and depth.

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11

Three Kashmirian Texts on Sanskrit Syntax

Kuḍaka's Samanvayadiś, Devaśarman's Samanvayapradīpa and Samanvayapradīpasaṅketa

Oliver Hahn

IT was in 1992 that attention was drawn to a small group of Sanskrit texts which stand out against the mass of (published) texts on indigenous Sanskrit grammar, inasfar as they are specially concerned with the syntax of Sanskrit: in his article,[1] Slaje dealt with three texts, all of which bear the term *samanvaya*° in their titles, namely the *Samanvayadiś* (*SD*) of a certain Kuḍaka/Chuḍḍaka, a small work in prose of which only a fragment is extant; the *Samanvayapradīpa* (*SP*) of Devaśarman, a work of some 70 mnemonic verses or *kārikā*s in the *anuṣṭubh* metre; as well as the *Samanvayapradīpasaṅketa* (*SPS*), being an auto-commentary on the latter.

Slaje had come across these texts when he was cataloguing Sanskrit manuscripts belonging to the National Library of Austria in Vienna, some hundred years after these manuscripts

1. Cf. Slaje, 1992.

had reached there from Srinagar, Kashmir, having been collected by the well-known archaeological explorer Marcus Aurel Stein in 1894.

Slaje's study includes a partial edition of the above texts, i.e. the extant parts of the *SD* together with the corresponding portions of the *SP*, adding some selected passages of the *SPS*.[2] On the basis of this edition, I have written an MA thesis,[3] in which I translated and commented on the Sanskrit text edited so far.

Thus, the present article is a summary of both Slaje's study and the findings of my MA thesis, in which, however, I was not yet able to study the whole text of the *SPS*.[4]

The Available Manuscripts

Of the *SD*, there is only a fragment (fols. 11-12 and 14-19) of one single birch bark manuscript, written in Śāradā characters, available.[5] In its colophon, the author of this text is called Chuḍḍaka:

> *iti samanvayadik samāptā,*
> *kṛtī rājānapaṇḍitacchuḍḍakasya* ||[6]

> Thus the *Samanvayadiś* is completed, the work of the learned *rājāna* Chuḍḍaka.[7]

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2. These portions of the *SD* and *SPS* are now also available as an e-text in the Göttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages (GRETIL).
3. Cf. Hahn, 2000.
4. Currently, I am preparing a PhD thesis, which will contain a critical edition and annotated translation of the complete *SPS*.
5. Ms. "Sanskrit 4" (Österr. Nationalbibliothek, Wien), cf. Slaje 1990.
6. Slaje 1992:125 sub 6.
7. On the title *rājāna* see below.

Up to now, four manuscripts of the *SP* and the *SPS* have become accessible. In each case, the auto-commentary *SPS* incorporates the verses of the *SP*.[8]

Interdependence of the Texts

Before we deal with the subject matter of these texts, let us see how *SD* and *SPS* are related to each other. In this connection we are informed in the last verse of the *SP* and the correspondent parts of the *SPS* that Devaśarman is following the way or method as taught by Kuḍaka,[9] the only difference being that the latter's work was written in prose, while Devaśarman chose the metrical form of *kārikā*s for his text:

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8. A manuscript written in Śāradā: Ms. "Sanskrit 5" (Österr. Nationalbibliothek, Wien), cf. Slaje 1990. Another Śāradā manuscript: Hs. or. 12336 (Staatsbibliothek Berlin, Sammlung Janert). In the writer's colophon, this text is called *Samanvayapradīpikā*: *saṁvat* 1917 *māghaśudi pratipadi ravau likhiteyaṁ samanvayapradīpikā śubham* I The date corresponds to 11th February 1861 CE (for the computation of which I am grateful to Karl-Heinz Golzio, Bonn). A manuscript in Kashmiri style Nāgarī: Ms. 327/1875-76 (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona), cf. Descr. Cat. BORI, no. 353.

   In the summer of 2005, I was kindly informed by Mrinal Kaul of Delhi University of two more Śāradā manuscripts in the Iqbal Library of the University of Kashmir, Hazratbal, Srinagar, bearing the title *Samanvayapradīpa*: S. No. 3305 and 3306. Thanks to his great help, I was able to consult at least one of these (S. No. 3306). In the writer's colophon, this text is called *Samanvayapradīpikā*, too: *iti samanvayapradīpikā samāptā* . . .

9. This is the form in which the author of the *SD* appears in all the four manuscripts of the *SPS* I was able to consult until now.

samanvayapradīpo 'yaṁ kuḍakoktādhvanā mayā ।
darśito vibudhair atra kāryā skhalitayojanā ॥[10]

I have laid down this *Samanvayapradīpa* according to the way taught by Kuḍaka. The learned should put right [anything that is] mistaken here.

SPS:

kuḍakaḥ paṇḍita ekaḥ । *tenokto yo 'dhvā* [=] *mārgaḥ, samanvayadigākhyo granthaviśeṣa ity arthaḥ* । *sa tu gadyarūpeṇa sthito, 'yaṁ tu padyarūpeṇaitāvān eva viśeṣaḥ* ॥[11]

Kuḍaka was a learned man. The way that has been taught by him is a particular treatise named *Samanvayadiś* — such is the meaning (of the compound *kuḍakoktādhvanā*). That [work] is in prose, whereas this [*Samanvayapradīpa*] has metrical form — only this much is the difference.

Kuḍaka was not the direct teacher of Devaśarman, as the latter names his *guru* Gaṅgādhara in the introductory stanza of the *SPS*:[12]

praṇamya viṣṇuṁ lokeśaṁ gaṅgādharaguruṁ tathā ।
svakārikāṇāṁ saṅketaḥ kriyate devaśarmaṇā ॥

Having bowed to Viṣṇu, the lord of the world, as well as to [my] teacher Gaṅgādhara, Devaśarman is making [this] *saṅketa* on his own *kārikā*s (i.e. on his *Samanvayapradīpa*).

A closer look at the contents of both the extant parts of the *SD*, of which most of the second half has come down to us,

10. Slaje, 1992:125 sub 6.

11. Ibid.

12. Slaje, 1992:106f.

and the complete *SPS* shows how faithfully Devaśarman is following the track of his forerunner, both with regard to the arrangement and the subject matter of his work. Thus, we can deduce with some confidence the missing parts of the *SD* from the *SPS*.

Subject Matter

As already mentioned, the texts of Kuḍaka and Devaśarman deal with *samanvaya* (besides this, the terms *sambandha* and *abhisambandha* are used synonymously), that is, the (integrated grammatical) relation of the words (*śabda*) within a sentence (*vākya*), in short, syntax. That the sentence and its constituent parts are the primary object of Devaśarman's (and Kuḍaka's) text is clearly stated in the beginning of the *SP*:[13]

> *iha hi vyavahāro 'yaṁ śabdādhīnaḥ pradr̥śyate* |
> *vākyaṁ vinā sa śabdasya kevalasya na vidyate* ||

> In this [science of grammar],[14] these [linguistic] transactions[15] certainly appear as based on words. Word(s) alone, [however], are not used without a sentence.

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13. Slaje, 1992:107.
14. The *SPS* explains *iha* with *śāstre*, which might either refer to a specific treatise, i.e. the *SP*, or, in a more general way, to the "science [of grammar]" (i.e. *vyākaraṇa*) as a whole or, last but not least, to the specific field of grammar Devaśarman is devoting his text to, i.e. syntax (*samanvaya*).
15. "[Linguistic] transactions" (*vyavahāra*), i.e. (verbal or written) communication or, more specifically, the received usage of the Sanskrit language. *Ayam* "this here" seems to add to *vyavahāra* the sense of "under consideration here."

That is, the sentence (*vākya*) is the ultimate unit of speech. Although speech (or a "speech act") in the first place seems to be constituted of words (its "obvious" elements) these words alone do not make up a meaningful utterance. In his *SPS* on this verse, Devaśarman explains that if something like *gām* ("the cow," acc. sg.) is uttered, this is not an intelligible usage of words, since in this case neither some action (*pravṛtti*) nor the omission of some action (*nivṛtti*) is understood.[16]

On the other hand, even a single word like *brūhi* ("speak!") can be considered a meaningful and complete sentence, that is to say, if the context makes it clear enough what the speaker is driving at by his elliptic statement. In such a case, the missing parts or "factors of action" (*kāraka*) of the sentence have to be mentally supplemented (*adhyāhṛta*). This is expressly stated in a verse towards the end of the *SP*:[17]

> *adhyāhṛtakārakāṇāṁ sambandhaś ca kvacid bhavet* ।
> *ekakriyāprayoge 'pi, yathā 'brūhy, apasarpa, bhoḥ'* ॥
>
> And in some cases there is a [syntactical] connection of supplemented factors of action, even if [only] a single [word expressing an] action is used, such us "speak!" [or,] "go away, Sir!"[18]

Let us return once again to the beginning, though. Having stated the importance of the syntactical unit "sentence," Devaśarman goes on to define it:

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16. Devaśarman: *vyavaharaṇaṁ* [=] *vyavahāraḥ pravṛttinivṛttyātmakaḥ . . . na hi gām ity ukte pravṛttir nivṛttir vā gamyate.*
17. Slaje, 1992:124 sub 5.2.
18. In this connection, cf. *Mbh* ad Pāṇ 2.1.1 sub *Vārtt.* 10: *ekatiṅ* ॥ *ekatiṅ vākyasaṁjñaṁ bhavatīti vaktavyam* । *brūhi brūhi.*

taṁ jñātuṁ lakṣaṇaṁ tasmāj jñātavyaṁ tasya paṇḍitaiḥ ।
tadartham ādau vākyasya lakṣaṇaṁ kriyate mayā ॥

sakārakaṁ sāvyayaṁ ca viśeṣaṇasamanvitam ।
tasya lakṣaṇam ākhyātam 'na brūyād anṛtaṁ vacaḥ' ॥[19]

Therefore, in order to know that [received usage], the learned need to know the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*)[20] of the [sentence]. For this purpose, to begin with, I make a definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of the sentence.

Its characteristic is the verb, together with the *kārakas* (instruments of action), indeclinables, and attributes. (Example:) "One should not speak an untrue sentence."

In the following, I give a table of contents as they are dealt with in the *SPS*, since Devaśarman very rarely deviates from Kuḍaka's arrangement of topics, as we can see from the extant parts of the *SD*.[21]

Two programmatic verses
vākyalakṣaṇa (definition of the sentence)

1. *viśeṣaṇa* (adjectives, adverbs, etc.)[22]

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19. Cf. *Vārtt.* 9 *ad* Pāṇ 2.1.1: *ākhyātaṁ sāvyayakārakaviśeṣaṇam vākyam*. The last *pāda* of this verse gives an example incorporating all of the four (possible) components of a sentence, the verb being, however, the most essential part or characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of it.

20. Devaśarman's gloss on *lakṣaṇa* is as follows: *lakṣyate 'nenety lakṣaṇam* [=] *asādhārano dharmaḥ*.

21. Cf. Slaje, 1992:112. Occasionally, however, Devaśarman goes much more into detail than Kuḍaka. Cf. his discussion of relative and correlative clauses (*yat-tat-sambandha*) below.

22. The term *viśeṣaṇa* in its widest application means any specification both of a noun (such as mention of an attribute, apposition) or a verbal action. Thus, the *kārakas* are treated as *vyadhikaraṇa(kriyā)viśeṣaṇa*.

1.1. *samānādhikaraṇa* (concordant)

1.2. *vyadhikaraṇa* (non-concordant)

1.3. *samāsa* (compounds)

2. *kriyā* (verb, finite)[23]

2.1. *kartṛkarmabhāvaniṣṭhā kriyā* (active, passive, and impersonal constructions of the verb)

2.1.1. *parasmaipadin* (roots taking the endings of the *parasmaipada*)

2.1.2. *ātmanepadin* (roots taking the endings of the *ātmanepada*)

2.1.3. *ubhayapadin* (roots taking the endings of either *parasmaipada* or *ātmanepada*)

2.1.4. *dvikarmakadhātu* (roots governing two objects)

3. *kṛt* (primary affixes forming verbal nouns, i.e. *kṛdantā kriyā*)[24]

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23. The term *yagādyantā kriyā* (i.e. "a verb [the stem of which] ends in *yak*, etc.") is used for the Pāṇinian *tiṅantā kriyā*. The *vikaraṇa* (i.e. infix) *yak* (*-ya-*) forms the passive stem of a verb (cf. Pāṇ 3.1.67; in *sūtra* 3.1.87 *yak* is taught for the stem of the reflexive verb), whereas °*ādi* comprises all the remaining *vikaraṇa*s. Thus, the term *yagādyanta* denotes the whole range of finite verbs in active, passive (including reflexive), and impersonal constructions. With the following verse, Devaśarman winds up his discussion of the finite verb and introduces the section devoted to verbal nouns (*kṛdanta*).

kriyā bhedād yagādyantā kṛdantā ca prakīrtitā |
prathamoktā dvitīyāpi saṅkṣepād vakṣyate 'dhunā ||

The verb(al action) is traditionally divided into finite verb (*yagādyantā kriyā*) and verbal noun (*kṛdantā kriyā*). The first [group of verbs] has been taught [so far], the second [group] will be taught now as well.

24. The extant parts of the *SD* begin with this section.

- 3.1. *kṛtya* (gerundive)
- 3.2. *niṣṭhādi* (past participles)
  - 3.2.1. *kta* (past participle passive)
  - 3.2.2. *ktavantu* (past participle active)[25]
- 3.3. *ghañādi* (agent and action nouns)
  - 3.3.1. *vuṇ-tṛc* (agent nouns ending in *-aka* and *-tṛ*)
  - 3.3.2. *ghañ-yuṭ-kti* (action nouns ending in *-a* (masc.), *-ana* (neut.), and *-ti* (fem.))

4. *pradhānaguṇakriyā* (main and subordinate verbs)
   - 4.1. *pradhānakriyā* (main action)
   - 4.2. *guṇakriyā* (subordinate action)
     - 4.2.1. *pūrvakālakriyā* (gerund)
     - 4.2.2. *samakālakriyā* (present participle)
   - 4.3. *kriyādhyāhāra* (supplementation of a verb)
5. *vākyasambandha* (connection of sentences, i.e. clauses)
   - 5.1. *yat-tat-sambandha* (relative and correlative clauses)[26]
   - 5.2. *kārakādhyāhāra* (supplementation of *kāraka*s)
   - 5.3. *vākyārthaparisamāpti* (completion of the meaning of a sentence or its nomenclature)

Thus, our authors deal with the whole range of possible syntactic relations, both within one sentence and between sentences or clauses, as in the case of the relation of *yad* and

25. For deviations of technical terms within the *Samanvaya* system from the Pāniṇian system see the next section.
26. The words *yad* and *tad* comprise all case forms and derivatives of the respective pronouns, including *yatra-tatra* "where-there," *yadā-tadā* "when-then," etc.

tad clauses. Furthermore, the analysis of the structure of compounds (*samāsa*) is meant to uncover their "hidden" syntax, which is conveyed in a condensed form. Consequently, it is not surprising at all that *samāsa* should form a part of a treatise on syntax, as is the case with Devaśarman's *SPS*.[27]

Another central concept in the field of Sanskrit syntax is the notion of the *kārakas*, i.e. "factors" or "instruments of action." One possibility to express the relationships between a verbal action (*kriyā*) and its *kārakas* is through the case ending of an inflected noun, as in *devadatta odanaṁ pacati* "Devadatta cooks rice."[28] However, there are four more possibilities to indicate such a *kāraka* relationship within a sentence.[29] These are the following: a verbal ending (*tiṅ*), a primary affix (*kṛt*), a secondary affix (*taddhita*), and a compound (*samāsa*). Out of these four, as can be seen from the above list, only the *taddhita* affixes are not dealt with by Kuḍaka and Devaśarman.[30]

Terminological Deviations from the Pāṇinian system of Grammar

Although most of the technical terms used in the *SD* and the *SPS*, such as *kartṛ* "agent, logical subject" or *dhātu* "verbal root," are universally accepted not only in the Pāṇinian system of

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27. Whether or not Kuḍaka actually dealt with *samāsa* can, of course, not be determined with absolute certainty.

28. Here, the accusative ending of *odanam* "rice" signals the functioning of this word as a *karman* (logical object) of the transitive verb *pacati* "cooks," which is used in the active construction (*kartari prayoge*).

29. Cf. Pāṇ 2.3.1: *anabhihite*, i.e. the case endings apply only when the *kāraka* relations have not been expressed otherwise.

30. The *Vārarucasaṁgraha*, another work on syntax in 25 *ślokas*, equally deals with the categories *kāraka*, *samāsa*, *taddhita*, *tiṅ*, and *kṛt*. Devaśarman actually incorporates two half verses of this work, →

grammar but also in other schools, there are a number of terms seemingly peculiar to the *samanvaya* system. As noted above, there are more or less significant deviations concerning the terms for the primary suffixes (*kṛt*), as the following table shows:

Table-1

	Samanvaya tradition	*Pāṇinian tradition*
kṛtya	*ghyaṇ*	*ṇyat* (3.1.124)
niṣṭhādi	*ktavantu*	*ktavatu* (1.1.26)
	kvansu	*kvasu* (3.2.107)
	kāna	*kānac* (3.2.106)
	śantṛṅ	*śatṛ* (3.2.124)
	ānaś	*śānac* (3.2.124)
	yu	*yuc* (3.2.148)
	śānaṅ	*śānan* (3.2.128)
	tṛṇ	*tṛn* (3.2.135)
	vuṇ	*vuñ* (3.2.146)
	ṇin	*ṇini* (3.1.134)
ghañādi	*vuṇ*	*ṇvul* (3.1.133)
	yuṭ	*lyuṭ* (3.3.113)
	kti	*ktin* (3.3.95)

As all of these deviating or modified terms are handed

→ defining the use of the *parasmaipada* and the *ātmanepada* endings. The expressions *kartari*, *bhāve* and *karmaṇi* (scil. *prayoge*) refer to the active, impersonal and passive construction of the verb respectively. The verse, occurring in *Vārarucasaṁgraha* 15cd-16ab, runs as follows (the edition has, however, *jñeyo* and *vijñeyo*):

parasmai kartari jñeyaṁ na bhāve nāpi karmaṇi ।
ātmane triṣu vijñeyaṁ bhāve kartari karmaṇi ॥

[The endings of the] *parasmaipada* should be known [to denote only] the *kartṛ* (logical subject), not the *bhāva* (the action itself), nor the *karman* (logical object). [The endings of the] *ātmanepada* should be known as [denoting] all three: *bhāva*, *kartṛ*, [and] *karman*.

down in the same shape in all the manuscripts consulted so far of both *SD* and *SPS*, we can virtually rule out mere errors of transmission. Therefore, we have to look for some other reason for these modifications.

First of all, we may assume some influence from other systems of grammar, such as the Kātantra, Cāndra or Sārasvata systems. Indeed, of all these three, the Kātantra is likely to have influenced the terminology of the Samanvaya system, which elsewhere follows, by and large, the *munitraya* of Sanskrit grammar, as is shown by citations and discussions from the *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Kāśikā*, which now and then are taken up by Kuḍaka and Devaśarman. The following table shows a list of the *niṣṭhādi* affixes as taught in Durgasiṁha's commentary on *Kātantra* 2.4.42, compared with the respective terms of the Samanvaya and Pāṇinian systems:

Table 2

Kātantra	*Samanvaya*	*Pāṇini*	*denotes*	*example*
kta	*kta*	*kta*	past part. pass.	*kṛta*
ktavantu	*ktavantu*	*ktavatu*	past part. act.	*kṛtavant*
śantṛṅ	*śantṛṅ*	*śatṛ*	pres. part. par.	*pacant*
āna(ś)	*ānaś*	*śānac*	pres. part. ā.	*pacamāna*
vansu	*kvansu*	*kvasu*	perf. part. par.	*papivas*
ki	*ki*	*ki, kin*	agent noun	*papi*
ud-anta	*u*	*u*	"	*cikīrṣu*
ukañ	*ukañ*	*ukañ*	"	*ākāmuka*
avyaya	*ktvā*	*ktvā*	gerund	*kṛtvā*
	ṇam	*ṇamul*	"	*kāram*
	tumun, etc.	infinitive	*kartum*	
khal-artha	*khal*	*khal*	verbal adjective	*īṣatkara*
tṛn (*tṛṇ*)	*tṛṇ*	*tṛn*	agent noun	*vaditṛ*

Comparing the terms for the *niṣṭhādi* affixes of these three systems, we shall concentrate on the so-called *anubandha*s or *it*s, that is the mute elements serving as markers for specific information about how the affix they are appended to influences the stem with regard to accent, *guṇa*, *vṛddhi*, and so on. When we look at the lists of affixes in both tables, we note a tendency of the two non-Pāṇinian systems to remove certain *it*s (cf. *ṇam* for *ṇamul*), to shift their position (*ānaś* for *śānac*), to use different *anubandha*s (*vuṇ* for *vuñ*), or even to create additional *it*s (*śantṛṅ* for *śatṛ*).[31]

As the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is meant for describing both the language of the Veda (the Vedic texts are frequently referred to by Pāṇini as *chandas*) and the so-called *saṁskṛtā bhāṣā* (the Sanskrit as it was spoken by the *śiṣṭa*s, i.e. the learned in Pāṇini's time), quite a number of Pāṇini's *anubandha*s deal exclusively with Vedic, first and foremost with Vedic accents. It is exactly this group of *anubandhas* which is lacking in those systems of grammar which are no longer concerned with Vedic Sanskrit, as is the case with the Kātantra and the Samanvaya system under consideration here. Among the *it*s in question, there are *nit*, *tit*, *rit*, and *lit* (cf. *samanvaya kti* for *ktin* or *yuṭ* for *lyuṭ*). On the other hand, certain *anubandha*s are retained in the two non-Pāṇinian systems, i.e. those signalling, for instance, the substitution of *guṇa* or *vṛddhi* (e.g. *ṇit* is retained in *ṇam* for *ṇamul* or *vuṇ* for *ṇvul*). The last example is especially interesting in that it may suggest a reason for the shifting of certain *it*s: as the giving up of the Vedic *lit* strictly would lead to a supposed **ṇvu*, the *ṇit* of which might, for the sake of pronunciation, have been transposed to give the *samanvaya* term *vuṇ*.

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31. For the insertion of an *-n-* in *śantṛṅ* see below.

There is still another interesting observation to be made with regard to this affix *vuṇ*: it is listed both in the group of the *niṣṭhādi* affixes and the *ghañādi* affixes (cf. Table 1). That is, we have one and the same term for two different terms of Pāṇini, i.e. *Samanvaya vuṇ* for Pāṇ *vuṇ* and *ñvul*. Both suffixes denote an agent noun ending in *-aka* (e.g. *nindaka* and *kāraka*), the only phonetic difference lying, once again, in the accent, as the *udātta* is to be placed differently on words ending in *vuñ* and *ṇvul*. This might account for the fact that, the accent being neglected, both suffixes appear in the same shape, i.e. *vuṇ*, in the *Samanvaya* system. However, there is a subtle semantic difference between the two: whereas *ghañādi vuṇ* = *ṇvul* is taught to form any agent noun in *-aka* (e.g. *kāraka* in the general sense of "doer"), *niṣṭhādi vuṇ* = *vuñ* expresses the additional notion of a habit, a duty, or a special capacity of the respective agent noun (e.g. *nindaka* = someone who has the habit of finding fault, a niggler, fault finder). Thus it seems justified to keep the homophone *vuṇ* listed under two different sets of affixes, the *ghañādi*s and the *niṣṭhādi*s.

Finally, the terminology of the *Samanvaya* system occupies a middle position between the full-fledged system of Pāṇini's and the somewhat simplified one of the Kātantra, which is still based or modelled on the Pāṇinian terms. However, we might presume at least some influences of the *Kātantra* terminology on the *Samanvaya* nomenclature, as examples like *ktavantu* for Pāṇ *ktavatu* and *śantṛṅ* for Pāṇ *śatṛ* suggest. In the first example, the dental of the (strong) stem has been retained in both non-Pāṇinian systems, in the second one the *anubandha* *ṅ* (*ṅit*) has been added to the (strong) stem, the dental of which is equally retained. On the other hand, a similar tendency to remove certain Vedic *anubandha*s as well as other yet unexplained reasons may have led independently to similar results within the *Kātantra* and the *Samanvaya* systems.

Influence of the Alaṅkāraśāstra

The following are the two final *śloka*s of the *SP*, teaching the terms *muktaka, yugala, tilaka, cakkalaka, kulaka,* and *mahākulaka* for a semantic unit extending over one, two, three, four, five, and more than five verses respectively:[32]

> *yatra vākyārthaviśrāntiḥ ślokenaikena dṛśyate* ।
> *muktakaṁ tatra yugmena yugalaṁ tilakaṁ tribhiḥ* ॥
>
> *caturbhiś ca cakkalakaṁ pañcabhiḥ kulakaṁ smṛtaṁ* ।
> *mahākulakam ācāryāḥ kathayanti tataḥ param* ॥[33]

> Where the meaning of a sentence is seen to be completed by a single verse, there [such a verse is called] *muktaka*. [Is it only completed] by two, three, four, or five [verses], [these] are remembered (i.e. taught) as *yugala, tilaka, cakkalaka,* and *kulaka* respectively. [Any number of verses] beyond that the teachers call *mahākulaka*.

Now, what may such nomenclature possibly have to do with a grammatical treatise dealing with syntax? Nevertheless, there are many instances in the *SPS* where Devaśarman relates his treatise directly to the Alaṅkāraśāstra, especially when he comments on the topic of relative and correlative clauses. On such occasions he quotes from Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* and, to an even greater degree, from Mahimabhaṭṭa's *Vyaktiviveka* (including Ruyyaka's commentary thereon). As is well known, these authors made abundant use of verse material taken from

32. The term *cakkalaka* is of special interest here, as it is another instance hinting at Kashmir as the place of origin of the *Samanvaya* tradition, cf. the next section.

33. Slaje, 1992:125 sub 5.3. The two verses themselves make up a *yugala*. Here, Devaśarman seems to deviate only *metri causa* from Kuḍaka's term, which is *yugalaka* in analogy to all the remaining terms ending in *-ka*.

the great works of *kāvya* (both Sanskrit and Prākrit) to illustrate their own teachings, taking these examples to demonstrate the good and bad usages of poets.[34]

Thus, we also find Devaśarman quoting Kālidāsa (*Śākuntala, Kumārasambhava*), Murāri (*Anargharāghava*), Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa (*Bālarāmāyaṇa*), Hanumat (*Hanumannāṭaka*, i.e. *Mahānāṭaka*), Śrīharṣa (*Rāmacarita*) and others. While many of the examples cited can thus be traced to the (mainly dramatic) works of the above authors, quite a few of them only turn up anonymously in anthologies such as Jalhaṇa's *Sūktimuktāvalī* or Vallabhadeva's *Subhāṣitāvalī*.

In the light of such copious quotations from the Alaṅkāraśāstra in the *SPS* it becomes clear that the authors of the *SD* and the *SPS* may indeed have intended their syntactic treatises for the benefit of (future) poets, emphasizing that without a thorough knowledge of grammar (i.e. syntax) a *kavi* never can succeed.[35]

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34. For Mahimabhaṭṭa's analysis of poetic flaws cf. McCrea, 2004.

35. Cf. also the following explicit mention of the *kavis* in the *SP*, again in connection with relative and correlative clauses (Slaje, 1992:124 sub 5.1.1.2.2.):

ekavākyasthakartuś ca nirdiṣṭasyedamādibhiḥ ।
tacchabdena parāmarśo na kāryaḥ kavibhiḥ kvacit ॥

Poets, however, should never refer with the word *tad* "that" to an agent (*kartṛ*) occurring in one and the same sentence, [nor] to [something] which has been expressed by [the words] *idam* "this here," etc. (i.e. *adas* "that" and *etad* "this").

This verse, the particle *ca* of which I have taken somewhat freely in the meaning of *tu* "however," seems to be closely modelled on a verse of Mahimabhaṭṭa's *Vyaktiviveka*, from the second chapter of which (*śabdānaucityavicāravimarśa*) Devaśarman is silently quoting to a considerable extent in the *SPS*:

yaś caikavākye kartṛtvenokto yaś cedamādibhiḥ,
tacchabdena parāmarśo na tayor upapadyate. →

Synopsis of the Known Texts of the Samanvaya Tradition

In his auto-commentary, Devaśarman mentions two more texts, at least one of which must be regarded as forming part of what we may call the text corpus of the *Samanvaya* tradition of grammar, which was most probably founded on Kuḍaka's *Samanvayadiś*.[36] Previous to the *SPS*, Devaśarman had written a commentary directly on Kuḍaka's *SD*, named *Samanvayadiksaṅketa*, as he writes in the *SPS*:

> *etac ca samanvayadiksaṅkete 'smābhir nirṇītam ity alam*[37]
>
> This, however, has been [sufficiently] expounded by us in [our] *Samanvayadiksaṅketa* — thus [be it] enough.

Another text of his mentioned in the *SPS* is a *Liṅgānuśāsanaṭīkā*:

> *liṅgānuśāsanaṭīkāyām asmābhis tatra tatra liṅgavicāro vihita eveti neha pratanyate*[38]
>
> As I have already made a detailed (lit.: "on various occasions") investigation on gender in [my] *Liṅgānuśāsanaṭīkā*, it is not done here [again].

Up to now, no manuscripts of either of these two texts have been traced. In the absence of anything else but Devaśarman's

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→ Within one and the same sentence, the word *tad* "that" is neither suitable for referring to [something] expressed as an agent (*kartṛ*, or some other *kāraka*), nor [for referring to something expressed] by [the word] *idam* "this here," etc.

36. According to Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum* (1:108) Kuḍaka is quoted in Abhinavagupta's *Dhvanyālokalocana* as the author of a *Samanvayasampradāya*. This quotation, however, could not be verified up to now.

37. Slaje, 1992:125 sub 5.3.

38. *Ibid*.

hint at his own *ṭīkā*, we cannot determine whether he commented on one of the already existing *Liṅgānuśāsanas*, viz. of the Pāṇinian, or *Kātantra*, tradition, or whether he composed a commentary on some independent text of the *Samanvaya* school.

Thus, the following body of texts can safely be reconstructed as belonging to the *Samanvaya* tradition of Sanskrit grammar:

(i) Kuḍaka's *Samanvayadiś* (fragmentary)

(ii) Devaśarman's commentary *Samanvayadiksaṅketa* (lost)

(iii) Devaśarman's *Samanvayapradīpa* (extant)

(iv) Devaśarman's auto-commentary *Samanvayapradīpa-saṅketa* (extant)

Time and Place of Origin

Determining the time of origin of these texts, we cannot but establish a relative chronology. Out of all the authors, either mentioned directly[39] or indirectly referred to by quotations from their works, Ruyyakācārya of Kashmir and Śrīharṣa (both twelfth century) are those who provide the earliest possible

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39. In the *SPS* commenting on the line
ya ekasya yadaḥ pūrvaṁ prayogo duṣṭa eva saḥ ।
— Slaje, 1992:124 sub 5.1.1.2.2.

The [use] of *yad* alone [in the] preceding [clause] (i.e. in a preceding relative clause, without *tad* in the following correlative clause) is a bad usage indeed.

Mammaṭa (around CE 1100) is quoted thus: *tathoktaṁ mammaṭena — prāg upātto yacchabdas tacchabdopādānaṁ vinā sākāṅkṣa iti* (*KP*:309). Thus says Mammaṭa: "A word *yad* ("who, which") used in the preceding clause, without a [subsequent] word *tad* (that), [remains] possessed of an expectancy [in meaning].

date for Devaśarman's composition of the *SPS*. How many years may have elapsed between Kuḍaka and Devaśarman, since the latter was not a direct disciple of Kuḍaka, is yet another question that remains to be answered.

As regards the localization of our texts, we are on safer grounds. We must assume it in the region of Kashmir out of the following considerations: for one thing, there is a formal relation to Kashmir, as all extant manuscripts come from there and are written in Śāradā script, or, in the case of one manuscript, in a Kashmiri style Devanāgarī. For another thing, there is terminological evidence: the term *cakkalaka*, used by both Kuḍaka and Devaśarman to denote a syntactical unit extending over four verses, is a typical Kashmiri one, as the editors of Maṅkhaka's *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita* tell us.[40] Moreover, Kuḍaka (Chuḍḍaka) is characterized as *rājānapaṇḍita* in the colophon of the *SD*. Now, *rājāna(ka)* was an honorific conferred by Kashmiri rulers, especially on learned men (*paṇḍita*) and poets (*kavi*) at court.

Conclusion

Drawing to a close, I would like to summarize the most important aspects of this paper. Kuḍaka's *SD* is a short prose text dedicated to the syntax of Sanskrit on which Devaśarman modelled his *SP*. The latter, accompanied by an auto-commentary *SPS*, can be called a versified version of the former text which follows Kuḍaka very faithfully. Thus, we are virtually in a position to reconstruct the lost portions of the *SD*, at least as far as their subject matter is concerned.

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40. Cf. Maṅkhaka, loc. cit. (n. 10): *cakkalakaśabdas tu prāyaḥ kaśmīradeśaprasiddha eva.*

The main topics dealt with in both *SD* and *SPS* are the following: the definition of a sentence and its parts (*vākyalakṣaṇa*); congruent and incongruent specifiers of the noun and the verb (*samānādhikaraṇa* and *vyadhikaraṇa viśeṣaṇa*, the *kāraka* relations are also treated in this section); the finite verb and its three modes of syntactical constructions, viz. active, passive, and impersonal construction (*kartṛ*°, *karma*°, and *bhāvaniṣṭhā kriyā*); primary suffixes forming agent and action nouns (*kṛdantā kriyā*); main and subordinate verb (i.e. clause) within a sentence (*pradhāna*° and *guṇakriyā*); relative and correlative clauses (*yad* and *tad* clause). In this connection, Devaśarman in his *SPS* quotes copious examples from well-known *kāvya* works, thus underlining the special importance of his and Kuḍaka's texts for the use of poets. Finally, a nomenclature regarding syntactical units stretching over one, two, three, and more verses is taught (*vākyārthaparisamāpti*).

Both *SD* and *SPS* show some peculiar features regarding the terminology of the *kṛt* suffixes taught, on the one hand deviating from Pāṇini's terms, on the other hand showing — albeit not in all cases — a certain affinity to the terminology of the *Kātantra*. By and large, however, our texts can be said to follow the mainstream of Pāṇinian grammar, as quotations from the *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Kāśikā* show.

Finally, the fact that the *SD* and the texts following in its wake appear to have been in use exclusively in Kashmir, which we may conclude from the provenance of all extant manuscripts, as well as from the text-immanent evidence, seems to entitle us to regard the *SD*, *SP* and *SPS*, and last but not least the (probably) lost *Samanvayadiksaṅketa*, as constituent parts of the text corpus of a regional school of Sanskrit grammar with a special emphasis

on syntax (*samanvaya*). Thus, for convenience's sake, this school may be called the *Samanvaya* tradition of grammar.[41]

Postscript

1. Another scrutiny of the SD's section on the *yat-tat-sambandha* made it clear that Kuḍaka modelled his remarks on Mahimabhaṭṭa's treatment of the subject in his *Vyaktiviveka*. Thus, Kuḍaka cannot have lived before the 11th century.
2. In his section on the primary affixes (*kṛt*), Kuḍaka at places cites complete *sūtra*s of th *Kātantra*, or elsewhere closely models his remarks on them. This strongly underlines the close affinity of the Samanvaya system with the terminology of the *Kātantra*.
3. The following *Kātantra* terms in table 2 should be corrected as follows: *ānaś* (Kāt 4.4.2), *kvansu* (4.4.1), *u* (4.4.51), *ktvā* (4.6.1), *ṇam* (4.6.5-6), *tṛn* (4.4.15).

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41. In this connection I would like to quote part of a written communication of Prof. Dr A.N. Aklujkar (Vancouver) to Prof. Dr A. Wezler (Hamburg), cf. Slaje, 1992:111: "The *Samanvaya-diś*, *Samanvayapradīpa*, and *Samanvayapradīpasaṅketa* belong to an apparently sizeable body of literature that spans the distance between grammars like Pāṇini's dominated by non-pedagogical principles of linguistic description and grammars written principally for the purpose of teaching Sanskrit as a language . . . is closer in terms of intent and form to grammars such as *Kātantra* or *Vopadevīya* . . . they belong to the category formed by *Ṣaṭ-kāraka-vivaraṇa*, *Kāraka-saṁgraha*, *Kāraka-cakra*, *Prayogaviveka-saṁgraha* . . ., etc. associated with the names of Vararuci, Rabhasanandin, Vidyānanda, etc. and found in the Pāṇinian as well as non-Pāṇinian traditions of Sanskrit grammar."

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12

Jayanta's Interpretation of Pāṇini 1.4.42

V.N. Jha

JAYANTABHAṬṬA, a Kashmirian logician of the nineth century CE, entered into a deep discussion on the concept of instrumentality while presenting his theory of *pramāṇa* in his encyclopaedic treatise: *Nyāyamañjarī* in its first *āhnika*. The present paper is an analytical presentation of his discussion and arguments.

The word *pramāṇa* is derived in the sense of an instrument or process of a valid cognition or knowledge (*pramīyate anena* "by which, i.e. by which process (a *prameya*) is known)." Obviously, this derivation involves the notion of an instrument or *karaṇa*. A *karaṇa* is defined by Pāṇini as *sādhakatama* "the most effective means" (cf. *sādhakatamam karaṇam P.* 1.4.42).

Jayanta's Theory of Pramāṇa

Jayantabhaṭṭa proposed a unique concept of *pramāṇa* by defining it as "A collection of factors (*sāmagrī*) which consists of true cognition (*bodha*) and non-cognition (*abodha*) and that which generates a true cognition is a *pramāṇa*."

According to this theory, a collection of factors alone can be taken as an instrument and not any single factor of the collection.

Thus for a perceptual cognition (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) the soul, its contact with the mind, the mind, its contact with the sense-organ, the sense-organ, its contact with the object of perception, the object of perception and its indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) are involved. When each of these factors is present, a perceptual cognition takes place and in the absence of any one of them it does not take place and hence "the collection" (*sāmagrī*) is to be treated as the *karaṇa kāraka* in real sense of the term, says Jayanta. It is in this context the discussion on the meaning of *P*. 1.4.42 is initiated.

The opponents want to point out that the above theory does not hold water because it is contrary to what Pāṇini thinks. According to the opponents, Pāṇini accepts only one of the collection of factors as *karaṇa kāraka* and not the entire collection. But Jayanta thinks that the opponents have not understood *P*. 1.4.42 properly and what he understands should be the meaning of *P*. 1.4.42.

The first Objection of the Opponents

The opponents point out that *P*. 1.4.42 contains the expression *sādhakatama* with a superlative suffix *-tama* "most" and this implies that *karaṇa* is one of the many factors and not a collection of factors. If it were a collection of factors, the superlative suffix in the word *sādhakatama* would become redundant.

JAYANTA'S REPLY

Jayanta contends that if a *karaṇa* is understood as a collection of factors then alone the superlative suffix becomes meaningful, because a single factor cannot produce the result, but only a collection can do so. Therefore, a "collection" alone can be a *karaṇa*.

The Second Objection of the Opponents

If "collection" is treated as *karaṇa* then even "agent" (*kartṛ*) and "object" (*karman*) should be called *karaṇa*.

JAYANTA'S REPLY

No, such a contingency will not arise because someone will be called "agent" and something as "object" only after the "collection" (*sāmagrī*) has already produced the resultant activity (*kriyā*). Therefore, *sāmagrī* alone should be called *karaṇa kāraka*.

The Third Objection

Then, nothing remains to be called an "object" because every factor is included in the *sāmagrī*.

REPLY

It seems that the idea of *sāmagrī* needs a little elaboration. *Sāmagrī* is a property (*dharma*) existing in the factors which have come together to yield the result. We are not suggesting that *sāmagrī* will replace all individual factors. Even when there is a collection, the individual factors remain intact with their own forms. There is no destruction of their individual forms. So, the "object" will continue to exist in its own form and the *karaṇa* will operate towards it.

The Fourth Objection

Granting that *sāmagrī* is *karaṇa kāraka*, how is it that *sāmagrī* is not recognized as an independent entity? If *sāmagrī* is treated as identical with the individual factors all the factors will become *karaṇa kāraka*, which is absurd.

REPLY

It is not true that we do not recognize *sāmagrī* as an entity. We do recognize it when all necessary factors come together to

produce an effect. *Sāmagrī* is "the state of coming together." It is true that *sāmagrī* is not seen as a "whole" made out of parts but it is definitely known when factors come together. It is something like "the property of togetherness" (*saṁhitā*).

The Fifth Objection

If *sāmagrī* were *karaṇa*, how is it that we do not find people saying "I see it with the collection" (*sāmagryā paśyāmi*)? But we do find people saying "I see with the eyes" (*cakṣuṣā paśyāmi*). Thus, a single factor is a *karaṇa kāraka* and not the collection of factors.

REPLY

Sāmagrī means closeness (*saṁhitā*) and hence it is taken always along with the factors which come closer to produce a result and hence we do not find usages like *sāmagryā paśyāmi*. But we find people saying *cakṣuṣā paśyāmi*, simply because people superimpose the property called *sāmagrī* on a single factor. Such superimposition is quite normal as we know that a vessel (*sthālī*), in reality, is an *adhikaraṇa kāraka*. But we do find people saying *sthālyā pacati* "He cooks with the vessel" superimposing *karaṇatva* on the *sthālī*. Thus, we can conclude by saying that *sāmagrī* alone can be the nature of a *karaṇa kāraka*, and the use of the instrumental case-ending after the stem expressing the individual factor is by transforming *sāmagrī*'s role.

This is how by answering all the questions raised by the opponents Jayanta concludes that a *karaṇa kāraka* is not any one single factor, but a collection of all factors which generate the result.[1]

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1. See *Nyāyamañjarī* (Mysore edition) 1st *Āhnika*. Also the English translation of it by V.N. Jha, published by Indian Books Centre, Delhi.

Let us now turn to the interpretation of *P.* 1.4.42 by the school of Pāṇini.

Mahābhāṣya on P. 1.4.42

Patañjali raises the issue of why the superlative suffix *-tama* is added in the definition of *karaṇa* by Pāṇini.

Sādhakaṁ karaṇam would have been sufficient to define the concept of *karaṇa kāraka*. It can be argued that if *-tama* were not added, then any *kāraka* would become a *karaṇa kāraka,* since all *kāraka*s are *sādhaka* or generators of verb-meaning. It is because the earlier designations of *kāraka*s will become *bādhaka*s and also because the later designations obviously will have no scope on account of their being later in the order of Pāṇini's sūtras.

It is also not the case that in the absence of *-tama* the *dhanuṣ* — in the expression *dhanuṣā vidhyati* "He pierces with the (arrow-equipped) bow" will take both the designations *karaṇa* as well as *apādanā*.

Because we find that even if one uses the expression *abhirūpāya kanyā deyā* "One should get one's daughter married to a suitable bridegroom" it amounts to saying that "one should get one's daughter married to the "most" suitable bridegroom" even without using the superlative suffix *-tama,* we can take the position that even without the suffix *-tamap, sādhaka* can stand for *sādhakatama,* and, as such, the use of the suffix *-tamap* would become redundant in *P.* 1.4.42.

If, in spite of this, Pāṇini uses the suffix, he must be implying that in defining the *kāraka*s comparative or superlative degrees are not that significant.[2]

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2. The *Mahābhāṣya* on *sādhakatamaṁ karaṇam, P.* 1.4.42: *tama-grahaṇaṁ kimartham? na, "sādhakaṁ karaṇam" ity evocyate* । *sādhakaṁ karaṇam"* →

It is because of this fact we can justify ablative and locative case-endings in the following sentences:

(a) *sāṅkāśyakebhyaḥ pāṭaliputrakā abhirūpatarāḥ* ।

(b) *gaṅgāyāṁ gāvaḥ* ।

Kāśikā on P. 1.4.42

The Kāśikākāra paraphrases the expression *sādhakatama* as *kriyāsiddhau yat prakṛṣṭopakārakaṁ vivakṣitam* "that which is intended as most effective means with regard to the production of an action." This implies that the *Kāśikā* understands *karaṇa kāraka* as "the most effective means."[3]

Nyāsa on Kāśikā on P. 1.4.42

The Nyāsakāra explains the *Kāśikā* in detail. He gives the reason why the *kāśikākāra* interprets *sādhakatama* as "the most effective means": Someone may argue that an action is produced by a

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→ *itīyaty ucyamāne sarveṣām eva kārakāṇāṁ karaṇa-saṁjñā prasajyeta* । *sarvāṇi hi kārakāṇi sādhakāni* । *tama-grahaṇe punaḥ kriyamāṇe na doṣo bhavati* । *naitad asti prayojanam* । *pūrvās tāvat saṁjñā apavādatvāt bādhikā bhaviṣyanti* । *parāḥ paratvāc cānavakāśatvāc ca* । *iha tarhi "dhanuṣā vidhyati" apāya-yuktatvāc cāpādāna-saṁjñā, sādhakatvāc ca karaṇa-saṁjñā prāpnoti* । *tama-grahaṇe punaḥ kriyamāṇe na doṣo bhavati* । *evaṁ tarhi lokata etat siddham* । *tad yathā* । *loke 'bhirūpāyodakam āneyam, abhirūpāya kanyā deye'ti* । *na cānabhirūpe pravṛttir asti* । *tatrābhirūpatamāyeti gamyate* । *evam ihāpi sādhakaṁ karaṇam ity ucyate* । *sarvāṇi ca kārakāṇi sādhakāni, na cāsādhake pravṛttiḥ asti tatra 'sādhakatamam' iti vijñāsyate* । *eveṁ tarhi siddhe sati yat tama-grahaṇaṁ karoti taj jñāpayaty ācāryaḥ — kāraka-saṁjñāyāṁ taratama-yogo na bhavatīti* ।

3. Kāśikā on *sādhakatamaṁ karaṇam*, P. 1.4.42, *kriyāsiddhau yat prakṛṣṭopakārakaṁ vivakṣitaṁ tat sādhakatamaṁ kārakaṁ karaṇasaṁjñam bhavati* । *dātreṇa lunāti* । *paraśunā chinatti* । *tamabgrahaṇam kiṁ? gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ, kūpe gargakulam* । *karaṇapradeśāḥ "kartṛkaraṇayoḥ tṛtīyā" ityevamādayaḥ* ॥

bundle of factors and if from that bundle even one factor is taken out the action would not materialize. Hence the bundle of factors should be the instrument. In that case, how should one understand the meaning of the superlative suffix in *P.* 1.4.42? The Kāśikākāra, therefore, clarifies by saying that "the most effective means" is the *karaṇa kāraka*. Moreover, when a speaker 'intends' some entity in that form, that becomes a *karaṇa kāraka*. Thus, the same "bow," when intended as a *karaṇa* and when intended as an independent factor, becomes the instrument (or cause) and the agent in the sentences *dhanuṣā vidhyati* and *dhanuḥ vidhyati.*

The author of the *Nyāsa* thus justifies the purpose of adding the superlative suffix *-tamap* in a tone similar to that of the *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Kāśikā*. He clarifies that in the *kāraka* section the superlative suffix is significant only in *P.* 1.4.42. That is why we can justify a locative case-ending not only in *tileṣu tailam* "oil in the seeds" but also in *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ* "milkman's house on the Ganges."

In other words, the justification of the usage of the *kāraka vibhakti* in *gauṇa* cases is done by the method of indirect implication adopted by Pāṇini.[4]

4. *Nyāsa* on *P.* 1.4.42 *nanu ca sāmagryadhīnā hi kriyā-siddhir ekasyāpy abhāvena na bhavati* । *tat kasmād atra prakarṣo yat-parigrahāya sādhakatama-śabdasya grahaṇam iti yaś codayet taṁ praty āha kriyāsiddhau ityādi* । *prakṛṣṭaṁ atyantam upakārakam* । *athavā prakarṣaḥ prakṛṣṭam* । *napuṁsake bhāve ktaḥ* । (*P.* 3.3.114) *prakṛṣṭena prakarṣeṇa upakārakam prakṛṣṭopakārakaṁ* । *yat kriyā-siddhi-viṣye prakarṣeṇa upakārakaṁ vivakṣitaṁ tat sādhakatamam* । *vivakṣita-grahaṇaṁ yadā prakṛṣṭopakārakatvena vivakṣyate tadā sādhakatama-vyavahāro vijñāyate nānyadeti jñāpanārtham* । *tathā hi vivakṣāvaśād yad eva kadācit karaṇaṁ bhavati 'dhanuṣā vidhyatī'ti tad eva kadācit svātantrya-vivakṣāyāṁ kartṛtvam anubhavati 'dhanuḥ vidhyatī'ti* । *lunātī'ti pvādīnāṁ hrasvaḥ* (*P.* 7.3.60) *tamab-grahaṇaṁ kim? gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ iti* । *yadi tamab-*

→

Padamañjarī on Kāśikā on P. 1.4.42

The author of the *Padamañjarī* points out that in the expression *dātreṇa lunāti* "He cuts with an axe," the entering of the axe in the wood will be the role (*vyāpāra*) of the axe. Similarly, in the expression *kāṣṭhena pacati* "He cooks with the wood fuel," the entering of the hot touch caused by the fuel should be the *vyāpāra*. The other factors involved in the production of the desired action do not have that capacity and hence other *kārakas* cannot play the role of a *karaṇa kāraka*. Hence, *dātra* and *kāṣṭha* alone should be treated as *karaṇa*.

In support of this explanation Haradatta, the *Pada-mañjarī* author quotes from the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari:

kriyāyāḥ pariniṣpattir yad-vyāpārād anantaram ।
vivakṣyate yadā tatra karaṇatvam tadā smṛtaṁ ॥ — *VP* 3.7.90

He also points out how time, space and the state of affairs contribute to the intention of a speaker in identifying the role

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→ *grahaṇaṁ na kriyeta tato 'trādhikaraṇa-saṁjñā na syāt* । *iha hi dvividha ādhāraḥ* । *gauṇo mukhyaś ca* । *tatra mukhyo ya ādheyena vyāpyate yathā tileṣu tailam asti* । *atra tailena ādheyena ādhāra-bhūtāḥ tilāḥ vyāptāḥ* । *avyāpto gauṇaḥ yathā gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣa iti* । *atra hi sāmīpyād gaṅgāyām ādhāratvam upacaritam* । *na mukhyam* । *vyāpyābhāvāt* । *tatrāsati tamab-grahaṇe gauṇa-mukhyayoḥ mukhye kārya-sampratyaya iti mukhyaysaiva adhikaraṇa-saṁjñā syāt* । *netarasya* । *tamab-grahaṇāt tasyāpi bhavati* ।

tathāpīha tamab-grahaṇaṁ na kartavyam । *katham? vināpi tena prakarṣāvagateḥ* । *yathaiva hy anabhirūpāya kanyā-dānasya pravṛtir nāstīty abhirūpāya kanyā deyety ukte vināpi prakarṣa-pratyayena abhirūpatamāyeti gamyate tathehāpi kārakādhikārād asādhake saṁjñāyāḥ pravṛtir nāstīti 'sādhakaṁ karaṇam,' ityukte 'ntareṇāpi tamab-grahaṇaṁ sādhakatamam iti gamyate* । *tat kiṁ tamab-grahaṇena? tad etat tamab-grahaṇaṁ jñāpanārthaṁ kṛtam* । *etad anena jñāpyata iha kārakādhikāra itaḥ sūtrād anyatra vinā tamab-grahaṇaṁ na prakarṣo 'vaśīyata iti* । *tena "ādhāro 'dhikaraṇam" ityanena gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣa ityādau amukhyasyāpi gaṅgāder ādhārasya adhikaraṇa-saṁjñā siddhā bhavati* ।

of a *kāraka*. Although in reality a vessel is a locus (*adhikaraṇa*), a speaker may identify the role of a *karaṇa kāraka* in it and may say *sthālyā pacati* "He cooks with a vessel" instead of *sthālyām pacati* "He cooks in a vessel, especially if the speaker finds that the vessel is made of a thinner material which can absorb heat faster,"

Here too the *Padamañjarīkāra* quotes *Vākyapadīya* (3.7.91) in support of his explanation:

vastutas tad anirdeśyaṁ na hi vastu vyavasthitam ।
sthālyā pacyata ity eṣā vivakṣā dṛśyate yataḥ ॥

He further points out that an agent can never be elevated to the level of a *karaṇa* because *karaṇa* and the *kartṛ* belong to two different types of factors. As a matter of fact, it is only after the agent starts an activity other factors start performing their roles. Therefore, "agent" belongs to a different category altogether. He beautifully uses the metaphor of a rich person (*śatadhana*) and a poor borrower (*niṣkadhana*) for "agent" and other *kāraka*s and asks how one can compare a rich person with a poor person?

He concludes his comments by summarizing the arguments already advanced by the earlier commentators with regard to the redundancy of the superlative suffix *-tamap* and the implication derived therefrom.[5]

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5. *Padamañjarī* on P. 1.4.42 *nanu sāmagryadīnā kriyā-siddhiḥ, na khalu kartrādīnāṁ anyatamāpāye 'pi kriyā niṣpadate, tat kim-apekṣaḥ kārakāṇāṁ madhye ekasya atiśaya-yogaḥ syāt? ucyate* । *dātrādeḥ chedya-dravyānupraveśo vyāpāraḥ* । *kāṣṭhādeḥ pāke jvalana-janitoṣṇa-sparśānupraveśaḥ* । *tad-anantaram eva kriyā-siddhiḥ* । *naivam kārakāntareṣv anupraveśaḥ tad-vyāpārānantaram vā kriyā-niṣpattiḥ samasti* । *ataḥ*
kriyāyāḥ pariniṣpattir yad-vyāpārād anantaraṁ ।
vivakṣyate yadā tatra karaṇatvaṁ tadā smṛtaṁ ॥ — *VP* 3.7.90.

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Resumé

From all that has been discussed above one can see that the entire school of Pāṇinian grammar, including the philosophy of grammar of Bhartṛhari, interprets *P.* 1.4.42 in such a way that a single factor is given the label of *karaṇa kāraka*. But Jayanta-bhaṭṭa differs from them and re-interprets *P.* 1.4.42 in his own way. The rationale behind Jayanta's interpretation seems to be this: When it is an accepted fact that only in the presence of all required factors an action (*kriyā*), which is the immediate result to be achieved by all factors coming together, can come into existence and in the absence of any single factor from

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→ *vivakṣyate ityanena etad darśayati deśa-kāla-ādi-avasthā-vaśena yasya kriyām prati upayogātiśayena vyāpāraḥ pratyāsīdan vivakṣyate, tadā tasya karaṇatvam bhavatīti* । *yathā sthāly adhikaraṇatvena prasidhā, tasyā api tanutara-kapālatayā prakarṣa-vivakṣāyāṁ karaṇatvam bhavati — sthālyā pacyata iti* । *uktaṁ ca —*

vastutas tad anirdeśyaṁ na hi vastu vyavasthitam ।
sthālyā pacyata ity eṣā vivakṣā dṛśyate yataḥ ॥ — *VP* 3.7.91.

na caivam kartur api karaṇatva-vivakṣā-prasaṅgaḥ, bhinna-jātīyatvāt । *sakala sādhana-viniyogakārī khalv-asau, na ca śatadhano niṣkadhanena saha spardhate* । *kathaṁ tarhi aśvena dīpikayā rathena saṁcarata iti bahūnām karaṇatvaṁ, yāvatā teṣv api yad āsannopakārakaṁ tad eva karaṇaṁ yuktam? ucyate — kārakāntarāpekṣaḥ karaṇasya atiśayaḥ, na sva-kakṣāyāṁ, tena sarveṣām kriyā-niṣpattau saṁnipatyopakārakatvāt siddhaṁ karaṇatvam* ।

tamab-grahaṇam kim iti । *kārakādhikārāt siddhe sādhakatve punaḥ sādhaka-śrutiḥ prakarṣārthā bhaviṣyatīti praśnaḥ* । *gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ iti* । *asati tamab-grahaṇa ādhāro nāma yatrādhārātmā vyāpto bhavati ādheyena, tena ihaiva syāt — tileṣu tailaṁ, payasi sarṣir iti, gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣa ityatra na syāt* । *tamab-grahaṇaṁ tu jñāpayati — iha prakaraṇe sāmarthya-gamyaḥ prakarṣo nāśrīyate* । *tena ihāpi bhavati* । *yadā ca deśa-dharmo ghoṣaṁ prati ādhāra-bhāvaḥ srotasi upacaryate, tadaiva tamabgrahaṇasya prayojanam, yadā tu gaṅgā-śabdas tīre vartate tadā na prayojanam, ādheyena vyāpti-sambhavāt mukhya eva ādhārādheyabhāva iti* ।

that "collection of factors" (*sāmagrī*) it does not come into existence, *sāmagrī* alone can qualify to be the *karaṇa kāraka*. This *sāmagrī* alone can be called the most effective means (*prakṛṣṭa kāraka*) in terms of the production of the desired action (*kriyā-niṣpatti*) because in the absence of any one factor the desired action does not come into being. Therefore, the logic of *anvaya* and *vyaterika* demands that *sāmagrī* should be called *karaṇa kāraka*. There is no problem in explaining the use of an instrumental case-ending after a stem expressing one individual factor. We can accept a transfer of the role of *sāmagrī* to a single factor of that *sāmagrī*. Even grammarians had to explain this transfer by accepting a factor called *vivakṣā* "speaker's intention." Instead of *vivakṣā*, Jayanta says, it is *āropa* or superimposition of the *dharma* of one on the other. *Sāmagrī* is the *dharma* of *samagra*. However, a speaker superimposes it on a single factor and treats that single factor as if it is able to perform the role of the *sāmagrī*.

By adopting such a position two purposes are served: (a) logic is not sacrificed and (b) *P*. 1.4.42 is provided a rational interpretation.

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13

On Nāgeśabhaṭṭa's Misunderstanding of Kaiyaṭa

The Kashmirian Commentator on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya

S.D. Joshi

An independent monograph is required to examine *Kaiyaṭa*'s statements regarding the theory of syntax and semantics, the principles for word formations, the theory of *sphoṭa,* etc. made in the appropriate contexts while commenting on Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*. Kaiyaṭa worked in a tradition which started some centuries before him. Between Bhartṛhari[1] (CE 450-500) and Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa* (eleventh century CE) there are no truly informative works available in the Pāṇinian school of grammar, apart from the *Kāśikāvṛtti* of Jayāditya (eighth century CE).[2] The main aim of this vṛtti is to preserve an authentic "Indian tradition of interpretation of Pāṇini" independent of and different from that of Patañjali.

1. Sadhu Ram, "Bhartṛhari's Date," *Journal of the Ganganath Jha Research Institute,* vol. IX, 1952.

2. S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen "Evidence in the Kāśikāvṛtti for the Authentic Tradition Independent of Patañjali," *Prof. S.M. Katre Felicitation Volume,* Bulletin of the Deccan College Post Graduate and Research Institute, Pune, vol. 51-52, 1991-92, pp. 131-36.

The first full commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* available to us is the *Pradīpa* of Kaiyaṭa.[3] This commentary is largely based on Bhartṛhari's *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* (*MBD*). What is known of Kaiyaṭa is derived from the statements made in the opening verses of his commentary. He himself tells us that he was a son of Jaiyaṭa. His teacher was Maheśvara and his commentary *Pradīpa* is based on Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*.[4] It is traditionally believed, Kaiyaṭa, as his name suggests, was a native resident of Kashmir. This tradition appears to be reliable and has not been questioned by any scholar.[5]

Bhartṛhari's commentary is only available in fragments on the first seven *āhnika*s of the *Mahābhāṣya*.[6] The text of the *MBD* is in a bad condition and unintelligible in many places. In the year 1970, Prof. K.V. Abhyankar and Acarya V.P. Limaye

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3. The *Pradīpa* has been fully translated with notes (the *Samāsa* section *P*. 2.1.1–2.2.38, the *Kāraka* section, *P*. 1.4.23–1.4.55, The *Vibhakti* section *P*. 2.3.1–*P*. 2.3.71, *Paspaśāhnika* by S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen, Publications of the CASS Class C, University of Poona, 1986, *Sthānivadbhāvāhnika* (*P*. 1.1.56-59), Part I and II by S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen, BORI Unit Publications No. 11-12, BORI, Pune, 1990-1996).

4. For the text and translation of these introductory verses (4-7), see *Mahābhāṣya Paspaśāhnika*, S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen, Publications of the CASS, Class C, No. 15, University of Poona, 1986.

5. Cf. *Kāvyaprakāśa*, ed. by A.B. Gajendragadkar, 1921-23, Bombay: The form of the name Mammaṭa is typically Kashmirian. Similar Kashmirian names are Allaṭa, Udbhaṭa, Jaiyaṭa, Kaiyaṭa, Rudraṭa and Lollaṭa.

6. In my opinion the author of the *vṛtti* available on the first two *kāṇḍa*s on the *Vākyapadīya* is different from Bhartṛhari.

tried to reconstruct the text of the *MBD*. Their reconstruction was published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (BORI), Pune. Again in 1980-90, the BORI undertook the responsibility for a new edition and translation of the *MBD* and released it in 7 volumes. Probably the whole commentary was available to Kaiyaṭa. He bases his comments on the *MBD* which deals with semantics, philosophy of language and technical points of grammar in the form of abbreviated notes. The value of Kaiyaṭa's commentary lies not only in its learned interpretation of the *Mahābhāṣya* but also in that it reflects the development in the field of grammatical thought from Bhartṛhari's time to his own time. For instance, *Mahābhāṣya*[7] No. 14 answers the question raised by *Mahābhāṣya* No.4: Now, in *gauḥ* what (is to be considered) word? No. 14 says that, for example, that from which, when uttered, we understand an object possessing a dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs and horns. Kaiyaṭa at the end of his commentary on the same states: That is why in the *VP* the following is said in great detail: that is *sphoṭa* which is different from these (phonemes and) which is manifested through *nāda* "sound," and which is expressive (of meaning). Here, Kaiyaṭa makes reference to *sphoṭa* on the basis of the *MBD*. The *MBD* mentions three different views on the nature of the word extensively. For the benefit of those who are interested in the historical development of the *sphoṭa* doctrine the comments made by the *MBD* are extremely useful. Kaiyaṭa only summarizes the arguments.

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa (CE 1670-1750) was a great original scholar of the Pāṇinian school. He wrote a commentary called *Uddyota* on Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa*. What is new in the commentary *Uddyota*

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7. See note 9, p. 18: *Mahābhāṣya Paspaśāhnika*, S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen, Publications of the CASS, Class C, No. 15, University of Poona, 1986.

is an attempt to give a precise analysis of the arguments in the *Mahābhāṣya*. Nāgeśa accepted Patañjali as an unquestionable authority on the interpretation of Pāṇini. He reformed the interpretation of the *Mahābhāṣya* and criticized the views of Kaiyaṭa occasionally. In what follows, I have limited my remarks to one single instance in which he clearly misunderstood Kaiyaṭa's comments.

The *Mahābhāṣya* passage concerned (NSP edn. p. 161)[8] raises a debatable point: whether *P.* 1.1.3 (*iko guṇavṛddhi*) is subsidiary or complementary to *alo 'ntyasya* (*P.* 1.1.52) or whether it is an exception to *alo 'ntyasya*.

The first view is called *taccheṣa* view and the second *tadapavāda* view. *taccheṣa* implies joint application of *P.* 1.1.3 and *P.* 1.1.52 in connection with the rules which prescribe *guṇa* or *vṛddhi* substitutions; *tadapavāda* implies that *P.* 1.1.3 prevails over *P.* 1.1.52 and sets aside its application. This will be clear from the following examples.

P. 1.1.3 states that *guṇa* (*P.* 1.1.2) and *vṛddhi* (*P.* 1.1.1) are substituted in place of *ik* vowels. *P.* 7.3.84 states that "a *guṇa* vowel comes in place of a verbal base (*aṅga*) ending in *ik* vowels if a *sārvadhātuka* (*P.* 3.4.113) or an *ārdhadhātuka* (*P.* 3.4.114) suffix follows immediately." In this rule, we supply *ikaḥ* on the basis of the *paribhāṣā* "convention" *P.* 1.1.3. *ikaḥ* qualifies *aṅgasya* continued from *P.* 6.4.1 and is incorporated to mean *igantasya aṅgasya* "in place of a (verbal base) *aṅga* ending in an *ik* vowel." According to *P.* 1.1.52, the substitution takes place of the final phoneme of an *aṅga*. In this interpretation, both the *paribhāṣā*s *P.* 1.1.3 and *P.* 1.1.52 work together. This interpretation, which is the correct one, is based on the *taccheṣa* view. As an example

8. Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* with the commentaries of *Pradīpa* and *Udyota*, Nirnayasagar Press, 1908-1955.

of *tadapavāda* view, one may quote *P*. 7.3.86. The rule states that a *guṇa* vowel comes in the place of the *ik* vowel of a verbal base *aṅga* which ends in *pUK* (*P*. 7.3.86) or which has a short pre-final vowel if a *sārvadhātuka* suffix (*P*. 3.4.113) or an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix (*P*. 3.4.114) follows immediately. Here also we apply *P*. 1.1.3, but the rule *P*. 7.3.86 is not interpreted to mean *igantayoḥ pugantalaghūpadhayoḥ aṅgayoḥ* (with a *vibhaktivipariṇāma*), but *aṅgasya* (*P*. 6.4.1) is regarded as an *avayavaṣaṣṭhī* in connection with *ikaḥ*. Therefore *P*. 7.3.86 means a *guṇa* vowel comes in the place of an *ik* vowel which forms the part of a verbal base. Here, the substitution does not take place according to *P*. 1.1.52, that is, the final phoneme of the *aṅga* is not substituted. Nor do we apply *tadantavidhi* by *P*. 1.1.72. Therefore this is an example of the *tadapavāda* view.

Then *vārttika*s 3 and 4 point out the difficulties in the *taccheṣapakṣa*, and *vārttika* 5 points out the difficulties in the *tadapavāda* view. If we maintain that a *guṇa* replaces an *ik* vowel only, disregarding the final position or the non-final position of the *ik* vowels, then we have a difficulty in connection with *P*. 7.3.83, *P*. 7.3.84, *P*. 7.3.108., *P*. 7.3.109, *P*. 7.3.110, and *P*. 6.4.146. In the examples of these rules, the *guṇa* substitution will be applied also in place of non-final *ik* vowels, which is not desired.

Vārttika 6 on *P*. 1.1.3 says that the difficulty pointed out by *vārttika* 5 is really not there, because the inclusion of the word *laghūpadha* is meant for restriction. If we allow a *guṇa* by *P*. 7.3.84 to any *ik* vowel occurring in a final or a non-final position of a verbal base *aṅga*, the *guṇa* prescribed for the *ik* vowel of a verbal base *aṅga* ending in *pUK* (*P*. 7.3.86) or having a short vowel in pre-final position will be redundant. The examples of *P*. 7.3.86 like *knopayati* "he causes to crack" or *bhedanam* "cutting" will be justified by *P*. 7.3.84. So *P*. 7.3.86

will be redundant. Therefore *laghūpadha* must be considered restrictive. That is, if one wishes to apply *guṇa* in place of non-final vowels, the *guṇa* is to be applied to an *ik* vowel of *puganta* and *laghūpadha* only; we are not supposed to apply *guṇa* in the place of *ik* vowels occurring in non-final positions. Then Patañjali points out that this *niyama* would be valid for a *guṇa* which has been prescribed by the rule *P*. 7.3.84. It will not be valid for *P*. 7.3.108, etc., and the *guṇa* prescribed by *P*. 7.3.108, etc. will be applicable to *ik* vowels occurring in non-final positions also.

Patañjali further says that *P*. 7.3.86 offers a twofold restriction: *pugantalaghūpadhasyaiva sārvadhātukārdhadhātukayoḥ* "before a *sārvadhātuka* and an *ārdhadhātuka*, only an *aṅga* ending in *pUK* (*P*. 7.3.86) or which has a short pre-final vowel takes *guṇa*. Elsewhere *guṇa* is not applied." By this *niyama* we can present *guṇa* in the place of non-final *ik* vowels of *aṅga* before the suffixes called *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka*. By this *niyama* we can prevent the application of *P*. 7.3.84 in forms like *īhitā* "he will exert" and *īhitum* "in order to exert," but *guṇa* prescribed by *P*. 7.3.108, *P*. 7.3.109, *P*. 6.4.146, which is not conditioned by the following *sārvadhātuka* or *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes, will be applied in the place of non-final *ik* vowels also. To overcome this difficulty, we could accept a twofold restriction as follows:

(A) before a *sārvadhātuka* and an *ārdhadhātuka*, only in place of an *aṅga* ending *pUK* or having a short pre-final vowel, *guṇa* takes place; and

(B) in the place of *ik* vowels belonging to an *aṅga* ending in *pUK* or having a short pre-final vowel, *guṇa* substitution takes place before the *sārvadhātuka* and *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes only, not elsewhere (that is, not before any suffix other than a *sārvadhātuka* or *ārdhadhātuka* suffix).

In (A), a *guṇa* prescribed in place of (*puganta*) *laghūpadha aṅga* is restricted. A *guṇa* not conditioned by a (*puganta*) *laghūpadha* is freely allowed in the place of *ik* occurring in a final position or non-final position.

In (B), a *guṇa* prescribed in the place (*puganta*) *laghūpadha* is allowed before a *sārvadhātuka* or *ārdhadhātuka* suffix only. In this *niyama* (B), a *guṇa* prescribed in place of *ik*, whether occurring in a final position or a non-final position, would be freely allowed before a non-*sārvadhātuka* or a non-*ārdhadhātuka* suffix and it will be allowed in *anenijuḥ* (*nij* 3.11, imper. 3rd. perf. plu.) because a *guṇa* in the place of *ik* belonging to a *laghūpadha aṅga* before a *sārvadhātuka* or an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix is freely allowed. That would give the undesired form *anenejus*.

Kaiyaṭa thinks that even if we accept both the *niyamas* (A) and (B), still a *guṇa* prescribed before a non-*sārvadhātuka* or a non-*ārdhadhātuka* suffix and not restricted to a *laghūpadha aṅga* will be applicable in the place of *ik* vowels occurring in a final position of an *aṅga* or a non-final position of an *aṅga*. He gives the example of *P*. 7.3.108 which would mean that a *guṇa* vowel replaces *ik* of a nominal base *aṅga* ending in a short vowel when a vocative singular follows. The undesired examples quoted by the *Pradīpa* are *he picavya*, "O cotton plant," *he buddhe* "O intellect," etc. (NSP edn., p. 165). Since the vocative particle *he* is used by the *Pradīpa*, the examples given by it must be understood as referring to the vocative sing, only where *P*. 7.3.108 is applicable. The *Pradīpa* points out the difficulty that *i* and *u* occurring in a non-final position of the *aṅga* would be *guṇated* by *P*. 7.3.108 and we would have the examples *he pecavya* or *he boddhe* which are undesired. That the *Pradīpa* is talking of *guṇa* prescribed by *P*. 7.3.108 is clear from the use of the vocative particle *he*.

While interpreting the example *picavya*, Nāgeśa is confused. He thinks that the *Pradīpa* is referring to the example of a *guṇa* prescribed by *P*. 6.4.146, which means "*guṇa* comes in the place of *u* of a nominal base *aṅga* if a *taddhita* suffix follows immediately." The derivation of the example *picavya* goes thus:

(*picu*+*Ṅe*) + *yaT*	*P*. 5.1.5
(*picu*+ 0) + *ya*	*P*. 2.4.71
pico + *ya*	*P*. 6.4.146
picavya	*P*. 6.1.79

Actually there is no possibility of applying *P*. 1.1.3 when the genitive item *oḥ* is explicitly present as the *sthānin* in *P*. 6.4.146. The genitive singular *oḥ* determines that a *guṇa* vowel replaces the vowel *u*. So there is no possibility of applying the *ik paribhāṣā* (convention with *P*. 1. 1 .3). To prevent the application of the *ik paribhāṣā*, the direct *sthānin oḥ* is mentioned. So *picavya* cannot be the example of the *ik paribhāṣā*. To justify the *Pradīpa* somehow, Nāgeśa re-interprets *P*. 6.4.146 to mean "a *guṇa* vowel comes in the place of an *ik* vowel of the nominal base *aṅga* ending in *u*, if a *taddhita* suffix immediately follows." Under this interpretation, conflicting with the fact that the *sthānin oḥ* mentioned, *P*. 1.1.3 becomes applicable and states that the *ik* vowel which occurs in a non-final position (i.e. *i* in *picavya*) will be *guṇated* in the stage *picu* + *ya* by *P*. 6.4.146, even if *oḥ* is explicit in the rule. Nāgeśa is not satisfied with Kaiyaṭa's interpretation containing over-application of *P*. 1.1.3. He thinks that the *Pradīpa* should state that *u* (which is specifically mentioned as a *sthānin*) occurring in a non-final position would be *guṇated* by *P*. 6.4.146. So he re-interprets the example cited by the *Pradīpa*. He thinks that the *Pradīpa* should give the cogent counter-example *Sauśrutaḥ*, which is derived as follows:

(Suśrut + *Ṅas)* + *aṆ* *P.* 4.1.92
(Suśrut + 0) + *aṆ* *P.* 2.4.71
Sauśrut + a *P.* 7.2.117
Sauśruta

Even if we accept a double restriction, *P.* 6.4.146 would be applicable to *u* non-occurring in a final position. In this interpretation, Nāgeśa keeps the *sthānin u* intact and points out the difficulty of application of *guṇa* in the place of *u* occurring in a non-final position in the *aṅga*. Nāgeśa remarks:

> *ugavāditvād yat. uvarṇāntasya aṅgasyeko guṇa iti vyākhyānam abhipretyātra doṣopanyāsaḥ. pare tu sauśruta ity-atrāpi prāpnotīti bhāṣyānanuguṇā sā vyākhyeti cintyo 'yaṁ kaiyaṭa ity āhuḥ.*

"The *yat* suffix is added because (*picu*) is listed in the *ugavādigaṇa* (*P.* 5.1.5). With such an explanation in (his) mind, Kaiyaṭa speaks of the fault (in that explanation). We (= *pare*), however, say that this (part of the explanation by) Kaiyaṭa is questionable, because it does not agree with the *Bhāṣya* statement: "*sauśruta ity atrāpi prāpnoti.*"

Actually, Nāgeśa has misunderstood Kaiyaṭa. Nāgeśa thought Kaiyaṭa is referring to *P.* 6.4.146. From the statement of *he picavya*, it is clear that Kaiyaṭa is referring to the *saṁbuddhi guṇa* (*P.* 7.3.108) and not to *or guṇaḥ* (*P.* 6.4.146). Without understanding Kaiyaṭa's statement, Nāgeśa has made indiscriminate attacks on the statement of *Pradīpa*.

14

The Śāradā Manuscripts of the Kāśikāvṛtti — Part II[1]

Malhar Kulkarni

THAT the text of the *Kāśikāvṛtti* (hereafter *KV*) was studied and preserved in most of the parts in India as one of the major works in the tradition of Pāṇini's grammar at a point of time in history is well substantiated by the fact that manuscripts (Mss) of the *KV* are found in almost all parts of India and in almost all major scripts of ancient India. It is obvious that the spread of the Mss of the *KV* must have originated from an original text, though we are unable to say which one at present. It is, however, possible to identify stages of development in the concrete text of the *KV* that is available to us today.

1. I would like to express my deep sense of gratitude towards Mrinal Kaul who invited me to write this article. I am also grateful to him for providing me with the information about some Mss in possession of the Sanskrit Manuscripts Library, Jammu and Kashmir Research and Publication Department, Goverment of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar (Located at Iqbal Library, University of Kashmir, Srinagar) and also having made arrangement of habitation in Srinagar. I also wish to thank my student Chaitali Dangrikar for helping me in preparing the electronic version of the tree showing interrelation of the Mss.

In a separate publication (1999), I studied the structure of the text of the *KV*. In it, I also presented some material in the form of a passage from a Ms throwing light on this structure.

In another publication (2000), the Mss forming the base of the first-ever printed edition of the *KV* were identified. This helped me in getting a clearer picture of the reasoning related to the acceptance of certain readings over others by the later printed editions. It was mentioned in the same article that Ms S6 is one of the three Mss used for the first printed edition.

In another publication of mine (2002), it was shown that the 'traditional' belief about the division of the text of the *KV* — adhyāyas 1-5 authored by Jayāditya and adhyāyas 6-8 authored by Vāmana — is not supported by the Ms traditions.

In yet another publication (2003), I studied the then available Mss written in Śāradā characters and made some comments regarding their interrelation.

In this paper I intend to use the material of three additional Śāradā Mss which were not available to me earlier. I would also like to change the way of presentation of the data followed in 2003. An attempt is made here to find out the interrelation of all Mss so far found written in Śāradā characters based on the evidence in the form of variants. It is not the aim of this paper to find out all the sources of each of these Mss.

Description of the Mss Material

For a detailed description of the following Mss, see 2003 –

S1 — Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, No. 60, 283/1875-76. Contents — Complete. Date — CE 1660 Birch bark. (bh7 in 2003).

S2 — Central Library, BHU, Varanasi, No. C 921, 2A/747. Folio — 120. Contents — Incomplete. Paper. (bhu1 in 2003).

S3 — Central Library, BHU, Varanasi, No. C 4452, 2A/745. Folio — 435. Contents — Almost Complete. Paper. Date — CE 1726 (bhu2 in 2003).

S4 — The India Office Library, London. San Mss 3345, IOL 4089, Contents — Complete. Date Eighteenth-nineteenth century CE (io7 in 2003).

S5 — Shri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute, Jammu. No. 20 bhu. Folio — 422. Contents — Complete. Birch bark. Date — Nineteenth century CE (jm1 in 2003).

S6 — Niedersächsische Staats und Universitätbibliothek Göttingen, Cod. Ms. Sanscr Mu 1, 94. Folio — 432. Contents — Complete. Date — CE 1809. Paper. (g 3 in 2003).

S7 — The Sanskrit Manuscripts Library of the Jammu and Kashmir Research and Publication Department, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar[2] No. 779. Folio — 440. Contents — Complete. Paper.

S8 — The Sanskrit Manuscripts Library of the Jammu and Kashmir Research and Publication Department, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar, No. 931. Folio — 271. Contents — Incomplete (from the beginning up to 3.3.10). Paper.

S9 — The Sanskrit Manuscripts Library of the Jammu and Kashmir Research and Publication Department, Government of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar. No. 1015. Folio — 259 Contents — Incomplete (from the beginning up to 4.1.1). Paper.

The text passage selected for collation is 2.2. of the *KV*.

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2. The Jammu and Kashmir Research and Publication Department has now shifted its office along with the Sanskrit Manuscripts Library to the Allama Iqbal Library, University of Kashmir, Hazratbal, Srinagar.

Most Significant Variants (MSV)

Following is a list of the Most Significant Variants –

1. Omission of the statement in the *KV* on 2.2.3, namely *turīyaśabdasyāpīṣyate turīyaṁ bhikṣāyāḥ turīyabhikṣā bhikṣāturīyaṁ vā* — S1-5 and 7-9.
2. *vidhānasāmarthyāt* for *samāsavidhānāt* in the *KV* on 2.2.4 — S1-9.
3. Omission of the *vārttika* in the *KV* on 2.2.6, namely *naño nalopas tiṅi kṣepe. apacasi tvaṁ jālma* — S1-5 and 7-9.
4. Omission of the statement in the *KV* on 2.2.9, namely, *guṇāt tareṇa taralopaś ceti vaktavyam* । *sarveṣāṁ śvetataraḥ sarvaśvetaḥ* । *sarvamahān* । *na nirdhāraṇa iti pratiṣedhe prāpte vacanam idam* । *sarvaśuklā gauḥ* — S1-5 and 7-9.
5. Omission of the statement in the *KV* on 2.2.11, namely, *anantarāyāṁ tu prāptau pratiṣiddhāyāṁ viśeṣaṇaṁ viśeṣyeṇa bahulam iti bhavaty eva samāsaḥ* । *pūrvanipātaś ca tadā niyogato viśeṣaṇasyaiva* — S1-5 and 7-9.
6. Omission of the statement in the *KV* on 2.2.22, namely, *avyaye yathābhipretākhyāna iti ktvāpratyayaḥ. samāsapakṣe lyab eva* — S1-5 and 7-9.
7. Omission of the verse quotation in the *KV* on 2.2.24, namely, *samantaśitirandhreṇa dvayor vṛttau na siddhyati* — S1-5 and 7-9.
8. Omission of the sentences *pūjāyām iti kiṁ. chātrasya hasitaṁ chātrahasitam* in the *KV* on 2.2.12 — S1-5, 7-9.

From the above data following points emerge —

1. That all the Mss written in Śāradā characters have one origin is substantiated by variant No. 2 presented above.

2. All other variants show that these Mss can be straightforwardly divided into two groups, namely — (i) S1-5 and 7-9 and (ii) S6.

Let us now study some other Significant Variants (SV) –

1. Omission of the word *ayam* in the sentence *ṣaṣṭhīsamāsāpavādo 'yaṁ yogaḥ* in 2.2.1, 2 and 3 — S1-5 and 7-9.
2. Omission of the words *ahannanyatarasyāṁ ṅau* in 2.2.1 — S1, 4, 5, 7-9.
3. *ardhaketakī* for *ardhakośātakī* in 2.2.2 — S2, 7.
4. Omission of the words *ṣaṣṭhīsamāsapakṣe* and *vā* in 2.2.3 — S1-5, 7-9.
5. Omission of the words *na brāhmaṇaḥ abrāhmaṇaḥ* in 2.2.6 — S1-5, 7-9.
6. Addition of the word *iti* in 2.2.7 — S1-5, 7,9.
7. *idhmavraścanaḥ* for *idhmapravraścanaḥ* in 2.2.8 — S1-5, 7-9.
8. Addition of the word *tṛjakābhyāṁ kartari* in 2.2.9 — S1-5, 7.
9. Omission of the word *potṛ* in 2.2.9 — S1-3, 5, 7-9.
10. *snāpaka* for *snātaka* in 2.2.9 — S1-5, 7-9.
11. Omission of the words *ṣaṣṭhī samasyate* in 2.2.9 — S1-5, 7-9.
12. *kṛṣṇā* after *gavām* in 2.2.10 — S1-5, 7-9.
13. Addition of the verse quotation *idam eṣāṁ parākrāntaṁ siṁhānām iva palvale* in 2.2.13 — S1-4, 7-9.
14. Addition of *me* in 2.2.14 — S2, 4, 5, 7-9.
15. Omission of the words *na tṛjakau* in 2.2.17 — S1-5, 7-9.

16. Omission of the sentence *tatpuruṣaś ca samāso bhavati* in 2.2.17 — S1-5, 7-9.
17. Omission of the words *saha samāso* in 2.2.18 — S1-5, 7-9.
18. *kanye iva* for *vastre iva* in 2.2.18 — S1-4, 7.
19. Addition of *kanye iva* in 2.2.18 — S5, 8, 9.
20. Addition of *samayo bhoktum velā bhoktum* in 2.2.20 — S1-5, 7-9.
21. Omission of the words *bahuvrīhir vaktavyaḥ* in 2.2.24 — S1-5, 7-9.
22. Addition of *udaremaṇiḥ* in 2.2.24 — S2-5, 7-9.
23. Omission of the words *astyādayo nipātāḥ* in 2.2.24 — S1-5, 7-9.
24. Addition of the sentence *dvandvāc cudaṣahāntāt samāhāra iti ṭac* in 2.2.29 — S1-5, 7-9.
25. Addition of *vyāghrādeḥ* in 2.2.31 — S1-4, 7.
26. Addition of *ghyādeḥ* in 2.2.31 — S5, 8, 9.
27. Addition of *udaremaṇiḥ* in 2.2.35 — S1, 3-5, 7-9.
28. Addition of words *dantajātaḥ śmaśrujātaḥ pītatailah pītaghṛtaḥ bhāryoḍhaḥ gatārthaḥ arthagataḥ* in 2.2.37 — S8, 9.

These variants give us following groups —

(1) S1-9 (MSV 2)

(2) S1-5, 7-9 (MSV 1,3-8), (SV 1,4-8, 10-12, 15-17, 20, 21, 23, 24).

(3) S1-4, 7-9 (SV 13).

(4) S1-3, 5, 7-9 (SV 9).

(5) S2-5, 7-9 (SV 22).

(6) S1, 4, 5, 7-9 (SV 2).

(7) S1-5, 7 (SV 8).

(8) S2, 4, 5, 7-9 (SV 14).

(9) S1, 3-5, 7-9 (SV 27).

(10) S1-4, 7 (SV 18, 25).

(11) S5, 8, 9 (SV 19, 26).

(12) S2, 7 (SV 3).

(13) S8, 9 (SV 28).

Only those variants mentioned in the 2003 publication which receive support from the added new material (3 Mss) are mentioned below. The number of the variant refers to the variant mentioned in 2003.

5 — S1, 3, 7.

6 — S2, 4, 7.

8 — S2, 3, 4, 5, 7.

9 — S2, 3, 4, 5, 7.

10 — S2, 3, 4, 5, 7.

12 — S2, 4, 7.

13 — S2, 4, 8, 9.

This gives us the following groups —

(1) S2, 5, 7 — (8, 9, 10).

(2) S2, 4, 7 — (6, 12).

(3) S2, 4, 8, 9 — (13).

(4) S1, 3, 7 — (5).


Some Observations on the Interrelation of these Mss

The MSV 2 gives us a clue that all these Mss must have a common origin which we call S. That there are two streams within this S — which we call Sa and Sb — is evident from MSV 1, 3-8 and SV 1, 4-8, 10-12, 15-17, 20, 21, 23, 24. In Sa, we

have Ms 1-5, 7-9. In Sb, we have S6. In Sa, again we have 1, the oldest available Ms from which we can show Mss 3 and 4 as emanating. From 3, Mss 5, 8, 9 are copied and are shown together (SV 19, 26). From 3, Ms 2 is copied and it is shown as diverging by 5, 8 and 9. Ms 7 is copied from 4 (colophon mentioning *Jayanta*). Ms 9 is copied from 8 (SV 28). It is possible that there are other Mss unknown at present to which the variants mentioned above point. Whatever their number and wherever they are to be placed in the tree, they can be accommodated in further lines crossing the already drawn lines reflecting the analysis proposed above. The following diagram should, therefore, be seen as offering an adequate general explanation of the interrelation of the available Mss.

Conclusion

From the material presented above the following conclusions can be drawn —



Interrelation of the Śāradā Mss of the KV

Colophons

Let us now study the colophons collected from the end of each and every available *pāda* of the *KV*.

	1				2				3				4				5				6				7				8			
S	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	j	j	j	*	j	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	-
2						-																										
3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			j		j	-	j	-		j	j		v	v									v
4	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	j a	v	ja v	-	ja v	j a	j a	j a	j	ja v	ja v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
5	-	-	- -	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	j	j	j	j		-	-	-	-	v		v	-	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	-
6	-	-	j	j	j	j	j	j	-	j	j	j	-	-	-	-	-	j	j	v	-	-	-	v	-	-	-	v	-	-	-	-
7		*	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	j	j	j	j	-	-	j a	-	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	v	-
8	-	-	-	-	v	-	-	-	-	-																						
9	-	v	-	-	v	-	-	-	-	v	-	j																				

Note to the Table: S — Śāradā, j — Jayāditya, v — Vāmana, ja — Jayanta, "-" — No author mentioned, "*"— colophon missing, Empty Space — No colophon available.

1. The *KV* known to the Śāradā Mss is a shorter text than what is available in print form today.
2. The Śāradā Mss tradition is the tradition which mentions Jayanta, along with Jayāditya and Vāmana, as the author of the *KV*.

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15

Uvaṭa
The Kashmirian Prātiśākhya Commentator

Nirmala Kulkarni

THE present paper takes into consideration the contribution of Uvaṭa to Indian grammatical tradition besides trying to articulate the problems involved in his personal account. The paper is designed as follows:

(1) Commentaries by Uvaṭa.

(2) The Uvaṭa controversy revisited.

(3) Contribution of Uvaṭa to the Indian commentarial tradition as it pertains to the Prātiśākhyas (*Prs*).

Commentaries by Uvaṭa

At present, the following commentaries are ascribed to Uvaṭa.

(1) A commentary on the *Vājasaneyi Saṁhitā* (*VS*) (published).[1]

(2) A commentary *Pārṣadavyākhyā* on the *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya* (*RPr*) (published).[2]

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1. W.L. Panshikar, (1929) ed., *Śukla Yajurveda Saṁhitā* (with the *Bhāṣyas of Uvaṭācārya and Mahīdhara*), Nirṇaya Sāgara Press, Bombay.

2. Virendra Kumar Varma, (1970) ed., *Ṛgveda Prātiśākhyam* (*Uvaṭabhāṣyasahitam*), Kashi Hindu Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi.

(3) A commentary *Mātṛmodā* on the *Vājasaneyi Prātiśākhya* (*VPr*) (published).[3]

(4) A commentary on the *Ṛksarvānukramaṇī* (*RSr*) (unpuplished).[4]

Even a cursory glance at the extent of his commentaries suggests that he might have come from a family of "Dvivedis." He has written commentaries on the ancillary texts of the *Ṛgveda* as well as on the *VS* and *VPr*. He extensively quotes examples from both the Saṁhitās while explaining the rules of the *Prs*. This does not seem possible without training in the oral tradition of both the texts. Moreover, he nowhere mentions himself as belonging to any particular Vedic branch. Analysis of his *Pr* commentaries confirms that he first wrote the commentary on the *RPr* and then the commentary on the *VPr*. While commenting on the *VPr* he quotes many supporting *sūtra*s from the *RPr*.

The Uvaṭa Controversy Revisited

Personal accounts given by Uvaṭa and what scholars have said about Uvaṭa raise the following issues:

(1) Did Uvaṭa belong to Kashmir or Gujarat?

(2) Who was his father? Jaiyaṭa or Vajraṭa?

(3) Were Mammaṭa and Kaiyaṭa his brothers?

(4) Was Uvaṭa a predecessor of Mahīdhara?

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3. Virendra Kumar Varma, (1975), *Śukla Yajurveda Prātiśākhyam* (*Bhāṣyadvayasahitam*), Kashi Hindu Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi.

4. BORI 14 of 1902-07, 121 fol 3267 dated Śaka 1681 as given in Aithal, K.P.S. However, according to Mangal Deva Shastri, this commentary is not from the pen of Uvaṭa, but from that of Ṣaḍguruśiṣya. See M.D. Shastri, (1959), *The Ṛgveda Prātiśākhya with the Commentary of Uvaṭa* vol. 1, Vaidika Svādhyāya Mandira (Messrs Motilal Banarsidass), Varanasi, p. 78.

(5) Was Uvaṭa senior to Viṣṇumitra, the commentator of the *RPr*?

Scholars such as L. Sarup, Mangal Dev Shastri and Madhubala have tried to address these issues. In the following paragraph I will recapitulate their views and attempt to give further direction to the study of Uvaṭa.

CONTROVERSIES REGARDING PLACE

The name Uvaṭa makes him a Kashmirian scholar. The suffix *ṭa* that seems to be an abbreviation of Bhaṭṭa is seen added to several persons belonging to the Kashmir region, e.g. Mammaṭa, Vajraṭa, Lollaṭa, etc. However, in the colophons of his commentaries Uvaṭa mentions himself as belonging to Ānandapura or Avantīpura. To quote:

1. *iti śrīpārṣadavyākhyāyām ānandapuravāstavya-vajraṭaputra-uvaṭakṛtau prātiśākhyabhāṣye ṣoḍaśaṁ paṭalam* ।
2. *ṛṣyādīṁś ca namaskṛtya hyavantyām uvaṭo vasan* ।
   mantrabhāṣyam idaṁ cakre bhoje rājyaṁ praśāsati ॥
3. *ānandapuravāstavyavajraṭasya ca sūnunā* ।
   uvaṭena kṛtaṁ bhāṣyam ujjayinyāṁ sthitena tu ॥

Therefore, scholars such as Scharfe[5] and Bhagavaddatta[6] take him to be a Nāgara brāhmaṇa. However, if we take into consideration the political situation of eleventh century CE, his Kashmirian origin will not be problematic. In the eleventh century CE Kashmir was troubled by Muslim invasions. Bhoja Paramāra had helped the then king of Kashmir and had given many grants to temples, etc. Therefore, there is a possibility

5. H. Scharfe, (1977), "Grammatical Literature" in *A History of Indian Literature*, Wiesbaden, p. 133.
6. Bhagavaddatta (1976), *Vaidika Vāṅmaya Kā Itihāsa*, p. 217.

that Uvaṭa, because of the respect for his Vedic scholarship, might have migrated to Avantī (modern Ujjain in M.P.), a principal city in the domain of Bhoja, and, for the same reason, he might sometimes be staying at Ānandapura (modern Vadnagar in Gujrat). However, the *ṭa* suffix is a strong proof that he originally or by lineage belonged to Kashmir.

WHO WAS HIS FATHER? VAJRAṬA OR JAIYAṬA?

The colophons of the printed editions of Uvaṭa's commentary raise this problem. In some colophons Uvaṭa calls himself a *Vajraṭasūnu*, whereas in some other colophons he calls himself a *Jaiyaṭasūnu*. L. Sarup[7] noticed this discrepancy for the first time in the old editions of the *VS*. With a careful scrutiny of the colophons in mss, he came to the conclusion that the mention of Jaiyaṭa as father of Uvaṭa was a scribal error. However, without giving a careful eye to this earlier attempt, Madhubala[8] concluded, on the basis of a colophon of Uvaṭa's commentary on the *VS*, that Vajraṭa was the father of Uvaṭa, but he became an adopted son of Jaiyaṭa. In this, she did not study new manuscripts and ignored the scholarly comments of Sarup. Sarup had taken into consideration the old editions and also had analysed manuscripts from Benares and Baroda. On the basis of the colophons of these mss, Sarup had decided that the colophon, later depended upon by Madhubala, was spurious. Relying on the same spurious colophon, Madhubala found a way out by concluding that Uvaṭa was an adopted son of Jaiyaṭa. Many new manuscripts are available now.

7. L. Sarup, (1933), *Uvaṭa and Mahīdhara* in Essays presented to Sir George Abraham Grierson, The Linguistic Society of India, Lahore, pp. 73-87.
8. Madhubala (1985), *Bhāṣyakāra Uvaṭa*, Vinītā Prakāśana, Naī Dillī, pp. 7-8.

Therefore, a fresh look into the matter is necessary, especially a scrutinizing of mss in Kashmir. However, at least until such a study takes place, we should prefer Sarup's conclusion.

WAS UVAṬA A BROTHER OF MAMMAṬA AND KAIYAṬA?

The only evidence to call Uvaṭa a brother of Mammaṭa (author of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*) and Kaiyaṭa (commentator of *Pātañjala Mahābhāṣya*) is the following stanza from Bhīmasena,[9] a commentator of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*:

> *śrīmajjaiyaṭagehinīsujaṭharāj janmāpya yugmānujaḥ*
> *śrīmanmammaṭasañjñayāśritatanuṁ sārasvatīṁ sūcayan* ।
> *śrīmat kaiyaṭa-auvaṭau hy avarajau yacchātratām āgatau*
> *bhāṣyābdhiṁ nigamaṁ yathākramam anuvyākhyāya siddhiṁ gataḥ* ॥

However, even this stanza is said to be spurious by scholars like Sarup and is not accepted as pointing to historical truth. It is the only source, and Bhīmasena does not indicate the source on which his information is based.

WAS UVAṬA A PREDECESSOR OF MAHĪDHARA, THE COMMENTATOR OF THE *VS*?

The statements in the mss of the commentaries of Uvaṭa and Mahīdhara have led scholars to conclude as follows:

(1) Uvaṭa was a predecessor of Mahīdhara.

(2) Mahīdhara was a predecessor of Uvaṭa.

(3) Uvaṭa and Mahīdhara were contemporaries.

However, with the help of internal evidence Sarup[10] has proved that Uvaṭa is a predecessor of Mahīdhara. According

9. Vishweshwar, *Kāvyaprakāśa* as quoted by Madhubala, op. cit., p. 63.

10. op. cit.

to him, Mahīdhara's commentary is not an independent exegesis, but a mere amplification of Uvaṭa's explanation. Uvaṭa belonged to the first half of the eleventh century, whereas Mahīdhara belonged to the first half of the twelfth century. These statements have occurred because of scribal errors in the MSS of these commentaries.

WAS UVAṬA A PREDECESSOR OF VIṢṆUMITRA, THE COMMENTATOR OF THE RPr?

Mangal Dev Shastri[11] has looked into this matter. We find a commentary by Viṣṇumitra on the first two *varga*s of the *RPr*. It quotes and comments on the alphabetical list prefixed to the *RPr*. Therefore, a querry has been raised about the chronological order of the two commentators: Uvaṭa and Viṣṇumitra; whether Viṣṇumitra is earlier or Uvaṭa is earlier. Mangal Dev Shastri argued that Uvaṭa was a predecessor of Viṣṇumitra, on the following grounds:

Uvaṭa does not comment on the introductory verses of the *RPr* whereas Viṣṇumitra's commentary is available on the introductory verses. Uvaṭa's comment on the *sūtra* 1.3 of the *RPr* confirms that Uvaṭa did not know the introductory verses prefixed to the main body of the text. To quote Uvaṭa:

> *nanu kathaṁ varṇasamāmnāyam anupadiśyaiva — "aṣṭau samānākṣarāṇy āditaḥ"* (1.1) *iti, upadiṣṭasya hi vyapadeśa evam upapadyate "āditaḥ" iti, nānupadiṣṭasya. tathā "catvāri sandhyakṣarāṇy uttarāṇi" ityuttaravyapadeśo naiva ghaṭata iti* ।
>
> *naiṣa doṣaḥ, upadiṣṭo varṇasamāmnāyo laukiko vidyate, tatra yāvanto varṇā asyāṁ śākhāyām upayokṣyante tāvatāṁ sañjñāṁ kartuṁ tam eva varṇasamāmnāyam urarīkṛtyāha — aṣṭau samānākṣarāṇy āditaḥ, tathā tām evānupūrvīm aṅgīkṛtya "catvāri sandhyakṣarāṇi" ityuttaraśabdam āha* ।

11. op. cit.

Moreover, one may say that Viṣṇumitra has commentated only on the portion on which Uvaṭa had not commentated. This could be taken as an additional argument to prove that Viṣṇumitra is a follower of Uvaṭa.

Contribution of Uvaṭa to the Commentary Tradition of the Prātiśākhyas

On the basis of the discussion of Uvaṭa's personal details given above, we may say that Uvaṭa is the oldest commentator of the *Prs* available so far. As we have seen, he has written two commentaries, one on the *RPr* and another on the *VPr*. Both the commentaries are elaborate. The editors of the respective *Prs* have extensively analysed Uvaṭa's exegesis. In the following paragraphs I will point out just some special features of his exposition of the *Prs*.

QUOTATIONS FROM ŚIKṢĀS

The *Pr* commentators often quote many verses from the older Śikṣā texts. The chronology of the Śikṣā literature is difficult to decide. Because many of the Śikṣās are verse compositions, it is possible that many verses could have been interpolated in them. However, in this context the old commentaries provide help as testimonia.[12] An editor can make proper use of them in preparing critical editions of Śikṣā texts. As an aid to prospective editors and other researchers, I have appended the quoted verses in alphabetical order to this paper. (Appendix I — *RPr*) (Appendix II — *VPr*).

CLARIFYING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A ŚIKṢĀ AND A Pr

Uvaṭa is the first author to point out to the demarcating line between a Śikṣā text and a *Pr*. He says:

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12. Vide N.R. Kulkarni (2006), *Problems of Editing the Śikṣā Texts in Vedic Studies*, Bharatiya Kala Prakashan, Delhi, pp. 213-25.

śikṣācchandovyākaraṇaiḥ sāmānyenoktalakṣaṇam ।
tad evam iha śākhāyām iti śāstraprayojanam ॥

The general description given in the Śikṣā, Chanda and Vyākaraṇa is specified in the *Prs*. In modern terms one may say that a Śikṣā is a text of phonetics, whereas a *Pr* is that of phonology.

This verse is not located in other texts and is applicable only to the *RPr*; because no other *Pr* cites rules for Chandas (metre). Therefore, it is possible that it is from the pen of Uvaṭa.[13] He further comments that the *Pr* texts belonged to each *śākhā* of the Vedas; and therefore, the description given in the *Prs* is more authentic. To strengthen his point he quotes the following verse, coming probably from a Śikṣā:

śikṣā ca prātiśākhyaṁ ca viruddhyete parasparam ।
śikṣaiva durbalety āhuḥ siṁhasyeva mṛgī yathā ॥

UVAṬA ON THE TERM SAMĀNĀKṢARA

The term *samānākṣara*[14] is a peculiar term used mainly in the *Prs* to denote monophthongs or simple vowels, i.e. the vowels that do not contain a combination of vowels. For example, *a* is a simple vowel, which does not involve *sandhi*; however, *ai* is a vowel formed through a combination of *ā* + *e*. The lists of *samānākṣaras* given in the various *Prs* differ. The *RPr* lists the first eight vowels of the alphabet, formulating the rule *aṣṭau samānākṣarāṇy āditaḥ* । *RPr* 1.1, *VPr* 1.44.

Thus, the *RPr* and *VPr* include short and long varieties of *a*, *i*, *u* and *ṛ* in the list and exclude *pluta* (protracted) varieties of the same. In fact, protracted vowels do not show a

13. V.K. Varma (1970), op. cit.
14. Vide N.R. Kulkarni, (2006), *On the Term Samānākṣara* in *Vedic Studies*, Bharatiya Kala Prakashan, Delhi, pp. 240-51.

qualitative change; they show just a quantitative change. As explained above such a change is outside of the purview of the term. The data of the *TPr* contrasts with that of the *RPr*. The *TPr* includes *pluta* varieties of *a, i* and *u* along with the short and long, and excludes the *pluta* varieties by formulating the rule *navāditaḥ samānākṣarāṇi*.

The difference is there because of the development in the concept of the term as well as development in formulating the rules. For the *Prs* other than the *TPr*, the *savarṇadīrgha sandhi* is the motive. One may think of *savarṇadīrgha sandhi* of *r̥*. However, the same *sandhi* of *pluta*s may involve many theoretical problems. Therefore, *r̥* is included and *pluta*s are excluded. For the *TPr*, however, *samāna* is that phoneme which does not show qualitative change. Therefore, it excludes *r̥*. According to all the *Prs*, *r̥* is formed of consonant *r*+ vowel *a/i/u*. Therefore, it is called *pr̥kta*, i.e. mixed with a consonant. The vowel does not show a pure vocalic quality. If *samānākṣara* means that vowel which does not show any qualitative change, then one need not include *r̥*, since it is not a pure vowel. Similarly, one need not exclude *pluta* varieties. However, only *samānākṣara*s are involved in the *savarṇadīrgha sandhi*. Therefore, *RPr* and the followers of it focus on the application of the term and exclude the *pluta* varieties of the term and include *r̥*. The term is applied in the context of the *savarṇadīrgha sandhi*. Uvaṭa precisely notices this point as follows:

> *iha tu teṣāṁ plutānāṁ grahaṇaṁ na sambhavati prayojanābhāvāt* ।
> *savarṇadīrghatvaṁ ca saṁjñākaraṇe prayojanam* ।
> *na ca savarṇadīrghatvam uktānāṁ plutānāṁ sambhavati* ।
> *ataḥ plutāḥ na gr̥hyante* । — *VPr* 1.44.

UVAṬA AS A PHONETICIAN

Uvaṭa's knowledge of phonetics and phonology is evident in his exposition of almost each *sūtra*. It is a well-known fact that

ancient Indian tradition of phonetics was rich even before Pāṇini. This tradition is noticeable in the Śikṣās, *Prs* and especially in the commentaries on the *Prs*. All the commentators explain accurately the purport of the *sūtra*. Moreover, they are aware of the debates current in their time. Uvaṭa is no exception to this. For example the first *sūtra* of the *Śikṣā-paṭala* of the *RPr* is as follows:

vāyuḥ prāṇaḥ koṣṭhyam anupradānaṁ
kaṇṭhasya khe vivṛte saṁvṛte vā ।
āpadyate śvāsatāṁ nādatāṁ vā vaktrīhāyām ॥

The *sūtra* states that speech is the appearance of *prāṇa*. Uvaṭa knows even the other opinion. According to it, speech is the appearance of *udāna*. He reads these two views in between the lines. Furthermore, he justifies that the *sūtra* can be explained keeping in front both these views. To quote him:

> *evam ubhayathācārya-vipratipattidarśanāt śaunakena bhagavatā prāṇaṁ manyamānenedaṁ śāstram evaṁ praṇītam — vāyuḥ prāṇaḥ koṣṭhyam . . . iti, ye punaḥ udānaṁ manyante teṣām idaṁ na siddhyati udānābhāvāt, teṣāṁ ca siddham, śārīrāṇāṁ pañcānām api prāṇa iti nāma sādhāraṇam, tasmāt teṣām api "vāyuḥ prāṇaḥ koṣṭhyam anupradānam" ityevaṁ siddham* ॥

DEFINITIONS GIVEN BY UVAṬA

The commentaries of the *Prs* are important, because many a time they explain in the simplest way the technical terms employed in the *Prs* or those, which are used by them. They are learner-oriented. They are written to explain the rules to the Veda students of the respective branch. Here, I will not deal with the subject exhaustively. I will just quote a few examples to make my point.

In the first *paṭala* of *RPr* many technical terms dealing with phonetics are introduced, but are not defined. Uvaṭa defines

many of these terms. He explains them by clarifying the underlying concept and mentioning its area of application. This is the general method adopted by the commentators of grammatical works. Uvaṭa follows the same. To quote a few:

ete svarāḥ । — *RPr* 1.3

Uvaṭa says: *svaryante śabdyante iti svarāḥ* ।

Here, Uvaṭa defines, following the traditional notion of vowel, that vowels are independently audible and consonants are heard because of vowels.[15] His definition is anticipated in the Indian grammatical tradition (cf. *Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya* 1.2.23, 6.7.2). Ancient Indian traditions of phonetics concentrated on the data available to them in the living language of the Vedic branches as well as their own mother tongues. The data available to them does not go against the definition of *svara* given by these scholars. The definition given by them is applicable to the entire Indo-European language group. Till recently, this definition was accepted even by modern phonetics. However, after the study of many African languages, the perspective changed and therefore, the above-quoted definition is not accepted. A vowel is that which does not obstruct the air stream, and simply modifies the air stream. This is the modern definition.

teṣām ādyāḥ sparśāḥ । — *RPr* 1.7

Uvaṭa comments: *spṛṣṭakaraṇāḥ sparśāḥ kādayo māntāḥ* ।

It is a well-known fact that the Indian tradition of phonetics has evolved two important concepts in the analysis of speech sounds.[16] These are *bāhya prayatna* alias *anupradāna* (external

15. For details see N.R. Kulkarni (2004), ed., *Lakṣaṇacandrikā* (A commentary on the *Taittirīya Prātiśākhya* by Mahadeva Ramacandra Gadre), Bharatiya Kala Prakashan, Delhi, Introduction, pp. 14-15.

16. For details see N.R. Kulkarni (2004), op. cit.

effort) and *ābhyantara prayatna* (internal effort). In the *bāhya prayatna*, the positions of glottis are taken into consideration and sounds are classified accordingly as having *saṁvāra* (with closed glottis) or *vivāra* (with open glottis), *ghoṣa* (voiced) or *aghoṣa* (voiceless), *udātta, anudātta* or *svarita* (with these pitch accents), etc. In the *ābhyantara prayatna*, contact between the place of articulation and *karaṇa*, i.e. the articulator, is taken into consideration. *Spr̥ṣṭa* (complete contact), *īṣatspr̥ṣṭa* (slight contact), *īṣadvivr̥ta* (slightly open) and *vivr̥ta* (complete open) — these four internal efforts are recognized. Keeping these concepts in front, Uvaṭa explains the term *sparśa* as *spr̥ṣṭakaraṇa*. It means that while articulating consonants the articulator completely contacts the place of articulation. Stop is the term adopted in modern phonetics to denote consonants. There is a slight difference in the concept of *sparśa* and stop, though the same class of sounds is denoted by both the terms. Indian phonetic tradition focuses on the contact, whereas modern tradition of phonetics focuses on the stoppage of airflow.

Uvaṭa clearly distinguishes the two types of sounds *ūṣman* (fricatives) and *soṣman* (aspirates) by defining them respectively as follows:

uttareṣṭā ūṣmāṇaḥ । — *RPr* 1.10
Uvaṭa: *ūṣmā vāyuḥ* । *tatpradhānā varṇā ūṣmāṇaḥ* ।

Ūṣmā means air. The sounds sharing excessive air are *ūṣmans*.

yugau soṣmāṇau । — *RPr* 1.13
Uvaṭa: *ūṣmā vāyuḥ* । *tena saha vartante iti soṣmāṇaḥ* ।

The *soṣman* sounds are those in which some part of air is there.

Concluding Remarks

Thus, analysis of the commentaries of Uvaṭa as well as those of the other commentators is very much important for many reasons. In the present paper I have just indicated some of the issues involved in the personal history of Uvaṭa, pointed out some features of Uvaṭa's analysis, and given a direction for further study.

No commentary of a *Pr* has been analysed independently in detail, except that of Uvaṭa on the *RPr* and that of Bhārgava Bhāskara on the *Śaunakīyā Caturādhyāyikā*.[17] Even Uvaṭa's commentary on *RPr* has not been compared with that of the *VPr*. We do not yet have English translations of the commentaries except of the one on the *Śaunakīyā Caturādhyāyikā*.[18] Translating these texts into English and reviewing their contributions to Indian tradition of phonetics is a need of the hour.

Appendix I[19]

1. *anupradānāt saṁsargāt sthānāt karaṇavibhramāt* ।
   jāyate varṇavaiśeṣyaṁ parimāṇāc ca pañcamāt ॥
   — *RPr* 13.13 (*TPr* 23.2).

2. *uktvodāharaṇaṁ kiñcid bahugranthadharo naraḥ* ।
   ākṣiptaḥ śaikṣikeṇeha tṛṇāgnir iva śāmyati ॥
   subahujño 'pi yo bhūtvā śikṣāṁ cen nādhigacchati ।
   na rājati sabhāyāṁ sa śaikṣikasya samīpataḥ ॥

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17. Madhav Deshpande, (1997), ed. & tr., *Śaunakīya Caturādhyāyikā* with *Vṛtti of Bhārgava Bhāskara*, Harvard Oriental Series.
18. op. cit.
19. Some verses, at least in their form accessible at present, have meter-disturbing sandhi and problematic case usage.

brāhmaṇeṣu sameteṣu vidvatsu ca bahuṣv api ।
brahmodye sampravṛtte yaḥ śaikṣikaḥ sa virājate ॥ — *RPr* 14.69

3. *upariṣṭān mukhād agra ūrdhvaṁ yo 'vartate 'nilaḥ* ।
ūrdhvakarmakriyāḥ sarvāḥ prāṇināṁ sampravartayan ॥

nābhyuro 'tha śirobhāgaṁ gacchan karaṇasaṁyutaḥ ।
kaṇṭhatālvoṣṭhadantānāṁ sa prayatnaḥ samīritaḥ ॥

hrasvadīrghaplutān varṇān snigdhān rukṣāṁś ca naikadhā ।
udāttānanudāttāṁś ca svaritān kampitān api ॥

samān vikīrṇāṁś ca tathā saṁvṛtān vivṛtān api ।
dehinām avabodhārthaṁ tenodānaḥ sa ucyate ॥ — *RPr* 13.1

4. *ubhayārthaṁ parārthaṁ vā sūtraṁ syād ādhikārikam* ।
saṁjñāsūtraṁ parārthaṁ syāt pāribhāṣikam eva ca ॥

paribhāṣāṁ ca saṁjñāṁ ca kāryakālāṁ pracakṣate ।
adhikāraḥ kṛto yatra tato 'nyatra na gacchati ॥ — *RPr* 1.68

5. *kramābhigamabhinnāni durgāṇi sumahānty api* ।
vilīyante 'rkabhinnāni tamāṁsīva niśātyaye ॥ — *RPr* 11.65

6. *gāyatryādīni cchandāṁsi somo yair āhṛtaḥ purā* ।
tāni sarvam idaṁ kṛtsnaṁ trailokyaṁ sacarācaram ॥

svargyaṁ yaśasyam āyuṣyaṁ puṇyaṁ vṛddhikaraṁ śubham ।
kīrtimṛgyaṁ yaśasyaṁ ca chandasāṁ jñānam ucyate ॥
— *RPr* 15.62, 18.62

7. *triṣṭubho yā virāṭsthānā virāḍrūpās tathā parāḥ* ।
bahūnā api tā jñeyās triṣṭubho brāhmaṇaṁ tathā ॥ — *RPr* 16.69

8. *dhruvakālam anirdeśyam alpatvāt kavayo viduḥ* ।
yaddhi prāg aṇumātrāyāḥ kālabhede 'pi tatsamam ॥

nādo hy abhinidhānena pīḍyamāno na naśyati ।
tasmād uccāryate tasya yāvad varṇātmanaḥ param ।
ekāntalopo kavayo varṇayanti dhruvasya ca ॥

nāsikāsthānaṁ raktasya tathā rūpeṇa nirdiśet ।
saptamīkālanirdiṣṭe pūrvasya vidhir iṣyate ।

pañcamyās tūttarasyāhus tasmāt kṛcchras tvaṇur bhavet ॥
— *RPr* 6.39

9. *pragāthe punarādānaṁ dṛṣṭvā yajñavidhau muniḥ* ।
arthavantaṁ kramaṁ brūyāt devatāyāś ca śāstrataḥ ॥
— *RPr* 11.70

10. *yadi viṣayagato nānyaṁ janayati kañcid guṇaviśeṣaṁ kṛtsnam* ।
kaluṣamatikaraṁ sādhus tat parṣadi na vadediti ॥ — *RPr* 11.66

11. *śaradyujjvalo vitimiro vibhāti bhagavān yathāṁśumān* ।
satyavacanavittamaḥ kramakaḥ kramate hi saṁśayāṁs tamas-tathātmavān ॥ — *RPr* 11.71

12. *śikṣācchandovyākaraṇaiḥ sāmānyenoktalakṣaṇam* ।
tad evam iha śākhāyām iti śāstraprayojanam ॥
— *RPr* Introduction

Appendix II

1. *anitāvadhyāya iti kṛtaṁ sūtraṁ yataḥ purā* ।
atas tadavadhijñaptiḥ kriyate 'dhyāyasaṅkhyayā ॥

atrāvadhisamādhītaṁ padam antar vikāri yat ।
ācāryeṇocyate tasya prāguktyādiprayojanam ॥ — *VPr* 4.1

2. *ardhamātrā tu kaṇṭhyasya aikāraukārayor bhavet* । — *VPr* 1.73

3. *avagraho yadā nīca uccayor madhyataḥ kvacit* ।
tāthābhāvyo bhavet kampas tanūnaptre nidarśanam ॥
— *VPr* 1.120, 4.139 (*Varṇaratnapradīpikā Śikṣā* 71)

4. *ādimadhyāntaluptāni samāsānyanyāyabhāñji ca* ।
nāvagṛhṇanti kavayaḥ padāny āgamavanti ca ॥ — *VPr* 5.45

5. *upasargāt paro yas tu padādir api dṛśyate* ।
uccasthānasthito yatra guruṁ tatraiva kārayet ॥ — *VPr* 6.23

6. *ekāro 'tha cakāro vā repho dīrghapareṣu ca* ।
samupasargetyetaṣṭed gurur eva na saṁśayaḥ ॥

viṁśater ūpasargāṇām uccā ekākṣarā nava ।
ādyudāttā daśaiteṣām antodāttas tva bhīty ayam. —*VPr* 6.24

7. *oṁkāraś cāthakāraś ca dvāv etau brahmaṇaḥ purā* ।
kaṇṭhaṁ bhittvā viniryātau tenemau maṅgalāv ubhau ॥
— *VPr* 1.17

8. *kriyāvācakam ākhyātam upasargo viśeṣakṛt* ।
sattvābhidhāyakaṁ nāma nipātaḥ pādapūraṇaḥ ॥ — *VPr* 3.2

9. *dvāv eva varjayen nityam anadhyāyau prayatnataḥ* ।
svādhyāyabhūmiṁ cāśuddhām ātmānaṁ cāśuciṁ dvijaḥ ॥
— *VPr* 1.21

10. *punaruktāni lupyante padānīty āha śākalaḥ* ।
alopa iti gārgyasya kāṇvasyārthavaśād iti ॥ — *VPr* 4.177

11. *brahmaṇaḥ praṇavaṁ kuryād ādāv ante ca sarvadā* ।
kṣaratyanoṅkṛtaṁ pūrvaṁ parastāc ca viśīryate ॥
— *VPr* 1.16 (*Manusmṛti* 2.74)

12. *yamān vidyād ayaspiṇḍān sāntasthān dārupiṇḍavat* ।
antasthāyamavarjaṁ tu ūrṇāpiṇḍaṁ vinirdiśet iti ॥
— *VPr* 4.165

13. *yasya yenārthasambandho dūrasthasyāpi tasya tat* ।
arthato hy asamarthānām ānantaryam akāraṇam ॥ — *VPr* 6.14

14. *mantro hīnaḥ svarato varṇato vā mithyāprayukto na tam artham āha* ।
sa vāgvajro yajamānaṁ hinasti yathendraśatruḥ svarato 'parādhāt ॥
— *VPr* 1.4

15. *lopāgamavikārāś ca naivetikaraṇe smṛtāḥ* ।
avagrahas tu carcāyām itinā copadiśyate ॥ — *VPr* 3.20

16. *sadṛśaṁ triṣu liṅgeṣu sarvāsu ca vibhaktiṣu* ।
vacaneṣu ca sarveṣu yan na vyeti tad avyayam ॥ — *VPr* 2.26

17. *sarvatīkṣṇo 'bhinihitaḥ praśliṣṭas tadanantaram* ı
tato mṛdutarau svārau jātyakṣaiprāv ubhau smṛtau ı
tato mṛdutaraḥ svāras tairovyañjana ucyate ı
pādavṛtto mṛdutama stv etat svārabalābalam ıı — *VPr* 1.125

18. *svaraḥ uccaḥ svaro nīcaḥ svaraḥ svarita eva ca* ı
svarapradhānaṁ traisvaryaṁ vyañjanaṁ tena sasvaram ıı
— *VPr* 1.107

19. *svaro varṇo 'kṣaraṁ mātrā tatprayogārtha eva ca* ı
mantraṁ jijñāsamānena veditavyaṁ pade pade ıı — *VPr* 1.34

16

The Mythico-ritual Syntax of Omnipotence

On Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta's Use of Kriyā-kāraka Theory to Explain Śiva's Action

David Peter Lawrence

THIS essay will examine the interpretation, by the tenth- and eleventh-century Kashmiri philosophers Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, of monistic, tantric Śaiva myth and ritual in terms of Sanskrit action syntax. I will focus primarily on their works on *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* but will also refer to Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka* and *Tantrasāra*.[1] Aside from the

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1. The chief Pratyabhijñā texts interpreted here are Utpaladeva, *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* (*IPK*) and Abhinavagupta, *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* (*IPV*), for which I will use the edition *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* of Abhinavagupta, *Doctrine of Divine Recognition: Sanskrit text with Bhāskarī*, 2 vols., ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer and K.C. Pandey (reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986). I will sometimes refer to the eighteenth-century commentary on the *IPV*, *Bhāskarī*, by Bhāskarakaṇṭha (*BIPV*). Other Pratyabhijñā writings within the scope of this essay are: Utpaladeva, *Siddhitrayī and the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti*, ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 34 (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steam Press, 1921), and the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī by Abhinavagupta*, 3 vols., ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir →

importance of these particular theories, I believe that the area of Sanskritic philosophical speculation they exemplify is of interest for general comparative research.

Propaedeutic Overview of Monistic Śaivism and the Pratyabhijñā Apologetics

Monistic Kashmiri Śaivism contains a plethora of complex, interweaving symbolic and ritual traditions, of which Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta adhere to a lineage called Trika. For our purposes it will be most useful to describe the broader patterns. For these traditions, the only reality is the omnipotent deity Śiva. Śiva, out of a kind of play, divides Himself from His consort and power Śakti, and in sexual union emanates the universe through Her. Liberation is the realization of one's true self as Śiva. This is achieved through diverse ritual practices that reenact the cosmogonic myth, ranging from sexual rites, in which the partners become Śiva and Śakti, to theosophical contemplations.

→ Series of Texts and Studies (reprint, Delhi: Akay Book Corporation, 1987). The *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti* and *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* will henceforth be referred to as *IPKV* and *IPVV*, respectively. For Abhinavagupta's writings on symbolic and ritual theology I will use, first, the *Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta with the Commentary of Jayaratha*, 8 vols., ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri and Mukunda Rama Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, republication, ed. R.C. Dwivedi and Navjivan Rastogi (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987). Abhinava's book will henceforth be referred to as *TA*, and Jayaratha's commentary, *Tantrālokaviveka*, will be referred to as *TAV*. I will also refer to *The Tantrasāra of Abhinavagupta*, ed. Mukunda Ram Sastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 17 (reprint, Delhi: Bani Prakashan, 1982). This text will be abbreviated *TS*.

The Pratyabhijñā system developed by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta is both a philosophical apologetics and a gnoseological internalization of tantric praxis. Its primary mode of explanation is epistemological. The thinkers explain the myth of Śiva's emanation of the world through Śakti as His self-recognition (*ahampratyavamarśa);* they also equate this self-recognition with Bhartṛhari's principle of the Word Absolute (*śabdabrahman/parāvāk*) in order to interpret creation as linguistic in nature. In debates with the Buddhist logicians, the Śaivas attempt to show that this recognition is the reality underlying and constituting all states of affairs. As a ritual enactment, by thus disclosing the necessity and ubiquity of Śiva's self-recognition, the system leads the student to complete participation in it.[2]

Indian Semantics of Mythico-Ritual Narrative

Now Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta also explain the myth and ritual of Śiva-Śakti, or Śiva's self-recognition, as His *kriyā*.[3] This word, derived from the root *kṛ*, is cognate to the English word "create," and means both creation and action. The universe is Śiva's "cre-ation."

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2. I investigate the thinkers' understanding of the Pratyabhijñā as both philosophical proof and spiritual exercise in "Tantric Argument: The Transfiguration of Philosophical Discourse in the Pratyabhijñā System of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta," *Philosophy East and West* 46 (2) (1996): 165-204. In "Śiva's Self-Recognition and the Problem of Interpretation," *Philosophy East and West* 48 (2) (1998): 197-231, I more fully examine and defend the Śaiva philosophy of recognition in its analogies with the Western philosophical theology of logos.

3. Śiva's epistemic-recognitive and active aspects are often described, respectively, as His Knowledge (*jñāna*) and Action (*kriyā*) Śaktis.

This interpretation is also based on semantic theory. Just as the Śaivas follow Bhartṛhari in viewing the universe synthesized through Śiva's self-recognition as inherently linguistic, they follow the dominant Vyākaraṇa, "Grammarian," view that *kriyā*, action, is the chief meaning of all language. Language is said to express being (*sattā*) as an action to be accomplished.[4] This view extrapolates to all discourse the priestly interpretation of the Vedas as expressing injunctions for the ritual *kriyā*s of sacrifice.[5]

I believe that the Śaiva and related semantic concepts of action have some analogy to comtemporary Western theories of the intrinsically narrative character of experience.[6] However, the Śaiva and other Indian theories neither relativize narrative like Lyotard nor "revisionistically" metaphorize it like Ricoeur.[7] The mythical story that is paradigmatic for human ritual action is not understood to be a mere quality of experience generated by imagination, but is posited of existence itself. We are talking here of a narrative or mythico-ritual narrative *ontology*.

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4. See *Vākyapadīya* of *Bhartṛhari, Kāṇḍa* 3, ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer (Pune: Deccan College, 1963-73), pt. 2, 3.8. 1-40, particularly 3.8.1, 1; 3.8.27, 22; 3.8.35, 26.

5. The ritualistic philosophical school of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā elaborated at great length on the injunctive nature of language, describing the dispositional and concrete "bringing about" (*bhāvanā*) of actions conveyed by the inflected verbs in sentences.

6. An influential earlier study is Stephen Crites, "The Narrative Quality of Experience," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 39 (September 1971): 291-311.

7. See Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, tr. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), and Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*. 3 vols., tr. Kathleen McLaughlin/Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984-88).

Diverging Mythico-Ritual Syntaxes

Now, the Śaivas along with other Indian philosophies further interpret the action of myth and ritual with theories of Sanskrit syntax. This is provided for by the system of the Sanskrit *kārakas*. While the six *kārakas* are historically related to the Indo-European cases, their conception is more subtle, and bridges in a particular way the areas of semantics and syntax.[8] *Kārakas*

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8. Most of the basic ideas on *kārakas* explained here may be found in *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Kārakahnika* (P. 1.4.23-1.4.55), ed. with introd., trans., and notes by S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergan (Pune: University of Poona, 1975). Also see the *Kriyāsamuddeśa*, in *Vākyapadīya, kāṇḍa* 3, pt. 2, 3.8. 1-40, and the *Sādhanasamuddeśa*, in *Vākyapadīya, Kāṇḍa* 3, pt. 1, 3.7, 230-370. Some of the more important secondary studies, representing a variety of points of view, are: K.A. Subramania Iyer, *Bhartṛhari: A Study of the Vākyapadīya in the Light of the Ancient Commentaries* (Pune: Deccan College, 1969), pp. 283-344; George Cardona, "Pāṇini's Syntactic Categories," *Journal of the Oriental Institute*, Baroda 16 (1967): 202-15; idem, "Pāṇini's *Kārakas*: Agency, Animation and Identity," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2 (1974): 231-306; Sergiu Al-George, "Le sujet grammatical chez Pāṇini," *Studia et Acta Orientalia Bucaresti* 1 (1957): 39-47; idem, "The Extra-Linguistic Origin of Pāṇini's Syntactic Categories and Their Linguistic Accuracy," *Journal of the Oriental Institute*, Baroda 18 (1968): 1-7; Rosane Rocher, "'Agent' et. 'object' chez Pāṇini," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 84 (1964): pp. 44-54; Bimal Krishna Matilal, "Indian Theorists on the Nature of the Sentence (*vākya*)," *Foundations of Language* 2 (1996): pp. 377-93; idem, "The Doctrine of Karaṇa in Grammar-Logic," *Journal of the Ganganath Jha Research Institute* 17 (1960): pp. 63-69; idem, "The *Kāraka* Theory,"chap. in Bimal Krishna Matilal, *The Word and the World: India's Contribution to the Study of Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 40-48; Frits Staal, "Syntactic and Semantic Relations in Pāṇini," *Foundations of Language* 5 (1969): pp. 83-117; Edwin Gerow, "What is Karma (*Kiṃ Karmeti*): An Exercise in Philosophical Semantics," *Indologica Taurinensia*, 10 (1982): 87-116.

describe various logical relationships of the referents of declined nouns to the main action expressed by a verb: the action's agent (*kartṛ*), its chief instrument (*karaṇa*), the object it effects or affects (*karman*), the location (*adhikaraṇa*), where it comes from spatially, causally, and so forth (*apādāna*), and for whom or what one performs it (*sampradāna*). The same *kāraka* may actually be expressed in more than one case declension. The genitive is not even considered a *kāraka*, as it usually articulates relationships between nouns, rather than between nouns and a verb.

The word *kāraka* is a derivative from the same root as the word "action" (*kṛ*), having the causal significance of "actor," "maker," "factor." The *kāraka*s are understood as functioning to accomplish the action expressed by the verb. The action is said to be "that which is to be established" (*sādhya*) and the *kāraka*s are "establishers" (*sādhana*s). Take the typical example: "He cooks rice in the pot with fire." The pot contains the rice and water, and the fire heats them. The rice, that is, the direct object expressed in the accusative, is explained to be the locus of the result (*phala*) of the action of cooking. This result is a transformation of the nature of the rice.

In accordance with its general emphases on language and action, Sanskritic speculation about many philosophical topics often has recourse to arguments about the interrelations between the various *kāraka*s and the overarching *kriyā*. Even traditions such as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Advaita Vedānta, and Buddhism, which do not accept the notion that semantics is primarily the expression of action, are influenced by the view and also engage in these discussions.

To help thematize one of the trajectories within these discussions, I point out an analogous area of Western theory,

propounded by Kenneth Burke in his *Grammar of Motives*.[9] Developing his categories from a model of drama, Burke identifies five intrinsic factors or "motives" necessary to all accounts of action: the act itself, the agent, the scene, the agency (i.e. instrument),[10] and the purpose.[11] The last four of these roughly overlap with the Sanskrit *kartṛ*, *adhikaraṇa*, *karaṇa*, and *sampradāna*, and an interesting parallel may also be observed between the causal significance of motive and that of *kāraka*.[12] However, I am not concerned here with a detailed comparison of the schemes.

Rather I am interested in Burke's insight that different philosophical and literary expressions tend, explicitly or implicitly, to emphasize reductionistically or "feature" particular motives at the expense of the others. For example, Burke observes that Hegelian idealism features the agent. Materialism, from the Greek atomists through modern science

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9. Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

10. I prefer the term "instrument" rather than Burke's "agency" in order to avoid confusion with the category of the "agent." The term "instrument" is also more commonly used in grammar and philosophy.

11. After I had developed my ideas on the analogy between Burke and aspects of *kāraka* theory, I discovered the following: the use of terminology for dramatic roles is applied to understanding the sentence by D. Terence Langendoen. The roles are actually used to describe semantic relationships that are turned into syntactic relationships through transformational rules (D. Terence Langendoen, *Essentials of English Grammar* [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970], pp. 61 ff.). This approach in turn is suggested as a way of understanding *kāraka*s by S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen, in the introduction to *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Kārakahnika*, pp. iii-iv.

12. Though he attempts to derive his categories from Aristotle, was Burke actually reflecting on the Indo-European case structures?

and, I would add, historicism and social scientific contextualism, feature the scene.[13] Burke interprets scientific and technological thought, pragmatism, and utilitarianism as featuring the instrument/agency, in an analysis which may be assimilated to other studies of contemporary "instrumental" rationality. Outside the classification of philosophies, Burke's grammar has notably been used in sociological theories to typologize different sorts of explanatory accounts and justifications of action.[14]

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13. According to Burke, Marxism also features the scene. However, it attributes to the scene a degree of its own conscious agent-hood. While it is illuminating to view such approaches as emphasizing the "scene," it seems to me that Burke should have included a separate category of the "object." Scientific or empirical research methodologies in the "hard" sciences as well as culture studies have of course been preoccupied with "objective" knowledge. This does not contradict Burke's analysis, as the approaches he identifies emphasize the "scene" as what is known objectively.

14. For example, Burke has been used to analyse different sociological and legal approaches to the problem of drunk driving. Some explanations emphasize the category "drunk driving" as an *act* carrying with it liability, and others emphasize the "drunk driver," an *agent* acting with intention and at fault. See Joseph R. Gusfield, *The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

    A study that, although it only mentions Burke, laid the groundwork for later uses of the grammar of motives is C. Wright Mills, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive," *American Sociological Review*, 5 (1940): 904-13. For assessments of Burke's grammar of motives along with other aspects of his theory of symbolic action, including reviews of applications of his ideas, see Joseph R. Gusfield, introduction to *Kenneth Burke on Symbols and Society*, ed. Joseph R. Gusfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 1-49; Sonja K. Foss, Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp, *Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric* (Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press, 1985), pp. 153-88, 291-304 (with a good bibliography); Herbert W. Simons and Trevor Melia, eds., *The Legacy of Kenneth Burke* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,

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It is not necessary to attempt to use Burke to classify different South Asian philosophies. I believe that an important dimension of the Sanskritic debates about action syntax is precisely an effort of the different schools to *articulate their own, literally grammatical, grammars of motives.* This is exemplified in the area of inquiry that is the chief focus of this essay. I will here sketch how the Śaivas' and other Indian theories either feature or downplay the role of the *agent* in relation to the syntactic nexus of *action and its objects and results.*[15]

→ 1989); and George K. Zollschan, "Reasons for Conduct and the Conduct of Reason: The Eightfold Route to Motivational Ascription," in *Social Change: Explorations, Diagnoses and Conjectures*, ed. George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch (New York: John Wiley, 1976), pp. 270-317.

15. It should be understood that this study, in purposes and method, is completely different from earlier efforts to characterize civilizations on the basis of their languages, as for example in Hajime Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1971). I view such projects of generalization as highly problematic. I am concerned here with *competing* philosophical *theories* of Sanskrit syntax.

I must also distinguish my approach from Frits Staal's syntactical analyses of Vedic ritual. See his "Ritual Syntax," in *Sanskrit and Indian Studies: Essays in Honour of Daniel H. H. Ingalls*, ed. M. Nagatomi et al. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980), pp. 119-43. Staal does not examine Sanskritic understandings of the motivation of action. Moreover, whereas I am concerned with theories of *mythico-ritual* syntax, he abstracts the syntax of ritual from semantics on the basis of his well-known conception of the "meaninglessness of ritual." He explains the highly convoluted synchronic structure of ritual in terms of Chomskian categories such as "phrase structure," "transformational," and "self-embedding" rules. (It would be interesting to relate such analysis to the indigenous understandings considered here.) He also claims that the meaningless ritualistic syntax preceded, and still affects, the structures of actual languages. Staal further elaborates his ideas in his *Rules without Meaning: Ritual, Mantras and the Human Sciences*, Toronto Studies in Religion, vol. 4 (New York; Peter Lang, 1989).

The Orthodox Hindu and Buddhist Denigration of the Agent in the Syntactic Nexus of Action and Result

Now the mainstream of orthodox Indian philosophical systems, Hindu as well as Buddhist, has in various ways denigrated the role of the agent within the syntactic nexus. First, the agent is devalued in the same manner as all of the other *kāraka*s. As I have said, action is the chief meaning and referent of language. All of the *kāraka*s are accessories (*sādhana*s) helping to accomplish that action which is to be accomplished (*sādhya*).

In his study "What is *karma*," Edwin Gerow places this point in a more complicated pattern of considerations that syntactically subordinate the agent. On the one hand, the word *karman* means action. On the other, it designates the *kāraka* indicating the direct object, which is (usually) expressed in the accusative case. As stated previously, the direct object is understood to receive the result (*phala*) of the verbal process (*vyāpāra*), for example the rice which is cooked.

Gerow points out a strong tendency in Indian linguistic and philosophical speculation toward the identification of the verbal process with the result. The reasoning for this identification is complex. However, it may be stated briefly that the case of intransitive verbs, which to us would seem exceptional, became paradigmatic. In "He sits," the sitting is a unity of both process and result. The meaning of the word *karman* as both action and direct object articulates the identity.

Furthermore, explains Gerow, the unitary nexus of process and result came to be understood as the dominant feature of syntax. This is observed in a proclivity in Sanskrit toward passive constructions — a proclivity that in itself emphasizes the agent's accessory status. Now, in passive syntax, the verb agrees with the *karman*, for example, "The rice is cooked by

him." In Gerow's view, the culmination of these patterns of thinking is the late grammarian Nāgeśa's treatment of what would seem to us the oddest case as most paradigmatic, that is, passive intransitive syntax. Thus "It is sat (by him)." The process-result is featured strongly.

According to Gerow, this grammatical understanding is *the same* as the religious conception of *karman* as a chain of process and result extending across lives. The agent is seen as a kind of adjunct bound within the nexus. Gerow is careful to distinguish his views from earlier arguments that Sanskrit causes an alleged "passive character" of the Indian mind.[16] Nevertheless he still contends that it is primarily a fact about the Sanskrit language that was reflected in the various forms of the doctrine of *karman*, and was increasingly realized in the linguistic and philosophical speculation.

I believe that the range of ideas about *karman* in Indian history is far too vast to be explained this way. I also view Sanskrit and other languages in themselves as semantically more indeterminate.[17] My interest is rather in how the second-order, scholastic speculation reflects *divergent* religious-cultural understandings within the South Asian cultural area. In any event, Gerow has made the important observation that a number of philosophical and theological systems do think in precisely the way described, using grammar to support their views. I believe that this pattern of thinking articulates not

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16. Nakamura continues these discussions. See my remark in the previous note.

17. It should be understood that the critical remarks made here and below are not meant to disparage Gerow's innovative study. They endeavour only to advance further the inquiry into these subjects.

only the agent's bondage to *karman* in rebirth for Hindus and Buddhists but also its subordination to the order of objective ritual behaviour — pertaining to caste, sacrifice, life-cycle, and so forth — in orthodox Hindu society.

Support is accorded to this mode of explanation by Alexis Sanderson's study, "Purity and Power among the Brahmans of Kashmir."[18] Sanderson examines conceptions of agency with a social-historical rather than a grammatical focus, and he is especially concerned with the associated symbolism of purity and impurity. Nevertheless, his analysis of the extreme but divergent approaches to denigrating agency of the orthodox traditions of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and Advaita Vedānta is based on the very texts discussing the syntax of action.

The case of the orthodox ritualistic system of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā is particularly interesting. The Mīmāṁsakas actually stress the importance of the agent in carrying out ritual injunctions. However, the agent is "depersonalized" in various ways. As with most Indian traditions, he is subject to *karman* as action and result in rebirth. More specifically, he must follow the injunctions to perform rituals. Salvation comes from performing rituals that *completely transcend all worldly purpose.* Sanderson explains:

> This contradiction, that of the "solipsistic conformist," was his self-representation as ritual agent. The notion of autonomous agency individualized the person, but his determination by a world of revealed duties, his wish to

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18. Alexis Sanderson. "Purity and Power among the Brahmans of Kashmir," in *The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History*, ed. Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins, and Steven Lukes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 190-216.

> conform to the Brahmanical ideal, depersonalized this individual, purging him of all independent motivations.[19]

As Sanderson observes, Advaita Vedānta accepts the necessity of social-ritual action described by Mīmāṁsā, but contends that it is ultimately illusory and escapes from it in a liberation equated with non-agency.[20] I will take Śaṅkara as the representative of Advaita because his name is so well-known in the West.[21] Śaṅkara is thoroughly grounded in the ritualistic school of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā. He rigidly defends the orthodox Hindu patterns of behaviour. However, I would say that he is equally terrified of them. For him an agent is inexorably subordinated to the syntax of acting and enjoying results. Śaṅkara thus systematically rejects the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā process of exegesis and ritual action as the way to ultimate salvation. He divorces the saving knowledge of the real Self/*Brahman* from agency and action. The following passages from the *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya* are typical:

> We maintain [as opposed to the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā] that the knowledge of the Self does not pertain to something which is to be done. [This knowledge] is not for the purpose of avoiding or pursuing [anything]. Our excellence is [maintaining that], when there is the realization of the Self

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19. Sanderson, "Purity," p. 196.
20. Ibid., pp. 196-97.
21. The explanations and quotations of Śaṅkara are my own. I note that while the Śaivas indicate familiarity with Advaita Vedānta, they never quote Śaṅkara. It does not matter here whether they knew his works, or those of other representatives of Advaita, for I only wish to show how they subvert a common mode of thinking.

as *Brahman*, there is the abandonment of everything which has to be done, and the completion of what has to be done.[22]

This is what one who knows *Brahman* realizes: "I am *Brahman*, which is completely different from that [limited self] known previously as agent and enjoyer; and is neither agent nor enjoyer in any of the three times [i.e. past, present, and future]. Thus previously I was neither agent nor enjoyer. Nor am I now. Nor will I be at a future time." Only thus is liberation possible. For otherwise, if there were no destruction of the *karmas* which have been proceeding for beginningless time, there would be no liberation.[23]

This gnosis of non-agency is the individuality of the renunciant as interpreted by Louis Dumont.[24]

The valuation of subordination to action in Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and the attempt to escape from the same in Advaita Vedānta indicate the diversity of ways of proceeding from the same or similar assumptions. Sanderson also observes that there are

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22. Bādarāyaṇa, Śaṅkara, Vācaspatimiśra, Amalānandasarasvatī, and Appayyadīkṣita, *The Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya: With the Commentaries Bhāmatī, Kalpataru and Parimala*, 2 vols., ed. K.L. Joshi (Delhi: Parimal Publications, 1987), 1.1.4, 1 : 130.

23. Ibid., 4.1.13, 2 : 954. Cf. 3.4.16, 2 : 876.

24. Dumont emphasizes that this individuality is achieved through the renunciation of action in the sphere of worldly caste and other social relationships. I agree with his sociological observations about the reciprocal and complementary relationships that nevertheless exist between renouncers and the worldly, and about the cultural creativity of renunciant traditions. See Louis Dumont, "World Renunciation in Indian Religions," appendix in *Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications*, tr. Mark Sainsbury, Louis Dumont, and Basia Gulati (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 267-86.

moderate devaluations of agency in the Hindu "middle ground," for example by the Vaiṣṇavas.[25] Of course, the mainstream Buddhist positions completely deny the existence of a self/agent. I have said enough to provide a foil to the Śaiva conceptions.

The Śaiva Grammar of Omnipotence

As Sanderson explains, the monistic Śaivism of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta pursues the value of "power" as opposed to the orthodox Hindu "purity." The omnipotence of identity with Śiva-Śakti or participation in Śiva's self-recognition stands in continuity with other limited magical powers (*siddhis*) that are pursued. And, as Sanderson points out, the tantric praxes transgress the ritual proscriptions concerning purity, for example regarding caste, diet, sexuality, and death. Likewise, for the monistic Śaiva traditions *karman* as bonding process and result extending across lives is not an inexorable consequence of action. It is described as one of three illusory taints (*malas*), the taint of *karman* (*kārma mala*).[26] This taint is understood as only an incomplete realization of one's omnipotent, cosmogonic Action Śakti. Freedom from *karman* is the realization of that Śakti.[27]

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25. Sanderson, "Purity," pp. 197-98.

26. The other two *malas* are those of limited individuality, the *āṇava mala*, and *māyā*, the *māyīya mala*.

27. See *The Spandakārikās of Vasugupta with the Nirṇaya by Kṣemarāja*, ed. and tr. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 42 (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steam Press, 1925), 3.16, 71-72; Abhinavagupta, *Śrī Mālinīvijaya Vārttikam*, ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 31 (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steam Press, 1921). 1.313-315, 30-31; *TA* and *TAV*, 13.266-268a, 5 : 2363-2365; *IPK* and *IPV* 3.2.4-10, 2 : 248-56.

In developing a grammar of power or omnipotence, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta take up several earlier understandings of the (albeit often delimited) role of the *kartṛ* or agent, particularly from the Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika traditions, and radicalize them. The alternatives provided by these considerations were not given sufficient attention by Gerow.

I will summarize the most important of these to the Śaivas. As I have explained, all of the *kārakas* are understood to function in accomplishing the overall action or process (*vyāpāra*) expressed by the verb. They do this through their own *subordinate processes*. The pan *holds* the rice, the fire *heats* it, and so forth. Where are all the subordinate processes synthesized into the larger one? This is understood to be accomplished by the agent, who is the locus of the overall process (*vyāpārāśraya*).

Furthermore, according to grammar, it is the agent who is the instigator (*prayojaka*) of all of the subordinate processes comprising the larger one. He arranges the equipment, lights and controls the fire, and so forth.[28] Sometimes further subjective factors in this instigation are identified. The Naiyāyikas in particular stress that the agent has the intention or desire (*icchā*) and makes the effort (*yatna*) that brings about the action. The followers of Pāṇini state that the direct object (*karman*), as receiving the result of the process, is that which is most desired (*īpsitatama*) by the agent.

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28. In this respect, there are analogies between the ordinary agent and the agent of the causative conjugation.

I will make one more point. While the agent controls the processes of the other *kāraka*s, no other *kāraka* has a similar influence on him. The other *kāraka*s are "determined by another" (*paratantra*), but he is "self-determined" or "free" (*svatantra*) with regard to their operations.

The Śaivas explain the Lord's/Self's cosmogonic omnipotence as His creation of the universe from His mere intention (*icchā*) and self-determining freedom (*svātantrya*). Most important to their syntactic theory is their interpretation of Śiva's character as locus of all subordinate processes of all things in the universe. This is explained as His synthesis (*anusaṁdhāna*) of them by recognizing Himself through the recognitions of each of them.

This philosophical syntax is exemplified in the following explanation by Abhinavagupta, which uses the analogy of ordinary agency to elucidate that of the Lord:

> Here [according to this system], action is really nothing but the Supreme Lord's intention [*icchā*]. [This intention] consists of uninterrupted self-recognition [*svātmaparāmarśa*], which has the nature of unobstructed freedom [*svātantrya*], and is not dependent on another. . . . For [limited individuals such as] Caitra or Maitra, etc., the inner intention [*icchā*, such as that expressed] "I cook" is the action. Thus, even though there is the relation of [one who is cooking] with numerous movements [*spanda*] such as putting something on the fire, etc., the [intention] "I cook" is uninterrupted. It is nothing but the intention [*icchā*] "I cook" which appears as such movements. . . . Thus is that recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] of the Lord, which has the nature of intention [*icchā*, which may be expressed] "I Lord," "I appear," "I manifest in cosmogonic vibration [*sphurāmi*]," "I create through

> agitation [*ghūrṇe*]"[29] and "I recognize [*pratyavamṛśāmi*]." The essential nature [of such recognitive judgement] is nothing but "I". . .[30]

Thus there is a reductionism in a direction opposite to that which Gerow observed. In a sentence such as "Devadatta cooks rice in the pan with wood," the factors such as the pan, wood and rice appear (*prakāśante*) as merged in the action. The action in turn rests (*āśritām*) in the agent.[31] According to the Śaivas, even action that seems to be situated primarily in the object is actually located in the agent through His unifying recognitive synthesis.[32]

THE ŚAIVA SYNTAX OF CAUSATION

The Śaivas elaborate this syntax in a number of different spheres of philosophical explanation. We may first look at their theorization about the important Indian philosophical topic of the cause-effect relation.[33] To begin with, the term most

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29. The Śaivas commonly describe the unitary, eternal Lord's emanation of temporal diversity as a kind of agitation or vibration. This is the understanding articulated in the doctrine of Śiva's *spanda*. Abhinava emphasizes the connection with this doctrine here in describing the movements of the one cooking as *spandas*.

30. *IPV* 2.1.8, 2 : 24-25.

31. Utpaladeva, *Sambandhasiddhi*, in *Siddhitrayī* and the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti*, 9.

32. *IPVV* 2.4.5, 3 : 189-90.

33. The classic contemporary reading of Indian philosophical positions in terms of the issue of causality is Karl H. Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963). Unfortunately I cannot here get into all of the technicalities of the Śaiva theorization on causality. I can only point out some of the key ways in which they structure the subject with their understanding of syntax. Causality is the focus of the whole of *IPK* and *IPV* 2.4, 2: 150-209.

frequently used for cause in discussions of causality is *kāraṇa*. This word is situated in syntax in the position of the *kāraka* called *karaṇa*, which corresponds to our instrumental case.[34] Whereas all the *kāraka*s have a kind of causal role in the accomplishment of an action, this case indicates that the cause proper is conceived as the most efficient means (*sādhakatama*). Sometimes the cause is also declined in the *apādāna* or ablative, indicating that from which the action comes. The effect is the result (*phala*) that is understood to occur in the direct object (*karman*).

The Śaivas subsume the cause-effect relation within their idealistic agential syntax. Through His recognitive synthesis, the omnipotent agent Śiva/the Self is the substratum of the overarching verbal process that contains the subordinate operations of all the other *kāraka*s, and it is He who instigates these operations. He moves and, as underlying substance, connects through time what is ordinarily considered the cause with the effect in the object. As such it is He who is the real or essential cause. Utpaladeva puts this densely, referring to Śiva's action as His Action Śakti:

> That [Action] Śakti is the existence [*sattā*] of both [cause and effect, which are at different moments each] existent [*sat*] and non-existent [*asat*]. That [Action Śakti] does not belong to what is insentient. Therefore the essential nature of the

34. For elucidation of the correspondence of *kāraṇa* and *karaṇa*, see Matilal, "The Doctrine of Karaṇa in Grammar-Logic."

> cause-effect [*kārya-kāraṇa*] relation is the agent-direct object [*kartṛ-karma*] relation.[35]

In the following passage of his commentary, Abhinavagupta more fully explains the Lord's instigation and synthesis of the different moments through His Action Śakti, using the example of germination:

> [At the time of the seed, regardless of whether or not] the sprout [is conceived to be either] existent [implicity within the seed] or non-existent,[36] the insentient seed does not have the capacity to make it have such existence that it is

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35. *IPK* 2.4.2, 2 : 153. Abhinavagupta is not sure exactly how to take Utpaladeva's reference to the existent and the non-existent. In my translation, I have taken the assertion as indicating the fact that the successive moments of an action, and thus the constituent "processes" of cause and effect, become existent and then non-existent. The action itself is the existence/Being (*sattā*) that unifies these moments. This interpretation seems to be supported by the following statement of Bhartṛhari: "Therefore that which is non-existent [*asat*] has disappeared. And that which is existent [*sat*] is experienced. [*Action*] is understood as the unitary essential nature [*ātman*] of the existent [*sat*] and the non-existent [*asat*]" (*Vākyapadīya, kāṇḍa* 3, pt. 2, 3.8.19,18). Another possibility is that Utpaladeva is asserting the inadequacy of both the Sāṁkhya and Nyāya theories of causality. According to the former, the effect pre-exists in the cause, and arises as a sort of transformation of it. (This view will be discussed further below.) According to the latter, the effect is non-existent in the cause, and "emerges" as something new. For Abhinava's discussion of the alternative interpretations, see *IPV* 2.4.2, 2 : 154, and *IPVV* 2.4.2, 3 : 186. Also see *BIPV* 2.4.2, 2 :154. In any case the basic point expressed by Utpaladeva regarding the role of the agent remains the same.
36. Abhinava is referring to the interpretation of the verse in terms of the Sāṁkhya and Nyāya theories, as explained in the previous footnote.

> experienced [i.e., as developed into the sprout]. In the sprout being born from the seed, there is no power of the sprout because it does not yet exist. In the sprout being born, how can there be the power of the seed, since it is other than the sprout? Since this is so, it is concluded that the effect [*kārya*] is nothing but the direct object [*karma*] being manifested through the Action Śakti. This [fact] is evinced in the gerundive suffix [used to derive the word for effect, *kārya*, from the verb for action, *kṛ*].[37] [The effect] is caused to be produced by Him.[38] [He is the] agent by reason of exercising the capacity for this [production of the effect]. Therefore the cause [*kāraṇa*] rests in the agent *[kartṛ]*, who is consciousness.[39]

Within the perspective of this idealism, furthermore, the apparently unconscious process of a sprout arising from a seed is really not different from the manifestly conscious process of a potter making a pot. The Lord manifests from Himself the seed, along with the additional necessities such as earth and water — and then the sprout.[40] Also, it is ultimately the Lord Himself, and not the potter *qua* limited individual, who makes the pot. The Lord manifests the potter, the tools and

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37. As a gerundive, *kārya*, "effect," literally means "that which is to be done."

38. I have used this awkward phrase to indicate that the verb *kāryate* is conjugated in the causative.

39. *IPV* 2.4.2, 2 : 153-54. Utpaladeva explains the Lord's creation of things through his agential intention (*icchā*) at *IPK* 2.4.1, 2 : 152. Abhinavagupta epitomizes this verse as also asserting that the relation of cause and effect is nothing but the relation of agent and direct object, at *IPV* 2.4, Introduction, 2 :151. Cf. the explanation more focused on the idealistic character of causality in *IPK* 2.4.4, 2 :153.

40. This is spelled out at *IPVV* 2.4.8, 3 : 192.

materials, and their activities. Abhinava places the process in the monistic idealistic perspective with the analogy of the reflection in a mirror of a potter making a pot.[41]

The Śaivas elaborate some of the same basic syntactic considerations to produce an interesting refutation of the Buddhist understanding of causation as "dependent origination." According to this conception, causality is a mere regularity of succession between evanescent entities, without any continuous or substantial "connection" between them. Such causality may be described in the manner "When there is this, then there is this" (*asmin satīdam asti*). Now, this expression in Sanskrit uses the grammatical construction that in English is called the "locative absolute."

The Śaivas interpret the regular priority and posteriority expressed with the locative construction as a sort of expectation (*apekṣā*) between the moments. They contend that such an expectation could not exist between discrete entities that in themselves lack recognitive synthesis (*anusaṁdhāna*).[42] Here is another terse statement by Utpaladeva:

> The cause-effect relation [is formulated by the Buddhists as dependent origination expressed] "When there is this, then there is this." This [relation] cannot belong to insentient things, which are devoid of expectation [*apekṣā*]. For the referents of the seventh case cannot be supposed to be those [insentient things] which are situated only in themselves and are devoid of recognitive synthesis [*anusaṁdhāna*], whether they are existent [*sat*] or non-existent [*asat*].[43]

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41. See *IPV* 1.8.9, 1 : 411; *IPV* 2.4.4, 2 : 157-59; *IPV* 2.4.9, 2 : 169-70.

42. See *IPV* 2.4.14, 2 : 188; *IPVV* 2.4.14, 3 : 218.

43. *IPK* 2.4.14-15, 2 : 187-90. See the discussion of the qualifications "existent" and "non-existent" above.

In his commentary, Abhinava again invokes the Śaiva interpretations of the syntactic principles regarding the agent as free and as substratum uniting the constituent processes of the *kārakas* in the overarching process. It is He who unites what is expressed in the locative with what is expressed in the main clause:

> The meaning of the seventh [locative] or other declension is classified as the relation between the *kriyā* and *kāraka*. It is this [relation between the *kriyā* and *kāraka* which is the only] regular succession[44] between things. There is no other dry[45] [form of regular succession]. That [regular succession] is possible if the pair of things [which are related] rest on [Him] who is free [*svatantra*] and has the nature of consciousness, and not otherwise. . . . [The Buddhists have advocated dependent origination as a regular succession of cause and effect having such typical expressions using the locative as] "When there is the seed, there is the sprout" and "When there is fire, there is smoke." All this [regular succession is possible only when there is rest [of the things occurring in succession] on the subject [*pramātṛ*] who is free [*svatantra*] and has the nature of consciousness. And not otherwise.[46]

For the Śaivas there is no unrelated component of the sentence. All syntax is related through the agent.

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44. This term, *samanvaya*, also has the significance of syntactic co-ordination.

45. It is notable that Abhinava refers to other ostensible relations as "dry" (*śuṣka*): Bhāskarakaṇṭha glosses this term as *niḥsāra*, "without essence," and lists as examples "conjunction" (*saṁyoga*), and so forth. It is clear that Abhinava's "moist" relationship is that which involves action by the agent.

46. *IPV* 2.4.16, 2 : 192-93.

We see that in the discussions of causality the agent's ability, as substratum and instigator, to unite the processes of cause and effect is crucial. It will be useful for us briefly to consider the Pratyabhijñā thinkers' evaluations of the Sāṁkhya and Advaita Vedānta expressions of *satkāryavāda*, the view that the effect preexists in the cause. According to the Sāṁkhya, the effect is a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of a *continuous* underlying material cause (*pradhāna, prakṛti*). The Śaivas applaud the Sāṁkhya for asserting the continuity between cause and effect.[47] However they disagree with the Sāṁkhya understanding of the underlying material cause as insentient matter. Here is an excerpt from Abhinavagupta's argument that the different moments of the action of transformation can only be synthesized and instigated by a conscious agent:

> Action is explained to be a differentiation between forms belonging to a unitary essential nature, which is unitary due to the force of recognition [*pratyabhijñā*]. Since [action] is accompanied by temporal sequence, these mutually differentiated forms do not appear simultaneously. . . . So, because the material cause [*pradhāna*] is characterized by a particular action, it has agency. It does not have a mere dry causality. . . .[48] The material cause [in its ultimate nature as source of the universe, viewed by the Pratyabhijñā as the agent Śiva] abandons one form, establishes another distinct

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47. Abhinavagupta describes the Sāṁkhyas as "having long-ranging insight" and "resorting to recognition (*pratyabhijñā*)" (*IPV* 2.4.18, 2 : 194-95). As asserted above, Utpaladeva may have briefly expressed disagreement with the Sāṁkhya account in *IPK* 2.4.2, 2 : 153.

48. Cf. the mention of "dry" relations above.

from it, and becomes intent [*prahvatā*] upon a third . . ..[49]

The Pratyabhijñā syntax articulates a distinctive *satkāryavāda*, of emanating Consciousness.[50]

Advaita Vedānta also advocates the *satkāryavāda*, and maintains that the underlying material cause is the Self/ Consciousness rather than insentient matter. However, it claims that the effect that is the universe is an illusion (*māyā*), a false supposition or "projection" (*vivarta*) on this Self. The Śaivas adduce many of the well-known (non-syntactic) arguments against the Advaita Vedāntin understanding of *māyā* — the impossibility of denying a world that all experience, the difficulty of specifying the subject of cosmic illusion, and the illogicality of the Advaita view of the ontological inexplicability (*anirvacanīyatva*) of illusion.[51] On the basis of such considerations, the Śaivas claim that the unity of the multiplistic universe can only be explained with their narrative

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49. *IPV* 2.4.18, 2 : 196-97. The translation of the last sentence is rough, but the idea is clear for our purposes. See the discussion of the Sāṁkhya view throughout *IPK* and *IPV* 2.4.17-19, 2 : 193-200. The thinkers further argue that only a conscious agent can logically arbitrate unity and multiplicity at *IPK* and *IPV* 2.4.19, 2 : 197-200.

50. The Nyāya also maintains that an agent must be conscious. See Cardona, "Pāṇini's *Kārakas*: Agency, Animation and Identity." However, they hold the causal theory of *asatkāryavāda*, and would never admit that all cre-ation materially emanated from God as sole agent.

51. The Advaita Vedāntins maintain that illusion is not strictly non-existent, because it is experienced. However, it is not existent, because it disappears when one attains self-realization.

syntax of "cre-ation" by the conscious agent Śiva.[52] To quote again an excerpt from Abhinavagupta:

> Therefore, even if it is admitted [with Advaita Vedānta] that the real Consciousness is a unity, there will not be possible [by their view] creation/action [*kriyā*], which involves entrance into diverse forms. [This creation] has agency [*kartṛtva*] as its definitive characteristic. However, all this is possible if there is [in accordance with our view, agential] freedom [*svātantrya*], which has the essential nature of recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*]. For recognitive judgement is intention [*icchā*], which has the nature of the desire to create/act [*cikīrṣā*]. Everything to be created exists within that [intention] in non-differentiation. . . . Thus the Great Lord causes the universe, which has the nature of awareness, to appear in diversity. This universe is real [but at the same time] is essentially nothing but His own Self, has the ultimate nature of awareness, and is a unity of unbroken awareness. Lordship [*aiśvarya*] is explained to be freedom [*svātantrya*] having the character of doing this which is extremely difficult. . . . Because the subject of discussion here is the cause-effect [*kārya-kāraṇa*] relation, both the *kartṛ* and the *karman* are mentioned. However, the other *kārakas* also really follow within [*anupraveśīni*] the unitary agency [*kartṛtva*]. Otherwise, how could that [creation/action] be undifferentiated, when there is a differentiated multitude of *kārakas*, such as the *karaṇa*, etc.?[53]

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52. Śaṅkara's theistic *saguṇa brahman*, as ultimately illusory, does not address the Śaivas' considerations on the requirement for a genuine creator.

53. *IPV* 2.4.20, 2 : 203-05. See the whole discussion through *IPK* and *IPV* 2.4.20, 2:201-06. There are scattered arguments against Advaita Vedānta throughout the Śaiva literature.

The divergence from Śaṅkara's grammar of the agent's bondage to action within the realm of illusion could not be greater.

THE ŚAIVA SYNTAX AS ONTOLOGICAL

The explanation of all things as the results of Śiva's/the Self's cre-ation underlines the fact that the Śaivas are articulating a theory of existence, a narrative ontology that reductionistically features the agent. Thus Abhinava explains in the conclusion to the discussion of causality:

> [The expression] "The pot exists" has this [true] meaning: The Great Lord, who is awareness [*prakāśa*], desires to exist as the pot and assumes that existence through His freedom [*svātantrya*]. . . .[54]

To relate ontology and syntax even more explicitly, I quote two more statements by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta:

> Being is the condition of one who becomes, that is, the agency of the act of becoming . . ..[55]

> Being is the agency of the act of becoming, that is, freedom [as is characteristic of an agent] regarding all actions.[56]

THE EPISTEMIC SYNTAX OF OMNIPOTENCE

Now the Śaivas' ontological syntax as explained so far is parasitic on their idealistic epistemology of Śiva's emanating self-recognition. However, the category of ontology may be

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54. *IPV* 2.4.21, 2 : 207.

55. *sattā bhavattā bhavanakartṛtā* (*IPKV* 1.5.14, 19).

56. *sattā ca bhavanakartṛtā sarvakriyāsu svātantryam* (*IPV* 1.5.14, 1 : 258-59).

understood as in a certain way comprehending epistemology, inasmuch as knowledge of various sorts must be assigned some sort of existence. The Śaivas thus also situate epistemology within their narrative ontology. They explain cognition as action. As a statement of Somānanda cited by Abhinavagupta puts it, "At the time of the cognition of a pot, there is the action "He knows the pot." "[57]

Like other Indian philosophical schools, the Pratyabhijñā makes frequent use of syntax to explain the structure of processes of human knowing. To begin with the epistemological triad (*tripuṭī*) of subject, means, and object of cognition: The subject of cognition (*pramātṛ*) is, of course, the agent (*kartṛ*). The word for means of cognition, *pramāṇa*, is derived in the same way, and has the same syntactic function as the *kāraka* usually used to express the cause, that is, *karaṇa*. The *pramāṇa* is the most efficient means (*sādhakatama*) for the accomplishment of the action of cognizing. The object of cognition is the direct object (*karman*) of the action of cognizing. And another relevant category outside the triad, cognition itself (*pramā*, *pramiti*), is the result (*phala*) of the process (*vyāpāra*) of cognizing the object of cognition.

The Śaivas' basic strategy is to reduce all the other categories in essential nature to the process (*vyāpāra*) of self-

57. *The Śivadṛṣṭi of Śrīsomānandanāth with the Vṛtti by Utpaladeva*, ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 54 (Pune: Aryabhushan Press, 1934), 1.24, 19. Abhinavagupta cites this statement in the course of explaining the ultimately internal nature of the Action Śakti (*IPV* 1.1.4, 1 : 74). For more on the Śaivas' understanding of the reciprocal encompassment of knowledge and action see my "Argument and the Recognition of Śiva," pp. 194-96.

recognition internal to the subject/agent. The Śaivas claim that the other factors in the syntax of cognition only appear to function independently through a sort of contraction (*saṁkoca*) of this self-recognition.[58]

Now, the relation between means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and cognition (*pramā, pramiti*) is a particular form of the relation between cause and effect, which we have already considered. The underlying process is perhaps even clearer here where the focus is explicitly on knowledge. In the following passage, Abhinavagupta places both means and cognition within the synthetic nexus of the agent's self-recognition:

> Recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] has been established previously to be, in its essential nature, inwardly directed [as self-recognition]. Only when that [recognitive judgement] is contracted in the condition of [having apparently separate] objects, it is cognition as a result [*phala*]. [We may take the following as an illustration:] There is the awareness "I who am brave am victorious." One may analyse into a cause-effect relation the two conditions of bravery and victory, which are actually situated in a single [agent]. [This would be expressed] "Since I am brave, therefore I am victorious." Similarly [there is the analysis] that, since there is the perceptual awareness of blue, therefore there is the judgement "This is blue." Even though they really have a

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58. I note that the Pratyabhijñā syntax of the *tripuṭī* also rationalizes features of Krama tantric contemplations of circles of Śaktis — of great importance to Abhinavagupta. In these, the *pramātṛ*, *pramāṇa*, and *prameya* are identified, respectively, with fire, the sun, and the moon. The latter are in various ways contemplated as "absorbed" in the former. See *TA* 4.122 ff., 3 : 740 ff.; *TA* 5.19 ff., 3 : 945 ff.

> unitary nature, [through this artificial analysis, they are understood in] a cause-effect [*hetu-phala*] relation.[59]

What are normally regarded as cognitive means and effect are equally reduced to subjective conditions.[60]

In this vein, there are a large number of examples where the Śaivas reinterpret expressions of cognitive states in forms that uncover the syntactic role of the agent. Thus Abhinava glosses the sentence "The blue appears to me [*mama nīlam bhāti*]" as "The blue is cognized by me [*mayā nīlam jñāyate*]."[61] Likewise Utpaladeva explains regarding the memory of an earlier experience:

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59. *IPV* 2.3.1-2, 2 : 74-75.

60. I note that in this explanation the Śaivas are reformulating and subverting within their own syntax the Buddhist understanding of the means of cognition. The Buddhists also identify the means (*pramāṇa*) with the result of cognition itself (*pramā*), with the purpose of claiming artificial the notion of an enduring, agent-located process (*vyāpāra*) connecting them. At *IPV* 2.3.1-2, 2 : 75, Abhinavagupta cites *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.308 on the means-result identity. This Buddhist conception of the identity of cognitive means and result may be understood as a non-agential formulation of *esse est percipi*. It also instantiates in a particular epistemological context the syntactic trajectory against agency exposited by Gerow. While accepting the Buddhist idealism, the Śaivas place it within the processual nexus of an enduring cognitive agent. See the discussion throughout *IPV* 2.3.1-2, 2 : 73-76. Also see the denial of the phenomenal objectivity of the Buddhist logicians' "unique particulars" (*svalakṣaṇas*) at *IPV* 2.3, introduction, 2 : 67. For a discussion of Buddhist philosophy as denying the essential features of action-syntax, which as explained here is articulated with reference to this syntax, see Nandita Bandyopadhyay, "The Buddhist Theory of Relation between Pramā and Pramāṇa," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 7 (1979): 43-78.

61. *IPV* 1.1.3, 1 : 63.

> [An earlier experience] may be remembered as different [from the subject, as expressed in the form] "That cognition of mine was thus." [The memory having this expression] is nothing but a grammatical analysis [*vyākaraṇa*][62] of the memory [expressed] "It was seen by me."[63]

In another interesting example, Abhinava refutes the apparent perception of a wife as an independent "other." He controverts the idea that the direct object (*karman*) is the locus of cognition as result (*phala*) of cognizing:

> One may claim that cognition rests on the lotus face of one such as a wife [i.e. as an object of cognition], and is not produced within the Self. For there is the past passive participle affix as referring to the direct object [*karman*]. [We respond] that the one [claiming this] does not understand his own speech. For the direct object [*karman*] is what is to be obtained by means of the action [*kriyā*] of the agent [*kartṛ*]. Thus the action [*kriyā*] of cognizing is established in the agent [*kartṛ*].[64]

This is the opposite of the direction of thinking observed by Gerow.

Sometimes the thinkers parse the underlying syntax of experiences with expressions that do not even mention a direct

62. The grammatical analysis of a unitary discourse into sentences, and sentences into parts of speech, roots, suffixes, declensional endings, and so forth, is frequently said to be artificial and heuristic. The idea here is that it is artificial to reify cognition as a separate entity rather than as a process integral to the subject.

63. *IPK* 1.4.6, 1 : 178. Also see on this *IPV* 1.4.6, 1 : 177-82.

64. *IPV* 1.4.6, 1 : 180. Bhāskarakaṇṭha here cites the familiar principle of Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.49 (*BIPV* 1.4.6, 1 : 180).

object.[65] Thus, Abhinava states:

> Thus even [apparently separate objects such as] blue, etc., existing in a . . . recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] such as "This is blue," are established to be constituted by the Self, because they rest upon the root recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] "I." Even "I cognize this to be blue" really amounts to "I am aware [*prakāśe*]."[66]

Abhinava states that some believe that the expression that does not mention the object is the most proper one.[67]

Some Practical Implications

I must emphasize that this narrative syntax that we have considered is ritually axiomatic as well as doctrinal/mythical. In his *Tantrāloka* and *Tantrasāra*, Abhinavagupta uses syntactic theory in explaining the inner significance of preliminary ceremonies of the tantric ritual: *nyāsa*, the divinizing projection of mantric syllables onto the body and other parts of the ritual; and purifications[68] with the sacrificial vase. Abhinava identifies

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65. In the sentence in Utpaladeva's verse, "It was seen by me," the direct object is not given a pronoun but is expressed, according to normal Sanskrit usage, as the referent of the participle.

66. *IPV* 1.5.17, 1 : 279. The thinkers engage in an involved grammatical discussion of epistemology throughout *IPK* and *IPV* 1.5.17, 1 : 273-80, in the course of treating the apparent objectification inherent in any designations of one's self-recognition as "Lord," "Self," "Śiva," "subject," and so forth.

67. *IPV* 1.4.6, 1 : 182. This is explained in terms of an alternative gloss of Utpala's verse. Utpaladeva uses the objectless syntax to explain the awareness in memory of an original experience at *IPK* 1.4.4, 1 : 167. See Abhinavagupta's grammatical explanation at *IPV* 1.4.4, 1 : 169-70.

68. It must be understood that tantric "purity" (*śuddhi*) pertains to the realization of unity as described here, and is transgressive of →

various components of the ritual, such as the location, ritual implements, object of sacrifice (e.g. flowers), and oblations, with the grammatical cases of *adhikaraṇa, apādāna, karaṇa, karman,* and so forth. He explains the overarching ritual process as the aspirant's identification with Śiva as agent of all the cases. It is this identification that is facilitated by *nyāsa* and purifications with the vase. The experience of this identification is cultivated in the rites of worship (*arcā, pūjā*) with the intent of carrying it over into the rest of one's life. To quote Abhinava:

> All things are without separation from Śiva, who has supernatural power [*siddhi*], or is perfectly complete [*pūrṇa*]. Here, through [the *kriyā* which is] worship, the *kāraka*s [are realized to be without separation from Śiva]. In the case of worship, the entire collection of *kāraka*s is revealed to be undifferentiated from Śiva. This also obtains in [ordinary worldly actions such as] walking, etc. A horse which has been freed from carrying loads and roaming in an enclosed area, does not betray its training [*śīkṣā*] even when it has entered in battle.[69] Similarly, one who has identified the *kāraka*s with Śiva — through training [*abhyāsa*] in the *kriyā* of worship — eliminates the duality of *kāraka*s [and the aspirant's true Self as Śiva] even [when engaged in ordinary worldly actions such as] walking or standing. So, to the one occupied with this training [*abhyāsa*] of unity, this universe appears immediately [*akramāt,* "without temporal

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→ the ostensibly objective (and hierarchically defined) purity of Hindu orthodoxy. Abhinava himself is very careful to make the distinction. See *TS* 4, 31; *TA* 4.118-19, 3 : 737; and *TA* 4.218-20, 3 : 858-59.

69. My interpretation of the analogy of the horse is influenced by that of *Luce delle Sacre Scritture (Tantrāloka)*, tr. Raniero Gnoli (Torino: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1980), p. 454.

> succession"] and powerfully [*haṭhāt*], like a woman dancing in a frenzy [*kṣobha*] of the perfectly complete state of Śiva . . .[70]
>
> Thus, since the *kriyā* of worship bestows this identification [of everything with Śiva], its ultimate nature is the unity of all the *kārakas* with Him. By the ceremonies of purification of the place, there is [realized] the identity [with Śiva] of the seat of the sacrificer. By means of the divinizing-meditative-projection [*nyāsa*], the sacrificer, object of sacrifice [i.e. the direct object or *karman*], place of that [sacrifice — the locative], *karaṇa* [instrument], *ādāna* [ablative] and *sampradā* [dative] attain [*adhiśerate*] identity with the state of Śiva.[71]

The Pratyabhijñā system itself participates fully in this ritual syntax. As I have explained, the epistemological disclosure of Śiva's self-recognition as the inner reality of all experiences is supposed to lead us to participate in the same. The whole philosophical inquiry is equally explained as a meditation on agency. As Utpaladeva states:

> That one succeeds [*siddhyati*], who places his feet on this [the path of the Pratyabhijñā *śāstra*], and, contemplating that the status of the Agent [*kartṛ*] of the world belongs to himself, submerges himself incessantly in the state of Śiva.[72]

Conclusion

While this essay can hardly have been exhaustive, I hope, by thematizing aspects of philosophical *kriyā-kāraka* theory as articulating grammars of motives, to have pointed to a fruitful direction of inquiry for both Indology and general comparative

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70. *TA*, 15.147-51, 6 : 2516-18.
71. *TA*, 15.157-158, 6 : 2520. Also see *TS*, 13, 135 ff.
72. *IPK* 4.1.16, 2 : 309.

studies. A great deal more research can be done on the particular question taken up here of Sanskritic theorization on the relation of the syntactic agent to action, its objects, and results. The ramifications of the Śaiva view in myth and ritual can be further explored. More can be done on the intricate theories of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and Advaita Vedānta, as well of the other schools — Nyāya, Jainism, Buddhism, and so forth. It is also possible that some schools (the Vaiṣṇavas?) may develop a more "moderate" syntax than either of the polarized orthodox and tantric theories I have presented. Again, more work can be done on how the various other *kāraka*s — for example, location (*adhikaraṇa*), instrument (*karaṇa*), purpose (*sampradāna*), and so forth — have been said to relate to the action.

Given contemporary academic preoccupations with action, language, and narrative, I believe that Kenneth Burke's pioneering study of competing grammars of motives deserves still greater attention than it has already received. Used flexibly, Burke's own pentad of categories still has heuristic value — particularly in attempting to characterize implicit narrative grammars. However, I believe it would often be of greater interest to examine various cultures' indigenous, explicitly grammatical, reflections on action syntax and its relation to religious myth and ritual — as I have done with Sanskritic discussions. Among classic intellectual traditions, the Sanskritic may have been exceptionally concerned with linguistic speculation. Nevertheless, I believe that "grammars of motives" could be developed into a useful comparative problematic to order some of the vast and growing body of scholarship on theories of language and action in other cultures — Greece, Islam, China, Judaism, Christianity, and so forth.

The dialogical and critical confrontation with foreign world-views/myths and praxes/rituals in the comparative philosophy of religion should also be facilitated by an understanding of how their grammatical reflections rationalize understandings of motivation. The syntax of omnipotence elaborated by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta further elucidates the distinctiveness of their religious philosophy. It clearly diverges from the subordination of the human to God in the mainstream Judeo-Christian narratives, although it may have analogues in more radical appropriations of Neoplatonism[73] and in nineteenth- and twentieth-century romanticism and Neo-Hegelianism.[74]

The Śaiva syntax likewise diverges from the modern "meta-narratives" of individual agents who scientifically understand a world of independent objects[75] in terms of causal relationships and exploit them through technology, and who organize their societies with the same rationality. Scientific and technological thought has been widely analysed in proto-syntactical terms as "objectivist" and "instrumentalist."

"Postmodern" theorists, in turning the critical resources of modernity upon itself, have also attempted to deconstruct its correlative understandings of the individual rational agent. One could speak of a "fragmented" agent of the paralogical

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73. Thus Meister Eckhart talked of an experience of identity with the Godhead, in which the aspirant could *create the universe with God.*

74. As even mainstream monotheistic theology has been marginalized, absolute idealism has virtually disappeared, except for isolated revisionists such as J.N. Findlay.

75. In my broad syntactic observations here, I am including the category of "object." See note 13 above.

post-modern narratives. However, the "fissures" posited in the agent by thinkers such as Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard are in a sense "hyper-modern": (crypto-)objective cultural-historical context and linguistic structure or "post-structure," and instrumentalities of power and legitimation, sexual drives, and so forth.

Carrying further such speculation about implicit and explicit Western grammars of motives is beyond the scope of this essay, and it is not necessary for the reader to agree with all of it. I only wish to underline my suggestion that understanding the Pratyabhijñā thinkers' syntactic theories makes the intellectual and spiritual alternative they pose to contemporary thought stand in sharper relief.

Note

This essay develops one of the themes in my "Argument and the Recognition of Śiva: The Philosophical Theology of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta" (Ph. D. diss. University of Chicago, 1992), being prepared for publication. An earlier version of this essay was presented as a paper at the 24th Annual Conferenece on South Asia, Madison, Wisconsin, 1995. At various points since the early 1980s, I have benefited from studying and discussing the Śaiva and related grammatical theories of action with several other scholars, including Navjivan Rastogi, Hemendra Nath Chakravarty, Saudamini Deshmukh, Srinarayan Mishra, and Edwin Gerow.

Abbreviations

BIVP — *Bhāskarī* by Bhāskarakaṇṭha, commentary on *IPV*.

IPK — *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* by Utpaladeva.

IPKV — *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti* by Utpaladeva, commentary on *IPK*.

IPV — *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* by Abhinavagupta, commentary on *IPK*.

IPVV — *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* by Abhinavagupta, commentary on Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti*.

TA — *Tantrāloka* by Abhinavagupta.
TAV — *Tantrālokaviveka* by Jayaratha, commentary on *TA*.
TS — *Tantrasāra* by Abhinavagupta.

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17

Some Peculiar Vocables in the Paippalāda-saṁhitā

Hukam Chand Patyal

1.0. AN attempt is made in this paper to discuss some peculiar vocables which we find mainly in Atharva-veda's (*AV*) *Paippalāda Saṁhitā*.

1.1. *AV* is said to have had nine recensions, but now only two recensions have come down to us, viz. the Śaunaka (*AVŚ*) and the Paippalāda (*AVP*). The Paippalāda was discovered in 1870; it was based on a single birchbark manuscript partly destroyed and corrupt beyond recognition. This manuscript was reproduced in 1901 under the supervision of Maurice Bloomfield and Richard Garbe. The *AVP* text is by and large unaccented; we find very few sporadic accented portions. Leroy Carr Barret worked very hard and made us available the so-called *Kashmirian Atharvaveda* (1905-40). The text appeared in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* and also as an independent publication of the American Oriental Society. Raghu Vira produced the same text *mutatis mutandis* in Devanāgarī (Lahore, 1936-42) in three volumes. The late Professor Durgamohan Bhattacharyya published this text, based on the Orissa manuscripts. Volume I, consisting of *kāṇḍa* 1, appeared in 1964, and volume II, consisting of *kāṇḍas* 2-4, appeared in 1970. Both these volumes are published by the

Sanskrit College, Calcutta. Now his able son Professor Dipak Bhattacharyya has published volume I, consisting of *kāṇḍa*s 1-15. This is published by the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1997. Volume II, consisting of *kāṇḍa*s 16-20 is in the process of printing and is likely to be published soon by the same scholar and the same Society. Professor Michael Witzel (Harvard University) and Professor Arlo Griffiths (Leiden University), in collaboration with many international scholars, have undertaken a project of gradually bringing out truly "critical" re-editions of portions of the text. Karl Hoffmann (1968:1) rightly remarks:

> . . . Everyone who dealt with the Paippalāda version from a philological or linguistic point of view has, again and again, been driven to despair. There were only rare cases in which the details inferred from the text could be relied upon.

2.0. Only a few vocables of the *AVP* will be discussed in this paper in their Devanāgarī alphabetical order. Some of these words are rare or *hapax legomenon.*

1. *agnimedin* (*AVP* 16.73.5) *adj.* "having Agni for an ally (said of Indra)." This word is not recorded in *An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles* (*EDS*), Deccan College, Pune. The word occurs in *AVP* 16.73.5. The text reads:

> *tān indro devān śacīpatir agnimedī pradahann etu śakraḥ* ।
> *bṛhaspatir varuṇas soma indro mamaiva dattaṁ kevalaṁ kṛṇvantu* ॥

The form *-medin* is to be derived from *mid-+ Ṇinl* (*P.* 3.1.134). This is an *upapadasamāsa.* The verse would mean "Let mighty Indra, Lord of Śacī, having Agni for an ally, come burning (all those gods). Let Bṛhaspati, Varuṇa, Soma (and) Indra take hold of (i.e. accept) my gift alone." This word is recorded by Renou (1957: 74) as remarkable.

2. *adr̥ṣṭavīrya* (*AVP* 20.49.8). This word is not recorded in the *EDS*. The text is quite corrupt, it reads:

yad asr̥k sr̥ṣṭaṁ yad divā svapne yan nisr̥ṣṭam asr̥ṣṭau ।
acchedanam asyam adr̥ṣṭavīryam ॥

The text is quite unintelligible; it requires many conjectural emendations. The word means "whose energy is invisible or imperceptible." This word is recorded by Renou (1957: 75).

3. *priyaṁkaraṇa (AVP* 3.28.6) *adj.* "acting kindly or favourably, giving delight." This word is an *upapada* compound with non-elision of the accusative. The text reads:

priyaṁkaraṇam uttamaṁ madhughena tadābhr̥taṁ ।
tvaṁ hāsi varcasyo atho hāsi sumaṅgalaḥ ।
atho sarvāsāṁ vīrudhāṁ priyaṁkaraṇam ucyase ॥
— Bhattacharyya's edn.

For this type of *upapada* compounds with non-elision of accusative one may refer to Whitney, *Skt. Gr.*, sec. 1250 a; Ram Gopal, *Vaidika Vyākaraṇa,* Pt. 1, 417, sec. 184.6. This word is to be derived like this: *priya* + *mUM*+ *kr̥*- +*KHyuN* (i.e. *-ana*) (*P.* 3.2.56), with the accent falling on the root-initial; vide *P.* 6.2.139 which preserves the *NIT*-accent taught in *P.* 6.1.197. The proparoxytonesis falling on the word confirms the view that Pāṇini is acquainted with the Paippalāda word. Unfortunately this text has come down to us in an unaccented form. This word would be accented as **priyaṁ-káraṇaṁ*. On the accentual problem of *subhagaṁ-káraṇī* (*AVŚ* 6.139.1); *ayakṣaṁ-káraṇī* (*AVŚ* 19.2.5; *AVP* 8.8.11), and *priyaṁkáraṇam* (see Balasubrahmanyam, 1984: 21-27; 1981). This word is recorded in *Alt. Gr.*, II.1.202, sec. 86c. Bhattacharyya reads *madhugha* whereas Kashmirian version has *madugha*. Really speaking we come across both readings, for *madugha*, see *Alt. Gr.*, I.279; I.1.162 (*Nachtr.*); and for *madhugha*, see *Alt. Gr.*, I.279, sec. 241ß; I.1.162 (*Nachtr.*). The

word *madhugha* is derived from *madhudugha* through haplology. And the form *madugha* is through deaspiration of *-dh-* to *-d-*. This verse may be rendered as follows: "(This plant, the eye) is the foremost, and delight-giving, is brought near (i.e. produced) by the *madhugha* (honey yielding) plant. You indeed are the bestower of vital powers and also indeed very auspicious. And indeed you are called the delight-making of all the herbs." This word is recorded by Renou (1957: 93).

4. *māmakī* (*AVP* 6.6.8). The feminine form *māmakī* is enjoined by Pāṇini (4.1.30) in the sphere of *saṁjñā*s (names) and of the *chandas*. The word is *māmaka* +*ṄīP*. Mostly in Classical Sanskrit and also once in *Gop. Br.*, 1.1.28, we have *māmikā* (see *Vār.* on *P.* 7.3.44). The *ak* is changed into *ik* in feminine in *-ā*. According to *P.* 4.3.3, *mamaka* is substitute morpheme for *asmad* in singular. Thus, *mamaka* + *aṆ* = *māmaka*, and *mamaka* + *khaÑ* (i.e. *īna)* = *māmakīna*. Besides *AVP* the feminine form *māmakī* is also found in the *Muktikopaniṣad*, 1.1.43. The *AVP* 6.6.8 reads:

> *yathā madhu madhukr̥tas saṁbharanti madhāv adhi* ।
> *evā yunajmi te mano adhy asyāṁ māmakī tanū* ॥

Dipak Bhattacharyya has rightly emended the *tanuṁ* to *tanū*, since *Kāśī Vr̥.* on 1.1.19 cites *tanū* as the *pragr̥hya* form in *-ū*, the meaning being that of locative (see K. Bhattacharyya in Dipak Bhattacharyya (ed.), 2001: 27 and note 7 on p. 29). *Pāda*s ab of this verse are found in the *AVŚ* 9.1.16 ab, whereas *pāda*s cd are different in the *AVŚ*. The verse be rendered "As the honey-makers bring together honey upon honey; so I unite your mind in this body of mine."

5. *śākalya* (*AVP* 1.32.3b) *n.* This reading is really problematic. *AVP* 1.32.3ab reads:

> *yady arcir yadi vāsi dhūmaḥ śākalyeṣu yadi vā te janitram* ।
> — Bhattacharyya's ed.

Manuscripts have *sakalyeṣu*. The parallel text *AVŚ* 1.25.2ab reads:

yady arcir yadi vāsi śociḥ śakalyeṣi yadi vā te janitram ।

The *padapāṭha* has *śakaly -eṣí*, supported by *AV Prāti.*, 3.52, which is extremely obscure and unintelligible. Sāyaṇa conjectures it as locative of *śakalyeṣ* — from *śakalya* "heap of shavings," and the root *iṣ-* "to seek," and so an epithet of fire. *PW*, VII.12 "following the shaving, i.e. glimmering." *MW*, *śakalyeṣín* adj. (according to *Padapāṭha śakalya + eṣin*) "desiring fragments of wood, devouring on looking (as a flame of fire)." The word is discussed in Patyal (2002: 108). Whitney renders the text as "If thou art flame, or if heat, or if thy birthplace seeks the shavings(?)." Bloomfield, SBE, 42.3 (*Hymns of AV*) renders "Whether thou art flame, whether thou art heat, or whether from licking chips (of wood) thou has arisen." All these readings and renderings are far from satisfactory. The *AVP* reading *śākalyeṣu* loc. pl. of *śākalya* means "among the shavings." The verse may be rendered as follows: "If you are flame, or if smoke, or if your birthplace is among the shavings."

3.0. From these few words discussed in this paper it is quite clear that the *AVP* has some rare and unique words. Many readings of the *AVP* are obscure and unintelligible. In *AVP*, many unique forms and *hapax legomena* are available; these words will be useful for our knowledge and understanding of the Vedic language in general and of the Atharvavedic language in particular.

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18

The First among the Learned
Kashmiri Poeticians on Grammarians

C. Rajendran

IN a celebrated passage in the *Dhvanyāloka*, commenting on the *Dhvanikārikā*, Ānandavardhana, referring to the expression, *sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ*, declares that the term *dhvani* has been used by the poeticians following the grammarians, who are the "first among the learned" (*prathame hi vidvāṁso vaiyākaraṇāḥ* — *Dhvanyāloka* I.13). This passage indicates the high esteem with which the grammarians were regarded by the poeticians in Kashmir. However, this exalted position grammarians and grammar enjoyed in Kashmir poetics begins only with the poetician's sustained engagement with linguistic problems, especially that form of Indian cognitive linguistics wherein the process of the cognition of meaning begins to occupy the focal point in their discourse. To be more precise, it is none other than Ānandavardhana himself who ushers in this era of "collaborative discourse" wherein the insights of grammatical philosophy are pressed into service by poeticians and aestheticians to address the problems related to linguistic comprehension. It follows from all this that there can be a notable difference in perceptions between the pre-*dhvani* period and the post-*dhvani* period in Kashmiri poetics with regard to grammar. While the pre-*dhvani* poeticians looked upon grammar as an ancillary to the study of poetry to ensure

grammatical "purity" of language, Ānandavardhana looked upon grammatical philosophy from a totally different perspective, as supplying a model for his cognitive philosophy. This perspective was not lost sight of by subsequent poeticians.

Coming to this pre-*dhvani* phase, we see that the earliest poetician of Kashmir to have been engaged with grammatical discourses is Bhāmaha, the author of *Kāvyālaṁkāra*, who is also the earliest known poetician in Sanskrit. Bhāmaha mentions *śabda*, by means of which he probably means *śabdānuśāsana*, the science of grammar as an essential pre-requisite of poetry (*Kāvyālaṅkāra* I.10). He also asserts that *śabdālaṅkāra*, the poetic figures related to *śabda*, is *sauśabdya*, the felicity of expression, consisting of the refinement (*vyutpatti*) of nominal and verbal forms. More importantly, he devotes an entire chapter of his work for the consideration of grammatical issues mainly in the context of the purity of words. Bhāmaha pays an eloquent tribute to grammar in the very beginning of the chapter, which is as follows.

sūtrāmbhasaṁ padāvartam pārāyaṇarasātalam ।
dhātūṇādigaṇagrāhaṁ dhyānagrahabṛhatplavam ॥

dhīrair ālokitaprāntam amedhobhir asūyitam ।
sadopabhuktaṁ sarvābhir nyayavidyākareṇubhiḥ ॥

nāpārayitvā durgādham amuṁ vyākaraṇānrnavam ।
śabdaratnaṁ svayaṁgamyam alaṁkartum ayaṁ janaḥ ॥

tasya cādhigame yatnaḥ kāryaḥ kāvyaṁ vidhitsatā ।
parapratyayato yat tu kriyate tena kā ratiḥ ॥
— *Kāvyālaṅkāra*, VI.1-4

Here, Bhāmaha compares grammar to an ocean, with the *sūtras* as water, the sentence-constituents as whirlpools, with attested concatenations (of linguistic units; texts in a wide sense) as the underlying floor/bottom, the *dhātus* and the *uṇādigaṇas* as

the crocodiles, the Dhyānagraha[1] (text) as the means to traverse it and (grammatical) words as its jewels (or precious treasures). He further observes that without mastering it, nobody is able to make the jewel of word a thing naturally or automatically acccessible to oneself. Hence a person who wishes to write poetry should master grammar. However, Bhāmaha does not mince words in criticizing some doctrines of the grammarians like that of *sphoṭa*. He says that "the arguments of the *sphoṭavādins* are not to be accepted even if accompanied by vehement entreaties." He says, "Who will believe when someone declares that there is a flower grown in the sky?" (*Kāvyālaṅkāra*, V.12) Bhāmaha's main argument against *sphoṭa* is that it postulates an aggregate entity beyond individual phonemes in words and sacrifices theoretical economy.

Bhāmaha also refers to the fourfold division of words based on their *pravṛttinimitta*, viz. substance, action, generic attribute and quality, and further records that according to some, accidental features also are *pravṛttinimitta*. He then proceeds to offer guidance regarding words that are to be employed and that are to be avoided by poets in poetry.

vakravacasāṁ kavīnāṁ ye prayogam prati sādhavaḥ ।
prayoktuṁ ye na ca yuktāś ca tadviveko 'yam ucyate ॥
— *Kāvyālaṅkāra*, VI.23

Bhāmaha, at the outset maintains that a word, which has not been employed before, should not be used by poets since it causes confusion in the mind. This echoes the grammarian's dictum "the grammar follows usage" [*prayuktānām idam anvākhyānam*]. The method followed by Bhāmaha is illustrative

1. Note added by Ashok Aklujkar: Dhyānagraha was the title of a text probably in the area of philosophy of grammar. It is mentioned in Bhartṛhari's *Mahābhāṣya-ṭīkā* and *Vākyapadīya-vṛtti*.

enumeration. After mentioning a number of cases, he concludes that it is impossible to deal with the subject exhaustively.

The next important poetician from Kashmir is Vāmana, the author of *Kāvyālaṅkārasūtravṛtti*. The esteem with which Vāmana looks upon grammar and Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* can be gauged from the fact that he mentions *śabda-smṛti*, the science of grammar, as the very first branch of knowledge to be mastered by a poet – as a pre-requisite for writing poetry. Vāmana states that the purity of words can be ascertained only from grammar and that poets should employ words allowed by grammar without any hesitation.[2] Vāmana devotes the entire second chapter of the fifth *adhikaraṇa* for the consideration of *śabda-śuddhi*, the grammatical purity of words. His method is to refer to certain usages in poetry involving grammatical peculiarities and to examine their validity.

This pragmatic engagement with grammar with regard to usage undergoes a radical change in the hand of Ānandavardhana, whose openness to grammar is more philosophical. Ānandavardhana seems to be influenced by Bhartṛhari more profoundly than by any other grammarian, and Bhartṛhari's approach to grammar is unmistakably philosophical. Ānandavardhana, as we are going to see subsequently, refers time and again to "the grammarians" (*vaiyākaraṇa*s) in his work, without, however, referring to anybody by specific name, but the context usually suggests that it is Bhartṛhari who is in his mind. Abhinavagupta reinforces this conjecture since he quotes profusely from the *Vākyapadīya* in support of his clarifications.

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2. *śabdānāṁ śuddhiḥ śabdaśuddhiḥ sādhutvanirṇayaḥ kartavyaḥ* ।
śuddhāni hi padāni niṣkampaiḥ kavibhiḥ prayujyante ।
— *Kāvyālaṅkārasūtravṛtti*, 1.3.4.

Ānandavardhana, in the *Dhvanyāloka* itself, refers to the Dhvani theory as "propounded by the learned" (*sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ*) and maintains that the learned propounders of the Dhvani theory are those who have followed the grammarians, the first among the learned (*prathame he vidvāṁso vaiyākaraṇāḥ*). He avers that all the systems of knowledge are based on grammar (*vyākaraṇamūlatvād sarvavidyānām*). Ānandavardhana observes

> *te hi śrūyamāneṣu varṇeṣu dhvanir iti vyavaharanti* । *tathaivānyaiḥ tanmatānusāribhiḥ sūribhiḥ kāvyatattvārthadarśibhiḥ vācyavācakasammiśraḥ śabdātmā kāvyam iti vyapadeśyo vyañjakatvasāmyād dhvanir ity uktaḥ*
>
> — *Dhvanyāloka* I, pp. 26-28

This passage could be roughly translated thus:

> They [the grammarians] employ the term *Dhvani* in respect of the phonemes being heard. Similarly, those other scholars also, who follow their path and who see the true nature (literally, an item that is the reality of poetry) of poetry, call what is known as poetry also as *dhvani*, which is an admixture of the meaning and word, and which consists of phonemes because of the common feature of suggestivity.

However, Abhinavagupta, in his *Locana*, gives an original and scholastic interpretation of the above passage. He reads the passage as implying that the term *dhvani* has five technical senses and that the poeticians have the sanction of the grammarians to use the word in all these five senses.

1. The learned grammarians call the phonemes, which enter into the ear of the hearer in a flow of sequence from the uttered sound, *dhvani*, since they are like the sympathetic chimes of a bell. Abhinavagupta has here in mind the concept of some grammarians who aver that the sounds uttered by the speaker

produce a sequence of similar sounds the last of which reach the listener's ear. They are like the resonances given rise to by the sounding of a bell. In this connection, Abhinavagupta refers to the following *kārikā* in *Vākyapadīya* to substantiate this usage of the word *dhvani*:

> *yaḥ saṁyogavibhāgābhyāṁ karaṇair upajanyate* ।
> *saḥ sphoṭaḥ. śabdajāḥ śabdā dhvanayo 'nyair udāhṛtāḥ* ॥
> — *Vākyapadīya* I, p. 105

Others have declared that whatever (articulate sound) is produced by the organs of articulation, through contacts and separation (of the articulating organs) is *sphoṭa*; the sounds produced by (this initial) sound are the *dhvani*.

Abhinavagupta avers that just as the grammarians call the audible phonemes, which are produced from the originally uttered phonemes, *dhvani*, similarly, the poeticians also call the suggested meaning, which partakes in the nature of resonance, *dhvani*.

2. Abhinavagupta further points out that the audible phonemes, which are called sounds (*nāda*s) also, and which manifest the *sphoṭa* comprehended in the ultimate process of auditory cognition of a word are also called *dhvani* by Bhartṛhari. He quotes the second of the two of the following *kārikā*s from *Vākyapadīya* which makes this point clear:

> *yathānuvākaḥ śloko vā soḍhatvam upagachati* ।
> *āvṛttyā na tu sa granthaḥ pratyāvṛtti nirūpyate* ॥
>
> *pratyayair anupākhyeyair grahaṇānuguṇais tathā* ।
> *dhvaniparakāśite śabde svarūpam avadhāryate* ॥
> — *Vākyapadīya* I, pp. 84-85

Just as a Vedic passage (*anuvāka*) or a verse is well fixed in the mind after the (last) repetition and is not fully grasped

> in each repetition, in the same way, through the previous cognitions, unnameable, but favourable to the final clear cognition, the form of the word, manifested by the last sound is revealed.[3]

Here it is the manifesting element and not the manifested, which is called *dhvani.* Abhinavagupta uses its analogy to support his claim that the suggestive sound and sense are also called *dhvani* by poeticians.

3. Abhinavagupta further points out that the individualistic features in the process of articulation of the speakers, like the slow and quick tempos are also called *dhvani* as attested by the following *kārikā* of Bhartṛhari:

> *śabdasyordhvam abhivyakter vṛttibhede tu vaikṛtāḥ* ।
> *dhvanayaḥ samupohante sphoṭātmā tair na bhidyate* ॥[4]

> After the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*, the secondary sounds cause difference in speed, but the essence of *sphoṭa* is not affected by them.

Here Abhinavagupta avers that there is sanction from the grammarians to use the word *dhvani* in the sense of the process of articulation, which causes variation in the (speed of) utterance of the word. On its analogy, the poeticians also use the word *dhvani* in the sense of the power or the process which gives rise to the suggested meaning as *dhvani*, as distinct from the primary power (*abhidhā*), purport (*tātparya*), and secondary power (*lakṣaṇā*).

Thus Abhinavagupta adduces the sanction of the grammarians for the following four usages of the word *dhvani*, i.e.

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3. I have adopted the translation of K.A Subramania Iyer, *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Vṛtti*, Chapter I, p. 84.
4. Ibid., I. p. 77.

1. The suggested sense,
2. The suggestive word,
3. The suggestive meaning, and
4. The suggestive power.

The poem having all these elements is also called *dhvani*, which constitutes the fifth sense of the word.

We now come to Mahimabhaṭṭa, another great poetician of Kashmir who was also a profound scholar of grammar. Mahimabhaṭṭa discusses several problems having a bearing on traditional grammar in several places of his *Vyaktiviveka*, a treatise in poetics written with the avowed object of demolishing the *Dhvani* theory. He refers to Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, Patañjali, and Bhartṛhari mostly in support of his views. However, we can see that he is skeptical about the validity of the doctrine of *sphoṭa*, a key concept of Bhartṛhari, which has played a pivotal role in the moulding of the *dhvani* doctrine. If Ānandavardhana has built his edifice of *dhvani* on the *sphoṭa* metaphysics of Bhartṛhari, Mahimabhaṭṭa has countered it by resorting to the logic as developed by Dharmakīrti, the medieval Buddhist logician.

Mahimabhaṭṭa's dissidence with some of the doctrines of the grammarians does not prevent him from being reverential to Pāṇini and his vision of language and grammar. Mahimabhaṭṭa does not hesitate to pay his homage to the great grammarian whenever there is an occasion. He takes pain to show that the subtle nuances of language explored by him are implicitly recognized by Pāṇini also. He alludes to Pāṇini's *sūtra ṣaṣṭhyā ākrośe* in support of his contention that some compounds stand in the way of expressing ideas clearly or with proper emphasis. According to Mahimabhaṭṭa, Pāṇini, through this *sūtra* concedes that the genitive case had to be

retained in the expression *dāsayāḥ putraḥ* to convey the sense of condemnation, which is lost in the form, *dāsīputra*. This exactly is the argument of Mahimabhaṭṭa also in his concept of the poetic defect *vidheyāvimarśa*. In his view, Pāṇini, by insisting that the *padavidhi* was applicable only in the case of *sāmarthya* or semantic compatibility, was showing his awareness of the undesirability of the compound in places which required the retention of the prominence of the meaning of individual words. However, conventionally, it was held that Pāṇini's *sūtra samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ* was meant to exclude instances of words having syntactical expectancy with other words lying outside the purview of the compound as in the case of *ṛddhasya rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*. To Mahiman, no Pāṇinian restriction is necessary to avoid such obvious instances; they are self-evident like the fact that one's own parents are to be respected (V*yaktiviveka*, II, p. 28).

Here Mahimabhaṭṭa makes an interesting distinction between Pāṇini and his blind followers whom he refers to sarcastically as *khaṇḍikopādhyāya*s or "experts of bits and pieces." They, to him, are insensitive to the subtle nuances of language and are not aware of the implications of Pāṇini's *sūtras*. Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains that they have not tasted aesthetic experience even in their dreams.

> *yad vā kavīnām evaiṣa viṣayo na khaṇḍikopādhyāyānām ity anavagatatadabhiprayair ūpekṣitam etad* I *te hi svapne 'py anāsāditasāhityasudhārasāsvādacamatkārāḥ śuṣkaśabdavyutpattimātrābhimānadurvidagdhāḥ vividhābhidhānādhānoddhārāḥ abhidheyapratītivaicitryavivekakauśalaśālīnāḥ lakṣanam astity eva rasābhivyaktivighnabhūtam aparam api bahutaram avakaraprāyaṁ prayuñjata iti rasānuguṇaprayogāvahitacetasām kavīnām eva taccintocitā nānyeṣām* II — Vyaktiviveka, II, p. 276

Mahimabhaṭṭa alludes to the views recorded by Patañjali that usage should be restricted to correct words even though there is the cognition of meaning from both the correct and incorrect words alike. The view referred to occurs in *Mahābhāṣya* thus:

> *evam ihāpi samānāyām arthāvagatu śabdena cāpaśabdena ca dharmaniyamaḥ kriyate śabdenaivārtho 'bhidheyo nāpaśabdeneti | evam kriyamāṇam abhyudayakāri bhavati*
>
> — *Mahābhāṣya*, p. 48

Mahimabhaṭṭa counters the argument with the explanation given by Patañjali himself: the demerit resulting from the employment of incorrect words is overcome by the profuse merit generated by the hearing, retaining, understanding and practising of the ideas contained in the scientific discourses wherein meaning is the predominant element in relation to the word:

> *tatra kūpakhānakavad vṛttir bhaviṣyatītyādinā tair eva prativihitam | sa cetihāspurāṇāgamaśāstreṣv astyeveti nāgamavirodhaḥ | trividhaṁ hi śāstraṁ śabdapradhānam arthapradhānam ubhayapradhānaṁ ceti | tatra śabdapradhānam vedādi, adhyayanād eva abhyudayaśravanād, manāg api pāṭhaviparyāse pratyavāyaśravaṇāc ca | arthapradhānam itihāsa-purāṇādi | tasyārthavādamātrarūpatvāt | ubhayapradhānaṁ sargabandhādi kāvyaṁ tasya rasātmakatvād, rasasya cobhayaucityena paripoṣadarśanāt | kāvyasyāpi śāstratvam upapāditam eva | tad evaṁ yad arthapradhānam iṣyate tacchravaṇa dhāraṇārthāvabodhaanuṣṭhānotthitena dharmeṇāsādhuśabdo-dīraṇodito 'dharmaḥ pratihato bhavatītiy asau kūpakhānaka-vṛttiḥ |*
>
> — *Vyaktiviveka*, p. 483

Here Mahiman maintains that poetry, like the Vedas and the Itihāsas, is a śāstra in that it produces instruction. Hence, even when it employs grammatically incorrect words, the demerit

produced by them is counterbalanced by the good final results. This is explained by the analogy of "digging the well" (*kūpakhānakavṛtti*). Though by digging the well, one gets dirt and dust, ultimately, it does not matter much, as one can clean oneself with the water from the well. This analogy is taken from Patañjali who says thus in his *Mahābhāṣya*:

> *athavā kūpakhānakavad etad bhaviṣyati* । *tad yathā kūpakhānakaḥ kūpaṁ khanan yady api mṛdā pāṁsubhiś cāvakīrṇo bhavati, so 'psu saṁjātāsu tata eva taṁ guṇaṁ āsādayati yena ca sa doṣo nirhanyate, bhūyasā cābhyudayena yogo bhavati* । *evam ihāpi yady apy apaśabdajñāne 'dharmas tathāpi yas tv asau śabdajñāne dharmas tena ca sa doṣo nirghaniṣyate bhūyasā cābhyudayena yogo bhaviṣyati* ।
>
> — *Mahābhāṣya*, p. 57

The main complaint of Mahimabhaṭṭa to grammarians is their insistence on doctrines like the manifestiveness (*dyotakatva*) of the *upasarga*s like *pra*, which is dangerously similar to the controversial suggestivity (*vyañjakatva*) propounded by Ānandavardhana and which goes contrary to his (= Mahimabhaṭṭa's) dictum that words do not have any suggestive power. Bhartṛhari, in the *Vākyapadīya* refers to three views about the nature of *upasarga*s (1) They are expressive (*vācaka*) (2) They are suggestive (*dyotaka*) (3) They are co-operative in the process of expression. Bhartṛhari, however, does not specifically state that *upasarga*s are either *dyotaka*s or *vācaka*s to the exclusion of one over the other. Mahimabhaṭṭa examines the whole question exhaustively and establishes that *upasarga*s are actually *vācaka*s since we cognize certain senses from their employment not available from the root itself.[5]

5. See C. Rajendran, *Vyaktiviveka — A Critical study*, pp. 105-107.

According to Mahimabhaṭṭa, the terms *śabda, apaśabda,* and *asādhuśabda* used in grammar require a fresh definition taking into account that they are only relative concepts and not absolute ones. Linguistic usage depends much on contextual and extra-linguistic features to effect communication and hence it will not be proper for us to evaluate linguistic features using absolute criteria.[6] Mahimabhaṭṭa avers that all words can theoretically denote all senses. Obviously this is an echo of the famous dictum, *sarve sarvārthavācakāḥ* । *dākṣīputrasya pāṇineḥ* ॥ Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains that even a wrong word can denote the intended sense if equipped with contextual and other reinforcement. Conversely, even a proper word may not be able to convey the intended meaning if it is unaccompanied by the necessary accessories.[7] In this connection, he quotes the following *kārikā* from *Vākyapadīya* in support of his position:

> *asvagoṇyādayaḥ śabdāh sadhavo viṣayāntare* ।
> *nimittabhedat sarvatra sādhutvam ca vyavasthitam* ॥
> — *Vākyapadīya* I, p. 149

Mahimabhaṭṭa seems to be the last great name in Sanskrit poetics who seems to have deep engagement with grammar and grammatical philosophy. We do not find any similar engagement of poeticians with grammar after him even though most of the post-*dhvani* poeticians were great scholars in grammar too and betray their familiarity with grammatical textbooks. In later poetics, grammar simply becomes a frame

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6. *kiṁ ca na svabhāvata eva śabdānām arthapratītikrama iti niyamāsambhavaḥ* । *kiṁ tarhi? sāmagrīvaśāt* ।
— *Vyaktiviveka*, p. 480

7. *tataś ca atadartho 'py anyaḥ śabdaḥ sāmagrīvaśāt samāsotktinyāyena tam avagamayituṁ kṣametaiva, na punas tadartho 'pi sāmagrīvikalo gavādiśabdaḥ* । — Ibid., p. 480.

of reference to discuss superficial issues like the varieties of *luptopamā* and larger issues of *śābdabodha* are tackled from the point of view of the Navya-Nyāya.

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19

From an Adversary to the Main Ally

The Place of Bhartṛhari in the Kashmirian Śaiva Advaita

Raffaele Torella

GENERALLY speaking, we know very little of what happened in the atelier of Indian philosophers, owing to the total lack of personal notes left by them, not to speak of "working" journals. For example, we know nothing of the inner developments which made Śaṅkaranandana abandon Śaivism and embrace Buddhism (or viceversa),[1] or of the possible intellectual wanderings of a Maṇḍana Miśra between Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṁsā. Apparently less dramatic but at least equally puzzling was the change of attitude of the *Pratyabhijñā* school towards Bhartṛhari, which took place very quickly in the span of only one generation and caused a difference between Somānanda and Utpaladeva, the recognized founder of the *Pratyabhijñā* and its systematizer, respectively, closely bound to each other by a direct *guru-śiṣya* relationship.[2]

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1. On this very interesting author, see recently Krasser 2001.
2. Somānanda's criticism of Bhartṛhari has received the attention of several eminent scholars: Gaurinath Sastri 1959: 59-61, 68-73; Seyfort Ruegg 1959: 113-14; Gnoli 1959: 55-63; Filliozat 1992: 471-74; Dwivedi 1993.

The significance of looking into such a change of attitude, which in a broader sense is also a paradigm change, goes far beyond the mere fact of clarifying a little mystery in the doctrinal history of one of the most important philosophical schools of traditional India. To investigate the problematic aspects of distancing oneself from one's own *guru*, and, lastly, to show how the choice of the opponents and allies may be the outcome of a definite plan rather than a consequence of mere liking or disliking some world-view. Such an enquiry can shed additional light not so much on some points of Bhartṛhari's doctrine but on the way it was received by other schools, and, more generally, on his lasting and pervading influence in Indian philosophical thought, also outside the range of grammatical speculation.

What first strikes us is the fact that Somānanda, after giving an outline of the main tenets of his Śiva-based philosophy in the forty-nine verses of the first chapter of the *Śivadṛṣṭi*,[3] immediately embarks on a very aggressive and detailed criticism of a few crucial points of Bhartṛhari's philosophy, without naming him directly but referring to *vaiyākaraṇa*s in general.

Let us first summarize the contents:

> The Grammarians who think of themselves as so clever — says Somānanda, quoting passages from the *Vākyapadīya* and the *vṛtti* — claim that the supreme *Brahman* is to be identified with Paśyantī Vāc, but the latter at the most is identifiable with the power of Knowledge that corresponds to the plane of Sadāśiva — definitely not to the highest plane. In fact, as the word itself says, Paśyantī "sees" something.

3. The first chapter has been translated into English by Raniero Gnoli (1957). The same author has also translated (into Italian) the second chapter (1959).

But what is the nature of its objects? If we say that they are externalized images that it itself has produced, we must ask ourselves whether they are real or unreal. In the first case the distinctive feature of this philosophy is lacking, namely seeing the manifestation as illusory (*vivarta*). On the other hand, the unreality of what it sees would have repercussions for it, rendering it *asatya*, which is inadmissible. If the cause of this perceiving of unreal things is nescience, it is the latter that must be established as being real or not. If it is real, then Paśyantī is contaminated by it. If it is not real, it is not understood how there can be a relation between a real thing and an unreal one. The same is also true of its creation. Moreover, this nescience cannot be seen as an attribute either of Paśyantī (for the above-mentioned reasons); or of something else, since nothing real exists apart from it. Nor is it to be considered as independent, because then it would be impossible to suppress it. Nor can *avidyā* be imputed only to the middle level, because in any case it is Paśyantī that is the cause of it. If Paśyantī is to be identified with the *sphoṭa*, we must ask ourselves how words, unreal as they are, can manifest it. Even the belief that pronouncing a correct word leads to heaven results in attributing, to the only reality that can be its subject, characteristics which are contrary to its nature, such as the desire for particular fruitions, etc. It is not possible to posit as the highest reality that which, because of its very nature, always remains — however you put it — an instrument of action (*vāc*). Not even identifying the *śabda-tattva* without beginning and end with Parā Vāc makes sense, since this means identifying the object (sound) with the instrument (voice). If, then, Paśyantī is said to be only a proper noun and hence, to escape all the criticism concerning the fact of seeing, etc., and that it is only the feminine ending that counts — which is intended to express its being the power of Knowledge —, the reply is that, if it has nothing to do with seeing, it is insentient and therefore cannot be the power of Knowledge either.

Then, the attributes that a verse[4] assigns to Paśyantī are criticized one by one. And so on this vein, until his final outburst:

> But why on earth have you left the sphere of grammar and taken it into your head to deal with a field which is not yours, like philosophy?
>
> — Torella 2002: XIX-XX

We can detect three main targets in Somānanda's criticism:

(1) the identification of *parabrahman* with *śabdarūpa-paśyantī-parāvāc*,

(2) the claim of *vyākaraṇa* to go beyond the narrow domain of grammar proper and constitute a world-view, and

(3) as a world-view, its preaching the unreality of manifested universe, just as within the field of linguistic speculation it upholds the basic unreality of sounds with respect to the *sphoṭa* they are supposed to reveal.

It is apparent that we are in front of two competing world views. So, does Utpaladeva understand the debate to come, when, in the short *bhūmikā* to the second chapter, he contrasts *īśvarādvayavāda* and *śabdaparabrahmādvayavāda*, and takes his subsequent arguments against *śabdādvaitavāda* as aimed to refute the latter?[5] Two crucial points are represented by the concepts

4. *avibhāgā tu paśyantī sarvataḥ saṁhṛtakramā* |
svarūpajyotir evāntaḥ sūkṣmā vāg anapāyinī ||

This verse, frequently quoted, is included (with reserve) by Rau — along with the entire passage to which it belongs — in the *kārikā* text (I.167); Iyer, instead, takes it as a quotation given in the *vṛtti*.

5. *īśvarādvayavāda eva yuktiyukto na tu śabdaparabrahmādvayavāda iti vaktuṁ, vaiyākaraṇopetaśabdādvaitaṁ tāvan nirākartum upakramamāṇa āha* (*Śivadṛṣṭi-vṛtti* p. 36, ll. 4-5). The *īśvarādvayavāda* guarantees the *satyatā* of the universe (ibid., p. 88, l. 7; p. 89, l. 29).

of *avidyā* and *vivarta*, which he also discusses later on, in Chapter VI, when dealing with the various schools of *vedāntavādins*. However, whereas Somānanda will treat them in a few verses, he devotes a full chapter to *śabdādvaitavāda*. Since we may not think that a highly sofisticated doctrine like that may have represented a direct challenge to *īśvarādvayavāda* in the Kashmir of his times in terms of "popularity," we are left with the hypothesis that Somānanda attacks it precisely because this is theoretically too close to the new Śaiva *darśana* that he has set out to build. This could explain the total lack of fair play in his attitude to Bhartṛhari, which resembles the fiery fightings between insiders rather than the cold dismissal of a full outsider. By "total lack of fair play" I refer both to the unnecessary sarcastic remarks and the punctilious pointing out of seeming contradictions in terminology, which show a Somānanda deliberately unwilling to catch the gist of Bhartṛhari's conception and expound it by doing justice to its boldness and originality. Somānanda does not show any interest, not even a negatively critical one, in Bhartṛhari, the epistemologist and grammarian, but only in his metaphysics of *śabdabrahman*. In fact, most of Somānanda's attention is caught by the famous first verse of the Brahmakāṇḍa and the almost equally famous verse, quoted in the *vṛtti*, where the nature of Paśyantī is described (see above note 4). Then, while concluding the main part of his criticism with a very basic observation ("why on earth have you grammarians left grammar aside to seek 'liberating wisdom,' which is not your business?"), he adds that this would-be knowledge is also expressed in another work of theirs, called *Samīkṣā*.[6]

6. II.72-73ab *vaiyākaraṇatāṁ tyaktvā vijñānānveṣaṇena kim* ।
bhavatām aprastutena na kevalam ihoditam ॥
vijñānābhāsanaṁ yāvat samīkṣāyām udāhṛtam ॥

→

Utpaladeva clarifies that Somānanda is referring here to a verse (again, of a metaphysical content) from another work by Bhartṛhari, the *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā*, or rather *Ṣaḍdhātu*°, as a passage from Utpaladeva's *vṛtti* seems to presuppose,[7] and as the *Spandapradīpikā* reads.[8] However, as a seeming exception, Somānanda, at the very beginning of the chapter (II.10ab), does quote an "epistemological" verse, the well-known *na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte* (*Vākyapadīya* I.131ab). But, in the course of his rather wild attack, he apparently forgets it. Or, more probably, I believe, what he had in mind in quoting that verse was rather its being used as an *anvaya* argument to prove the *śabda* nature of the ultimate cause of manifested world (so again a metaphysical content).

Knowing the central role that Bhartṛhari will play in the *Pratyabhijñā* philosophy from Utpaladeva onwards, we are legitimately curious to see how the latter might have put up with his so much disparaging master. Disappointingly, Utpaladeva remains more or less impassive in commenting on him, and we have to read his *vṛtti* very attentively to detect just some very slight traces of disagreement here and there. The most reasonable explanation could have been that the *vṛtti* is an early work, and Utpaladeva, after originally sharing his master's views on Bhartṛhari, changed his mind. But this is not how things stand, since the *vṛtti* is obviously posterior

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→ Then, the KSTS edition becomes rather confused: obviously, the *śloka* beginning with *dikkālādi*° (p. 84, ll. 4-5), included in the *vṛtti*, in fact belongs to the *Śivadṛṣṭi*.

7. *dhātuṣaṭkopagamād bhedavāde deśakālayogo 'vaśyaṁbhāvīti* (*Śivadṛṣṭi-vṛtti* p. 86, l. 4).

8. p. 10. The form *Dhātusamīkṣā*, which occurs on p. 4, is likely to be only an abbreviation of the latter. On this work, see Gaurinath Shastri 1959: 61; Iyer 1968: 9-10.

to the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*, which it quotes and refers to frequently. The impression is that Utpaladeva consciously plays with a certain ambiguity. He never declares openly his disagreement with his master Somānanda on the judgement about Bhartṛhari as a whole, but, for example, it seems to be not by chance that when Somānanda's ruthless attacks are just reaching their apex, he cites in the *vṛtti* the name of their "victim" by putting before it quite unexpectedly the epithet *vidvad-* (p. 84, l. 3). Another point of the *vṛtti* deserves our attention. In verse II.19[9] Somānanda gives voice to an opponent who objects to *vāc* being considered (by Somānanda) a mere *karmendriya*, not too different from an organ of locomotion, like the foot. In the process of reaching a reflective awareness of something (the opponent says) *vāc* stands first, taking the form of knowledge itself. Somānanda totally overlooks this quite reasonable objection, and impatiently returns to what concerns him more at the moment: the examination and demolition of Paśyantī. Utpaladeva, for his part, takes the argument very seriously and develops it thoroughly, but in such a way that it is clear that he is no more dealing with an opponent's view but with one of his own favourite doctrines: the centrality of the word for the arising of knowledge and the process of understanding, which he owes precisely to Bhartṛhari. Then, to take up again the thread of Somānanda's discourse, he concludes abruptly: *āstam anyad etat* (p. 49, l. 13). In fact, a bit too overtly he had put his own words into the opponent's mouth. Instead, in what I have listed above as point (2) Utpaladeva appears to be in real agreement with his master. The Grammarians should refrain from pushing their pretensions too far to claim that their thinking is able to

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9. *vimarśānubhavenaiṣā yathā vāk prathamaṁ śritā* |
lakṣyate bodharūpeṇa na tathā caraṇādikam ||

embrace the totality of being. The aim of grammar, Utpaladeva says, is to teach correct words, being able, as such, to cause the comprehension of meaning, whereas *saṁyag-jñāna* must be pursued by the Śāstras having liberation as their aim.[10] So, *vyākaraṇa*, even in the prestigious and culturally very complex form that it has received particularly from Bhartṛhari's contribution, cannot claim to a full autonomy, but is expected to be, or to become, only a means in a wider religio-philosophical context. This is precisely what Utpaladeva intends to do, when he integrates Bhartṛhari's teaching into the new Śaiva theology.

But, as I said earlier, when Utpaladeva writes his commentary on the *Śivadṛṣṭi*, he has already made his choices and composed his masterwork, the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*. In it, the presence of Bhartṛhari, particularly Bhartṛhari the epistemologist, is overwhelming. What is the reason that has made Utpaladeva appropriate Bhartṛhari's teaching by going, against his *guru* Somānanda? The reason, to my mind, is to be sought in the structure itself and the motivations of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*. If we look into the two seminal works of the *Pratyabhijñā*, we realize that they belong to two different orders both in contents and addressees. More rooted in the Śaiva scriptures, on the one hand, and more "self-centred" on the other — and consequently more willing to dispose of any antagonist doctrine — is the *Śivadṛṣṭi*. More analytical and "strategical" is the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*, which, instead of dispersing its philosophical energies against an undifferentiated multiplicity of opponents, very lucidly selects

10. *arthapratītihetusādhuśabdānuśāsanavyāpāraṁ eva* [→ °rūpaṁ?] *vaiyākaraṇatvaṁ tyaktvā mokṣaprayojanaiḥ śāstraiḥ yat samyagjñānam anusaraṇīyaṁ tadanveṣaṇena bhavatāṁ karaṇīyatvenāprastutena na kiṁcit* — *Śivadṛṣṭi-vṛtti*, p. 83, l. 3; p. 84, l. 1

just one, the most prestigious philosophical (and also religious) tradition of the Kashmir of that time, outside the Śaiva tradition (to which instead the other great tradition of Kashmir, the Vaiṣṇava Pāñcarātra is more or less closely related). For various reasons (the principal one probably being the wish to present the new *Pratyabhijñā* theologians as the champions of the entire Śaiva tradition against the main common antagonist; see Torella 2002: XXI-XXIII), these privileged opponents are the Buddhists, especially those belonging to the so-called logico-epistemological school (Torella 1992). Buddhist doctrines are criticized also by Somānanda, who did know of Dharmakīrti — two verses of his *Pramāṇavārttika* are easily recognizable in the *Śivadṛṣṭi* (I.45cd-46ab[11] and VI.39[12]) — but there the Buddhists are opponents just like many others, without being extended the special status they have in the work of Utpaladeva, for whom they, admired and attacked in an equally strong way, are, so to speak, the most intimate enemies.[13] To Utpaladeva, the criticism of their positions is of

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11. *dṛśyante 'tra tadicchāto bhāvā bhītyādiyogataḥ* ।
tatra mithyāsvarūpaṁ cet sthāpyāgre satyatedṛṣām ॥
— Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* III.282

kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ ।
abhutān api paśyanti purato 'vasthitān iva ।

Utpaladeva's comments make even more evident that Dharmarkīrti is the source (p. 33, l. 7 *kāmaśokabhayādiyogāc ca te te bhāvāḥ puraḥ sphuranto dṛśyante*).

12. *bhedavān iti lakṣyatve dṛṣṭānto 'sti na tādṛśaḥ* ।
grāhyagrāhakasaṁvitter bhedavān iva lakṣyate ॥
— Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* III.354

avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātmaviparyāsitadarśanaiḥ ।
grāhyagrāhakasaṁvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate ॥

13. I owe this expression to my friend Prof. Arindam Chakrabarti.

substantial help in building and refining the Pratyabhijñā philosophy; the two processes run in fact parallel.

Two radically different world-views are at stake here: the depersonalized universe of the Buddhists, made of discrete and discontinuous realities tentatively connected in the ultimately unreal net of *vyavahāra* — unreal insofar as it is the product of a "secondary" conceptual thought —, and the absolutely unitary universe of the Śaivas, identified with and penetrated by a supreme Person, Śiva, who runs through it like a golden thread unifying all the seeming multiplicity and dynamically transforming the apparently other into himself and himself into the other. Closely connected with Utpaladeva's choice of establishing the Buddhists as the main opponents is his adoption of Bhartṛhari as the main ally. At this point some questions may be asked: why Bhartṛhari? and, again: can he really be "used" against the Buddhists? What has been historically their attitude to him? A straightforward answer is not possible, but, indirectly, precisely their problematic reaction to him represents the fulfilment of a primary requirement for being a very strong adversary, that is, the fact of not being a total outsider but of sharing much of the same problems and presuppositions. In fact, Utpaladeva could have confronted the Buddhists simply by opposing to them the teachings of the Scriptures, which he did but only in a very secondary way, by adding an *Āgama-adhikāra* as a third chapter, but after the fully dialectical *Jñāna-* and *Kriyā-adhikāra*. Then, we should not forget that the Buddhist pilgrim I-tsing is even told that Bhartṛhari was a Buddhist (Takakusu 1896: 178-180). I cannot enter here into a detailed scrutiny of the Buddhist reaction to Bhartṛhari,[14] which starts in a rather

14. For a general survey see Lindtner 1993, which however contains not a few problematic points (see also Nakamura 1972).

enigmatic way, with Diṅnāga reproducing more than thirty verses from the *Sambandhasamuddeśa*, which thus come to form the main body of his *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, a work apparently dealing with an entirely different subject from the verses quoted (Frauwallner 1959: 113-116; Houben 1995: 273-274; interestingly, later Buddhist authors like Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin, and also non-Buddhist, like Jayaratha, do not show any doubt about Diṅnāga's authorship of them, (see Frauwallner 1959: 114, n. 49). For Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, particularly the latter, Bhartṛhari plays the role of inspirer and opponent at the same time, leaving unmistakable traces in the elaboration of the theory of *apoha*, both in its more strictly linguistic version and in the broader one, investing the whole of conceptual thought. The most thorough, and explicit, treatment of Bhartṛhari's doctrines can be found in the *Tattvasaṁgraha*[15] (in Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti's work we have to read it mainly between the lines), but the limits of space make me shift from the very elaborate pages of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (cf. Giunta 2003) to the commentary of Jñānaśrībhadra on the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, extant only in a Tibetan translation (Unebe: 2000), which, if certainly much less philosophically significant, has nonetheless the merit of presenting the main lines of the Buddhist attitude to Bhartṛhari in a quite clear and straightforward way. An additional reason for focusing on Jñānaśrībhadra is his belonging to Kashmir and living just a few decades later than Abhinavagupta. In explaining the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, perhaps among the Buddhist scriptures the one which shows the most radical criticism of the cognitive power of language and its closely associated

15. See, particularly, the whole of the *Śabdabrahmaparīkṣā*, *Śabdārthaparīkṣā* vv. 866-1211, *Pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā* vv. 1212-1360, *Anumānaparīkṣā* vv. 1361-1485, *Śrutiparīkṣā* passim.

conceptual thought,[16] Jñānaśrībhadra quotes as many as forty-six verses from the *Vākyapadīya*. Interestingly, most of them, the ones of a linguistic-epistemological import, are quoted with approval, and are used, sometimes mixed with Dharmakīrti's

16. This important *sūtra* (unfortunately, imperfectly edited and even more imperfectly translated into English) dwells on this subject at several points under the form of questions of Mahāmati to the Bhagavat. They belong to three main orders: the relationship between conceptual thought and language, the relationship between word and meaning, and whether language can guarantee the "reality" of the things it designates. The first two questions receive more or less the same answer (p. 86 *bhagavān āha* | *na hi mahāmate vāg vikalpād anyā nānanyā*; p. 155 *bodhisattvo mahāsattvo rutam arthād anyan nānyad iti samanupaśyati arthaṁ ca rutāt*). Also the motivations are basically the same: if they were not different, there could not be a cause/effect relationship between them; if, on the other hand, they were different, the meaning could not be manifested (p. 87 *yadi punar mahāmate vāg vikalpād anyā syād avikalpahetukī syāt* | *athānanyā syād arthābhivyaktiṁ* [Unebe's emendation, also confirmed by the following passage] *vāg na kuryāt. sā kurute*; p. 154 *°jalpo vikalpavāsanāhetuko rutam ity ucyate* [. . .] *yadi ca punar mahāmate artho rutād anyaḥ syād arutārthābhivyaktihetukaḥ syāt. sa cārtho rutenānupraviśyate pradīpeneva dhanam*). Jñānaśrībhadra adds in his *vṛtti* that the words never touch external objects, and meanings are not directly connected with them but only shaped by *vikalpa*: the fact that Jñānaśrībhadra conceives of the circularity of *vikalpa*-language-meaning is underlined by his quoting here the famous verse ascribed to Diṅnāga *vikalpayonayaḥ śabdā vikalpāḥ śabdāyonayaḥ* (Unebe 2000: 333-34). Words can tell us nothing about the reality of things (p. 104 *abhilāpasadbhāvād bhagavan santi sarvabhāvāḥ* | *bhagavān āha* | *asatām api mahāmate bhāvānām abhilāpaḥ kriyate. . .*). Yet, language and conceptualization are not to be simply dismissed, they can (or have to) be used by the *bodhisattvas* as a means to the supreme goal (p. 155 *evam eva mahāmate vāgvikalparutapradīpena bodhisattvā mahāsattvā vāgvikalparahitāḥ* [*°tāṁ?*] *svapratyātmāryagatim anupraviśanti*).

verses!, as a support of the equation upheld by the Buddhist *sūtra* between language and conceptualization:[17] they are not strictly speaking the same thing but, indeed, one is the source of the other. Different is the case with Bhartṛhari's "metaphysical" verses dealing with *śabdabrahman*, etc. which are instead quickly dismissed.[18] In treasuring the linguistic-epistemological teachings of Bhartṛhari, Jñānaśrībhadra moves along the same lines as Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita, but in a much more simplistic way. In fact, unlike Jñānaśrībhadra, Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita were well aware that Bhartṛhari did not limit the pervasion of language to the conceptual thought but considered it an intrinsic feature of any kind of cognition, including the perceptual one, and they strongly objected to this.

We can now revert to Utpaladeva's philosophical atelier. In order to undermine the discontinuous universe of the Buddhists he decides to avail himself precisely of the latter doctrine, the language-imbued nature of knowledge, which is meant to demolish its main foundation-stone, the unsurpassable gulf between the moment of sensation and that

17. The citation of Bhartṛhari's verses is, however, not always appropriate; cf. that of *VP* I.47 whose *buddhisthaḥ śabdaḥ* is wrongly identified with the *vikalpa* of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, whereas in fact it refers to *sphoṭa*.

18. But at least one Buddhist philosopher, Diṅnāga, did not conceal his potential appreciation also of Bhartṛhari's metaphysical ideas, provided that they be read in a Vijñānavāda perspective and by introducing, accordingly, some change in terminology; cf. the case of term *brahma*, found in a verse (most probably coming from Bhartṛhari's *Ṣaḍ/Śabda-dhātusamīkṣā*) incorporated into the *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, whose Tibetan translation *rnam shes* presupposes in the Sanskrit original its substitution with *vijñānam* or *cittam* (Frauwallner 1959: 113 n. 47; Lindtner 1993: 201).

of conceptual elaboration, representing, as it were, the very archetype of the Buddhist segmented reality. It is because of this that some of the most famous, and crucial, verses of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* originate.[19] As far as the metaphysical background is concerned, there is nothing essentially new in this doctrine, the scriptural *sarvaśaktivilolatā* "effervescence of all powers (in any reality)" of the *Śivadṛṣṭi* (I.11b) implicitly already contained it. What Utpaladeva needed was a shared, if controversial, strong "philosophical" argument. The omnipervasiveness of language is an epistemological version of the omnipervasiveness of Śiva, and at the same time calls for the integration into the spiritually dynamic Śaiva universe. Moreover, this allowed Utpaladeva to connect himself with the speculations on *vāc* and the phonemes found in the Kula and Trika *tantras*. The supreme Consciousness is the supreme Word, Paśyantī becomes a power of the supreme Lord. In this way, the formerly despised Bhartṛhari is raised to the core itself of the Pratyabhijñā. Did Utpaladeva accept the whole of Bhartṛhari's doctrine? I should say not. He accepted just

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19. I.V.11 *svabhāvam avabhāsasya vimarśaṁ vidur anyathā* । *prakāśo 'rthoparakto 'pi sphaṭikādijaḍopamaḥ* ॥ "The essential nature of light is reflective awareness; otherwise light, though "coloured" by objects, would be similar to an insentient reality, such as the crystal and so on." (tr. Torella 2002: 118). I.V.13 *citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā parāvāk svarasoditā* । *svātantryaṁ etan mukhyaṁ tad aiśvaryaṁ paramātmanaḥ* ॥ "Consciousness has as its essential nature reflective awareness; it is the supreme Word that arises freely. It is freedom in the absolute sense, the sovereignty of the supreme Self" (tr. Torella 2002: 120). I.V.19 *sākṣātkārakṣaṇe 'py asti vimarśaḥ. katham anyathā* । *dhāvanādy upapadyeta pratisaṁdhānavarjitam* ॥ "Even at the moment of direct perception there is a reflective awareness. How otherwise could one account for such actions as running and so on, if they were thought of as being devoid of determinate awareness?" (tr. Torella 2002: 125).

what matched his own well-gauged requirements. Other very significant aspects of Bhartṛhari's thought are instead rejected, like the theory of *sphoṭa*.[20] Apparently, Utpaladeva did not propose his own answer to the crucial question "what is the meaning-bearer?," looking for an alternative to the *sphoṭa*.[21] It will be his *praśiṣya* Abhinavagupta to do so: his solution (see Torella 2004) seems well in line with Utpaladeva's thought.

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20. Utpaladeva deals with the *sphoṭa* doctrine in the *Śivadṛṣṭi-vṛtti* but only as an opponent's theory, while commenting on Somānanda, who strongly criticized it at II.58-61ab; see also *Śivadṛṣṭi-vṛtti* p. 87 (on II.77).

21. The doubt, which is bound to remain such, is whether he treated this subject in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti* or *ṭīkā*, now almost completely lost.

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Helārāja's Defence of the Padāvadhika Method of Grammatical Explanation

Vincenzo Vergiani

HELĀRĀJA is typically known to scholarship for being the author of the *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* (or *Prakīrṇakaprakāśa*, henceforth, *PrPr*), the only extant commentary on the third *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* (henceforth *VP*) of Bhartṛhari and also the only surviving work of Helārāja.[1] From the information gleaned from the *PrPr*[2] it has been tentatively conjectured that Helārāja lived in Kashmir in the tenth century and was probably the son of one of Abhinavagupta's teachers, Bhūtirāja, for he often refers to himself as the "son of Bhūtirāja" (*bhūtirājatanaya*), and consequently, the brother of Indurāja, another teacher of the great Śaiva philosopher. Subramania Iyer (1969: 40)

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1. With the possible and partial exception of the *Ṭīkā* to the II *kāṇḍa*: for Aklujkar (1974) has argued that the *Vākyakāṇḍaṭīkā* is, in fact, Helārāja's work (for a criticism of this view, see Peri Sarveswara Sharma: 1983); more recently (Aklujkar 1993: 23 and n. 13) he has maintained that the "*ṭīkā* available at present should be considered a shortened version of Helārāja's as yet lost commentary on that *kāṇḍa*," and that the version was possibly prepared by Puṇyarāja.
2. See in particular Subramania Iyer (1969: 36-40); Peri Sarveswara Sharma (1972: 5-12); Cardona (1976: 299).

suggests[3] that Helārāja himself may have been a teacher of Abhinavagupta's and recalls that the latter is known to have written a grammatical work called the *Prakīrṇakavivaraṇa*, which is now lost. Its title may therefore indicate that it was influenced by Helārāja's commentary on the *VP* or even that it was a subcommentary on it.[4] Helārāja is a learned commentator, who quotes from a variety of texts — besides grammatical works — from different schools, such as the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra*, the *Tantravārttika* and the *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārilabhaṭṭa, the *Yoga-Sūtra* and the *Vyāsabhāṣya* thereon, the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*,[5] the *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti, etc. and refers to many others.

Yet Helārāja is more than just a reliable commentator on Bhartṛhari's work. He is also an original thinker in his own

3. This had already been proposed by Kanti Chandra Pandey in a 1963 publication, as reported by Cardona (1976: 299).

4. If this hypothesis is correct, it may be fruitful to look for the traces of Helārāja's influence on Abhinavagupta through a careful comparison of the grammatical ideas found in the latter's extant works with those expounded in the *PrPr*.

5. See the *PrPr* on *VP* III.7.9-12, where Helārāja discusses the Vaiśeṣika views on perception with remarkable thoroughness and insight. According to Preisendanz (1989: 149, n. 33), he refers to an "unorthodox" view on the invisibility of the eye-ray only to be found in Bhāsarvajña. This is particularly interesting because this Nyāya author was himself a Kashmiri and probably a contemporary of Helārāja (cf. Matilal 1977: 94-95, who tentatively dates Bhāsarvajña to the early or mid-tenth century). Thus it might be worth investigating Bhāsarvajña's works, the *Nyāyasāra* and the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, for the possible sources of other passages in the *PrPr* that appear to be quotations from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts. Aklujkar (1969) has shown that Helārāja also knew Candrānanda's *Vṛtti* on the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra*.

right. In order to show the subtlety and refinement of his arguments, I will, in the following pages, present a passage of the *PrPr* in which he defends the grammatical method of *padāvadhika anvākhyāna*, literally "explanation that has the word as its limit," against the criticism of an unnamed opponent.

The Padāvadhika Method of Grammatical Analysis

The phrase *padāvadhikam anvākhyānam* and its counterpart, *vākyāvadhikam anvākhyānam* "explanation that has the sentence as its limit," occur in the *Vṛtti* (henceforth, *Vṛ*) on *VP* I.24-26. According to the initial sentence in the *Vṛ*,[6] these verses enumerate the eight major topics that are dealt with in the whole work. The first four are the two kinds of meanings (*artha*) — the word meanings that are obtained through abstraction (*apoddhārapadārtha*) from the sentence and those that have a fixed character (*sthitalakṣaṇa*) — and the two kinds of *śabda*s "meaningful verbal units"[7] — those that are to be explained (*anvākhyeya*) and those that are used for the sake of explanation (*pratipādaka*).[8]

These verses — as well as the *vṛtti* thereon — implicitly refer to one of the most original ideas advocated by Bhartṛhari, namely that the sentence (*vākya*) is the fundamental meaning-bearing unit of speech and, consequently, the isolated inflected

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6. *triṣv apy eṣu ślokeṣu prastutasya parisamāptiḥ* । — *VP* I.65.1.

7. Even though *śabda* is commonly translated as "word," it often designates a meaningful verbal unit of undefined length (word, phrase, sentence . . .) and, particularly in the *VP*, it mostly seems to refer to the sentence (*vākya*). Biardeau (1964) translates it into French sometimes with "parole," sometimes with "élément verbal" (for example, in *VP* I.24-26 and the *Vṛ* thereon).

8. *apoddhārapadārthā ye ye cārthāḥ sthitalakṣaṇāḥ* ।
anvākhyeyāś ca ye śabdā ye cāpi pratipādakāḥ ॥ — *VP* I.24

word (*pada*) has no "real" existence, because it is just a fiction conceived by the grammarians. The meanings analytically extracted (*apoddhṛta*) from the sentence are mere generalizations and abstractions;[9] they cannot be used in everyday communication[10] and vary according to the theoretical assumptions of different thinkers.[11] Conversely, sentence-meanings[12] are specific — context-sensitive, one may say —

9. Cf. the gloss given in the *Vṛ* on *VP* I.24-26: *tatrāpoddhārapadārtho nāmātyantasaṁsṛṣṭaḥ saṁsargād anumeyena parikalpitena rūpeṇa prakṛtavivekaḥ sann apoddhriyate* "Among these, the so-called meanings of words (obtained) through abstraction, that (previously) had a close connection (with other meanings), are abstracted by introducing a separation with the help of a postulated form that is to be inferred from that connection" (*VP* I.65.1-2).

10. Cf. the following remark in the *Vṛ* on *VP* I.24-26: *pravibhaktaḥ sa tasya vastuno vyavahārātītaṁ rūpam* "In fact, the form of this entity that has undergone separation is beyond ordinary usage" (*VP* I.65.1-3). Note the use of *vastu* to refer to the isolated segment of "natural" speech, possibly to indicate that it is the "real thing" being artificially extracted from its context.

11. Cf., e.g., *VP* III.14.73: *śabdā yathā vibhajyante bhāgair iva vikalpitaiḥ* | *anvākhyeyās tathā śāstram atidūre vyavasthitam* "According as verbal units are divided into suppositious, so-called 'parts,' so they are interpreted. The *śāstra* is indeed far removed (from reality)." Commenting on this verse, Helārāja provides the following example — among others — of conflicting derivations of the same word: *kecit kila bhavatiśabdaṁ bhavāt tiḥ iti vyutpādayanti, kecid bhūśabdād atipratyayena, anye madhye vikaraṇena* "Some, as we are told, derive the word *bhavati* by means of (the rule) "(The suffix) *ti* is (introduced) after (the base) *bhava*," some by means of the suffix *ati* after the word *bhū*, others by means of a root class marker (*vikaraṇa*) in between" (*PrPr* ii.187.13-15).

12. The *Vṛ* on *VP* I.24-26 explicitly states that the *sthitalakṣaṇa* meanings are sentence meanings: *sthitalakṣaṇas tu vākyarūpopagrahaḥ kalpitoddeśavibhāgo viśiṣṭa ekaḥ kriyātmā* →

and fixed (*sthita*), in the sense that they are quite uniformly grasped in their essence by different individuals. On this point, compare the following remarks made in the *PrPr* on *VP* III.14.76[13]:

> Only the sentence-meaning has a stable character, because only the undivided sentence has the nature of a signifier. Accordingly, one first derives an appropriate general sense in the particular sentence-meaning with an analytic mind, [then] one extracts the thing we call "a word," which bears such a "meaning," in order to analyse it separately.[14]

The "stability" or "fixedness" of the sentence-meaning is thus based on the necessarily stable nature of the relationship between the signifier and the signified[15] that makes verbal

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→ *vicchinnapadārthagrahaṇopāyapratipādyaḥ* "On the other hand, the meaning with a fixed character is that which is grasped through a sentence, is divided into fictitious parts, is specific, unitary and has an action as its core, and it can be explained by grasping the separated word-meanings" (*VP* I.67.1-2).

13. *arthasyānugamaṁ kaṁcid dṛṣṭvaiva parikalpitam* ׀
padaṁ vākye pade dhātur dhātau bhāgaś ca muṇḍivat ׀׀

"Having observed the recurrence of some meaning, one conjectures that in a sentence there is a (certain) word, in a word a (certain) verbal base, and in a verbal base (there are) parts, as in *muṇḍi*" (= *muṇḍa* + *ṆiC* = *muṇḍayati*, according to *A* 3.1.21).

14. *vākyārtha eva sthitalakṣaṇo vākyasyaivākhaṇḍasya vācakatvāt* ׀ *tathā cāpoddhārabuddhyārthasāmānyaṁ vākyārthe viśeṣe 'nurūpam uddhṛtya, tāvadarthaṁ padaṁ nāma pṛthag anvākhyātum apoddhriyate* (*PrPr* ii.187.24-26). I have slightly emended the text as found in Iyer's edn.

15. Cf. *vt.* 1 in *Paspaśāhnika*: *siddhe śabdārthasambandhe lokato 'rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ yathā laukikavaidikeṣu* (*MBh* I.6.16, I.8.3, I.8.7; in the Kielhorn edn., the *vārttika* is divided into three parts, separated by Patañjali's →

communication possible among the members of a speaking community. The *apoddhṛta* meanings, on the other hand, being "invented," as it were, by scholars and the speakers of the language subconsciously analysing like grammarians, are arbitrary and therefore have an "unstable" nature.

Just as there are two kinds of meanings, there are two kinds of verbal signifiers (*śabda*), those that have currency in everyday life and are the object of grammatical analysis and those that are mere analytical tools, such as the individual words and, beyond them, the bases and affixes postulated by grammarians. With regard to the former, namely the *śabdas* to be explained (*anvākhyeya*), the *Vṛ* points out that there are two alternative views on this issue: according to some thinkers, the grammatical explanation has the individual inflected word (*pada*) as its limit (*avadhi*); according to others, its limit is the sentence (*vākya*).[16] In the following lines, the *vṛttikāra* does not

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→ commentary). This famous statement, establishing one of the fundamental principles of the grammarians' theory of language, is clearly recalled by *VP* I.23, *nityāḥ śabdārthasambandhās tatrāmnātā maharṣibhiḥ* । *sūtrāṇāṁ sānutantrāṇāṁ bhāṣyāṇāṁ ca praṇetṛbhiḥ*, which accepts the interpretation of *siddha* as equivalent to *nitya* proposed in the *bhāṣya* on the *vārttika*.

16. *Vṛ* on *VP* I.24-26: *keṣaṁcit padāvadhikam anvākhyānam, vākyāvadhikam ekeṣām* (*VP* I.68.5-6). Vṛṣabhadeva glosses this sentence as follows: "Having the word as its limit." *avadhi* (means) *maryādā* "boundary" of the explanation, because [the explanation] does not operate beyond the word. And this is according to the *padavādins*. "Having the sentence as its limit." (This is) according to the *vākyavādins*. According to them, in fact, words are unreal, they are the means (of grammatical explanation) (*padāvadhikam iti* । *avadhir maryādā* । *padāt pareṇāpravṛtter anvākhyānasya* । *padavādināṁ caitat* । *vākyāvadhikam iti* । *vākyāvādināṁ* । *teṣāṁ hi padāny asatyāni* । *upāyabhūtānīti*: *Paddhati*, *VP* I.68.28-69.2).

provide a systematic explanation of these two methods, but he shows that certain *sūtras* and statements in the *Mahābhāṣya* (henceforth *MBh*) assume either one or the other point of view and therefore, we may infer, are both legitimate.

However, the final remark in the *Vṛ*, before the next *pratīka* is introduced, is apparently meant to reaffirm the importance of *padāvadhika anvākhyāna*, which is a logical consequence of the procedure of *padāpoddhāra*: if it is accepted that the individual word is analyzable — and the whole Pāṇinian system is built upon this principle — then artificial[17] *śabdas*, that is, technical terms such as *bhū*, *bhū-ti*, *bhū-ati*, etc. can serve as the means (*pratipādaka*[18]) of grammatical analysis and they cause the understanding of the whole (*samudāya*) that they form together with other words, that is, of the sentence to which they belong.[19]

From this brief presentation of the *padāvadhika anvākhyāna* in the *Vṛ* to the first *kāṇḍa*, it can be concluded that, although the grammatical *śāstra* is a precious aid on the path that leads to the attainment of the ultimate reality,[20] paradoxically its mode of operation — which consists in splitting sentences into words and words into bases and affixes — is farther away from that

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17. Such terms are in fact *alaukika*, unfit for ordinary communication.

18. Cf. Vṛṣabhadeva's gloss: *asatyatvāt teṣām antarālavartinām anvakhyānopāyatvam* — as these (terms), which appear at the intermediate stages (of derivation), are not real, they have the nature of means of explanation — (*Paddhati*, *VP* I.71.13).

19. *Vṛ* on *VP* I.24-26: *padasya cānvākhyeyatvam abhyugamya bhū bhūti bhū ati ityevamādayaḥ śabdāntarasamudāyapratipattihetavaḥ parikalpitāḥ pratipādakāḥ śabdā upādīyante* — *VP* I.71.1-3.

20. As is repeatedly and proudly affirmed in the group of *kārikās* (*VP* I.15-23) immediately preceding those discussed here.

reality than ordinary language, which at least reflects it in the unity and immediacy of the sentence and the sentence-meaning. Therefore the *padāpoddhāra* is a necessary and useful tool that grammarians should neither idolize nor disown. This is the subject of the passage in Helārāja's *PrPr* that I examine below.

Helārāja's Presentation of the Padāvadhika Anvākhyāna

The passage in question forms the second half of Helārāja's commentary on *VP* III.7.3 (in the *Sādhanasamuddeśa*, the chapter on the factors of action) that reads:

> *sādhanavyavahāraś ca buddhyavasthānibandhanaḥ* ।
> *sann asan vārtharūpeṣu bhedo buddhyā prakalpyate* ॥
>
> Moreover the linguistic expression of *sādhanas* is based on states of the mind. It is the mind that conceives distinctions, whether real or unreal, in things.

In his commentary Helārāja first glosses the verse and provides examples of the capacity that cognition and language, as two sides of the same coin, possess to conceive and present reality in accordance with the speaker's needs and aims. Then he gives the discussion quite an unexpected turn by devoting the second part of his commentary to what amounts to a defence of the *padāvadhika anvākhyāna*. Significantly, this part of the commentary is introduced by the adverb *ittham* "thus, in this way," which establishes a parallel between the previous considerations concerning ordinary language and those that follow on the grammatical method.

This method is briefly outlined in the first few lines: in the process of correct derivation (*saṁskāra*) of a word, says Helārāja, it is possible to provide a grammatical explanation (*anvākhyāna*) that is *padāvadhika*, in other words, one that takes

the individual inflected word (*pada*) as its starting point (*avadhi*, the limit from which an action or process starts). Now, such a word does not exist in reality, for, from Bhartṛhari's perspective, an utterance consists at least of a verb and its agent.[21] However, for the sake of grammatical derivation one assumes that it has been extracted from a sentence — the procedure known as *padāpoddhāra* — or that it is uttered in isolation,[22] for instance in an elliptical sentence or, possibly, in an "artificial" context such as a grammar class or debate.[23] In this way, the unitary signifier that is *vākya* — the utterance — is theoretically split into its posited "building blocks," the inflected words or *pada*s, which are, in their turn, subdivided into bases and affixes.

Nonetheless, even "if one does not restrict [the explanation] to a particular meaning on the basis of some general formal property,"[24] the affix or affixes of a *pada* —

21. For even an isolated word in the nominative (*prathamā*) — a non-case in Pāṇini's syntax — will evoke an association with the "action" of being. In this respect, see, e.g. the following remarks in the *Vṛ* on *VP* I.24-26: *vṛkṣaḥ plakṣaḥ ity anupasaṁhate hi kriyāpade śabdopagrahāṇāṁ arthātmanāṁ nirūpaṇaṁ na vidyate / yāvac cāpavādabhūtāḥ kriyāviśeṣāḥ śabdapravṛttikāraṇam astitvaṁ na nivartayanti tāvad astir bhavantīparaḥ prathamapuruṣo 'prayujyamāno 'pi vṛkṣādibhiḥ padair ākṣiptaḥ pratīyate* — *VP* I.65.7-66.3.

22. In Helārāja's words: *prathamata evāprayukte padāntare* "when no other word has been uttered previously" (*PrPr* I.234.7-8).

23. Indeed, the reference to individual words and word-meanings is not uncommon in "natural" situations, as Bhartṛhari himself seems to suggest in the *Vṛ* on *VP* I.24-26 when he mentions the "expression of different (abstracted word meanings) in ordinary experience that is similar to their expression in the *śāstra*" (. . . *śāstravyavahārasadṛśaṁ ca laukikam bhedavyavahāram* — *VP* I.65.6-7.

24. *vivakṣitasya viśeṣasya rūpasāmānyād anavadhāraṇe* — *PrPr* i.234.8.

even if it is uttered in isolation — inevitably raise the expectation of one or more "general correlates" (*sambandhisāmānya*),[25] for instance of an agent if the *pada* is a verb, of an agent and a verb if the *pada* ends in the accusative, etc. In other terms, even an isolated *pada* starts making sense, as it were, although only provisionally, before the complete sentence to which it belongs has been uttered. "Otherwise," asks Helārāja rhetorically, "how could a definite meaning, which depends on correlates such as action, etc. be conceived by the mind?"[26]

An Authoritative Statement in Support of the Padāvadhika Method

In order to show that a grammatical explanation confined to individual inflected words is theoretically accepted by the Pāṇinīyas, Helārāja briefly refers to Pāṇini's *sūtra A* 3.4.1, *dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ* "Affixes (also) occur when a relation between actions is denoted,"[27] and recalls that it is rejected in the *MBh* on the grounds that it is judged superfluous.[28]

According to the traditional interpretation, this *sūtra* is meant to account for complex sentences such as *agniṣṭomayājy asya putro janitā* "a son who has performed the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice will be born to him," where the time-reference of the

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25. Read *saṁbaṁdhisāmānye* instead of *saṁbadhisāmānye* — *PrPr* i.234.9.

26. *anyathā buddhyā niyatam artharūpaṁ kriyādisaṁbandhyapekṣaṁ kathaṁ nirūpyeta* — *PrPr* i.234.9-10.

27. Tr. Sharma 1995: 587.

28. *śāstre dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ ityevamādīnāṁ pratyākhyānāt* — *PrPr* i.234.11-13. For the reasons of the rejection of the *sūtra* in the *MBh*, see below.

main action (here, the future of *jan* "to be born")[29] is different from that of the subordinate action, namely the past, which is denoted by the suffix *ṆinI* (= *-in*) occurring after the root *yaj-* "to sacrifice" in *agniṣṭomayājin*.[30] Nonetheless, the subordinate action is understood to take place in the future like the main action. Thus *A* 3.4.1 is meant to provide for the derivation of *agniṣṭomayājin* co-occurring with another verb when the time-frame is different from the one prescribed.

Commentators from Kātyāyana onwards have questioned the usefulness of the rule: *vt.* 1 on *A* 3.4.1, *dhātusaṁbandhe pratyayasya yathākālavidhānāt siddham*, affirms that the desired result, namely the affixation of *ṆinI* and the like, is achieved simply because each suffix is enjoined to denote its proper time. The difference in time-reference — the reference to the future instead of the prescribed past — is understood because it concerns a co-occurring word (*upapada*) (as is stated in *vt.* 2, *upapadasya tu kālānyatvam*), which is by nature dependent on another word and consequently conforms to the time-reference of the main action.[31]

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29. *janitā* is a form of the so-called periphrastic future derived from *jan-* "to be born" according to *A* 3.3.15, *anadyatane luṭ* "affix *lUṬ* occurs after a verbal base to denote an action in the future (*bhaviṣyati*, by *anuvṛtti* from *A* 3.3.3) excluding the day on which the utterance in question is used."

30. *ṆinI* is affixed to a verbal base co-occurring with a nominal *pada* signifying an instrument, provided that the denoted action has taken place in the past, according to *A* 3.2.85, *karaṇe yajaḥ*, where *ṆinI* is read by *anuvṛtti* from *A* 3.2.78 and the time-reference is stated in the *adhikārasūtra* *A* 3.2.84, *bhūte* "[when the action occurred] in the past."

31. In other words, it is the context of the sentence where a derivative such as *agniṣṭomayājin* is used that will decide its time-reference. This issue is dealt with at length by Bhartṛhari in the *Kālasamuddeśa*,

→

Thus there is a qualifier-qualified relation between the two actions involved,[32] which can only be conveyed at the sentence level, but does not affect the derivation of the individual words that make up the sentence, as Helārāja states in his commentary on *VP* III.9.94ab: "So, due to the relation of the adjoining word, i.e. of the qualifying word, with the qualified word, the time of it (i.e. of the qualified word) is determined by the sentence. Since the meaning of the sentence is absent when the word is formed, it (is) not an auxiliary (for

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→ vv. 93-100. In *VP* III.9.94 he says: *svakāla eva sādhuś cet kālabhede gatiḥ katham* | *vākyārthād atadartheṣu viśiṣṭatvaṁ na sidhyati* "If (a word) is (considered as) correct for a specific time only, how is the situation when the time changes? (The knowledge of a time other than its own specific time with regard to the qualifying word) comes from the sentence. The distinction (i.e. the relation between the qualifier and the qualified) does not result (in the words) which do not possess that meaning" (tr. Peri Sarwesvara Sharma 1972: 121).

32. The whole issue is summed up in very clear terms by Kaiyaṭa in *MPr* on *MBh* on *A* 3.4.1, *vt*. 2: *bhāvivyapadeśavijñānād viśeṣaṇasya kālānyatvaṁ vākyārthavaśād asaty api sūtrārambhe pratīyate* | *viśeṣyāyā ākhyātādipadavācyāyāḥ kriyāyāḥ prādhānyāt svakāla evāvasthānam, viśeṣaṇabhūtāyās tu kriyāyā upalakṣaṇabhāvenopādānād bhāvibhūta-vyapadeśaviṣayatāpratipādanāt kālānyatvāvagama ity arthaḥ* "Since the reference to the future is acknowledged, the different time-reference of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) is understood on account of the sentence-meaning, even if the *sūtra* is not formulated. It means that since there is primacy of the qualified action expressed by a finite verb form, etc. this occurs only to denote its own time, whereas one understands the different time-reference of the action that has become the qualifier because it is mentioned as a secondary indication, insofar as it conveys that the domain of its reference is the past in relation to the future [pertaining to the main action]" (*Pradīpa*, 3.254a).

framing grammatical rules)."[33] Therefore, according to the Pāṇinīyas the *sūtra* can be dispensed with.

Helārāja's purpose in mentioning the rejection of *A* 3.4.1 in the commentary on *VP* III.7.3 seems to be twofold. From the point of view of grammatical methodology, the argument underlying the rejection of the rule confirms the principles of *padasaṁskāra*, the correct derivation of individual words described just before the *sūtra* is quoted. In the broader context of the *kārikā*, it shows how a fiction such as a word extracted from a sentence, that is, an unreal division arbitrarily imposed on the unity of the sentence, can in fact help to form a valid cognition.

Correct Words in Incorrect Sentences?

However, there are a number of cases in which the *padāvadhika* method may seem inadequate because it is unable to detect a morphologically correct word in a syntactically faulty environment. Anticipating the possible criticisms of an opponent, Helārāja examines such cases and shows that they are either not relevant because they are outside the scope of grammar altogether or they can indeed be accounted for grammatically.

First Helārāja considers a sentence that suffers from complete *asaṅgati* "incongruity": **sthālīm odanena kāṣṭhe pacati*, literally "he cooks the pot with rice in the firewood," which makes no sense at all although the individual words are correctly formed. He remarks that "this is indeed not a

33. *upapadasya viśeṣaṇasya viśeṣyasaṁbandhāt tatkālatvaṁ vākyād avasīyata iti vākyārtho 'sau padasaṁskāravelāyām asaṁnihito nāṅgam* (*PrPr* ii.80.20-21; tr. Peri Sarwesvara Sharma, 1972: 121).

sentence,"[34] and therefore there is no chance of an explanation of the words being extracted from the sentence.

Then he turns to an example of *viprayoga*, "deviant[35] usage," such as *akṣīṇi me darśanīyāni*, literally "my eyes are beautiful,"[36] where the plural occurs instead of the dual. The correct usage is, in fact, *akṣiṇī me darśanīye* "my eyes are beautiful." This example is taken from the *bhāṣya* on the rule *A* 1.4.21, *bahuṣu bahuvacanam*, which states that the plural (*bahuvacana*) occurs only when plurality is to be denoted.[37] But the correct number of an inflected word — nouns and verbs alike — can clearly be decided only with regard to the utterance in which it is used and its extra-linguistic context. In other words, it is not only a matter of concord between a noun acting as the subject and a verb, or between a noun and its adjectives, but also of the correspondence between a noun and its referent. Now the first person pronoun *me* "of me = my" informs us unmistakably that the eyes belong to a human being, the speaker, and therefore are two, whereas any other pronoun with a possessive value would have a margin of ambiguity as to the referent, which could be, for instance, the three-eyed god Śiva or some mythological creature with several eyes, in

34. *tad vākyam eva na bhavatīti* . . . — *PrPr* i.234.14.

35. With the phrase "deviant usage" I try to render the Sanskrit term *viprayoga* (*vi* "away" + *prayoga* "usage") as literally as possible: as I show below, it refers to a usage that deviates from the norm, a "substandard" usage.

36. The same example is quoted by Helārāja in his commentary on *VP* III.13.23, *prayogo viprayogaś ca loke yatropalabhyate* ǀ *śāstram ārabhyate tatra na prayogāviparyaye* ǁ "When correct and incorrect usages are seen in ordinary language, grammar is required, not when no incorrect usage [is observed]."

37. *MBh* I.322.2. The example appears on line 5.

which case the phrase would be correct.[38] Note, however, that if one ignores the extra-linguistic context, the words forming the phrase in question are correctly derived.

Clearly a properly derived word is part of a well-formed sentence, one of the prerequisites for which is *yogyatā*, the logical compatibility of its constituents for mutual association. As Helārāja remarks, "that which is regarded as the meaning of an inflected word, even though it is general, is (correctly) derived only as long as it is suitable for a connection with the other meanings"[39] with which it is associated. Thus, he continues, a sentence such as *aṅgulyagre kariśatam āste* "a hundred elephants sit on a fingertip" cannot be properly derived because it is *asamanvita* "incoherent," that is, it expresses an impossibility,[40] although in its own way it makes sense.

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38. The choice of this sentence as an example of the uncertainties of usage (even among the learned speakers of Sanskrit, presumably) is likely to reflect the loss of the dual that had already taken place in Middle Indo-Aryan languages in Patañjali's time.

39. *sāmānyam api hi padārtharūpam arthāntarasaṁsargayogyam eva saṁstūyate* [*saṁskriyate*?] (*PrPr* i.234.15-16). The Iyer edition reads *saṁstūyate* (*PrPr* i.234.16). Note, however, that three of its sources (see critical apparatus, p. 234) read *saṁskriyatve*; although this word is obviously wrong, it suggests the emendation of *saṁstūyate* to *saṁskriyate*. My translation is based on this conjectural emendation.

40. Note that the same example is found in a slightly different form — *aṅgulyagre hastiyūtham asti* — in the "Tarkapāda" of Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī*, p. 24 ff, as well as in the Mīmāṁsā section of the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*. The variant *aṅgulyagre hastiyūthaśatam* (without the verb *asti*) also appears in the same context. Prabhākara gives this as an example of a *laukika* sentence in which the verbal expression (*śabda*) is characterized by *arthāsaṁsparśitā*

→

Another possible objection to the *padāpoddhāra* method is faced next. The words and sentences found in Vedic texts are handed down in a fixed form and because of their very sacredness their correctness cannot be questioned, even though they sometimes seem to violate the rules of ordinary Sanskrit. Thus, in the example *caṣālaṁ ye aśvayūpāya takṣati*[41] quoted by Helārāja, the plural pronoun *ye* does not concord with the third-person singular verb *takṣati*. However, one of Pāṇini's *sūtras*, *A* 3.1.85, *vyatyayo bahulam*, accounts for the interchange (*vyatyaya*) of suffixes that takes place in various and unpredictable ways (hence the qualification *bahulam* in the rule) in the domain of *chandas*,[42] i.e. Vedic usage. Helārāja alludes to this *sūtra* and in fact he borrows his example from the *bhāṣya* thereon.[43] According to Patañjali, this is a case of interchange of finite verbal endings (*tiṅ*), as a singular ending occurs instead of a plural: *takṣantīti prāpte* (*MBh*, II.64.22). Invoking the authority of *A* 3.1.85, as Helārāja does, serves "to remove the doubt that *caṣālaṁ ye aśvayūpāya takṣati* might be incorrect" for this "interchange is indeed purposeful" (legitimated as it is both by its being found in the Veda and by the Pāṇinian *sūtra*), "since, because it happens that a Vedic sentence has a fixed word order, it is appropriate to abstract words from it

→ "lack of a connection with a meaning, i.e. with a logically acceptable notion." Thus, although it *does* give rise to a cognition, such a cognition cannot be validated through other *pramāṇas*, "means of valid knowledge."

41. *Ṛgveda* 1.162.6.

42. *chandasi* is read here by *anuvṛtti* from *A* 3.1.84.

43. *MBh* II.64.22. It also appears in the commentary on two other *sūtras* that deal with Vedic usage: *A* 1.4.9 (*MBh* I.315.9-10) and 7.1.39 (*MBh* III.256.14).

[for the sake of grammatical analysis] in exactly this way."[44] Therefore the meaning of the sentence is understood to be as follows: "those who carve the top-ring for the post to which the (sacrificial) horse is bound." In other words, according to Helārāja, once the peculiarities of the Vedic language have been recognized and its intrinsic correctness is accepted, grammar can proceed in its usual way: a word is abstracted from the context in which it is found, analysed according to the relevant *sūtra*s — with "escape" rules such as *A* 3.1.85 to justify certain anomalies — and then construed with the other words in the sentence.

The cases examined so far — *asaṅgati, viprayoga, ayogyatā* and *niyatānupūrvya* — are like testing grounds for the validity of the grammatical method. However, according to Helārāja the real domain of grammar is *loka*, the "world of ordinary experience," and the language used in *vyavahāra* "wordly affairs." Thus, after providing appropriate solutions to the problems raised by the cases presented above, he moves one step further and boldy claims that in reality there is no chance of these kinds of anomalous utterances — except perhaps the *viprayoga*, as I will explain below — being analyzed grammatically, for

> in common experience an utterance is neither indefinite (*anavasthita*), nor has it a fixed order, nor is it incongruous; therefore the abstraction [of word meanings] from there [i.e. from such sentences] is not entailed.[45]

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44. . . . *chandasi caṣālaṁ ye aśvayūpāya takṣati ityādāv asādhutvaśaṅkāpanuttaye vyatyayo 'rthavān eva* | *niyatānupūrvīkasya chandovākyasya saṁbhavāt tatas tathaiva padāpoddhārasya nyāyyatvāt* — *PrPr* i.234.19-20.

45. *loke tu nānavasthitam niyatānupūrvīkam asaṅgataṁ vākyam iti na tato 'poddhāraprasaṅgaḥ* — *PrPr* i.234.20-21.

While the terms *niyatānupūrvīka* and *asaṅgata* explicitly point to two of the examples presented above — the Vedic quotation and the wholly incongruous sentence respectively — the import of the word *anavasthita* is not self-evident in connection with the preceding discussion and demands an effort of interpretation. I think it has to be explained in the light of the above-mentioned distinction between *sthitalakṣaṇa* and *apoddhṛta* meanings. In Helārāja's commentary on *VP* III.7.3 we may assume that the qualification *anavasthita* applies to the sentence *aṅgulyagre kariśatam āste*, which is said to lack the prerequisite of *yogyatā*. This sentence is not "incomprehensible" in the same way as the *asaṅgata* "incoherent" one. In fact, it is able to produce some kind of cognition in the hearer, and one can very well imagine it making full sense in the context of a fantastic tale — if the finger, for example, is a god's finger. But the point is precisely that, if the sentence stands on its own, having been extracted from a larger unit of discourse, no intuitive consensus can be reached on its "true" meaning because its constituents are logically incompatible with one another and, therefore, it is *anavasthita* "indefinite."

One may wonder whether the substandard usage *akṣiṇī me darśanīyāni* can be similarly regarded as *anavasthita*. The answer is possibly found in Helārāja's commentary on a verse in the *Vṛttisamuddeśa*, *VP* III.14.77:

> In the domain of correct speech there is no manifold usage, no variety of expression, because a linguistic unit that has a stable character and is the goal (*upeya*) (of grammatical explanation) has one single form in spite of the diversity of (theoretical) means (employed to explain it).[46]

46. *sādhutvaviṣaye vividhaḥ prayogo nānāvidhaṁ pratipādanaṁ nāsti sthitalakṣaṇasya śabdasyopeyasyopāyabhede 'py ekarūpatvāt* — *PrPr* ii.188.23-24.

Here the stability of correct verbal usage is once again opposed to the potential "instability" — that is, variety — of śāstric expressions. Clearly Helārāja is not denying the flexibility and creativity of language, which makes it possible to express similar notions in different ways, with different words, in a different word order, and so on. Rather he is suggesting, I think, that correct speech functions within set limits that grammar describes, but does not create. Thus, while in the field of Śāstra there is room for a certain degree of freedom in the explanation of linguistic forms, no speaker is allowed to invent his own grammatical rules and therefore use a certain ending instead of the prescribed one — for instance, a plural instead of a dual, as in our case. Nevertheless, Helārāja seems to believe that a *viprayoga* such as the one in question may well serve the purposes of communication: in fact, as he remarks elsewhere,

> a rule such as *bahuṣu bahuvacanam* (*A* 1.4.21) is formulated in order to prevent deviant usage because even such usage, which is the opposite (of the correct one), is observed among people (*loke*). Where no deviant usage is seen, however, what is the point of rules? For, since the purpose of a rule is to introduce a restriction, [and] since restrictions operate where rules are not observed, one would not introduce it [i.e. a rule] if there were nothing [i.e. no incorrect usage] to be excluded.[47]

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47. . . . *viparītasyāpi prayogasya loke darśanāt bahuṣu bahuvacanam ityādi śāstram ārabhyate viprayoganivṛttyartham* । *yatra tu viparītaḥ prayogo na dṛśyate kiṁ tatra śāstreṇa, niyamārthatvāc chāstrasyāniyame niyamapravṛtter vyavacchedyābhāve tadapravartanāt PrPr* ii.143.1-4. This passage appears in the *PrPr* on *VP* III.13.23 where the example discussed here is quoted together with the equally unacceptable *pādā me sukumārataraḥ*.

This implies that the expression *akṣiṇī me darśanīyāni* is commonly employed at least in some sections of the speaking community. Therefore, it cannot be considered *anavasthita* for its meaning is stable, that is, it does not vary according to individual interpretations. But grammar forbids it because it is not a "proper" usage, that is, it introduces a restriction for the sake of *dharma*.[48] In other words, for Helārāja — and indeed for Patañjali, long before him — the replacement of the dual with the plural is an attested but undesirable usage that grammar is called for to prevent, as is stated also in the *PrPr* on *VP* III.7.3.[49]

To sum up what has been said so far, let us go back to Helārāja's closing remark about the sentences to which the method of *apoddhāra* might apply. Countering the sophistry of the criticisms levelled against grammar by its unnamed opponents with his admirable empiricism, Helārāja simply objects that those utterances are not met with in ordinary speech. In other words, ordinary language, which is the primary domain of investigation for grammar, is generally made up of well-formed, coherent, logically admissible utterances that are perfectly amenable to grammatical analysis. Thus the said criticisms are totally ungrounded.

Padāvadhika vs Vākyāvadhika

The final part of the *PrPr* on *VP* III.7.3 compares the two approaches to grammatical explanation in concise and lucid terms, pointing out their respective pros and cons. It is worth quoting in full:

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48. Cf. vt. 1 in *Paspaśāhnika*: . . . *śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ* . . . (see n. 15 above).

49. *akṣiṇī me darśanīyānītyāder viprayogasya nivṛttaye śāstram arthavad eva* — *PrPr* i.234.15.

> . . . even when inflected words are taught after they have been abstracted from the sentence, such a word-based explanation is indeed unproblematic. And in such [analysis], because the (sentence-)meaning, which is particularised by a combination of qualifiers, is partless, when one proceeds to extract [individual words from it], the [resulting] portion of the general sense has indeed a form that is a figment of the imagination.
>
> Now it is only at the outset that a sentence-based explanation is given, paying attention to the particular [meaning]. But a direct [grammatical] explanation of sentences is not possible because of their infinitude. For it is by positing a division into bases, affixes, etc. that the teaching [of correct forms] becomes (logically) possible [and that too] only of words. And since it is impossible for [an inflected word] to exist in isolation, because it is [always] situated in a sentence, a word-based [explanation proceeds] by taking into account its general correlates; on the other hand, a sentence-based explanation depends on the specific correlates mentioned in the sentence. This is what the difference between these two approaches amounts to.[50]

It is for practical reasons, then, that the grammarians confine their task to the study of the correct derivation of words,

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50. . . . *vākyād apoddhṛtya padānuśāsane 'pi nirdoṣam eva padāvadhikam anvākhyānam* । *tatra ca samastaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭasyārthasya niraṁśatvād apoddhāre sāmānyamātrā buddhiparikalpitaśarīraiva* । *upakrame eva tu viśeṣāpekṣāyāṁ vākyāvadhikam anvākhyānaṁ kathyate* । *na tu vākyasyānantyāt sākṣād anvākhyānaṁ yujyate* । *prakṛtipratyayādivibhāgakalpanayā hi padasyaivānuśāsanam upapadyate* । *tasya ca kevalasyāsaṁbhavād vākyasthatve saṁbandhisāmānyāpekṣāyāṁ padāvadhikam, tadvākyopāttasaṁbandhiviśeṣāpekṣāyāṁ tu vākyāvadhikam anvākhyānam itīyān anayoḥ pakṣayoḥ viśeṣaḥ* — *PrPr* i.234.21-235.4.

essentially consisting in the combination of the basic units known as *prakṛti* "base" and *pratyaya* "suffix." Suffixes are introduced after verbal (*dhātu*) and nominal (*prātipadika*) bases under semantic and/or formal conditions laid down in the rules of Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. For the purposes of a grammatical description of the facts of language — especially of an inflected language like Sanskrit — it is sufficient, therefore, to postulate general correlates for the word to be derived, as Helārāja explains in the passage just quoted. But the grammarians are always aware that, in reality, words do not exist in isolation and that they are only artificially abstracted (*apoddhṛta*) from the utterances in which they occur. Once these premises are accepted, there is no need to take account of the context in which a word occurs in order to explain its derivation.

Conclusions

The second part of Helārāja's commentary on *VP* III.7.3 shows how the modes of śāstric discourse, and specifically grammatical discourse, are the same as those of everyday cognition. In both cases the human mind articulates its data through analysis and synthesis so that unitary entities are conceptually segmented, on the one hand, and heterogeneous elements are unified, on the other. It can be argued, in fact, that throughout this passage, two distinct aspects of grammatical practice are dealt with, even though Helārāja does not directly refer to them: on the one hand, the theoretical procedure of word-formation known as *prakriyā*, which operates through the combination of bases and affixes according to the rules set by Pāṇini and eventually leads to sentence-formation; on the other, the explanation of actual utterances, which resorts to the same rules as analytical tools to decode the meanings denoted by the formal structures of the language, moving backwards, as it were, towards the

posited basic components of words, that is, bases and affixes. To some extent, the former corresponds to the *padāvadhika anvākhyāna*, the latter to the *vākyāvadhika anvākhyāna*. In this way Helārāja demonstrates empirically how, even in Śāstra, language reflects the mental organization of cognitive data, which moves back and forth between distinction and unification.

In conclusion, I hope that I have been able to show, through this example of a theoretical discussion in the *PrPr* of Helārāja, that this work deserves to be studied thoroughly, not only because it is an invaluable guide to the understanding of the third *kāṇḍa* of the *VP*, but also because it is itself a mine of linguistic intuitions of considerable philosophical depth. Moreover, if the currently accepted date and place for Helārāja are correct, he must have been involved in the extraordinary intellectual ferment of tenth-century Kashmir. New, systematic research on the *PrPr* may also help to shed further light on this cultural burgeoning.

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21

The Impact of Cāndra Vyākaraṇa on the Kāśikā

P. Visalakshy

THE *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini holds an unrivalled position in Sanskrit grammar. This monumental work is not only the most authoritative and complete grammatical treatise on Sanskrit language, but also is a perfect model for a universal grammatical theory. However, it may be noted that even prior to Pāṇini there were eminent Sanskrit grammarians in India. Though references to them are noticed in subsequent works, including the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, the texts of such works are yet to be obtained. Most of the post-Pāṇinian works including Kātyāyana's *Vārttikas* and Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* are based on Pāṇini's.

The *Kāśikā* is also not an exception to this. It is an outstanding grammatical treatise which helps in the proper understanding of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. Colebrook states that "The *Kāśikā* is a perpetual commentary and explains in perspicuous language, the meaning and application of each rule adding examples and quoting in their proper places the necessary emendations from the *vārttika*s and the *Bhāṣya*."[1] The *Kāśikā* explains the *sūtra*s of Pāṇini quite minutely. In addition, it adds new examples and even makes some modifications in

1. *Miscellaneous Essays*, vol. II, pp. 9, 40.

the *vārttika*s of Kātyāyana and Patañjali. For example, under the *sūtra* 5-2-103 *aṇ ca*, it gives the example *vaisarpaḥ* which is not given by Patañjali (*Kāśikā*, vol. VI, p. 215). Similarly under 5-2-29 *samprodaś ca kaṭac*, it gives the examples *eraṇḍatailam* and *tilatailam* which are not found in Patañjali.[2] *Harater apratiṣedhaḥ* is the reading of the *vārttika* of the *Kāśikā* under *sūtra* 1-3-15 *na gatihimsārthebhyaḥ* (*Kāśikā* vol. I, p. 417). The reading of the same *vārttika* in the *Mahābhāṣya* is *harivahyor apratiṣedhaḥ*, in which *vahi* is not used in the sense of *gati* but in the sense of *deśāntaraprāpaṇa* (*Mahābhāṣya*, vol. II, p. 247). Hence, the *Kāśikā* omits *vahi* from the *vārttika*. Kātyāyana, through this *vārttika*, prohibits *Ātmanepadī* endings after the roots *hṛ* and *vahi*.

The Authorship of the Kāśikā

With regard to the name *Kāśikā*, there is a view that it is named so since it might have been written in Kāśī. Whatever it may be, there is a general consensus regarding the Kashmiri authorship of this work.

Sṛṣṭidharācārya, the commentator of *Bhāṣāvṛtti*, mentions Jayāditya as the author of *Kāśikā*, while Weber and Max Müller consider Vāmana as the author.[3] Belvelkar identifies Jayāpīḍā, the king of Kashmir, as Jayāditya and Vāmana as his minister.[4] According to Bhaṭṭojidikṣita, the *Kāśikā* is a combined work of Jayāditya and Vāmana. Bühler assigns the first four *adhyāya*s to Jayāditya and the last four to Vāmana. The joint authorship of the *Kāśikā* is also accepted by scholars like Dinesh Chandra Bhaṭṭācārya, Maurice Winternitz and Shrish Chandra Chakravarthy.[5]

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2. See the *vārttika: vikāre snehe tailac*, *Kāśikā* vol. IV, p. 147.
3. *History of Indian Literature*, p. 226.
4. *Systems of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 36.
5. *Paribhāṣāvṛtti*, see Introduction, pp. 2, 3; *Nyāsa*, see Introduction, p. 15.

Characteristics of the Kāśikā

One of the main characteristic features of the *Kāśikā* is the variant readings of the original *sūtra*s of Pāṇini through the technique *yogavibhāga*.[6] The original *sūtra* 2-3-32 *pṛthagvinānānābhis tṛtīyānyatarasyām* is split into two by the *Kāśikā* through *yogavibhāga* as *pṛthagvinānānābhiḥ* and *tṛtīyānyatarasyām*. By this arrangement *dvitīya* also is included in the aphorism.[7] Even though the *Kāśikā* is a commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, many *sūtra*s in the *Kāśikā* show considerable variation from the readings found in the *Mahābhāṣya* by Patañjali. These readings are effected by adding one or more words to the original text. The reading of the *sūtra* 6-4-100 in the *Mahābhāṣya* is *ghasibhasor hali* while the *Kāśikā* reads *ghasibhasor hali ca*. The *ca* is used here to indicate *anuktasamuccaya*, that is, in order to extend the scope of the *sūtra* to *acādi* and *ajādi* (*Mahābhāṣya*, vol. IV, p. 732; *Kāśikā*, vol. V, p. 408). We can find in certain places that the readings of the *sūtra*s of the *Kāśikā* are based on the *vārttika*s found in the *Mahābhāṣya*. The *sūtra* 4-1-166 *vṛddhasya ca pūjāyām* in the *Kāśikā* is in fact a *vārttika* in *Mahābhāṣya* under 4-1-163 and not the original *sūtra* of Pāṇini. This is clearly stated in the *Kāśikā* itself.[8] There the explanations of the *sūtra*s are meant to include information about the application and to make ideas clearer and perspicuous. Under the *sūtra* 1-3-48 *vyaktavācāṁ samuccāraṇe* Patañjali states that the *sūtra* refers to

6. *Yogavibhāga* is a particular technical device used by *Kāśikā* to secure right interpretation and proper application of Pāṇini's rules. See *Development of Sanskrit Language*, p. 211.

7. *pṛthagvinānānābhiḥ iti yogavibhāgo dvitīyārthaḥ* — *Kāśikā*, vol. II, p. 190.

8. *vārttikakārīyam cedam sūtram* — *Kāśikā* vol. III, p. 497. *vṛttikāreṇa tu sūtreṣu prakṣiptam*, see *Padamañjarī* on *Kāśikā*, vol. III, p. 497.

those who are *vyaktavāk*s (*Mahābhāṣya*, vol. II, p. 258). Here the *Kāśikā* clearly states that the *vyaktavāk*s are human beings only.[9]

Through some additional *vārttika*s the authors of the *Kāśikā* sometimes extend and sometimes restrict the scope of the *sūtra*s. The additional *vārttika, anuktasamuccayārthaś cakāraḥ* under the *sūtra* 3-2-26 *phalegrahir ātmaṁbhariś ca* is meant by the *Kāśikā* to extend the scope of the *sūtra* to *kukṣiṁbhariḥ, udaraṁbhariḥ* and *ātmaṁbhariḥ*. Here *ca* is taken to accomplish *anuktasamuccaya*.[10] The form *kukṣiṁbhari* is seen in *kāvya*s like the *Anargharāghava* and *Campūrāmāyaṇa*. The form *bhrājiṣṇu* is given in the *Kāśikā* while explaining the *sūtra* 3-2-138 *bhuvaś ca*. Here also, through the convention *anuktasamuccayārthaś cakāraḥ*, the *Kāśikā* extends the scope of the *sūtra* to the form *bhrājiṣṇu*. The *Nyāsa* supports the *Kāśikā*, stating *laukikaprayogaḥ. tasyopanyāso bhāṣāyām api bhrājṛ dīptau ityetasmād iṣṇucpradarśanārthaḥ*. The stem *bhrājiṣṇu* is used in classical literature in passages such as *bhrājiṣṇunā sātiśayam virejuḥ, bhrājiṣṇunā vimānena jahāra, bhrājiṣṇu kuṇḍalam*, etc.[11] Similarly, the *Kāśikā* restricts the scope of *sūtra*s through the *vārttika*s. Under the *sūtra* 3-1-15, *karmaṇo romanthatapobhyām vartticaroḥ*, it reads the *vārttika, hanucalana iti vaktavyam* and restricts the scope of the *sūtra* to the word signifying movement of jaws (*Kāśikā*, vol. II, p. 372).

Further, the *Kāśikā* uses *ślokavārttika*s in order to modify the *sūtra*s of Pāṇini. Under the *sūtra* 3-1-11 *kartuḥ kyaṅ salopaś*

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9. *vyaktavāca iti manuṣyāṇām prasiddhāḥ* — *Kāśikā*, vol. I, p. 447.

10. *Anuktasamuccaya* is a technical device used by *Kāśikā* in order to extend the scope of the *sūtra*. See *Development of Sanskrit Language*, pp. 213-17.

11. *Bhaṭṭikāvya*, XIV–15; *Bhāgavata*, 6-3-3. Also see *Anargharāghava*, II-44; *Campūrāmāyaṇa*, VI-II.

ca, Kātyāyana gives two *vārttikas salopo vā* and *ojaso 'psaraso nityam*. The *Kāśikā* (Vol. II, p. 362) does not mention these two *vārttikas* but instead gives a *ślokavārttika:*

> *ojaso 'psaraso nityam payasas tu vibhāṣayā* ।
> *sakārasyeṣyate lopaḥ śabdaśāstravicakṣaṇāiḥ* ॥
> —*Kāśikā*, vol. II, p. 362

It means that in the words *ojas* and *apsaras* the final *s* is invariably elided when forming the denominative verb but not so in the case of *payas*, where the elision is optional. Through this *ślokavārttika*, the *Kāśikā* supplements the rules of Pāṇini and the views of Kātyāyana-Patañjali.

In the *Kāśika*, a repetition of some *vārttikas* can be noticed. Sometimes there seems to be no particular need for the repetition. For example, under the *sūtra* 1-3-21 *krīḍo 'nusaṁparibhyaś ca*, the *Mahābhāṣya* and *Kāśikā* read a *vārttika* as *kirater harṣajīvikākulāyakaraṇeṣv iti*.[12] The *Kāśikā* repeats the same *vārttika* under 6-1-42. But there seems to be no need for the repetition of this *vārttika* under 6-1-42. However, in some instances the *Kāśikā* repeats the *vārttika* with a specific intention. Under the *sūtra* 6-3-21 *ṣaṣṭhyā ākrośe*, the *Mahābhāṣya* reads the *vārttika*, *āmuṣyāyaṇāmuṣyaputrikety upasaṁkhyānam*. But the *Kāśikā* reads this *vārttika* with a variation, i.e. *āmuṣyāyaṇā-muṣyaputrikāmuṣyakulike cālug vaktavyaḥ* (*Kāśikā*, vol. V, p. 210). It reads the same *vārttika* under 5-4-25 just as in the *Mahābhāṣya* (*Kāśikā*, vol. IV, p. 343). In one case *aluk* is given to *ṣaṣṭhī*, while in the second the suffix *yat* is treated. Thus both the readings are justifiable.

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12. *Mahābhāṣya* vol. II, p. 524; *Kāśikā*, vol. I, p. 424, also see *Kāśikā*, *sūtra* 6-1-42.

The Influence of the Cāndra on the Kāśikā

Cāndravyākaraṇa was written by a Buddhist scholar Candragomin. The Cāndra school of grammar is considered to be one of the eight ancient schools of Sanskrit grammar, the others being: Indra, Kāśakṛtsna, Apiśali, Śākaṭāyana, Pāṇini, Amara and Jainendra.[13] The *Cāndravyākaraṇa* was very popular in Kashmir, Nepal, Tibet, etc. In several instances, the *Cāndra* modifies the *sūtra*s of Pāṇini. For example, instead of the fourteen *Māheśvara sūtra*s in the *Aṣṭādhyayī*, the *Cāndra* has only thirteen. The Vedic portion of Pāṇini is absent in the *Cāndra* grammar. This work contains six chapters and consists of 3060 *sūtra*s as against the eight chapter and 4000 *sūtra*s in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. *Cāndravyākaraṇa* is also termed *Asaṁjñaka vyākaraṇa*, because no technical terms or *saṁjñā*s are found employed in it. Belvelkar, Abhyankar and Kielhorn opine that this grammar was written in the fifth century CE.[14]

From its very first *śloka* it is clear that the *Kāśikā* is indebted to the *Mahābhāṣya* and other works like *Dhātu*, *Nāmapārāyaṇa*, etc (*Kāśikā*, vol. I, p. 3). In addition, under the headings *kecit, apare, itare, anye*, etc. *Kāśikā* cites the views of other grammarians. But it does not specify the sources of these views. They can be traced to some extent to works like the *Kātantravyākaraṇa* and *Cāndravyākaraṇa*. The influence of the *Cāndra* on the *Kāśikā* is evident from the fact that thirty-five *sūtra*s of the *Cāndra* are

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13. *indraścandraḥ kāśakṛtsnāpiśalī śākaṭāyanaḥ* ।
pāṇinīyamarajainendrā jayantyaṣṭādiśābdikāḥ ॥
— *Kavikalpadruma* of Bopadeva

See *Mugdhabodham Vyākaraṇaṁ*, tr. Nairrita Bhattacarya, Introduction, p. IX.

14. *Systems of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 58; *A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 144.

incorporated in the *Kāśikā*. From a close scrutiny one can determine that the *Kāśikākāra* and Candragomin express identical views in several instances. For example, while commenting on the *Pratyāhāra sūtra* 2 *ṛḷk*, the *Cāndra* and *Kāśikā* give the same lines. *Cāndra* reads *yac cāśaktijam asādhuśabdarūpam tadanukaraṇasyāpi . . . ity āheti*. Similarly, while explaining *Pratyāhāra sūtra* 5, *hayavaraṭ*, the *Cāndra* and *Kāśikā* express a similar view: *Dvirvacane 'pi rephasya yarantarbhāve sati yat kāryatvaṁ prāptaṁ tat sākṣācchiṣṭena . . . dvir ucyate rephaḥ* (*Cāndravyākaraṇa*, Pt I, p. 5; *Kāśikā*, vol. I, p. 46). While commenting on *Pratyāhārasūtra* 14, both the *vṛttis* read the same lines, i.e. *atha kimartham upadiṣṭo 'pi hakāraḥ punar upadiśyate* (*Cāndravyākaraṇa*, Pt I, p. 9; *Kāśikā*, vol. I, p. 57). The above examples clearly show the influence of the *Cāndra* on the *Kāśikā*.

In the interpretation of the *sūtra*s also, the indebtedness of the *Kāśikā* to the *Cāndravyākaraṇa* can be seen. For example, under the *sūtra* 4-1-50 *krītāt karaṇapūrvāt*, the *Kāśikā* states that the word *krītā* first takes *ṭāp* forming *krītā* and then this feminine word is compounded with *dhana*, thus forming *dhanakrītā*. The source of this statement of the *Kāśikā* is the *Cāndravyākaraṇa* remark: *katham dhanakrītā. ābantenāyaṁ samāsaḥ. ata iti vartate* (*Cāndravyākaraṇa*, 2-3-55, Pt I, p. 236). Similarly under the *sūtra* 6-3-45 *ugitaś ca* the *Kāśikā* examples *viduṣitarā, śreyastarā, viduṣītarā* and *vidvattarā* can be traced in the *Cāndravyākaraṇa* under 5-2-44: *katham śreyastarāvidvattare 'ti. prakarṣayogāt prāk strītvasyāvivakṣitatvād siddham* (*Kāśikā*, vol. V, p. 242; *Cāndravyākaraṇa*, 5-2-44 *Ugitaḥ*).

In the *vārttika*s of the *Kāśikā* too one can get ample examples of the influence of the *Cāndra*. A few of them are given below:

Under the *sūtra* 2-2-3 *dvitīyatṛtīyacaturthaturyāṇy anyatarasyām*, the *Kāśikā* extends the scope of the *sūtra* to the word *turīya* by stating: *bhikṣāturīyaṁ turīyaśabdasyāpīṣyate* । *turīyam*

bhikṣāyāḥ turīyabhikṣā II (*Kāśikā*, vol. II, p. 101). This is based on the *Cāndra's* statement *turyabhikṣā bhikṣāturyam vā* under 2-2-19.

Under the *sūtra* 2-3-73 *caturthī cāśīṣyāyuṣyamadrabhadra-kuśalasukhārthahitaḥ*, the *Kāśikā* reads the *vārttika*, *atrāyuṣyādīnām paryāyagrahaṇam kartavyam*. The source of this *vārttika* is *āśiṣyāyuṣyabhadrārthakuśalārthaiś ca* under *sūtra* 2-1-98 of the *Cāndra* (*Cāndravyākaraṇa*, Pt I, p. 187). Through this *vārttika*, the *Kāśikā* includes the synonyms of the form *āyuṣya* also under the scope of the *sūtra*.

While commenting on the *sūtra* 3-1-143, *vibhāṣā grahaḥ*, the *Kāśikā* reads the *vārttika*, *bhavataś ceti vaktavyam*, by which it includes the root *bhū* also under the purview of the *sūtra*, which might be based on *Cāndra sūtra* 1-1-151 *bhuvo vā*.

The *Kaśikā* gives the *vārttika nindākṣamāvyādhipratīkāreṣu san iṣyate anyatra yathāprāptam pratyayā bhavanti* while interpreting the *sūtra* 3-1-5 *guptijkidbhyaḥ san*. This *vārttika* of *Kāśikā* is based on three *Cāndra sūtras*: *tijaḥ kṣāntau san* 1-1-17, *kitaḥ saṁśayacikitsayoḥ* 1-1-18 and *guponindāyām* 1-1-19. Similarly the *vārttika*, *dṛśeḥ ksaś ca vaktavyaḥ* under the *sūtra* 3-2-60 *tyadādiṣu dṛśe 'nālocane kañ ca* can be traced to *Cāndravyākaraṇa sūtra* 1-2-51 *sāmānānya-tyadāder upamānād vyāpye dṛśaḥ ksakañau ca*. Haradatta in his *Padamañjarī* also supports the *Kāśikā* by stating *ksaś ceti tyadādiṣu sāmānānyaś ca sādṛkṣaḥ anyādṛkṣaḥ iti dṛkṣe ceti vaktavyam iti sabhāva ātvaṁ ca* (*Padamañjarī* on *Kāśikā*, vol. II, p. 585).

The *vārttika*, *aṅgagātrakaṇṭhebhyaḥ iti vaktavyam* in the *Kāśikā* under the *sūtra* 4-1-54 *svāṅgāc copasarjanād asaṁyogopadhāt* is also based on the *Cāndravyākaraṇa*, in which the reading of the *sūtra* is *nāsikodarauṣṭhajaṅghādantakarṇaśṛṅgāṅgagātra kaṇṭhāt* 2-2-62. Thus we can find a number of *vārttikas* in the *Kāśikā* which are highly influenced by the *Cāndra*.

Certain additional examples in the *Kāśikā* and also some words which are different from those found in the works of the *munitraya* are clear indications of the currency of such forms in the days of the *Kāśikā*. Many such forms can be found in the *Cāndra* also. We can find the usage of such forms in Sanskrit literature. A few examples are given below.

The form *turīyabhikṣā* cited by the *Kāśikā* under the *sūtra* 2-2-3 is due to the influence of the *Cāndravyākaraṇa* (2-2-19). In this respect, the *Nyāsa* commentary also follows the *Kāśikā* by stating *turyaśabdaḥ 'caturaśchayatāvādyakṣaralopaś ca' iti yatpratyayāntaḥ pūraṇārthasya pratipādakaḥ* (*Nyāsa* on *Kāśikā*, vol. II, p. 100). The usage of this form can be seen in the *Campūrāmāyaṇa* as *ayam apy anāryaśīlas turīyam upāyam antareṇa na mām āryaputrasya samarpayiṣyati* (*Campūrāmāyaṇa*, V-30).

The form *bhagandharaḥ* given in the *Kāśikā* under the *sūtra* 3-2-41 *pūḥ sarvayor dārisahoḥ* through the *vārttika*, *bhage ca dārer iti vaktavyam*, the source of which is *Cāndra sūtra* 1-2-20, is not noticed by Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali. Here also the *Nyāsa* supports the *Kāśikā*: *bhage co 'papade dāreḥ khaj bhavatīty etad artharūpam . . . khaj bhavatīti* (*Nyāsa* on *Kāśikā*, vol. II, p. 569).

The form *yāmyam* under 4-1-85 *dityadityādityapatyuttarapadāṇ ṇyaḥ* given by the *Kāśikā* justifies this form through the *vārttika*, *yamāc ceti vaktavyam*. The *Cāndra* by its *sūtra* 2-4-2 sanctions this form, and usages of it can be found in the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* (XIV-15) and the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (6-3-3).

dvāraṁ raraṅgatur yāmyam;
bhagavatpuruṣai rājan yāmyāḥ pratihatodyamāḥ

Similarly, in order to justify the form *yauvatam*, the *Kāśikā* reads *yuvatiśabdo 'tra paṭhyate. tasya grahaṇasāmarthyāt puṁvadbhāvo na bhavati* under the *sūtra* 4-2-38 and adds *yuvatīnāṁ samūho yauvatam*. The *Cāndravyākaraṇa* cites this form through the

vārttika bhasyāḍe taddhite under the *sūtra* 6-3-55 (*Bhikṣādibhyaḥ*, 3-1-44, *Cāndravyākaraṇa*, Pt I, p. 284). It can be seen in *Naiṣadhīyacarita: avadhṛtya divo 'pi yauvatair na* (*Naiṣadhīyacarita*, II-41).

The above-cited examples are only a few among the many instances of *Cāndra* influence on the *Kāśikā*. It is also interesting to note that the *Kāśikā* sanctions certain forms which are considered to be *apāṇinīya*. Some of them are not even sanctioned by the *Cāndra*. This fact indicates that the *Kāśikā* does not blindly follow the views found in the *Cāndra*. For example, under the *sūtra* 7-3-34 *nodātto padeśasya māntasyānācameḥ*, the *Kāśikā* says that the form *viśrama* alone is correct and *viśrāma* is incorrect with its statement: *sūryaviśrāmabhūmiḥ ityevamādikam prayogam anyāyyam eva manyante* (*Kāśikā*, vol. VI, p. 40). Bhaṭṭojidikṣita too states that *viśrāma* is incorrect. But the *Cāndravyākaraṇa*, through the *sūtra* 6-1-142, states *viśrama viśrāmo veti vikalpena vidhividhānād rūpasiddhiḥ*. The form is used by the poets such as Murāri and Kālidāsa.[15] Mallinātha justifies both the forms, following the *Cāndra*, while Haradatta sanctions only *viśrāma* and its usage in *bhāṣā* (*Padamañjarī* on *Kāśikā*, *Kāsikā*, vol. VI, p. 40). Both the forms are used in later works like the *Rāmābhyudaya* (XII-96, XXIV-100, VIII-18). In the *Prakriyāsarvasva* Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭatiri clearly states that the word *viśrāma* is correct. He justifies the usage of Murāri, Bhavabhūti, etc. through the following lines:

> *viśrāmasyāpaśabdatvaṁ vṛttyuktaṁ nādriyāmahe* ।
> *murāribhavabhūtyādīn apramāṇīkaroti kaḥ* ॥
>
> *viśrāmaśākhinaṁ vācāṁ viśrāmo hṛdayasya ca* ।
> *viśrāmahetor ityādi mahāntas te prayuñjate* ॥[16]

15. *viśrāmo hṛdayasyaca* — *Uttararāmacarita*, I-39, *viśrāmam labhatām ca* — *Śākuntalam*, II-6.

16. *Keralīyasaṁskṛtasāhityacaritram*, vol. III, p. 134.

Similarly, according to the *Kāśikā* under 5-2-89, the usage of *paripanthī* is to be accepted in the Vedas only. However, one can see the usage of this form in *bhāṣā* also (*Mālatīmādhava*, IX-51; *Gītā*, III-34). But a few instances of this sort do not diminish the value of *Kāśikā*.

The *Kāśikā* definitely forms an excellent aid for understanding the pithy *sūtra*s of Pāṇini. It has a prominent position among the Sanskrit grammars written after the period of the *munitraya*. It makes use of the earlier grammars like the *Kātantra*, *Cāndra*, etc. and adopts their views wherever they were found justifiable. At the same time, there are instances in which the views of the *Kāśikā* are quite independent and differ from all the earlier grammarians including Pāṇini.

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Appendices

Containing Select Manuscript Lists
and Select Authors-and-Works Lists

Compiled by

Mrinal Kaul

I. University of Kashmir Collection

II. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Collection

III. Sri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute Collection

IV. National Museum Collection

V. Kashmirian Authors Showing Significant Engagement with Language in Approximate Chronological Order

Lists in I-III are reproduced as I found them in my sources

Appendix - I

A List of Manuscripts Related to the Linguistic Traditions of Kashmir in Sanskrit Manuscripts Collection, Jammu and Kashmir Research and Publication Department, University of Kashmir, Srinagar.

S. no.	Acc. no.	Title	Author	Script	Paper	Folio
1844	1472	कारकवादः	जयराम	Ś	CP	26
1869	1224.04	काशिकाकारिका	—	Ś	CP	7
1870	779	काशिकावृत्तिः	जयन्त वामन	Ś	CP	442
1871	931	काशिकावृत्तिः	जयादित्य	Ś	CP	207
1872	1015	काशिकावृत्तिः	जयादित्य	Ś	CP	249
1873	1130	काशिकान्यासपर्यायः	जयादित्य (?)	Ś	CP	42
1875	404	काश्मीरशब्दामृतम्	ईश्वर कौल	D	CP	227
1876	761	काश्मीरशब्दामृतम्	ईश्वर कौल	D	CP	200
1879	1483.01	कातन्त्रकौमुदी	कृपालु कोकिल	Ś	CP	90
1880	2174	कातन्त्रकौमुदी	कृपालु कोकिल	Ś	CP	36
1881	2228	कातन्त्रकौमुदी	कृपालु कोकिल	Ś	CP	132
1882	1651.02	कातन्त्रकर्मप्रक्रियावृत्तिः	शङ्कर शर्मा	Ś	CP	189
1883	10(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम्	—	D	MP	120
1884	731.01	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम्	—	Ś	MP	—

S. no.	Acc. no.	Title	Author	Script	Paper	Folio
1885	837	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम्	—	Ś	MP	252
1886	907	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम्	—	Ś	MP	277
1887	1005.01	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम्	—	D	CP	30
1888	1733	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम्	—	Ś	CP	323
1889	1170	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम्	—	Ś	CP	242
1890	1174	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम्	—	Ś	CP	120
1891	1218	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम्	—	Ś	CP	198
1892	1222	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम्	—	Ś	CP	235
1893	1332	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम्	—	Ś	CP	22
1894	1621	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम्	—	Ś	CP	315
1895	1805.01	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम्	—	Ś	CP	214
1896	2284	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम्	—	Ś	CP	224
1897	1621	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम् (लघु-वृत्तिः)	—	Ś	CP	316
1898	1400.01	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम् (लघु-वृत्तिः)	भट्ट छुच्छुक	Ś	CP	184
1899	1401	कातन्त्रव्याकरणम् (लघु-वृत्तिः)	भट्ट छुच्छुक	Ś	CP	310
1900	9(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण बालबोधिनी	जगद्धर भट्ट	D	CP	284
1901	13(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण बालबोधिनी	जगद्धर भट्ट	D	CP	31
1902	79(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण बालबोधिनी	जगद्धर भट्ट	D	CP	45

1903	208	कातन्त्रव्याकरण बालबोधिनी	जगद्धर भट्ट	Ś	CP	79
1904	748	कातन्त्रबालबोधिनी	जगद्धर भट्ट	Ś	Birch	289
1905	836.01	कातन्त्रव्याकरणबालबोधिनी	जगद्धर भट्ट	Ś	CP	330
1906	947	कातन्त्रव्याकरणबालबोधिनी	जगद्धर भट्ट	Ś	CP	309
1907	1195	कातन्त्रव्याकरणबालबोधिनी	जगद्धर भट्ट	Ś	CP	496
1908	1380	कातन्त्रव्याकरणबालबोधिनी	जगद्धर भट्ट	Ś	CP	327
1909	1772	कातन्त्रव्याकरणबालबोधिनी	जगद्धर भट्ट	Ś	CP	187
1910	1853	कातन्त्रव्याकरणबालबोधिनी	जगद्धर भट्ट	Ś	CP	464
1911	1882	कातन्त्रव्याकरणबालबोधिनी	जगद्धर भट्ट	Ś	CP	555
1912	1937	कातन्त्रव्याकरणबालबोधिनी	जगद्धर भट्ट	Ś	CP	370
1913	156(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-बालबोधिनीन्यास	शितिकण्ठ	D	MP	400
1914	160(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-बालबोधिनीन्यास	शितिकण्ठ	D	MP	12
1915	163(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-बालबोधिनीन्यास	शितिकण्ठ	D	MP	80
1916	164(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-बालबोधिनीन्यास	शितिकण्ठ	D	MP	68
1917	165(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-बालबोधिनीन्यास	शितिकण्ठ	D	MP	70
1918	166(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-बालबोधिनीन्यास	शितिकण्ठ	D	MP	90
1919	1014	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-बालबोधिनीन्यास	शितिकण्ठ	Ś	CP	29
1920	157(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-शिष्यहितान्यास	उग्रभूति	D	MP	300
1921	161(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-शिष्यहितान्यास	उग्रभूति	D	MP	50

S. no.	Acc. no.	Title	Author	Script	Paper	Folio
1922	162(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-शिष्यहितान्यास	उग्रभूति	D	MP	65
1923	167(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-शिष्यहितान्यासः	उग्रभूति	D	MP	59
1924	168(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-शिष्यहितान्यासः	उग्रभूति	D	MP	60
1925	171(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-शिष्यहितान्यासः	उग्रभूति	D	MP	50
1926	176(T)	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-शिष्यहितान्यासः	उग्रभूति	D	MP	94
1927	802	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-शिष्यहितान्यासः	उग्रभूति	D	CP	467
1928	1555	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-शिष्यहितान्यासः	उग्रभूति	D	CP	53
1929	753.02	कातन्त्रव्याकरण-सूत्रपाठः	—	Ś	CP	10
2207	2153	महाभाष्य	पतञ्जलि	Ś	KP	90
2208	2279	महाभाष्य	कैयट-पतञ्जलि	D	KP	373
3278	628	शाब्दबोध	—	D	KP	23
3279	1025.07	शाब्दबोधप्रक्रिया	—	Ś	KP	7
3280	696	शब्दशासनकौमुदी	—	D	KP	36
3282	695	शब्दोच्चारणचन्द्रिका	—	D	KP	45
3304	1936.06	समन्वयमुष्टि	जोगराज	S	Birch	5
3305	1043.08	समन्वयप्रदीप	देवशर्मा	Ś	KP	8
3306	1945	समन्वयप्रदीप	देवशर्मा	Ś	KP	13

3307	1543	समन्वयसारः	जोगराज	Ś	KP	55
3308	1936.05	समन्वयसारः	जोगराज	Ś	Birch	24
3370	703	संस्कृतवाक्ययोजना	—	D	KP	14
4112	1588	सूत्रपाठः (कातन्त्र)	—	Ś	KP	19
4321	1117.01	उणादिसूत्र	—	D	KP	6
4322	1400.02	उणादिसूत्र	—	Ś	KP	14
4323	1445.03	उणादिसूत्र	—	Ś	KP	12
4324	2229.02	उणादिसूत्र	—	Ś	KP	20
4426	1025.04	वर्णशिक्षासङ्क्षेप	जगद्धर भट्ट	Ś	KP	12

Abbreviations:

D - Devanāgarī Script
CP - Country Paper
MP - Manufactured Paper
Ś - Śāradā Script
KP - Kashmiri Paper

Appendix - II

A List of Manuscripts Related to the Linguistic Traditions of Kashmir in Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune (Georg Bühler Collection, 1875–76)

No.	Title	Author	Script	Paper	Folio	Lines	Remarks
4	ऋग्वेदप्रातिशाख्यभाष्य	उवट	D	P	14	11	Inc.
263	शब्दव्यापारविचार	मम्मट	D	P	6	12	Com.
271	अपशब्दनिराकरण	जगद्धर भट्ट	Ś	P	15	25	Com.
272	अव्ययवृत्तिः	क्षीरस्वामिन् (?)	Ś	P	10	15	Com.
277	कातन्त्रकौमुदी	गोवर्धनभट्ट	Ś	P	106	15	Inc.
278	कातन्त्रकौमुदी	गोवर्धनभट्ट	Ś	P	306	15	Com.
279	कातन्त्रलघुवृत्ति उत्तरार्ध	छुच्छुकभट्ट	D	P	47	12	Com. पूर्वार्ध
280	कातन्त्रलघुवृत्ति उत्तरार्ध	छुच्छुकभट्ट	D	P	63	12	Com.108
281	कातन्त्रसूत्राणि	शर्ववर्मन्	D	P	13	12	Com.
283	काशिकावृत्ति	वामन-जयादित्य	Ś	Bhurj	440	–	Com.
284	काशिकावृत्तिन्यास-I, II, 2-4	जिनेन्द्रबुद्धि	Ś	P	48	14	Inco.
285	काशिकावृत्तिन्यास, IV	जिनेन्द्रबुद्धि	D	P	58	12	Inco.
286	काशिकावृत्तिन्यास, VII	जिनेन्द्रबुद्धि	D	P	94	12	Inco.
287	क्षीरतरङ्गिणी	क्षीरस्वामिन्	Ś	P	257	12	Com.

288	क्षीरतरङ्गिणीसङ्केत	—	D	P	57	12	Com. fol.17
289	चन्द्रसूत्राणि, वर्ण, परिभाषा	चन्द्र	D	P	1	12	Com.
290	निपाताव्ययोपसर्गवृत्तिः	क्षीरस्वामिन्	D	P	18	12	Com.
292	वादप्रकरणसंगति	योगराज	D	P	3	12	Com.
293	प्राकृतप्रकाशटीका मनोरमा	भामह	Ś	P	35	15	Com.
294	प्राकृतप्रकाशटीका मनोरमा	भामह	Ś	P	41	17	Com.
297	बालबोधिनी	जगद्धर	Ś	Birch	346	20	Inco.
298	बालबोधिनी	जगद्धर	Ś	Birch	295	20	Inco.
299	बालबोधिनी, पूर्वार्ध	जगद्धर	Ś	P	175	24	Com.
300	बालबोधिनीन्यास, पूर्वार्ध	—	Ś	Birch	96	22	Inco.
303	महाभाष्य, नवाह्निकी	पतञ्जलि	Ś	P	98	23	Inco.
304	महाभाष्य, नवाह्निकी (I.I.103 - II.63)	पतञ्जलि	Ś	P	70	13	Inco.
305	महाभाष्य, नवाह्निकी (I.IV - VI.1)	पतञ्जलि	Ś	P	101	28	Inco.
306	महाभाष्य प्रदीप	कैय्यट	Ś	P	99	20	Inco.
314	वाक्यपदीय II with टीका	text-भर्तृहरि टीका-पुण्यराज	D	P	164	9	Com.
322	शिष्यहितान्यास	उग्रभूति	Ś	Birch	280	21	Inco.
323	शिष्यहितान्यास (Another fragment to complete the begining of No. 322)	उग्रभूति	Ś	P	43	34	Inco.

No.	Title	Author	Script	Paper	Folio	Lines	Remarks
324	शिष्यहितान्यास (Another fragment to complete No. 322 at the end)	उग्रभूति	Ś	P	7	12	Inco.
325	शिष्यहितान्यास	उग्रभूति	Ś	Birch	118	24	Inco.
327	समन्वयप्रदीपसङ्केत	—	D	P	12	12	Com.
332	अमरकोष टीका K-I	क्षीरस्वामिन्	D	P	47	12	Com.
333	अमरकोष टीका	क्षीरस्वामिन्	D	P	310	20	Com.
559	नन्दिकेश्वरकारिका	—	D	P	4	11	Com.
789	अमरकोष with Kashmiri Explanation	—	Ś	P	51	10	Com.
791	कश्मीरी कोष	—	Ś	P	11	10	Com.
796	बाणासुरवध	—	Ś	P	80	10	Inco.
811	A Kashmiri Grammar and Dictionary	—	P	P	-	-	Com.

Abbreviations:

D - Devanāgarī Script
Ś - Śāradā Script
P - Paper
Com. - Complete
Inco. - Incomplete.

Appendix - III

A List of Manuscripts Related to the Linguistic Traditions of Kashmir in Sri Ranbir Sanskrit Research Institute, Jammu (J&K)

S. no.	Title	Author	Folio	Lines/ Words	Remarks
21	कातन्त्रलघुवृत्तिः बालबोधिनी	जगद्धर भट्टः	361	24/16	Comp. New Kashmiri Script
167	कातन्त्रलघुवृत्तिः बालबोधिनी	जगद्धर भट्टः	18	10/42	संधिप्रकरणम् । असमाप्तम् ।
88	कारकवादः	—	23	11/51	With the beginning and end.
87	कारकव्याख्या	जयरामः	11	10/37	Incom.
20-भू	काशिकावृत्तिः	जयन्तवामनौ	522	20/22	Incom. (Birch Bark-Śāradā)
3	काशिकावृत्तिः	जयन्तवामनौ	688	12/34	Com. New Kashmiri Script.
145	काशिकावृत्तिः	जयन्तवामनौ	409	19/36	1-3. Folios Missing.
113	काशिकावृत्तिः	जयन्तवामनौ	34	10/42	Seventh Chapter/Inco.
4	काशिकावृत्तिटीकापदमञ्जरी	हरदत्त मिश्रः	1010	18/44	Comp.
5	काशिकावृत्तिटीकापदमञ्जरी	हरदत्त मिश्रः	40	18/52	1. Chap. Beginning Missing
112	काशिकावृत्तिटीकापदमञ्जरी	हरदत्त मिश्रः	101	14/29	1. Chap. Incomp. and Middle portions Beginning Missing

S. no.	Title	Author	Folio	Lines/ Words	Remarks
122	काशिकावृत्तिटीकापदमञ्जरी	हरदत्त मिश्रः	49	10/58	2, 3, 7 Chaps. Incomp. Missing leaves in between. old leaves.
114	काशिकावृत्तिटीकापदमञ्जरी	हरदत्त मिश्रः	194	10/64	4, 5 Chaps. 5 chap. Incomp.
111	काशिकावृत्तिटीकापदमञ्जरी	हरदत्त मिश्रः	23	13/40	4 Chapters, 2 Pāda is comp.
104	काशिकावृत्तिन्यास टीका व्याकरणप्रकाशः	जिनेन्द्रबुद्धिः महामिश्रः	25	10/47	Only beginning
162-ख	नन्दिकेश्वरकाशिका टीका तत्त्वविमर्शिनी	उपमन्युः	6	11/33	Comp.
982	नन्दिकेश्वरकाशिका टीका तत्त्वविमर्शिनी	उपमन्युः	6	14/45	Comp.
94	प्राकृतप्रकाशवृत्तिः मनोरमा	वररुचिः । भामहः	23	13/39	Comp.
938	प्राकृतप्रकाशवृत्तिः मनोरमा	वररुचिः । भामहः	21	12/37	Comp.
1	महाभाष्य	पतञ्जलिः	1019	22/16	Comp.
127	महाभाष्य	पतञ्जलिः	365	10/36	1, 2 Chaps. Incomp. due to missing beginning and mid leaves.

2	महाभाष्यप्रदीपः	कय्यटः जय्यटपुजः	1189	13/55	Comp.
128	महाभाष्यप्रदीपः	कय्यटः जय्यटपुजः	232	15/55	First Chap. Incomp. Middle leaves missing.
130	महाभाष्यप्रदीपः	कय्यटः जय्यटपुजः	15	15/55	१ अध्यायस्य ४ पादस्य तृतीयाह्निकम्। असमाप्तम्
96	मितवृत्त्यर्थसंग्रहः पाणिनीय सूत्राणाम्	उदयनः		10	14/54 १ अध्यायः। समाप्तः। काशिकावृत्तेः संक्षेपः। प्रतिभात्ययं ग्रन्थः।
95	मितवृत्त्यर्थसंग्रहः पाणिनीय सूत्राणाम्	उदयनः	37	9/43	६ अध्यायः। Comp.
78	वाक्यपदीयटीका पुण्यराज	भर्तृहरि पुण्यराजः।	92	10/70	द्वितीयकाण्डः। संपूर्णः।

Appendix - IV

A List of Manuscripts Related to the Linguistic Traditions of Kashmir in National Museum, New Delhi.

S. no.	Acc. no.	Title	Script	Folio	Pages
163	57.106/214	बालबोधिनी	Ś	258	516
164	57.106/221	बालबोधिनी	D	80	160
165	57.106/220	बालबोधिनी	Ś	96	192
166	76.106/2	बालबोधिनी vol.2	Ś	133	365
167	76.726/1	बालबोधिनी	Ś	183	366
168	57.106/960	बालबोधिनी	Ś	15	30
652	57.106/697	कातन्त्रव्याकरण	Ś	94	188

Abbreviations

Ś - Śāradā Script D - Devanāgarī

Appendix - V

Kashmirian Authors Showing Significant Engagement with Language in Approximate Chronological Order

The authors come primarily from the branches of grammar, poetics, philosophy and religion. All dates given are approximate; some uncertain. "Not later than" is to be understood before most of them. The authors whose times cannot be determined even approximately within reasonable margins are listed toward the end. Works that have so far not been discovered have an asterisk in front of them. CE centuries have not been specified as such.

Author	Date	Works
Patañjali	2nd cent. BCE	Mahābhāṣya on Aṣṭādhyāyī Vārttikas
Vāmana-Jayāditya	6-7th cent.	Kāśikāvṛtti
Jinendra-buddhi	7th cent.	Kāśikāvṛtti commentary Nyāsa Pramāṇa- samuccaya-ṭīkā Viśalāmalavatī
Bhāmaha	Late 7th cent.	Kāvyālaṁkāra Prākṛta-Prakāśa commentary Manoramā
Kṣīra-svāmin	8th cent.	Amara-kośodghāṭana Kṣīra-taraṅgiṇī

Author	Date	Works
		Nighaṇṭu Vṛtti (same as Amara-koṣodghāṭana?) Nipātāvayavopasarga-Vṛtti (see Tilaka below) Bhvādi-gaṇa-vṛtti (same as Kṣīra-taraṅgiṇī?) Gaṇa-vṛtti (same as Bhvādi-gaṇa-vṛtti or incidental Gaṇa-pāṭha comments in Amara-kośodghāṭana?)
Udbhaṭa	8th cent.	Kāvyālaṁkāra-sāra-saṁgraha Bhāmaha-vivaraṇa
Vāmana	8th cent.	Kāvyālaṁkāra-sūtra and its Vṛtti
Ānanda-vardhana	*8th cent.	Sahṛdayāloka or Dhvanyāloka and its Vṛtti
Mukula-bhaṭṭa	9th-10th cent.	Abhidhā-vṛtti-mātṛkā
Jayanta-bhaṭṭa	9th cent.	*Vṛtti commentary on Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī Nyāya-mañjarī Nyāya-kalikā
Somānanda	9th cent.	Śiva-dṛṣṭi
Utpala-deva	9th-early 10th cent.	Śiva-dṛṣṭi-vṛtti

		Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikās and their Vṛtti *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vivṛti (see Torella fn. 21 above) Ajaḍa-pramātṛ-siddhi Saṁbandha-siddhi Īśvara-siddhi
Rudraṭa (resident of Malwa?)	9th cent.	Kāvyālaṁkāra
Kaiyaṭa	10-11th cent.	Mahābhāṣya-pradīpa
Helā-rāja	Early 11th cent.	Prakīrṇa(ka)-prakāśa commentary on the third book of the Vākyapadīya or Trikāṇḍī *Commentary śabda-prabhā on the first book of the Vākyapadīya or Trikāṇḍī Commentary Vākya-pradīpa on the second book of the Vākyapadīya or Trikāṇḍī (probably available as a shortened version in the commentary published under the name of Puṇya-rāja or Phulla-rāja.

Author	Date	Works
		*Vārttikonmeṣa *Advaya-siddhi
Puṇya-rāja	10th-11th cent.?	See under Helā-rāja.
Bhaṭṭa-tota	9th-10th cent.	*Kāvya-kautuka
Bhaṭṭa-nāyaka	9th-10th cent.	*Hṛdaya-darpaṇa
Kuntaka	10th cent.	Vakrokti-jīvita
Ugra-bhūti	10th cent.	Śiṣyahitāvṛtti Śiṣyālokanyāsa
Vāmana	10th cent.	Viśrānta-vidyādhara Uṇādi-sūtra-vṛtti Liṅgānuśāsana
Kṣemendra	Late 10th-early 11th cent.	Aucitya-vicāra-carcā Kavi-kaṇṭhābharaṇa Suvṛtta-tilaka *Kavi-karṇikā-kāvyālaṁkāra

Abhinava-gupta	Late 10th -early 11th cent.	*Prakīrṇaka-vivaraṇa Dhvanyāloka-locana or Sahṛdayāloka-locana Abhinava-bhāratī *Kāvya-kautuka-vivaraṇa Parā-triśikā-vivaraṇa Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarśinī and vivṛti-vimarśinī Tantrāloka Parts of several of his other philosophical Śaiva and Tantra works.
Mahima-bhaṭṭa	10th-11th cent.	Vyakti-viveka *Tattvokti-koṣa
Mammaṭa	11th cent.	Kāvya-prakāśa Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra
Uvaṭa	11th cent.	Commentary on Vājasaneyi-saṁhitā Pārṣada-vyākhyā on Ṛkveda-prātiśākhya

Author	Date	Works
		Mātṛ-moda on Vājasaneyi-prātiśākhya Commentary on Ṛk-sarvānukramaṇī
Ruyyaka	11th cent.	Alaṁkāra-sarvasva Sāhitya-mīmāṁsā (author Maṅkha)
Maṅkha(ka)	11th-12th cent.	Alaṁkāra-sarvasva-ṭīkā Maṅkha-kośa Sāhitya-mīmāṁsā (?)
Jaya-ratha	11th-12th cent.	Alaṁkāra-sarvasva-vimarśinī Tantrāloka-viveka Commentary on Vāmakeśvarī-mata
Tilaka	12th cent.	Commentary titled Udbhaṭa-viveka or Udbhaṭa-vicāra on Kāvyālaṁkāra-sāra-saṁgraha of Udbhaṭa Nipātāvayavopasarga-vṛtti (?) (See Dhadphale fn. 6 above)
Joga-rāja	12th cent.	Samanvaya-muṣṭi

		Samanvaya-sāra Pāda-prakaraṇa-saṁgati
Śobhākara-mitra	14th cent.	Alaṁkāra-ratnākara
Jagaddhara-bhaṭṭa	Late 14th cent.	Kātantra-bāla-bodhinī Apaśabda-nirākaraṇa Varṇa-śikṣā-saṁkṣepa Laghu-lallita-vṛtti
Śiti-kaṇṭha	Late 14th cent.	Kātantra-bāla-bodhinī-nyāsa
Ānanda	17th cent.	Śitikaṇṭha-vibodhana or Nidarśana commentary on Kāvya-prakāśa
Ratna-kaṇṭha	17th cent.	Sāra-samuccaya commentary on Kāvya-prakāśa
Kṛpālu Kokila	19th cent.	Kātantra-kaumudī
Īśvara Kaula	1833-1893	Kāśmīra-śabdāmṛta
Chuchuka-bhaṭṭa		Laghu-vṛtti on the Kātantra-sūtras
Kuḍakācārya		Samanvaya-diś
Deva-śarman		Samanvaya-pradīpa Samanvaya-pradīpa-saṁketa

Author	Date	Works
		*Samanvaya-dik-saṁketa Liṅgānuśāsana-ṭīkā
Uddyotakara		?
Utpala-bhaṭṭa		Commentary on Nāma-liṅgānuśāsana Spanda-pradīpikā (?)

The Contributors

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Ashok Aklujkar received his M.A. degree in Sanskrit and Pali from the University of Poona and his PhD degree in Sanskrit and Indian Studies from Harvard University. He taught courses in Sanskrit language and in the related mythological and philosophical literatures (occasionally also in Indian *belles lettres* in general) at the University of British Columbia from 1969 to 2006. His published research is mostly in the areas of Sanskrit linguistic tradition and poetics. Advanced students have worked under his guidance in the areas of Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophy, religion and

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JOHANNES BRONKHORST studied Mathematics and Physics with Astronomy at the Free University, Amsterdam (until 1968). He studied Sanskrit and Pāli initially at the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur; and later at the University of Poona, Pune. He completed his MA in 1976, PhD in 1979 and a second doctorate at the University of Leiden, Netherlands, in 1980. He was a researcher at the University of Leiden (1981-87); and has been a professor at the University of Lausanne (Switzerland) since 1987. He has published numerous research articles and about ten books. He is the Editor of Brill's Indological Library; Editor of Handbook of Oriental Studies, India (Brill, Leiden); Regional Editor of Etudes Asiatiques / Asiatische Studien; Consultative Editor of the Journal of Indian Philosophy; and corresponding member of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). His major areas of research include Indian thought (linguistic, philosophical, religious: Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jaina). A list of his publications can be found at http://www.unil.ch/orient/page5552_en.html [**address**: Section de Langues et Civilisations Orientales, Université de Lausanne,

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Back cover photo:
Remains of Śāradā Pīṭha (the renowned Sanskrit university in ancient Kashmir) now in Pak-occupied Kashmir.

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